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ABSTRACT
While the objective of peacemaking efforts is the institution of a self-sustaining peace, 
the international community has not been able to accomplish this important goal in many 
war-tom societies around the world. Thus, the challenge to peacemakers is not 
necessarily the negotiation of a peace agreement, but its implementation in order to re­
integrate a divided society and allow former combatants to address contentious issues 
non-violently. In light of this reality, this doctoral thesis argues that contemporary peace 
initiatives have not established conditions of self-sustaining peace because the majority 
of peacemakers have conceive their efforts according to the tenets of the strategic 
approach to peacemaking. The strategic approach strongly believes that a self-sustaining 
peace can be achieved through state-building practices. Hence the international 
community has devoted much of its time and resources to strengthen state structures, 
strongly arguing that a strong state can integrate society and make negotiated peace 
agreements self-sustaining. Influenced by Habermasian critical theory, this thesis 
presents the theoretical foundations of the communicative approach to peacemaking. The 
communicative approach argues that state-building projects will not integrate society, at 
least in the short term, but foster more conflicts between contending groups. It places a 
higher premium on reconciliation efforts, civil society movements, and deliberative forms 
of democracy. Using the Dayton peace initiative as a case study, the thesis shows the 
reasons why the Office of the High Representative and other international agencies in 
Bosnia have been unable to establish a self-sustaining peace. It also critically reviews 
different ‘bottom-up’, society-centred peacebuilding programmes practiced in Bosnia 
since the signing of the peace agreement, exposing both its limitations and potentials. As 
a result, this doctoral thesis concludes by showing that new peacebuilding strategies must 
incorporate aspects of both approaches to peacemaking to make peace in Bosnia self- 
sustaining.
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INTRODUCTION
‘Problematizing’ Peacemaking Efforts
In the post-Cold War era, ethnic conflicts and intrastate wars have been a major cause of 
international concern. Apart from the sheer destruction these wars cause, the methods 
employed by combatants to fulfil their interests directly challenge the great powers’ 
ability to realise their more immediate foreign policy objectives. In fact, the atrocious 
methods utilise by combatants to ethnically cleanse conquered territory have not only 
made a mockery of international human rights regimes, but more important these have 
also caused serious refugee crises that have equally threaten the economic and social 
structures of many neighbouring nation-states. As a consequence, these wars have forced 
Western publics to pressure their governments to intervene in these conflicts and put an 
end to the hostilities.
While public pressure is not a guarantee for foreign intervention, governments in 
the Western world have recognised that non-intervention is a high price to pay. This is 
the case for at least two reasons. First, in a world where new technologies are challenging 
nation-states’ ability to control their populations, the success of a secessionist campaign 
will only incite more secessionist wars. Second, these wars affect the composition of the 
established international system and might even question the position of the strongest 
actor. In other words, these wars can challenge the dominant position of the United 
States, while also revealing the weakness of other actors, such as the European Union. 
While intrastate in nature, these ethnic conflicts have demonstrated that ‘the problem of 
contemporary and future international politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of 
domestic politics’ (Holsti 1996: 15).
While this proposition is important, it is also necessary to recognise the fact that 
these ethnic conflicts have become a problem for the international community. As Jara 
Choprat notes (1997: 179), the international community has been successful at ending 
wars, but not at re-constituting civil order, which is necessary for peace to become self- 
sustaining. The best example of this reality is the international community’s response to
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the Bosnian war. While the Dayton peace initiative, crafted by the Clinton administration 
with the assistance of its European allies and Russia, has settled the conflict, the 
implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (GFA), more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Accords, has not 
resolved the conflict that led the three communities to war. Hence the challenge the 
international community faces today is not only the prevention or the settlement of ethnic 
wars, but more important their resolution, so a self-sustaining peace can be established, 
allowing international actors to dedicate their resources to other conflict situations or 
other issues of pressing concern.
Using the Bosnian war as a case study, this doctoral thesis argues that current 
peacemaking practices, that is to say the combination of efforts employed by actors to 
settle and resolve conflicts, will not establish the foundation of a self-sustaining peace. 
Building on the critical work of David Campbell (1998), this thesis problematizes these 
‘accepted’ peacemaking practices in order to show why the Dayton initiative has not been 
able to achieve this important objective in Bosnia. The term ‘problematization’ was first 
conceived by Michel Foucault’s works. Campbell argues that problematization is a 
process that makes ‘it possible to think in terms of problems and solutions.’ Citing 
Foucault, he states that this process makes “‘possible the transformations of the 
difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general problem for which one proposes 
diverse practical solutions.’” (1998: x).
Consequently, the problematization of the peacemaking practices that produced 
GFA and the implementation of this agreement’s provisions in post-Dayton Bosnia 
demonstrate that these practices are ill-suited to the challenges posed by ethnic conflicts. 
This thesis not only provides a critique of the Dayton peace initiative. It also shows how 
new conceptions of peacemaking can have a positive influence in post-Dayton Bosnia 
and serve as an intellectual resource to peacemakers attempting to deal with on-going 
ethnic conflicts in the Balkans or other parts of the world.
As a result, this thesis is influenced by both theoretical and practical concerns. At 
the theoretical level, it argues that peacemaking activities can be differentiated into two 
general approaches: the strategic and the communicative. It is important to add that 
Jurgen Habermas’s critique of strategic reason and his expanded understanding of reason,
9
which he calls communicative reason, heavily influence this thesis’s examination of these 
two approaches to peacemaking. Apart from these different conceptions of reason, the 
difference between each approach to peacemaking is also determined by the objectives 
pursued by peacemakers and by the mechanisms they employ to make a negotiated peace 
settlement self-sustaining. Moreover, this thesis attempts to show how the 
overwhelmingly influence of the strategic approach has led peacemakers to execute 
strategies that are successful at ending wars, but not at instituting a self-sustaining peace.
At the more practical level, this thesis considers whether communicative 
peacemaking mechanisms can establish a self-sustaining peace. This is even more 
important at the present time, as corrective measures taken by these international 
institutions have failed to adjust the current peacebuilding strategy to changing 
circumstances. In this way, it argues that the problem with the Dayton peace initiative 
and its current peacebuilding strategy is that they are still caught within the tenets of the 
strategic approach. But, can communicative peacemaking mechanisms present a solution 
or should the international community combine insights from these two approaches to 
construct more effective peacemaking mechanisms?
This manuscript is divided into two parts. Part one, which is divided into three 
chapters, addresses theoretical issues. Chapter one shows the influence of Habermas’s 
research, in the context of this manuscript, and presents a comparative analysis that 
clearly differentiates the theoretical foundations of the strategic approach from those of 
the communicative approach. It is important to note that this review of both approaches 
tends to explain the overall motives that force peacemakers to intervene in conflict 
situations and the objectives of their efforts. Chapter two continues with this 
investigation, but it shows how strategic peacemaking practices attempt to translate the 
provisions of peace agreements into reality. Because this manuscript is primarily 
concerned with ethnic conflicts, a review between different paradigms that attempt to 
explain the nature of ethnic conflict and its relation to organised violence is offered. By 
showing that these conflicts are caused by an ethnic group’s decision to change existing 
social structures or to create a new society that exclusively represents its needs and 
interest, the investigation illustrate how strategic peacemaking efforts use state-centred 
practices of social integration to build new social structures that can settle and manage
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these conflicts. In this manner, strategic forms of post-conflict peacebuilding institute and 
strengthen state structures in order to integrate society and weaken the position of those 
that oppose such projects.
Chapter three presents Habermas’s society-centred social theory. Building on the 
critique of contemporary peacebuilding operations and their inability to establish the 
basis of a self-sustaining peace, communicative forms of peacebuilding argue that 
peacemakers must pay more attention to the reconstruction of society’s symbolic 
structures. These symbolic structures enable former combatants to participate in 
dialogical processes that de-construct the identities that fuelled the conflict and construct 
new ones according to shared understandings of post-conflict situations. Communicative 
peacebuilding practices argue that state-building projects will not be able to integrate 
society, at least in the short-term, and that the interaction of individuals in the organs of 
civil society have that ability of constructing social discourses that might integrate society 
and direct peacebuilding efforts according to the needs, values and interests expressed by 
these individuals and other civic organisations. This chapter concludes by stressing the 
tensions between strategic and communicative approaches and by raising questions 
whether they are polar opposites or different sides of the same coin.
Part two of this manuscript, which is divided into five chapters, presents a critical 
assessment of the Dayton peace initiative. Its purpose is to test the assertion that this 
peacemaking initiative was heavily influenced by the insights provided by the strategic 
approach. Chapter four presents a short examination of the domestic, regional, and 
international dynamics that fostered the Bosnian war. This chapter also explains the 
motives that led the Clinton administration to take control of international peacemaking 
efforts and create the Dayton peace initiative.
Chapter five shows how Richard Holbrooke and his negotiating team dominated 
the pre-settlement and the settlement-making stage of the Bosnian war. It also illustrates 
how the American negotiation team bullied the European and Russian delegations, 
Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegovic to accept the agreement’s 
provisions, even though these did not reflect their more immediate interests. Instead, the 
GFA embodied American interests and a minimalist peacebuilding strategy that 
emphasised military objectives over civilian ones.
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Chapters six and seven reviews the work conducted by the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR). In conjunction with other international and regional bodies, the 
OHR has not been able to establish the much sought-after self-sustaining peace. Chapter 
six discusses the challenges it faced in the first 18 months of peace implementation. It 
explains why the international community had to change the nature of the peacebuilding 
mission. At the Clinton administration’s behest, as documented in chapter five, this was 
basically a military operation supported by a civilian component. Its objective was to 
secure an end to the war and the creation of a balance of power between each 
community’s military forces as a way to prevent the re-occurrence of the armed conflict. 
Because of the slow implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions, the international 
community, fuelled by European concerns and the US’s dissatisfaction with the 
peacebuilding mission, decided to transform it into a civilian operation supported by the 
NATO peacekeeping force. As documented in chapter seven, this transformation enabled 
the international community to impose the GFA’s provisions, even though at times 
extreme nationalist leaders and their political parties successfully hindered these 
peacebuilding efforts. It is for this reason that the OHR’s powers were strengthen and its 
mandate expanded, to the point that the OHR became the de facto ruler of Bosnia. 
Presently, the OHR has been pushing through a number of corrective measures, including 
a state-building programme, in hopes that its peacebuilding efforts will lead to a self- 
sustaining peace.
Chapter eight provides review of some “bottom-up” peacebuilding programmes in 
order to show what society-centred forms of peacebuilding could look like. By reviewing 
the work of non-governmental organisations and intergovernmental organisations at the 
grassroots and society’s middle-level, the chapter shows both the potential and limitations 
of society-centred practices. The concluding chapter underscores both the value and 
limits of both approaches. As a result, this doctoral thesis concludes by showing that new 
peacebuilding strategies must incorporate aspects of both approaches to peacemaking to 
make peace in Bosnia self-sustaining.
With this in mind, the work conducted in this thesis is theoretical, but with 
practical intent. Building on Robert Cox’s infamous assertion that: ‘Theory is always for  
someone and fo r  some purpose’ (1996: 87), this thesis problematizes peacemaking efforts
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to show how these practices are actually influenced by a strategic approach. Using 
Habermas’s work and the research conducted by those that support conflict resolution 
and conflict transformation mechanisms of conflict intervention, this thesis presents an 
alternative understanding of peacemaking. The communicative approach’s insights may 
provide new ideas and practices that can facilitate individuals in post-conflict settings the 
theoretical and practical tools to establish the necessary foundations of a self-sustaining 
peace.
This thesis attempts to fill the gap between the theory and practice of 
peacemaking in order to illustrate the significance of the communicative approach in 
order to reconsider the validity of strategic forms of peacemaking. While it attempts to 
fulfil this objective, it is hoped that this thesis’ findings can also inform the work of other 
scholars, conflict analysts, and decision-makers involved in peacemaking efforts in other 
conflict situations around the world.
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PART ONE: 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
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CHAPTER ONE
Conceptualising Peacemaking: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Strategic and the Communicative Approaches
INTRODUCTION
The term ‘peacemaking’ is employed throughout this doctoral thesis to describe a set of 
interdependent practices that are conducted at three, but interrelated stages of a conflict: 
(a) pre-settlement activities designed to move contending parties closer to mediation or 
negotiation; (b) settlement-making and the drafting of peace agreements that promote 
new social structures that increase cooperation between the parties; and (c) post­
settlement peacebuilding, that is to say the combination of efforts to implement a peace 
agreement. This understanding is informed by the interconnected or the contingency 
approach (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2000; Bloomfield 1997; and Keashley and Fisher 
1996), which stresses that successful peace initiatives are those that can target different 
types of peacemaking activities to a conflict’s different stages. Seen from this 
perspective, peacemaking efforts must first settle the conflict and then work with the 
parties to engender a new social system that allows former combatants to work together 
to meet their mutual needs and interests.
From a theoretical standpoint, peacemaking activities cut across three levels of 
analysis: (a) the international, (b) the regional, and (c) the domestic. Because each level 
of analysis includes a series of factors that affect a conflict’s dynamics, that is to say its 
escalation or de-escalation, peacemakers must recognised these factors and address the 
problems posed by each level of analysis if their peace initiatives are to prove successful. 
It is important to note that although this theoretical model is a useful analytic tool to 
judge if peacemaking initiatives are a success or a failure, this thesis does not favour one 
level of analysis over the other, as Kenneth Waltz did in Man. The State, and War: A 
Theoretical Analysis (1959). Instead, it specifies that a successful peacemaking initiative 
must address each level’s problems and challenges. This implies that making peace is a
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systemic process; where by a peacemaker’s work at one level can have either 
constructive or negative consequences on overall peacemaking efforts.1
The peacemaking process that gave life to the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA), more commonly known as the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, started in March 1994 when the Clinton administration decided to settle the 
conflict between the Bosniaks2 and the Bosnian Croats, by pressuring the leaders of the 
two communities to establish the Croat-Bosniak Federation. From March 1994 to 
November 1995, the international community, headed by the United States’ intent to end 
the war and preserve the legitimacy of Europe’s security infrastructure, used a 
combination of political, military, and economic resources to force the contending parties 
to meet with the Contact Group at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio 
to negotiate an end to the war and to design the institutional structure of the new state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.3
Even though the signing of the GFA in Paris on 14 December 1995 started a new 
chapter in Bosnia’s recent history, increasing bickering between international actors and 
among Bosnia’s ethno-communal leaders has questioned the viability of the GFA as a 
credible tool of peacemaking. The agreement was a direct result of American power, 
European compliance with American demands, and the international community’s 
decision to ignore the needs and interests of the people directly affected by the war. By 
combining military coercion, diplomatic arm-twisting, and economic incentives, the 
Clinton administration, with the assistance of its European partners, was successful in 
forcing representatives of Bosnia’s contending factions to accept the peace agreement at 
Dayton and to start the implementation of its provisions to build a new country modelled 
on recognised international norms and principles of governance and of economic 
organisation.
1 Even though this framework of analysis will be developed in this chapter, it will not presented in full until 
the end of chapter three. In fact this framework serves as a tool to critically assess the Dayton peace 
initiative and judge if it has successfully establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.
2 Other studies label members of this group as Bosnian Muslim.
3 Even though the official name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the sake of brevity the name: 
Bosnia will be used throughout this thesis.
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Has the Dayton peace initiative been a success? An attempt to answer this 
question provokes yet another question: what defines the success of peacemaking efforts? 
While the ‘notion of success is inherently relative’, Fen Osier Hampson’s (1996a: 10) 
research suggests that the success of peacemaking initiatives is related to a war-torn 
society’s ‘ability to make an effective transition from a state of war to a state of peace 
marked by the restoration of civil order, the re-emergence of civil society, and the 
establishment of participatory political institutions.’ Even though many commentators 
might argue that a successful peacemaking initiative is one that settles a conflict and 
makes post-conflict peacebuilding possible, this investigation goes a step further. 
Successful peacemaking efforts are those that institute a self-sustaining peace. 
Conceptualising success in this way strongly suggests that the transformation and 
resolution of conflict situations is possible.
Accordingly, a self-sustaining peace is reached when the parties to a conflict can 
work together to implement the provisions of a negotiated peace agreement and address 
possible conflicts regarding this agreement’s implementation by way of non-violent and 
democratic means. More important, the existence of a self-sustaining peace requires 
individuals’ participation in the peacebuilding process. While this definition does not 
nullify the active presence of international actors, working to ensure the agreement’s full 
implementation, a self-sustaining peace must include a transfer of power from these 
international actors to domestic institutions and social groupings interested in the process 
of post-conflict rehabilitation. International actors often play a dominant role in these 
peacebuilding missions to fulfil their self-interests (Regan 1998: 757). As a consequence, 
a self-sustaining peace is not always the final objective of peacemaking efforts. Instead, 
the goal might be more limited; that is the settlement of a conflict and the establishment 
of a balance of power between contending parties that can prevent the recurrence of the 
conflict’s violent expression. Seen from this perspective, the parties are not seen as 
partners in peacebuilding, but as subjects that must follow a set of pre-determined rules, 
conceived by international actors to secure the settlement’s viability.
In Bosnia, a self-sustaining peace seems to be a fading reality. The GFA’s 
execution is directly dependent on the work being carried out by the Office of the High 
Representative, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) peacekeeping force,
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and other international actors. The Peace Implementation Council (an ad hoc 
international body that oversees the GFA’s implementation and is responsible for 
creating new strategies to meet the agreement’s objective) has noted in its many reports 
that the GFA’s implementation is possible thanks in part to international pressures and 
incentives. The willingness of the parties to support the GFA, as it currently stands, is 
minimal. More surprising, moderate and nationalist politicians have campaigned for the 
agreement’s re-negotiation. Many reports put together by Western research institutions 
have convincingly demonstrated why the international community needs to re-evaluate its 
role in Bosnia and question the GFA’s viability. While criticisms in and outside Bosnia 
seems commonplace, the international community has repeatedly expressed its 
commitment to fully implement the peace agreement, though it has modified the strategy 
used to translate the agreement’s provisions into reality.
Noting that the international community has failed to institute a self-sustaining 
peace in Bosnia, it seems that the first question posed above (has the Dayton peace 
initiative been a success?) can be answered with a simple ‘no’. It is important to 
remember that a successful initiative is not only one that stops the fighting, but one that 
can make peace self-sustaining. Although there is general acceptance of the Dayton 
initiative’s failure, in this regard, the problem is that alternative policies being suggested 
by influential think-tanks and other international bodies to correct the current 
peacebuilding strategy are just quick-fix solutions that will not make peace self- 
sustaining in Bosnia. For this reason, it is not enough to question the viability of the 
Dayton peace initiative, but to also show the reasons why it has failed. Such an exercise 
will unearth the guiding principles and interests that have motivated international actors 
to intervene in the Bosnian war. Moreover, this theoretical exercise will demonstrate that 
the problem with the Dayton initiative, including subsequent corrective changes executed 
after Bosnia’s first post-settlement elections, is not merely related to how the strategy is 
being implemented. The failure of this initiative can be also linked to the ‘operational 
code’4 or the analytic approach that inspirited the intervention, the negotiations, and the 
writing and implementation of the peace agreement.
4
By an operational code, it is meant the preconceived values, notions, and ideas that influence the making 
and implementation of policies (Cingranelli 1993: 5).
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Subsequently, this thesis proposes that the failure of the Dayton peace initiative is 
not necessarily connected to international actors’ unwillingness to enforce the agreement 
(Woodward 1999a) or the resistance of nationalist elements to implement the GFA’s 
provisions. Instead, the Dayton peace initiative has failed because it has been forged 
according to the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. Subsequently, any 
alternatives that attempt to correct the existing peacebuilding strategy must distance 
themselves from strategic conceptions of peacemaking, if these are to secure the 
foundations of a self-sustaining peace. These alternative strategies have to embrace new 
theoretical approaches to peacemaking, so new practices can emerge that allow Bosnia’s 
citizens to construct a social condition that advances their needs and interests without 
worries that former enemies will renew the fighting. As David Chandler’s (1999) critique 
of post-Dayton democratisation efforts advocate, new peacebuilding strategies must place 
the needs and interests of Bosnia’s citizens at centre stage, while equally empowering 
them to re-direct peacebuilding efforts in their country.
However compelling Chandler’s criticism is, his critique falls short of presenting 
a different theoretical framework that can give life to alternative strategies of 
peacebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia. Learning from this shortcoming, this doctoral 
thesis presents the theoretical basis of a competing approach to peacemaking modelled on 
the critical work of Jurgen Habermas. This approach serves as the theoretical foundation 
of an alternative peacebuilding programme for Bosnia, which is presented in this thesis’s 
last chapter. As a result, this investigation plans to show how international actors, closely 
following the tenets of the strategic approach, have crafted a peacemaking process that 
has put in doubt the possibility of instituting a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia, at least in 
the foreseeable future.5
This chapter is a first step in this thesis’s assessment of the peace initiative that 
gave life to the GFA. The objective is to ‘problematize’ (Campbell 1998) the theoretical 
underpinnings of the strategic approach in order to present the theoretical tenets of the
5 It is important to mention that the current strategy may produce a self-sustaining peace, if the international 
community stays involved in Bosnia at present levels for a generation or two. This was actually the view of 
Carlos Westendorp, the second High Representative in Bosnia. However, the PIC and other international 
actors have expressed their unwillingness to stay in Bosnia for such a long time.
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communicative approach. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part makes the 
case that Habermas’s theoretical insights can be used to analyse peacemaking efforts in 
Bosnia and in other regions of the world. The second part conducts a comparative 
analysis between strategic and communicative approaches to peacemaking. The 
comparison clearly specifies the similarities and differences between these two 
approaches.
I. HABERMASIAN INSIGHTS & THE STUDY OF PEACEMAKING EFFORTS
Critiquing the Dayton peace initiative requires first an analytical framework that makes it 
possible to ‘problematize’ an established interpretation by juxtaposing it against a 
competing explanation. Without this framework it would be difficult to assess 
peacemaking practices in Bosnia or to advocate changes to current peacebuilding efforts.
Habermas argues that individuals engaged in unhindered communicative 
processes, ingrained in the public sphere, have the ability of restructuring social 
arrangements according to principles of inclusion, mutual recognition, and deliberation. 
From this simple assertion flows Habermas’s entire work in the realm of philosophy, 
sociology and politics. While his philosophical insights are important elements that guide 
this thesis’s analysis, it is Habermas’s socio-political research that lies at the heart of this 
investigation.
Building on his proposition that communication can serve as a steering 
mechanism, his socio-political project has been directed at creating an emancipatory 
social theory that secures the foundations and reproduces the social structures of a 
deliberative democracy. This conception of democracy transcends the limitations inherent 
in liberalism’s and socialism’s socio-political programmes by pointing at the weaknesses 
and strengths o f both traditions. His first major work, The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (originally published 
in German in 1966 but translated and published in English in 1991), started this project 
by demonstrating the progressive and degenerative traits of liberalism. These 
degenerative traits, associated with the expansion of the welfare state, the intrusion of 
public interests in private matters, and the increasing organisation of society according to 
capitalist criteria, undercut the progressive characteristics of the liberal tradition, as
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captured in the ability of individuals to meet in public spaces to express their opinions 
and influence societal processes. According to Habermas’s project, the encroaching 
powers of the state and the market have to be substituted with the positive aspects of 
socialist ideals, which envision an inclusive society where individuals, participating in 
process of political will-formation, can build new strategies of social change. These 
themes were continued in his two-volume study, The Theory of Communicative Action 
(1984 and 1987), and lie at the heart of his most recent book, Between Facts and Norms 
(1996a) and a number of essays collected in the volumes: The Inclusion of the Other: 
Studies in Political Theory (1998), and The Postnational Constellation (2001).
In addition, Habermas has also dedicated his career to the ‘reconstruction’ of the 
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, especially the works conducted by Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer produced in the United States during and shortly after the 
Second World War. Although Habermas might be thought of as the Frankfurt School’s 
heir, he really is not as he directly questions Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s conclusions and 
presents a competing philosophical approach, which serves as the base of his theory of 
communicative rationality, discourse ethics, and deliberative democracy. His 
reconstructive work is not solely aimed against the Frankfurt School. It is also levied 
against post-structuralism, systems theory, and classical sociology running from Karl 
Marx to Emile Durkheim to Max Weber to Talcott Parsons. Consequently, Habermas’s 
socio-political project has been directed at explaining the working of modem societies in 
order to demonstrate ways social actors can re-structure these according to their values 
and principles. This serves as the practical and theoretical foundations of his model of 
deliberative democracy.
This thesis use of Habermas’s insights and analytic framework may be baffling, 
as most of his work explains the workings of advanced capitalist systems, mainly found 
in North America and Western Europe. In fact, Habermas has little to say about societies 
such as Bosnia. Apart from some articles where he addresses some of the events that led 
to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and some other essays where he deals with the 
sources and consequences of nationalism, his theories have not explained the nature of 
ethnic conflicts. In recent articles, Habermas does address the limits and possibilities of
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contemporary humanitarian interventions, but the reality is that these ideas are not 
developed fully.
Another limitation with Habermas’s theories is that although he is interested in 
creating a practical philosophy of social change, his ideas are so complicated that many 
critics have lambasted him for not presenting a clear link between theory and practice 
(Leonard 1990). Although some of these critics raise a very important point, it is also 
important to note Andrew Parkin’s argument that Habermas’s work can be best described 
as a research programme. In this way, Habermas’s critical theory ‘aims to contribute to 
the struggles of the disempowered by offering an understanding of the processes and 
tendencies that reproduce social relations of power. The intention is that the insights and 
interpretations offered by [his work] will be of relevance to those involved in the politics 
of resistance’ (Parkin 1996: 440).
Even though Habermas has not addressed issues concerning peacemaking 
processes, his insights have been widely used by researchers attempting to critique the 
international dynamics and conflict intervention mechanisms that have inspirited 
different peacemaking efforts. An important example is Denoil Jones’s (1999) book, 
Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords, which critically 
evaluates the mediation efforts that produced the Oslo Accords.
While this thesis is influenced by Jones’s analysis, it is important to mention that 
it does not accept all of its conclusions. The main reason for opposing aspects of Jones’s 
work is that his research, although using aspects of Habermas’s research, tends to 
question the role critical theory can play in transforming established social orders. 
Indeed, Jones concludes his book in a sombre note, demonstrating how mediation 
processes based on dialogical exchanges did not introduce a new condition that permitted 
the Palestinian people to achieve their national self-determination. He convincingly 
narrates how the Norwegian sponsored mediation process legitimised the inequality of 
the Palestinian people and re-created a state of occupation, where the Palestinian cause 
was tied to Israeli security concerns (Jones 1999: 160-63).
This conclusion does not diminish the value of Jones’s investigation. On the 
contrary, while he demonstrates the weaknesses of critical theory and questions the 
efficacy of conflict intervention mechanisms based on the facilitation of dialogical
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exchanges, the importance of his work is that it rightly argues that critical theory is a 
useful tool to scrutinize peacemaking processes and explain how the provisions of 
mediated peace agreements can question their emancipatory potentials. In this way, 
Jones’s work tends to support Parkin’s understanding of Habermasian critical theory as a 
research program, indicating the value of Habermas’s research to the study of 
peacemaking processes.
This thesis borrows Jones’s framework of analysis. He differentiates mediation 
processes into two approaches: ‘the power-politics/geostrategic’ and ‘the
facilitation/problem-solving’. By clearly differentiating between these two types of 
mediation practices, Jones ‘problematizes’ (Campbell 1998) mediation initiatives based 
on the power-politics approach and uses the insights provided by the facilitation approach 
in order to criticise the diplomatic process that led to the Oslo Accord. By juxtaposing 
one approach against the other, the problem with the overall process becomes apparent 
and a settlement that was seen by many as a legitimate means to resolve the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict is in doubt. Borrowing this approach and building on Habermas’s 
work, this doctoral thesis divides peacemaking efforts into: ‘strategic’ and
‘communicative’ approaches (Habermas 1984, 1987 & 1996). The first approach covers 
‘conflict management’ and ‘conflict settlement’ strategies and the second includes 
‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict transformation’ practices. At first glance, these 
peacemaking strategies seem to be attempting to reach a solution to the conflict and set 
the institutional foundations of a self-sustaining peace. A more in depth analysis reveals 
not only theoretical differences, but also practical distinctions concerning the final 
objective of these strategies and the interests guiding peacemakers’ actions.
II. APPROACHES TO PEACEMAKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As noted above, Habermas’s socio-political project was directed against the Frankfurt 
School’s findings, especially Adomo and Horkheimer’s critique of reason in Dialectics of 
Enlightenment (originally published in 1942 and republished in 1973). If the 
Enlightenment tradition has established that reason is a mechanism that allows human 
beings to break with oppressive social orders by giving them the tools to understand their 
social environments and design strategies of societal change, Adomo and Horkheimer’s
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study, building on Max Weber’s rationalisation thesis, argued that the opposite was true 
as well. Reason could be employed by society’s administrators (i.e. the state) to co-opt 
humanity and to prevent dissatisfied individuals from designing strategies of social 
change. Their pessimistic descriptions confirmed Weber’s claim that the triumph of 
bureaucratic rationality leaves individuals powerless to affect the composition of their 
society.
As one of Adorno’s most talented assistants, Habermas turned against Adorno and 
Horkheimer by proposing that reason could still serve as a mechanism of social change 
and human emancipation. This is not to say that Habermas completely disagreed with 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s conclusions. Rather, he believed that their study painted a one­
dimensional understanding of reason, history, and human emancipation. Thus, 
Habermas’s work can be best described as a reconstructive effort. By this Habermas 
explains that ‘reconstruction’ is an analytic endeavour in which ‘one takes a theory apart 
and puts it back together in a new form, in order to better achieve that goal which it set 
for itself. This is the normal way.. .of dealing with a theory that requires revision in many 
respects, but whose potential for stimulation has not yet been exhausted’ (cited in 
McCarthy 1981: 233). Following this methodology, Habermas not only turns Frankfurt 
School critical theory on its head, but he shows how a “reconstructed” sense of reason, 
grounded on his conception of communicative rationality, may empower individuals to 
create social movements attuned to social change.
Building on this observation, peacemaking has to be understood as a series of 
different, but interdependent endeavours pursuing a common goal. The term in itself 
suggests that the goal is to ‘make’ ‘peace’. However, ‘peace’ is a highly contested 
concept. It is for this reason that some analysts recommend that one define peacemaking 
as a process that ends war in order to build some kind of peace (Evans 1993). While this 
definition does not tell us much about the specific traits that define peacemaking as a 
distinct set of activities different from other activities, former UN Secretary General, 
Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace, provided a more widespread 
definition, which has had much influence on contemporary peacemaking initiatives.
Article 33 of The UN Charter clearly states that armed conflicts should be 
resolved via the following mechanisms: ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilitiation,
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arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements’ (cited in Evans 
1993: 89). In order to pressure the parties to undertake conflict resolution mechanisms, 
the UN Security Council, in conjunction with regional bodies and UN member countries, 
uses a combination of pressures and incentives, including the use of force, to persuade 
parties to peacefully settle their differences. It is no surprise that Boutrous-Ghali defines 
peacemaking as a set of ‘comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which 
will...consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among 
people’ (1992). Based on this definition, he strongly insists that peacemakers must not 
only help contending parties settle their conflict, but they must also make sure that peace 
agreements include clear provisions to move the parties towards a condition of self- 
sustaining peace.
Depending on the intensity of and the social consequences of the conflict being 
addressed, Boutrous-Ghali (1992) argues that these provisions should include a 
combination of the following activities:
...disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, 
the custody and the destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory 
and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, 
advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening 
government institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of 
political participation.
Consequently, and as demonstrated by Eva Bertram’s (1995: 388) review of UN 
peacebuilding operations from 1988 to 1995, peacemaking is a way of re-building or 
making state structures, while equally devising a formula that secures co-operation 
among former combatants in the transition from war to peace.
There at least two problems with this definition of peacemaking. First, while 
evidence indicates the relative success of peacemakers in the pre-settlement and 
settlement-making stages, the success of contemporary post-settlement peacebuilding 
efforts is in question. In the case of Bosnia, and this observation may apply to other 
similar cases, the traditional conception of peacemaking might not provide the adequate 
analytic framework to address protracted conflicts and move the contending parties 
towards peace. The second problem with this understanding is that it tells us little of the 
theoretical traditions and the interests that guide peacemakers’ activities. This last point is
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important because peacemaking activities do not always follow the interests and values of 
the UN, but the more narrow values or interests of the state actors that intervene to put an 
end to the fighting.
The following two sections present the differences between the strategic and 
communicative approaches to peacemaking. Such a comparative analysis is influenced by 
normative concerns. Peacemaking efforts, as traditionally defined, have a worthy 
objective. The problem is that this definition has not advanced conditions of self- 
sustaining peace in Bosnia. This thesis argues that this understanding of peacemaking 
(which approximates this thesis’s understanding of the strategic approach) has been too 
influential in Bosnia. The case study on peacemaking efforts in Bosnia should not only 
demonstrate this reality, but it should also demonstrate the reasons why an 
epistemological break with strategic conceptions of peacemaking is necessary, if a self- 
sustaining peace in Bosnia is to materialise. In this way, the comparative analysis, 
presented below, will also introduce the theoretical foundations of a new peacebuilding 
programme for Bosnia.
With this said, section one describes the theoretical foundations of the strategic 
approach. The second section defines those of the communicative approach. The 
distinctions are captured by each approach’s interpretations of the following common 
themes: (a) conception of rationality; (b) definition of peace; (c) the interests that 
influence third parties to intervene in a conflict’s dynamics; (d) the conflict intervention 
mechanisms used by third parties and the goals of these mechanisms; (e) the type of 
diplomacy used by outside players; (f) the role of local actors and outsiders in the 
implementation of a peace agreement; (g) the importance of reconciliatory mechanisms; 
(h) the ideal type of social integration practices; and (i) the type of democratisation being 
pursued. Before continuing, it is important to keep two things in mind. First, the 
comparative analysis provided in the next two sections addresses these common themes 
in the context of Habermas’s research. Thus, Habermas’s insights are crucial in 
understanding the differences of the strategic and communicative approaches. As will be 
seen below, the thesis’s intent to describe these approaches to peacemaking as “strategic” 
and “communicative” are related to Habermas’s socio-political project. Second, the last 
two of these common themes will be described in full detail in the next two chapters,
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which address questions concerning social integration; that is to say the causes of ethnic 
conflicts, state-failure, state-building, and peacebuilding.
A. The Strategic Approach
In the opening pages of the Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas (1984: 7) 
argues that any theory, which attempts to explain the dynamics that produce social order 
or foment disorder, has to be based on a conception of reason. In doing so, a theory not 
only explains how actors acquire knowledge (e.g. rationalism), but it must also make 
clear the relationship between knowledge and social action; that is to say how actors put 
into practice acquired knowledge so they can achieve certain specific ends (e.g. 
rationality). Consequently, such explanations can demonstrate how the application of 
rationality can transform social relations and the structural composition of society (e.g. 
rationalisation).
For Habermas, theories can be divided into two camps: (a) those theories that 
build their arguments and prescriptions according to the insights provided by the 
‘philosophy of the subject’ and (b) those that follow the tenets of the ‘philosophy of 
communication’. In the context of this thesis, the strategic approach to peacemaking is 
founded on the former, while the communicative approach is based on the latter. This 
section explains the interplay between strategic peacemaking and the philosophy of the 
subject.
1. Strategic Rationality and Social Action
The philosophy of the subject is modelled on the tenets of Newtonian physics. This 
model maintains that individuals attain knowledge by: (a) separating the observing 
subject from the observed object; (b) confirming the scientific character of observations 
through empirical techniques; and (c) establishing casual relationships by detecting ‘the 
invariant temporal relationships between observed events’ (Smith 1996: 15). This model 
conceptualises social action ‘as the intentional, self-interested behavior of individuals in 
an objectivated world, that is, one in which objects and other individuals related to in 
terms of their possible manipulation.’ (White 1988: 10). Consequently, strategic
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rationality foments goal-oriented action: ‘Actions are valued and chosen not for 
themselves, but as more or less efficient means to a further end’ (Risse 2000: 3).
Goal-oriented action can be divided into two types: (a) instrumental, and (b) 
strategic (Habermas 1984: 285). These two forms of actions are similar in many respects, 
but these are practiced in different circumstances. Regarding their similarities, theories 
based on strategic rationality ‘treat the interests and preferences of actors as mostly fixed 
during the process of interaction’ (Risse 2000: 3). Building on this understanding, and 
closely approximating Max Weber’s account of Zweckrationalitet, the main theoretical 
components of this approach are: ‘coherence/consistency’ and ‘efficiency’ (Gellner 1983: 
20-21).6 These two elements describe the process that enables actors to identify its 
‘interests’ and ‘preferences’.
The element of coherence/consistency specifies that social problems can only be 
addressed according to a scientific method that enables actors to make sense of complex 
issues by ordering all observed facts and determining the objective to be carried out by an 
actor. Thus, gathering and ordering information is a basic prerequisite of action. The 
element of coherence also sets a hierarchy of options an actor can pursue to address the 
problem at hand. Which response an actor employs depends on the second element, 
efficiency. In this way, an actor creates a strategy based on a cost-benefit analysis of each 
preference. The option that enables an actor to achieve its interests by minimising the 
costs and maximising returns is the one that an actor will put into practice. Noting the 
similarities, it is now important to present the differences between instrumental and 
strategic forms of action.
Habermas (1984) describes instrumental action as non-social behaviour, while 
strategic action occurs in the social world. While Habermas does not clearly differ one 
form of action from the other, research conducted in international relations can explain 
how they differ. According to the tenets of realism, nation-states, the sole actors in 
international politics, operate in conditions of anarchy, roughly resembling a Hobbessian
6 Max Weber did not specify these two elements in these words. This follows Ernest Gellner’s (1983: 20- 
21) interpretation of Weber’s understanding. However, the element of order is close to Weber’s analysis 
that maintains that rationality or rationalization results from the attempt at ‘organizing’ social spaces for 
particular ends. How to achieve this organization is dependent on ‘calculation’ of best ‘techniques’ to 
accomplish these ends (Weber 1958: 13).
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state of nature. Nation-states’ chief concern is survival. Survival in this respect is both an 
interest and an end. Nation-states pursue foreign policies that increase their ability to 
survive, while at the same time attempting to prevent other nation-states from hurting 
their position. Because all nation-states behave in similar fashion, interstate relations are 
marred by competition and distrust. Accordingly, this type of behaviour is non-social or 
instrumental because nation-states employ technical knowledge, that is knowledge 
acquired via an objective and scientific approach, to select the best means to achieve a 
particular end, without taking into consideration an opponent’s own interests.
In contrast, strategic action takes place within established social structures. An 
actor’s ability of achieving a particular end can be either constrained or empowered by 
these structures. In the case of instrumental action, actors are relatively equal in power. 
The existence of strategic action presupposes that some actors are more powerful than 
others; hierarchical relations of power, not anarchy best describes the social conditions 
where these acts take place. The structure of the system impels actors to not only follow 
the rules of rational choice models, but they also have to think of ways of influencing 
their opponents’ decisions. Hence, strategic action is social because actors recognise that 
existing social conditions and hierarchical relations of power can prevent them from 
fulfilling their self-interest (Habermas 1984: 285; and White 1989: 37).
It is not an accident that this definition of strategic action closely resembles neo­
realist explanations of international relations. This is not to say that liberalism’s 
explanations of interstate interactions are not based on the same understanding of 
rationality. Current international relations research has asserted how this analytic 
framework derives its explanations from this understanding. Whether these frameworks 
share or not the same conception of rationality is not at the centre of this investigation. 
This debate has already been reviewed by Miles Kahler (1998), while theorists influenced 
by the ‘interpretive turn’ in international relations have convincingly demonstrated how 
the same conception of rationality is shared by competing traditional frameworks of 
international relations (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 60-61). Even so, it is 
important to demonstrate how the liberal approach to international relations shares the 
same conception of rationality; as such an exercise reveals other features of the strategic 
approach.
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Liberalism, as recently presented by Andrew Moravcsik (1997 and 1999), 
challenges realism’s material understanding of world politics, arguing that non-material 
factors, such as international norms, ideas, identities, and institutions, can influence an 
actor’s behaviour in a specific situation. For proponents of liberalism, actors are not 
solely nation-states, but also include non-state actors (e.g. trans-national organizations, 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations and so forth). As a result, 
liberal theory presents a world in which institutions, ideas, and social norms matter. This 
is especially true in situations where actors see institutions as mechanisms they can use to 
achieve their preferences. As Frank Schimmelfennig (2001: 48) demonstrates in his 
review of the European Union’s (EU) decision to expand eastward, actors can be 
‘concerned about their reputation as members [of the EU] and about the legitimacy of 
their preferences and behavior.’ While an actor’s interests may remain fixed, the 
existence of institutions and accepted norms of behaviour force actors to reflect on the 
best possible strategy to achieve their interests.
It is important to stress that the existence of non-material factors and established 
institutions does not imply that actors will not behave strategically. Far from it, actors 
still behave strategically, but they are more concerned about the efficient pursuit of their 
self-interests (Jervis 1999: 45-47). They understand that their actions might have negative 
consequences on their position within the system, so they use calculative thinking to 
devise means that further their self-interest without breaking the norms that are supposed 
to regulate action. This is so for two reasons. First, breaking the established rules of the 
game might question the need of established institutions, permitting other actors to take 
similar steps and increasing the probability of conflict. Second, an actor’s decision to 
defect would force another actor or a group of actors to sanction this behaviour via 
different political, military, and economic means. The rationale behind this response can 
only be understood by actors’ motivations to create institutions and norms of accepted 
behaviour.
Actors create and support institutions when they consider these to be mechanisms 
that advance their particular self-interests (Jervis 1999: 57-58). Liberal theory concedes 
that competition is a feature of international relations, but the destructiveness associated 
with competitive behaviour forces rational actors to device ways that permit them to fulfil
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their interests without having to resort to coercion and violence (Moravscik 1997: 517- 
18). Institutions serve this purpose because they tend to increase contact between actors. 
This process allows actors to learn more about opponents’ patterns of behaviour, while 
also reducing the informational uncertainty that competitive relations tends to breed. 
Consequently, conflict is minimised and competitive behaviour, while possible, tends to 
be managed by existing institutions.
While this view tends to present a picture of politics as a bargaining process, 
rather than a zero-sum game, relations between actors are not characterised by co­
operation, as many liberal theorists might argue, but by manipulation and domination. 
Enough research has demonstrated how strategically motivated actors can advance their 
interest by means of co-operation (Keohane 1984 and 1989). Nonetheless, it is important 
to add that manipulation and domination are prevalent because liberalism cannot solve 
the problem of power distribution. Indeed, non-material factors may provide reasons for 
actors to co-ordinate their actions, but these by themselves do not guarantee that actors 
will not employ force or other coercive tactics to attain their goals. This axiom especially 
holds true for the most powerful actor within the system, which plays an important role at 
keeping order by creating, with the assistance of other actors, accepted norms and rules of 
behaviour. When these norms and rules fail to keep actors in line, the strongest actor, 
often in conjunction with other actors, employ its resources to reprimand dissenters, as 
their actions can question the established order, which in turn questions the position of 
the strongest power.
This review of strategic rationality and its influence on realist and liberal 
frameworks of analysis finds that the differences between these two frameworks can be 
best described as a sibling rivalry. Indeed, Robert Jervis argues that both traditions arrive 
at different conclusions because they tend to study different facets of the same world. 
Liberalism examines the relations of actors dealing with issues pertaining to the 
‘international political economy and the environment’, while realists tend to explain the 
‘causes, the conduct, and consequences of wars.’ The former ‘is more concerned with 
efficiency’ and the latter ‘focuses more on issues of distribution, which are closely linked 
to power as both an instrument and a stake’ (Jervis 1999: 45). Jervis’s observation is 
important because it not only confirms that both frameworks share the same conception
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of rationality, but more important because together these frameworks’ conclusions 
ascertain that an actor will attempt, via different mechanisms, to establish and maintain 
an international order that empowers it to satisfy its interests.
Because this thesis analyses the peacemaking efforts that produced the Dayton 
peace initiative, it demonstrates how the structure of trans-Atlantic relations and how the 
United States’ changing perception of the Bosnian war impacted the overall peace 
process. As demonstrated in chapters four and five, the Clinton administration crafted a 
foreign policy toward Bosnia firmly based on this conception of strategic rationality. This 
meant that the United States had to employ its resources to first press its European allies 
and Russia to accept its peace initiative and then to coerce Bosnia’s warring factions to 
accept the peace plan drafted at the Wright Patterson Airbase in Dayton, Ohio. But, this is 
only part of the story. Peacebuilding efforts, as demonstrated in chapters six and seven, 
were not conducted according to the American design proposed at Dayton. After it 
became evident that the American plan could not produce a self-sustaining peace in 
Bosnia, the European governments, with America’s consent, were free to design a policy 
that closely approximated their interests. The only problem is that the agents that 
designed this new peacebuilding strategy were also strongly influenced by a strategic 
conception of rationality.
2. The Importance o f Order
It is important to mention that the above review of strategic rationality and its influence 
in liberal and realist theories of international relations can also be extended to theories 
that explain how actors relate to each other in established domestic orders. The link 
between strategic rationality and a nation-state’s social system is established in the next 
chapter’s review of the problem of social integration and the challenge peacebuilding 
efforts have to confront in divided societies. One of the reasons that the above subsection 
described the influence strategic rationality has had on traditional approaches to 
international relations is that peacemaking tends to be an international practice, where 
outside parties intervene in a conflict to move warring factions towards peace.
The objective of this practice is to establish a new set of institutions that enables 
parties to co-exist without fear that one party will rely on organised forms of political
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violence to achieve their self-interests. If war can be described as a condition where 
parties relate to each other instrumentally, then this approach to peacemaking must be 
seen as a set of activities that enables these warring parties to relate to each other 
strategically. The aim is to force the warring parties to start co-ordinating their actions so 
they can agree on new institutions, norms, and rules that may guide their future 
behaviour. Consequently, peacemakers attempt to create order at both intrastate and 
international levels. Even though the goal of establishing order at both these levels 
motivates peacemaking efforts, it is important to stress that strategic peacemaking is 
primarily guided by the need to safeguard the basis of international order. To put it 
differently, the stability of an established international order can be secured by re­
arranging domestic systems according to “accepted” international norms and values. This 
maxim is especially applicable when the peacemaker is a great power that perceives 
intrastate disorder to be questioning the foundations of the international order, putting in 
doubt the institutions, norms and values that enable it to a achieve its self-interests.
This observation raises the following question: if third party interveners are 
stimulated by a desire to preserve international order, then what are some of the 
mechanisms they employ to make peace at the intrastate level? The growth of the 
discipline of conflict analysis has produced a number of conflict intervention 
mechanisms: (a) conflict settlement, (b) conflict management, (c) conflict resolution, and 
(d) conflict transformation. The first two are discussed in this subsection, as these are part 
of the strategic approach to peacemaking; the other two will be reviewed in the next 
section.
These mechanisms can be differentiated according to the objectives peacemakers 
expect to accomplish. Motivated by the creation of order, peacemakers acting 
strategically tend to employ mechanisms that settle or manage the conflict. Conflict 
settlement, as Joseph Scimecca avers (1993: 392), ‘produces an outcome that does not 
necessarily meet the needs of all concerned but is accepted because of the coercion of a 
stronger party.’ Consequently, peacemakers tend to rely on conflict settlement 
mechanisms in the pre-settlement and settlement-making stages. As noted above, the 
objective is to terminate the violent expression of conflict and impose the foundations of 
a social order that forces parties to co-ordinate their actions with their opponents. While
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conflict settlement mechanisms are usually employed at the above-mentioned stages, this 
does not mean that these cannot be employed at the stage of post-settlement 
peacebuilding. However, peacemakers understand that coercion is an inefficient way of 
safeguarding the viability of a settlement and the social order that it creates, because ‘it 
does not provoke voluntary compliance’ (Hurd 1999: 384). For this reason, peacemakers 
depend on conflict management mechanisms to encourage the parties to implement the 
peace agreement.
Strategic peacemakers do not believe that a conflict can be resolved (Zartmann 
and Touval 1996; and Jones 1999: 14-15). They argue that it can be managed. Thus, 
peacemakers assume that ‘conflict is an organizational problem that can be managed by 
changing the conditions within social institutions’ (emphasis added, Scimecca 1993: 
382); the emphasis is not to transform social structures, but to search for ways to 
accommodate the interests and needs of displeased groups and individuals by allowing 
them to have more access to political and economic structures.
This perspective sees conflict in a negative light, for it tends to question the 
viability of negotiated settlements, which are built on a modem conception of politics. 
Politics is not defined on conceptions of social justice or, what Habermas calls discourse 
ethics. Instead, politics is defined as a mechanism that determines who gets what, when, 
and how. It is therefore described in material fashion as a process that attempts to 
regulate citizens’ actions in order to satisfy the needs and interests of society. Not 
surprisingly, this understanding stresses that social conflicts are a threat to the established 
social order, questioning the social institutions that have been conceived to enable 
individuals to satisfy their interests and needs, while equally challenging the legal system 
that guide the work of these institutions and regulate the behaviour of society’s citizens.
In this vein, conflict management is more than just a set of practices that prevent 
parties from undermining or toppling the established social order; it is the key element in 
the founding of a self-sustaining peace. Once established social institutions can manage 
conflict in these societies, peacemakers can dedicate less resources to secure the basis of 
intrastate order and pay more attention to other conflicts or issues of concern. Conflict 
settlement and conflict management mechanisms do not only complement each other, but
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both mechanisms are also influenced by the tenets of the strategic approach and by the 
peacemakers’ attempt to control the peacemaking process.
This is an important observation because it demonstrates that peacemakers are 
agents of social control. By pursuing order and stability, they tend to ignore the needs and 
interests of the conflicting parties. Peacemakers are therefore aware of their interests and 
manipulate the conflict situation to secure the attainment of these interests. Their goal is 
not to create new social conditions that may be amenable to the contending parties. In 
fact, peacemakers see themselves as problem-solvers, utilising a scientific method to 
understand the conflict at hand and provide a settlement that may end its violent 
expression. Peacemakers use this scientific method to describe facts and make 
generalisations concerning these facts; hence the observer’s experience conforms to these 
generalisations.
The problem with this approach is that the peacemaker affirms ‘the externality 
and the objectivity of reality’, but it ‘never raises the question of how such a reality has 
come about’ (Keyman 1997: 96). The historical past is therefore not taken into 
consideration and existing social structures are taken for granted. Subsequently, 
peacemakers’ understanding of conflict situations ‘conforms to the ideas’ of the 
peacemaker and ‘not to experience itself (Rasmussen 1996: 18), leading to what Georg 
Luckas called ‘reification’ or ‘the process through which human beings are turned into 
things, and thing-like, objectified relationships and ideas come to dominate human life...’ 
(Kellner 1989: 10). Consequently, peacemakers tend to ignore the underlying causes of a 
conflict and freeze existing social relations as a way of moving the parties towards peace. 
As Robert Cox (1996: 88) argues, a problem-solving stance requires the researcher or the 
peacemaker to take the world as he or she finds it, ‘with the prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework 
for action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and 
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.’
Accordingly, the Bosnian war, as demonstrated in more detail in chapter four, 
challenged NATO’s role in the post-Cold War era and the Clinton administration’s vision 
of Europe. Once the United States understood that Bosnia was questioning its privileged 
position in Europe, it decided to end the conflict by pushing the parties to accept a new
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Bosnian state, modelled on internationally recognised democratic standards and the 
protection of human rights. It was argued that such a policy would not only stabilise the 
region, but it would also reinforce the principles of state sovereignty, multiethnic 
democracy, and capitalist doctrines of economic organisation. Consequently, the United 
States, via the Contact Group, was sending a clear message to secessionist movements in 
Southeastern Europe, and the rest of the world, that they had to reconsider their 
strategies, for the international community would not tolerate violent secessionist 
struggles.
It can be said that strategic forms of peacemaking reinforce the importance of 
Westphalian ideals. It is significant to note how the Contact Group was effectively 
securing the basis of international order since 1648: international stability can only be 
secured by nation-states, while intrastate order can be assured by creating an effective 
state apparatus that could manage or in extreme cases forcefully settle social conflict. 
Consequently, the Contact Group’s decision to create a new Bosnian state was not only 
guided by the belief that the state is the legitimate representative of Bosnia’s citizens in 
the international arena. More important, and building on the historical development of 
Western societies, the Contact Group also argued that the new state would integrate 
Bosnia’s divided society and start the transformation of the Bosnian economy along 
capitalist principles.
Note how state-building, the process by which a state is created and strengthened 
against other social sources of power (e.g. nationalist parties and their organisations), 
becomes a peacebuilding mechanism. Indeed, many experts believe that the state can do 
more than just settle or manage social conflicts; it can actually engender processes of 
interethnic reconciliation. In theory, the sense of security created by the state and the 
economic interdependence that results from economic reforms should provide each 
community’s leaders incentives to co-operate and support this state-building program. It 
would also impel individuals from different backgrounds to increase the level of contacts 
and start the healing process needed to normalise social relations.7
7 President Bill Clinton (1999: 1529) reinforced the general acceptance of this proposition during a press 
conference in 9 August 1999, when he was asked by journalist from the former Yugoslavia to comment on 
peace processes in Bosnia and Kosovo and the prospects of a sustainable peace in these situations in the 
near future.
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The only problem with this view, and as experienced in America’s intervention in 
Panama, Haiti, and Somalia, is that reconciliation is not an objective in itself. Rather, it is 
seen as a by-product of state-building programmes.8 The aim is to construct state 
institutions to secure social order, stability, and the necessary reforms to move war-torn 
societies closer to internationally recognised standards of political and economic 
organisation, which reinforce Western conceptions of international relations. 
Consequently, strategic peacemaking practices are guided by the twin objectives of 
internal order and regional stability. In light of this, strategic peacemaking can also be 
described as negative peacemaking, as the twin objectives closely resemble Johan 
Galtung’s (1996: 30-32) definition o f ‘negative peace’, which is defined as the absence of 
illegitimate acts of violence, that is to say violent acts not conducted by the state.
Therefore, this form of peacemaking is mostly driven by official diplomacy or 
what Joseph Monteville (1991) calls ‘Track-One’ diplomacy. The pervasive use of this 
type of diplomacy has two effects on peacemaking processes. First, peacemakers, who 
tend to represent governments and international or regional organisations, usually 
negotiate with their political counterparts, which usually tend to be the same leaders that 
started and waged wars against the other parties. Ironically, this ‘official’ interaction 
tends to legitimise these leaders position of power and grants them the authority to 
negotiate with peacemakers the makeup of the new society. Strategic peacemakers ignore 
the needs and interests o f individuals that are not represented by the leaders of warring 
parties. In fact, those moderate leaders that actually believe in multiculturalism and 
democracy tend to be sidelined during official negotiations because they lack the material 
resources to force the warring parties to end the war. While peacemakers agree that this 
official process may undermine the work of moderate movements and empower extreme 
forces that oppose the implementation of the peace agreement, they believe that in the 
long run new institutions and the introduction of democratic mechanisms and human 
right provisions will empower the citizens of war-torn countries to elect new leaders that 
support a multicultural ethos and democratic values of social organisation.
8 This proposition results from my reading of Karen von Hippel’s book, Democracy By Force: US Military 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (2000).
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Second, the use of official diplomatic tools suggests that the newly created 
government will be responsible for enforcing the peace agreement’s provisions. This is 
not to say that non-governmental organisations or private individuals will not have a role 
in these efforts. Their presence and activities are determined by their willingness to act in 
accordance with the provisions of a negotiated peace agreement, which represent the 
interests of peacemakers and the leaders that signed the agreement. Hence, peacebuilding 
tends to be dominated by a set of interests imbued in the provisions of the peace 
settlements. It is exactly for this reason that peacemakers strongly support the active 
presence of international organs in the process of post-settlement peacebuilding. 
Undeniably, the past failures of many brokered agreements and the escalation of violence 
that accompanies these failures has obligated the international community to manage and 
settle possible conflicts in post-settlement situations, while the new structures of power 
are created and strengthened. For this reason, the international community has learned 
that challenges to peace agreements must be confronted by modifying existing peace 
implementation strategies, so the objectives that encouraged outsiders to intervene in the 
conflict are met (Walter 1999). Keeping in mind the traits of strategic rationality, 
strategic peacemaking stresses that the peace implementation strategy may be altered to 
fit changing circumstances, but the objectives tend to remain the same.
In the end, traditional forms of peacemaking tend to equal this review of strategic 
peacemaking. The objective is the preservation of domestic stability as means to keep 
intact the structure of the international system. It is for this reason that peacemaking is 
generally described as an international practice led by state actors that are affected by a 
given conflict situation. Because the outsider tends to be stronger than the parties to the 
conflict, strategic peacemaking establishes social orders that reflect its needs and 
interests, while marginalising the needs and interests of the parties caught in the conflict.
B. The Communicative Approach
Communicative peacemaking has to be understood as an ideal, exalted by many scholars 
working in the tradition of critical theory. As demonstrated in Jones’s work, it has rarely 
affected the dynamics of intractable conflicts. Scholars working along the lines of 
strategic conceptions of international relations theory have characterised critical theory as
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a mere theoretical exercise that has little value in the making of public or foreign policies. 
For instance, Robert Keohane (1988: 392) argues that:
...the greatest weakness of the reflective school [the critical approach] lies 
not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in lack of a clear 
reflective research program that could be employed by students of world 
politics. Waltzian neorealism has so research program; so does the 
neoliberal institutionalism, which has focused on the evolution and impact 
of international regimes. Until the reflective scholars or other sympathetic 
to their arguments have delineated such a research program and shown in 
a particular studies that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, 
they will remain on the margins, largely invisible to the preponderance of 
empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly accept one or another 
version of rationalistic premises.
Despite the fact that Keohane’s views have been extremely influential, a growing amount 
of evidence shows that strategic peacemaking efforts in Bosnia and other parts of the 
world have not achieved its intended objectives.
It is not only important to question these peacemaking efforts, but it is also 
imperative to show the theoretical foundations of an alternative peacemaking approach 
that can guide new research and, in the case of this thesis, a different peacebuilding 
programme for post-Dayton Bosnia. Such a counter-approach is based on Habermas’s 
philosophy of communication. This is not to say that communicative forms of 
peacemaking are only influenced by Habermas’s work. Critical international relations 
writers and those that support the use of conflict resolution and conflict transformation 
mechanisms also influence this peacemaking approach. Consequently, this section is 
divided into two subsections. The first describes the theoretical basis of Habermas’s 
understanding of communicative rationality, while the next subsection links Habermas’s 
insights with the other two mechanisms of conflict intervention.
1 Communicative Rationality and Social Action
Habermas contends that the problem with the philosophy of the subject, and its 
conception of reason, is its inability to grasp the importance of human inter-subjectivity. 
The poverty of this approach is that it argues that actors are solely motivated by self- 
interests and self-preservation. Hence, actors objectify other actors in hopes of
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manipulating existing social circumstances and achieve their self-interests. This 
explanation even holds true when institutions and social norms influence actors’ 
behaviour. While these might limit actors’ capacity to fulfil their interests, what changes 
is not the objective or the motivational impetus for action, but the strategy designed and 
implemented to meet their interests.
Consequently, strategic models of action reduce interaction to the realm of labour 
or technical reason. Generally speaking, labour is the sphere in which individuals 
‘produce and reproduce their lives through transforming nature with the aid of technical 
rules and procedures’ (Roderick 1986: 7). By comparison, interaction refers to the sphere 
in which individuals ‘produce and reproduce their lives through communication of needs 
and interests in the context of rule-governed institutions’ (Roderick 1986: 7). The danger 
of the strategic model of action is that it has equated human emancipation or practical 
reason with technical mastery of social relations.
Breaking with this model of action, Habermas argues that self-interest is not the 
only motivation for human action. Instead, human beings also orient their actions ‘toward 
creating or maintaining institutions and traditions in which is expressed some conception 
of right behavior and a good life with others’ (White 1989: 16). This conceptualisation 
not only separates labour from interaction, but it also holds that reason ‘is not situated in 
any one particular subject at all but rather in subject-subject relations’ (Brand 1990: 10). 
For Habermas, emancipatory reason equals communicative reason. As he puts it at the 
end of the first volume of the Theory of Communicative Action (1984: 392):
The phenomena in need of explication are no longer, in and of themselves, 
the knowledge and mastery of an objective nature, but the intersubjectivity 
of possible understanding -  at both the interpersonal and intrapsychic 
levels. The focus of investigation thereby shifts from cognitive- 
instrumental rationality to communicative rationality. And what is 
paradigmatic for the latter is not the relation of a solitary subject to 
something in the objective world that can be represented and manipulated, 
but the intersubjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up 
when they come to an understanding with one another about something. In 
doing so, communicative actors more in the medium of a natural language, 
draw upon culturally transmitted interpretations and relate simultaneously 
to something in the one objective world, something in their common social 
world, and something in each actors’ own subjective world.
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Habermas’s shift to the philosophy of communication entails an ontological and 
epistemological change that sets the basis for his new theoretical framework. 
Epistemologically, the philosophy of the subject’s conceptualisation of rationality is 
completely displaced by this competing approach, which establishes that interacting 
subjects in communication processes can also attain knowledge. In other words, all 
knowledge is fallible as individuals can enter processes of argumentation with other 
individuals in order to test the validity and facticity of their propositions, which are a 
product of established facts, norms, and values (Habermas 1996a: 15).
Habermas’s research shows that individuals caught in processes of argumentation 
and deliberation employ four validity claims to support the significance of their 
propositions. The first validity claim is that of comprehensibility. The second validity 
claim is a claim to truth (is what a speaker saying accurate?). The third validity claim 
questions the rightness or the normative legitimacy of an utterance, while the last validity 
claim is that of authenticity, where an actor questions if an utterance is sincere according 
to the speaker’s feelings, beliefs, moral values, etc.
The process of argumentation demonstrate that individuals will employ these 
validity claims to convince others of their arguments’ relevance. In raising a claim to 
validity, an individual produces an utterance knowing that other individuals can contest 
the utterance’s validity. For this reason, an individual’s ability to refute or accept, with a 
simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, the argument defines this mode of conversation as co­
operative, because the communicative exercise, for it to be fortuitous, must end in an 
agreement that the utterance in question is valid. As Maeve Cooke points out, the 
importance of this communicative act is not only related to its co-operative character, but 
to the fact that it also represents an effort to recognise others in a conversation (Cooke 
1994: 12). Recognition of other individuals is of psychological value in intra-social 
relations.
Ontologically, Habermas’s theoretical framework breaks with the philosophy of 
the subject by positing three different ‘worlds’, rather than one objective world. Such a 
notion means that individual behaviour is not only influenced by (a) an objective world 
made up of facts, but also by (b) a world of social norms and values created by subject- 
subject relations, as well as by (c) a subjective world, where an individual’s internal
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makeup can help him or her question or reaffirm the validity of norms, values, and facts. 
For Habermas, the philosophy of communication establishes that communicative action 
is more than just communication; instead it becomes a mechanism to co-ordinate social 
action. The argumentation process described above can only be productive if individuals 
in a conversation are able to employ the four validity claims and relate them to these 
three worlds. Hence, each of these worlds is connected to each of the validity claims.
A subject in the objective world acting strategically raises a claim to truth or 
accuracy; in the subjective world a claim to rightness is advanced to either question the 
legitimacy of a norm or to act according to it; and in line with the subjective world, a 
subject acts to reveal to others how his or her inner-make-up guides his or her behaviour, 
thus raising a claim to authenticity or truthfulness. The claim to comprehensibility is not 
connected to a particular world because it is necessary to communicate with others.
The stress on inter-subjectivity must not be downplayed, as this communicative 
characterisation of human action is very similar to strategic forms of human action. As 
discussed above, strategic forms of action, just as this communicative type (White 1989: 
16), emphasise that non-material factors can influence human behaviour. The differences 
between these two approaches can be captured by two factors: (a) the motive for action; 
and (b) the mechanisms utilised by actors to co-ordinate their actions with other actors. 
While strategic action is influenced by self-interest and the attainment of social order, 
actors behaving according to the communicative rationality are motivated by a need to 
reach mutual understanding of a given situation. The individuals caught in these 
processes determine the end of these communicative processes. Hence, the process is not 
so much guided by control. Instead, social transformation is possible as dialogical 
processes can create new norms, rules, and social structures, if actors can agree on what 
things needs to be changed. The importance of this axiom is that it emphasises that social 
norms and rules must change according to the changing needs and interests of 
participants. Thus social orders are not static, but always adapting to new realities.
Second, the communicative model of rationality argues that communication 
becomes a mechanism to co-ordinate actors’ behaviour. This is an important trait of this 
model because the strategic model of rationality argues that communication is only one 
possible tool actors can employ to co-ordinate their action preferences with other actors.
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For this reason, Habermas (1984: 94) asserts that actors behaving strategically use 
communication ‘one-sidedly.’ ‘Only the communicative model of action,’ he states 
(1984: 95), ‘presupposes language as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby 
speakers and hearers, out of the context of their preinterpreted lifeworld, refer 
simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to 
negotiate common definitions of the situation.’ In all, Habermas presupposes that 
unhindered communication processes are able to bring about a break with ineffective, but 
established social structures, norms, values identities, so these can create new ones that 
truly reflect the needs and interests of a diverse public (1984: 69).
2. The Importance o f Social Transformation
This conception of rationality presents a new understanding of society. Society is not 
only composed of institutional structures that administer it, what Habermas calls ‘the 
system’. Society also encompasses a symbolic world of cultural traditions, social 
practices, and moral norms that empower individuals to determine how society should be 
organised. In addition, and as Habermas (1984: 70) argues, this symbolic world or 
lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is crucial because it supports the communication and the relational 
structures that permit individuals to reach mutual understanding of given situations:
Subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the 
horizon of a lifeworld. Their lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, 
always unproblematic, background convictions. This lifeworld 
background serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed 
by participants as unproblematic. In their interpretive accomplishments the 
members of a communication community demarcate the one objective 
world and their intersubjecitively shared social world from the subjective 
worlds of individuals and (other) collectives (Habermas 1984: 70).
The concept of the lifeworld can be linked with research conducted in conflict 
analysis and peace studies. Because communicative peacemaking places a heavy 
premium on undistorted processes of dialogue as a social mechanism of action 
coordination and because these processes establish that social transformation must occur 
according to the changing needs of social actors, then it is important to understand the 
role of conflict in society.
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On the one hand, conflict analysts take the position that social conflicts are a 
threat to the organisation of society, as conflicts can put a heavy burden on a society’s 
symbolic fabric. This would not only make communication between actors very difficult, 
but this burden could equally question ‘the normative functioning of social systems’ 
(Scher and Milovanovic 1999: 25) and endorse the violent division of society. The only 
problem with this view is that it legitimates the intervention of ‘the system’, that is to say 
administrative structures or outside powers, in order to protect the integrity of existing 
lifeworld contexts as a way of hindering conflicts from escalating. While the intervention 
could occur according to the principles of communicative rationality, historical examples 
demonstrate that interventions in conflict situations happen according to the tenets of 
strategic rationality because conflict analysts tend to explain social conflicts as a threat 
that has to be contained in order to secure the basis of social order.
On the other hand, even though social conflict results from groups and individuals 
that are dissatisfied with the way the social system is organised, a conflict is not 
necessarily a threat (Deutsch 1991: 27). This view defines conflict as a discourse that 
expresses the need for social change. This is not to say that social conflict does not have 
the potential to become a threat to peace. Indeed, a conflict that is ignored or forcefully 
settled may escalate into violence. In multi-ethnic societies, the existence of social 
conflicts can put undo pressure on a society’s symbolic fabric, slowly disintegrating the 
‘thin’ lifeworld contexts that enable groups that share different identities from 
communicating and relating to each other.
In this way, conflicts are constructive if society is organised in a way that permits 
dissatisfied groups and individuals to express their frustration and work with other groups 
and individuals to transform society according to new understandings of given social 
realities. Social conflicts become destructive when society’s strongest group opposes the 
transformation of existing social structures. Under these circumstances, dissatisfied 
groups may decide to divide society physically and symbolically in order to strengthen 
their struggle for social change or the creation of their own nation-state. The physical 
destruction of society, that is to say the creation of new structures of administration and 
economic organisation, leads to the creation of a new symbolic world in which old 
neighbours are transformed into enemies and those next of kin are presented as friends.
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Hence, communication is employed strategically; it becomes a mechanism to unite the 
ethnic groups in its struggle for change.9 In such cases, each group operates according to 
their own ‘lifeworld’ and its norms, values, and identities, making communication 
oriented towards reaching understanding difficult, if not impossible. It is important to 
note how the new administrative structures and group leaders use language one-sidedly in 
order to mobilise group cohesiveness and prepare its constituents for war.
Subsequently, Tarja Vayrynen (1997) argues that the partition of lifeworld 
contexts and the intensification of ethnic-based conflict ‘seals off alternative ways to 
typify the world’, strengthening dominant interpretations or understanding of “reality.” 
She further finds that ethnic conflict hampers ‘alternative self-definitions of the group 
and therewith exclude alternative identifications, roles and modes of actions.’ As a 
consequence, she argues that conflict intervention mechanisms must reconstruct these 
communicative processes via dialogical processes of conflict resolution. While this is an 
important suggestion she fails to explain what type of conflict intervention mechanisms 
peacemakers should employ to reconstruct these communicative structures.
Different conflict intervention mechanisms have been developed to address 
violent conflicts. These include: (a) conflict management, (b) conflict settlement, (d) 
conflict resolution, and (d) conflict transformation. The first two were said to be elements 
of the strategic approach and, as it will be demonstrated in part two of this thesis, they 
have had a profound influence on the Dayton peace initiative. The last two conflict 
intervention mechanisms have had less of an impact in Bosnia, but they show the 
possibility out of negative situations of peace. Indeed, conflict transformation, and 
conflict resolution to a certain extent, argues that ‘a sustainable peace requires far more 
than elite agreements’ (Ross 2000). The process must be open to the public at large so 
their needs and interests can affect and influence the peace process.
As a result, peacemakers that use conflict resolution mechanisms, such as 
interactive problem-solving workshops, bring together influential leaders from each 
group so they can address mutual issues of contention. These workshops’ organisers do 
not control the process. Their work tends to be driven by an expanded notion of peace.
9 This assertion is implicitly implied in Saunder’s work (1996: 424).
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Thus, they intervene in order to stimulate dialogue and make it possible for participants 
to comprehend their opponent’s views of the conflict dynamic. Herbert Kelman, as an 
organiser of numerous workshops on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, argues that the 
workshop’s facilitation of unrestricted dialogue enables ‘the parties to explore each 
other’s perspective and through a joint process of creative problem solving, to generate 
new ideas for mutually satisfactory solutions to their conflicts’ (1996: 501).
Even more important, this process of open dialogue serves as an instrument to 
deconstruct the ethnic identities that separate the conflicting parties and allow the 
construction of a new, but a “thin” identity based on relational empathy. Benjamin 
Broome’s (1993: 111) research on cross-cultural communication is especially important 
in this respect, as he shows how dialogical processes of conflict resolution can de- 
escalate the conflict by transforming adversarial attitudes and nurture a new ‘third 
culture’ that emanates from these processes. This ‘third culture’ is important because it 
provides the means for the involved parties to reconcile their opposing interests and 
develop working relationships that can lead to the conflict’s resolution, while building 
also a culture of trust and co-operation.
As promising this may sound, these problem-solving workshops have not been 
able to translate their outcomes in macro-sociological terms. For the most part, they have 
not affected the way society is organised. While these workshops have been able to 
generate new ideas and solutions to the conflict, the participants find a number of 
obstacles that keep them from translating these ideas into actual social processes of 
macro-sociological change (Ross 2000: 1027). As result, Raimo Vayrynen (1999: 149- 
150) strongly critiques this approach, arguing that these workshops’ organisers fail to 
capture the complex dynamics that energise these violent conflicts. It is for this reason 
that he makes the case that conflict resolution must be complemented with conflict 
transformation mechanisms.
Conflict transformation is a theory and practice of social change. In contrast to 
conflict resolution, conflict transformation is not concentrated on micro-mechanisms (e.g. 
mediation, workshops, etc.). Instead this approach focuses on how the ‘environment 
around a conflict can be transformed’ in order to solve the conflict by building grass-root 
initiatives ingrained in civil society (Ryan 1996: 216-17). This does not mean that this
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approach rejects the use of micro-mechanisms to change society. It clearly does employ 
them. The difference is that these mechanisms are part of a larger societal process. This 
process can be subsequently divided into two levels: (a) micro-sociological level 
mechanisms, and (b) those operating at the macro-sociological level.
At the micro-sociological level, conflict transformation facilitates a number of 
mediation seminars and conflict resolution workshops. While the literature on conflict 
transformation establishes that peacemakers need to be highly selective of the people they 
invite to these workshops and seminars, it is important to find people that are 
representative of the different groups affected by the conflict’s dynamics. All societies 
have influential leaders at different levels. John Paul Lederach (1997: 39) argues that 
influential individuals can be found at three social levels: top, middle-range, and 
grassroots. The top level includes military, political and religious leaders with ‘high 
visibility.’ These are leaders, who are usually involved in ‘Track-One’ diplomatic 
initiatives (Montville 1991: 162). The grassroots level encompasses local political 
leaders, heads of indigenous non-governmental organizations, local relief workers, 
factory workers, construction labourers and small business owners, to name a few 
(Lederach 1997: 143). The middle-range level, and the most relevant for the purpose of 
this investigation, includes academics, journalists, business owners, non-visible political 
and religious leaders, leaders of non-ethnic, civic-based political parties, artists, actors, 
leaders of trade unions and other influential people in each community (Lederach 1997: 
41-42). It is important to tap into the resources offered by the middle-range level. These 
individuals are the ones that have the most influence on the other two leadership levels of 
society (Lederach 1997: 48). If middle-range leaders from each community are brought 
together and they can reach a transformation of their attitudes and establish cross- 
communal working relations, people in the grassroots level might be more inclined to 
interact with individuals of other ethno-national communities. In fact, this could be the 
basis of Broome’s ‘third culture’, in which a new understanding of the conflict can 
generate and give life to new social movements campaigning for social justice and peace.
In many ways, this phase of conflict transformation emphasises the importance of 
reconciliation and forgiveness. At this level, it is important for the participants to not only 
mutually recognise each other’s needs, interests, and identities, but it is also important
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that they come to term with their past and move forward by constructing new ways of 
resolving their differences without ‘thereby negating their own narrative and threatening 
their own identity’ (Kelman 1999: 199). This stage suggests that participants are 
empowered by this experience because they come to question established social 
narratives that foster division and conflict.
A second purpose of this phase is to encourage participants to establish broader 
social projects intended to transform how people behave in society. For instance, 
individuals can be brought together to address issues of common concern, such as those 
in the fields of public health, economics, environmental protection and so forth (Kelman 
1999: 201). One such example is the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Health 
Bridges for Peace project in Bosnia, directed by Paula Gutlove (1997). She brings 
together health professionals from the different ethno-national communities so they can 
expand their conflict resolution capacities in order to create strategies that build an 
integrated health sector in Bosnia. At both these stages, the emphasis is placed in building 
trust and encouraging cross-communal communication.
The peacemaker plays an important role in these conflict resolution mechanisms, 
but there are differences among experts in the fields of conflict analysis and peace studies 
as to what this role is. Lederach argues that the intervener can decide to impose a format 
on the participants. Calling this the ‘prescriptive approach’, he argues that it ‘sends the 
subtle message that the trainer’s ways are best, that resources for empowerment he 
outside the setting [or workshop], and that productive conflict resolution -  like other 
models of development -  lies with emulating those who have made more “progress’” 
(1995: 68). This approach, which is widely utilized by peacemakers, is dangerous for it 
allows the peacemaker to interject his or her own interests into the conflict resolution 
process. Hence, the ‘prescriptive approach’ can easily give way to strategic models of 
peacemaking, by which peacemaker’s interests overpower those of the parties affected by 
the conflict.
In contrast, Lederach argues that an ‘elicitive approach’ can be more useful. Its 
strength is ‘its diligence in respecting and building from the cultural context, in fostering 
participatory design, and in constructing appropriate models in the setting’ (1995: 68). It 
is important to note that Lederach’s ‘elicitive approach’ empowers people to re-imagine
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their social landscape in order to build a new future. More important, this approach 
enables them to use values and norms created in their particular lifeworld contexts to 
construct conflict transformation mechanisms that can address issues of contention in 
order to build new lifeworld contexts and political cultures that can be embraced by the 
members of each contending party.
The intent of these workshops is to reconstruct fractured social relations by 
encouraging participants to come up with their own practices of conflict resolution in 
hopes that these will affect the way society is organised. Ideally, the move towards 
reconciliation should entail change, but powerful individuals that see inter-ethnic 
cooperation in negative fashion can thwart these projects. This is an important problem 
that has impelled critics of this approach to describe it as an idealistic enterprise.
While the success of conflict transformation can only be measured if the 
participants invited to these micro-mechanisms of conflict resolution can build and 
encourage others to create new social networks and movements to transform existing 
social structures according to their interests and needs, a successful peacemaking mission 
cannot completely ignore the significant role of international actors attempting to end the 
hostilities. In contrast to strategic peacemaking, the communicative peacemaking follows 
the tenets of multi-track diplomacy. According to Louise Diamond and John McDonald 
(1996: 1), this type of diplomacy is ‘an expansion of the ‘Track One, Track Two” 
paradigm’, developed by Joseph Montville (1982 and 1990). Track-Two diplomacy is 
described as peacemaking activities carried out by professional conflict resolution experts 
and non-governmental groups. Hence, the ‘Track One, Track Two’ paradigm emphasises 
that interveners must have competence with the tools and concepts necessary to bring 
peace to different conflict situation. Multi-track diplomacy argues that just as the 
challenges to ‘Track One’ diplomacy forced practitioners to develop ‘Track Two’ 
diplomacy, current challenges to peace operations necessitate a more expanded definition 
of diplomacy that gives non-professional conflict resolution organisations the ability to 
influence peace processes. Examples of these new players are business organisations, 
religious groups, private citizen initiatives, educational institutions, grant-making 
organisations and other non-governmental organisations that address different issues of
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international concern (e.g. human rights, social justice, sustainable development, 
environmental protection, democratisation, and so forth).
Diamond and McDonald’s model suggest that peacemaking must be based on a 
systemic approach that stresses the importance of interconnected spheres of different 
systems and action processes; meaning that the action of one actor will have an impact on 
the work of other actors. As result, the success or the failure of peacemaking activities 
can be measured by the way the parts interact with each other in order to achieve the 
objectives of a particular peacemaking mission (Diamond and McDonald 1996: 13). 
Although this system approach is also shared by strategic peacemaking, the 
communicative model, building primarily on Habermas’s sociological analysis, argues 
that undistorted communication processes of conflict resolution should have primacy 
over other peacemaking efforts based on strategic conceptions. In many ways, 
communicative peacemaking embraces aspects of strategic peacemaking. While 
communicative peacemaking places an emphasis on the construction of a new society, it 
argues that regional stability is necessary and that international actors have an obligation 
to intervene in conflict situations to prevent wanton acts from furthering destabilising 
social relations. To a certain extent, communicative peacemaking has to work within the 
model of strategic peacemaking because the creation of new social structures involves the 
creation of state institutions and market mechanisms that can only be constructed via 
strategic models of rationality.
In this manner, outsiders should intervene in conflict situations not to enforce 
their settlement on the contending parties, but to facilitate conflict resolution processes 
that enable the parties to rehabilitate their broken bonds and construct a new society 
consistent with their mutual needs and interests. The communicative model works within 
established social systems, but it emphasises that the Westphalian principles and modem 
practices of societal organisation and social integration must be substituted with new 
models that empower individuals to participate in communication processes of political 
and will formation. Thus, this model finds that the values of democracy are important in 
the formation of a new inclusive society, while pointing to the importance of civil society 
and its organisations in the peacebuilding phase. Even though an in-depth analysis of 
these issues will be offered in the next two chapters, it is important to emphasise that the
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creation of a strong state and the institution of a capitalist economy is secondary to the 
reconstruction of common lifeworld contexts.
The primacy of the lifeworld not only stresses the power of undistorted 
communication. It also accents the importance of individual action and the malleability of 
social structures. This is part of Habermas’s work, as he attempts to demonstrate a way 
that individuals meeting in the public sphere can create new discourses and social 
movements that can affect the way society is organised. This is not to say that 
Habermas’s sociological model ignores the work of the system, that is to say the 
subsystem of administrative power (i.e. the state) and the subsystem of the market. He 
emphasises the importance of the system in producing society’s material needs and 
keeping order by devising rules and norms of accepted social behaviour. What Habermas 
does underscore is that system imperatives, which are guided by the mediums of 
administrative power and money, must not guide the social integration of society or the 
socialisation of its citizens. This responsibility must be left in the hands of individuals 
freely operating in the public sphere, which is ingrained in lifeworld contexts.
In the end, communicative peacemaking efforts are driven by a humanitarian 
interest that places the needs and interests of those directly affected by the conflict’s 
dynamics before outside intervener’s interests. The institution of a negative peace based 
on social order, regional stability, and peacemakers’ attainment of their interests does not 
solely define the success of a peacemaking mission. Instead, peacemaking missions are 
successful if they can institute a positive conception o f peace at the societal level and 
stability at the international level. By positive peace it is meant a condition that is entirely 
representative of society’s members needs and interests, while also stressing the 
importance of social change driven by individuals in processes of undistorted 
communication.
The attainment of international stability is important because peacemaking would 
not be possible if the strongest international actor (e.g. a hegemon) does not lead or 
approve such an operation. As Habermas’s analysis finds, the importance is to empower 
individuals to reconstruct their broken bonds so they can build a new society. 
Peacemaking in this sense is not about the reconstruction of international orders, but that 
of domestic orders, even though the resolution of conflicts and the reconstruction of
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fractured social relations can potentially re-enforce the organisational principles of 
international orders. Just as Habermas believes that the institutions of the state is 
important because it makes the work of the public sphere possible, the construction of 
internal orders according to the values of communicative rationality must include a role 
for international actors. International peacemakers have the resources to assist the parties 
constitute new social orders. Without the international community many of these 
conflicts would end when one side imposes its values, norms, and identities on its 
opponents. This reality just re-enforces the legitimacy of violence as a tool actors can 
employ to fulfil their self-interests, while giving strategic forms of action free play in 
established social systems.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
States and non-state actors are working with and against each other to transform 
oppressive social systems according to internationally recognised principles of social 
organisation. The recent outbreak of intrastate war, fuelled by ethnic antagonisms, has 
forced international actors to intervene in these conflict situations in hopes of settling 
them. Regrettably, and as experienced in Bosnia, these wars, and all the inhumane acts 
that characterised them, have become all too common.
Consequently, peacemaking activities have dramatically increased in the last 
decade. Because most of these peacemaking missions have faced many challenges, the 
academic community has been creating new analytic tools to assist peacemakers achieve 
their objectives in a more efficient manner (Stem and Druckman 1999). In this way, this 
thesis, influenced by Habermasian thinking, shows the influence of the strategic approach 
to peacemaking, while also presenting a competing approach that can stimulate a debate 
on the feasibility of contemporary peacemaking practices to secure the basis of a self- 
sustaining peace in conflict situations, propelled by ethno-national claims.
It is important to emphasise that this thesis’s objectives, while influenced by 
Jones’s work on the Oslo peace process, goes a step further. Because Habermasian 
thinking is both a theoretical and a practical project, this thesis provides an alternative 
peacebuilding programme modelled on the communicative approach. While Jones work 
is similar to this thesis in that both works critique a peace process to explain how it was
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influenced by strategic conceptions of peacemaking, Jones’s work is uncertain about the 
feasibility of the Habermasian project. This is not the case in this investigation, as it 
illustrates the significance of the communicative approach to peacemaking as a 
theoretical resource to construct new peacebuilding efforts that make the peace in Bosnia 
self-sustaining.
This divergence is not stressed to reduce the significance of Jones’s work. 
Indeed, both works deal with different types of peacemaking initiatives, as peace in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is usually defined strategically. The objective of the Oslo 
Peace Accords was supposed to institute a process that would have secured the 
independence of Palestine. This is exactly what the international community has been 
trying to avoid in the Bosnian case.
Habermas’s ideas do not only explain how and why individuals are motivated to 
co-ordinate their actions, but more important his theoretical project also provides insights 
on how to integrate divided societies via communicative action processes working at a 
macro-sociological level. In other words, Jones’s only deals with one aspect of 
Habermas’s work. He focuses on Habermas’s micro-sociological investigation, but fails 
to consider Habermas’s macro-sociological work, as captured in his conception of 
deliberative democracy. This is an important fact that clearly demonstrates the 
differences between Jones’s book and this investigation.
With this said, this critical assessment of the Dayton peace initiative must answer 
the following question: what factors determine the success of a peacemaking initiative? 
An answer to this question needs to see peacemaking in a systemic manner. Hence, the 
success of this initiative is related to the general success of peacemaking activities in its 
three constitutive stages (i.e. pre-settlement, settlement-making, and post-settlement 
peacebuilding) and by clearing defining the interests that motivated peacemakers to 
intervene in a given conflict situation. In addition, peacemaking initiatives can only be 
successful if these address the following problems at three different levels of analysis: (a) 
the international, (b) the regional, and (c) the domestic.
For this reason it is important to keep in mind Robert Cox’s (originally published 
in 1981, republished in 1996: 87) oft-quoted assertion: ‘Theory is always fo r  someone 
and fo r  some purpose’; meaning that theories are not conceived in a social or a political
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vacuum. They emanate as a reaction to a social problem, by which it can show how to fix 
the problem in order to preserve the established social order or to demonstrate the 
importance of social change. Theories are conceptualisations of the social world, 
providing guidelines for human action. In so doing, theories define the moral and ethical 
limits of human praxis, which provide a sense of legitimacy to certain kinds of actions, 
while denouncing other practices. For this reason, the move from strategic forms of 
peacemaking to communicative forms starts at the level of theory. Thus, theory is in itself 
a practical way of demonstrating the inadequacies of the strategic approach and the 
significance of its communicative counterpart.
It is important to note that this chapter’s comparative analysis of the strategic and 
communicative approaches to peacemaking have said little about the challenges outside 
interveners and contending parties face in post-conflict situations. Building on this 
comparative analysis, the next chapter will demonstrate how the tenets of the strategic 
approach have influenced state-centred forms of peacebuilding, while chapter three 
questions the soundness of these practices, arguing that society-centred peacebuilding 
strategies, founded on the ideals of the communicative approach, can best make 
negotiated peace agreements self-sustaining.
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CHAPTER TWO
State-Centred Peacebuilding: The Challenge of Social Integration in
War-Torn Societies
INTRODUCTION
The single greatest challenge all social systems face is the problem of social integration. 
It is even more difficult in multiethnic societies, where citizens do not see themselves as 
part of one single group, but as part of different groupings; each with its own traditions, 
identities, and values. This problem is even more complex in newly re-created, war-torn 
societies that have experienced prolonged ethno-national violence. As the number of 
ethno-national wars increase, the international community and the discipline of 
international relations have devoted more time and resources to explain the causes and 
consequences of these wars and to device practical mechanisms to resolve existing wars 
and prevent their future occurrence.
Keeping in mind that the success of peacemaking initiatives depends on how 
peacemakers address domestic issues, this chapter addresses the problem of social 
integration in societies that have started to implement negotiated peace agreements. In 
this way, the chapter argues that international actors’ role in post-settlement 
peacebuilding is influenced by their desire to build internal orders that secure the basis of 
established international orders. Noting that the previous chapter presented two 
approaches to peacemaking and argued that strategic forms of peacemaking have played 
a dominant role in contemporary international affairs, the analysis provided in this, and 
the next chapter, continues with last chapter’s comparative analysis and re-affirms the 
dominance of strategic forms of peacemaking. As a result, this chapter demonstrates how 
the tenets of the strategic approach influence peacebuilding operations.
The post-conflict stage is the most crucial stage in any peacemaking initiative, as 
a negotiated peace can only be viable if the parties are willing to put their weapons aside 
and work together to create a new society and establish a self-sustaining peace. But this 
conundrum also demonstrates the difficulty peacemaking initiatives face. As Massimo 
Calabresi (1998: 38) finds, ‘diplomats can negotiate peace, and foreign soldiers can
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enforce it. Well-intentioned civilian supervisors can even provide day-to-day services. 
But no one has ever figured out how to make former combatants bury their hatreds along 
with their casualties.’ This challenge raises an important question: how are war-torn 
societies integrated?
Theoretically speaking, there are two general ways of integrating society. 
Traditional peacebuilding, founded on the tenets of the strategic approach, is based on a 
state-centred understanding of social order. Building on the Western European 
experience, this understanding finds that the state, legitimated via democratic means, with 
its monopoly over the use of legitimate violence, and its ability to legislate and impose 
legal rules, can create the necessary mechanisms to integrate society. Consequently, state- 
building initiatives aims to integrate society by creating strong social institutions that: (1) 
reduce the threat of inter-group conflict, (2) minimise the power of secessionist 
movements, and (3) prevent the outbreak or the resumption of political violence. Even 
though peacemakers argue that democratic mechanisms can secure the peaceful 
integration of society, the state, backed by international actors, arduously works to 
promote the benefits of social integration and provide disincentives, including the use of 
force, to groups and individuals that threaten the established order.
Countering this way of thinking, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato describe a 
society-centred understanding of social order (1990). This understanding is based on 
Habermas’s conceptualisation of society as ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ and his model of 
deliberative democracy. This envisioned paradigm of peacebuilding argues that civil 
society processes should direct these efforts, rather than international actors. This is not 
to say that international actors should not be part of peacebuilding missions. On the 
contrary, international actors should play a vital role in society-centred peacebuilding 
practices, but the objective of the mission should not solely be the creation of state 
structures. These missions must also promote social empowerment, so individuals, 
regardless of their ethnic lineage, can work with other individuals to forge new and re­
structure existing social arrangements according to their needs and interests.
As stated before, this chapter examines state-centred forms of peacebuilding. It 
attempts to show the relationship between traditional peacebuilding exercises and state- 
building programmes, as these have been executed in the Western experience. Hence, this
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chapter maintains that peacemakers’ use of the strategic approach requires them to equate 
peacebuilding with state-building. But, before conducting this analysis, it is first 
important to review some theories of ethnic conflict, as many social scientists and policy­
makers have argued that the Bosnian war was fuelled by ethno-national antagonisms.
I. ETHNIC CONFLICT & THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Since Plato’s Republic, the problem of social integration has challenged the stability and 
subsistence of established political communities (Richmond 1984: 5). Even though many 
studies have addressed this problem and have informed different social integration 
practices, the problem still affects contemporary political systems. Different factors have 
questioned the existence of many nation-states. Although economic transformation 
(prompted by modernisation, a transition to capitalism, industrialisation, or globalisation) 
and political changes (impelled by democratisation) have taken their toll on established 
political orders, many social scientists have noted that the renaissance of ethnicity and the 
economic and political claims associated with this resurgence are responsible for the 
fragmentation o f social orders, the phenomena of “state failure,” and ethno-national 
violence, driven by ethnic groups’ claim to the right of self-determination.
As a consequence, the augmentation of ethno-national violence, following the end 
of the Cold War, has forced international relations scholars to devote more time to 
understand the nature of ethnicity and its relation to the escalation of violence in divided 
societies. From an international relations perspective, ethno-national wars are becoming a 
threat to the established international system; and in the case of this investigation to the 
United States’ and its European allies’ ability to pursue their foreign policy interests. 
Ethno-national wars, while intrastate in nature, have the potential to spread across 
international borders, while creating refugee crises that can affect the economies of 
neighbouring states and the constituents of the developed world. Indeed, the European 
allies wanted to settle the Bosnian war and the one in Kosovo so refugees could return 
home (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000: 4). While Haiti was not driven by ethnic conflict, 
American intervention was driven by the same rationale (von Hippel 2000: 102), even 
though the level of refugees in the United States was lower than those of Bosnia’s 
citizens in Western Europe.
57
With this said, an ethnic group is commonly defined as a community of people 
that share one or a combination of the following elements: a language, a common 
territory, past historical experiences, cultural traditions, and religious beliefs. Although 
most scholars agree with this definition, they disagree on the nature of ethnicity and its 
relation to inter-ethnic conflict. Anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists, to a 
certain extent, have examined and explained this relationship by means of two 
paradigms: primordialism and instrumentalism. A third paradigm has been added to this 
debate in the post-Cold War era. Termed, constructivism, it questions primordial and 
instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict by demonstrating that ethnic conflicts tend to 
escalate in certain types of society and they are driven by both material factors and the 
protection of a particular way of life.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the individual works of Edward Shils and 
Clifford Geertz introduced the foundations of primordialism (Wicker 1997: 2-4). 
Supporters of this approach perceive ethnicity and its traits as fixed. These are understood 
to be biological traits or a set of cultural practices, passed from one generation to another, 
that are so ingrained in the ethnic makeup of the group that these are seen as immutable 
and permanent. In essence, primordialism believes that the complex historical processes 
that have defined the main attributes that differentiate one ethnic group from another 
group are responsible for inter-ethnic conflicts (Smith 1986: 3-17). For this reason, 
ethnic identity is central in the construction of political communities, overriding other 
types of social identities. Ethnic conflicts are inevitable and all attempts to settle these by 
transforming social structures or by weakening a group’s identity will be fruitless as this 
would threaten a group’s way of life, forcing it to struggle for the creation of its own 
political community (Smith 1991).
In the case of Bosnia’s ethnic war, proponents of this paradigm have argued that 
the partition of the country is the best formula to end and prevent the future re-ignition of 
hostilities, as conflict and violence between the three ethnic groups is inevitable. While 
this approach is popular in some political circles, it is limited in at least two ways. First, it 
does not provide an adequate explanation of why some ethnic groups have transformed 
their identities with the course of history. For instance, while many rejected the League of 
Communists’ national “Yugoslav” identity, many of today’s Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats
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and Bosnian Serbs once described themselves as Yugoslavs (Burg and Berbaum 1989; 
Malcom 1994; and Weine 1999). Second, and more important, primordialism’s 
incapacity to account for the peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups within the 
structures of different societies, raises many questions about this approach’s 
understanding of ethnic conflict. A vast amount of sociological and anthropological 
literature documents how Bosnia’s three ethnic groups lived in harmony between 1945 
and 1991 (Bringa 1993; and Weine 1999). Many critics maintain that ethnic conflicts are 
not necessarily about the protection of identity or a way of life, but about access to 
political and economic resources (Sisk 1996: 12).
Building on these two criticisms, the instrumental paradigm holds that ethnicity is 
not fixed; it is subject to manipulation. As a result, instrumentalists view ethnicity as a 
mechanism used by individuals in position o f power and influence to achieve a set of 
material goals. Elite sectors of society mobilise people by reminding them of historical, 
physical, or ideological affinities that unite them in order to encourage them to struggle 
for a common cause. In this respect, political or economic leaders disguise their 
individual objectives by arousing collective emotions. As Ernest Gellner’s (1983) 
research on nationalism emphasises, this becomes a process of social engineering to unite 
various interests under one common identity and a set of shared goals. Instrumentalists, 
mostly influenced by Gellner’s link of nationalism to the rise of modernity, argue that 
ethnic conflicts are a by-product of conflicts for material resources among different 
sectors in any communal order. It is important to stress that instrumentalists believe that 
conflict for material and political resources are characteristic of any form of social 
organisation.
Instrumentalists argue that the fall of Yugoslavia was caused by a political power 
struggle between the different leaders of the country’s republics. Consequently, each 
leader employed the “ethnic card” as a tool to mobilise its followers against other groups 
that were equally struggling for the same resources. Although this paradigm is extremely 
popular, David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1998: 6) criticise it by pointing out that 
‘ethnicity is not something that can be decided upon by individuals at will, like other 
political affiliations, but is embedded within and controlled by the larger society.’ This 
approach therefore ignores how social structures can construct, deconstruct, strengthen or
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weaken ethnic identities. Ethnicity, as Milton Esman (1994: 13) argues, has to be 
interpreted within a ‘relational framework.’ Esman’s observations and primordialism’s 
and instrumentalism’s inherent flaws have led Lake and Rothchild to synthesise aspects 
of these two contending theoretical frameworks to produce one that might account for the 
nature of ethnicity and its relation to conflict in the post-Cold War world. They have 
called this the constructivist paradigm.
Constructivism recognises both the social roots and the natural character of 
ethnicity. This approach holds that ‘as social interactions change, conceptions of 
ethnicity evolve as well’ (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 5). In this sense, ethnicity is not 
necessarily conflictive. Ethnic conflict ‘is caused by certain types of what might be 
called social pathological systems, which individuals do not control’ (Lake and Rothchild 
1998: 6). While political leaders might attempt to mobilise ethnic groups, according to 
their self-interests, different forms of societal organisation provide institutional 
counterweights that hinder them from accomplishing their objectives. Thus, 
constructivism argues that political leaders that want to mobilise ethnic groups to attain 
their own self-interest have to transform the way society is organised first, so they can 
dismantle the social structures that will inhibit them from fulfilling their interests.
For instance, the mobilisation of ethno-national movements in Yugoslavia during 
the mid-1980s had to first weaken the ideological apparatus that had traditionally kept 
these movements from expressing their sentiments or attempting to transform the 
established social order. In fact, the late Franjo Tudjman, who was a strong supporter of 
Croatian nationalism and eventually became Croatia’s president in 1990, tried to achieve 
this objective in the late 1960s by challenging the League of Communists’ (LCY) version 
of the events that occurred during the Second World War. Tudjman’s views were 
menacing because Josip Broz Tito’s state-building project was based on Partisan’s 
victories, which were often exaggerated. Tudjman’s re-interpretation de-legitimised 
Tito’s official historical interpretations and presented competing visions of the future of 
the country (Glenny 1999: A34). Tudjman was only one of the many dissenting voices 
that emanated in Yugoslav society. To assure the viability of the Yugoslav state, Tito 
took a two-faced conflict intervention strategy. Tito ordered the arrest of those that 
promoted dissenting ideas, but he successfully managed the escalating conflict by starting
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the reform process that led to the Constitution of 1974. The latter strategy repressed 
counter-hegemonic tendencies, while the other appeased the masses, which wanted social 
change. The important aspect of this policy is that it gave the Yugoslav state primacy in 
the reform process (Lampe 1996: 294-98). In the end the message was simple, the LCY 
controls all social processes, while defining who could participate in these processes.
Consequently, the destruction of Yugoslavia had to first deconstruct the idea of 
Yugoslav unity and the state apparatus that enforce this idea. Once this was done, 
nationalist political figures, as Tudjman, Slobodan Milosevic, and Milan Kucan, were 
free to construct new political identities and form social structures to support such 
identities. These identities were built on ethno-national characteristics imagined or 
reconstructed from the past. The breaking of these structures destroyed the networks that 
had kept society together and the “official” history of the Yugoslav nation was replaced 
by the particular histories of each ethnic group. Neighbours became strangers and as the 
conflict became more pronounced the stranger became the enemy. Each community saw 
the other as an obstacle to its self-determination, so the path was to divide Yugoslavia 
into other nation-states, even if this path led to war and the suffering and deaths of 
thousands of civilians.
It is important to notice that individuals could not stop the leaders from inducing 
the break-up of Yugoslavia. Indeed, there were many people, especially in Sarajevo and 
Tuzla (Campbell 1998: 3-5) that resisted these ethno-national projects (Glenny 1993: 
142). Many of these people did not see themselves as Muslim, Croat, or Serb, but as 
Yugoslavs. Despite the fact that they were against the division of country, their views 
were not influential because the structures of Yugoslavia did not provided an outlet for 
their expression. In fact, each community controlled its own media outlets, thus the 
interpretations of social events were manipulated according to the interests of ethno- 
national political movements. Universities and research centres were not independent, so 
they could not challenge their political leaders’ actions. In short, there was no civil 
society, as the ones that developed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, to counter the 
perspectives endorsed by each republic’s power structure (Leff 1999). Would history be 
any different if these groups could have been able to participate in society and challenged 
these false stereotypes that painted members of other ethnic groups as enemies? It would
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be difficult to say, but multiethnic societies founded on democratic principles that have 
not fallen prey to ethnic violence attest that individuals’ participation in political 
processes of will-formation can prevent leaders from conducting their self-interested 
projects.
The constructivist paradigm establishes that the sources of ethnic conflicts are 
usually related to the nature of political communities. Most types of social organisations, 
though differing on their philosophy, agree that the state is a necessary institution because 
it can achieve the integration of society. This is part of the development of the state 
throughout modem history. The problem with this understanding is that the state, 
historically speaking, has initiated processes of inclusion and exclusion. Essentially, 
states that erect boundaries that differentiate one ethnic group from other groups usually 
influence these excluded groups to struggle for the transformation of society or for the 
creation of their own nation-states. In this light, the constructivist approach is important 
because it ‘enhances our understanding of ethno-politics by suggesting that the origins 
and consequences of ethnic groups, nations, nationalism, and ethnic conflict in world 
politics are contextual and interactive’ (Robertson 1997: 266). Thus, this paradigm 
suggests that the transformation of society and the construction of new social processes 
that destroy these exclusionary practices and open social structures to all individuals or 
groups can redress the pathological currents inherent in this types of societies.
In the context of this doctoral thesis, the significance of this paradigm is that it 
allows theorists and policy-makers to study the nature of ethnic conflict and the outbreak 
of ethnic violence through the ‘system-lifeworld’ model proposed by Habermas (1987) or 
the ‘state-society’ model presented by Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue 
(1994). These models attempt to explain the integration of social systems by asking the 
following question: which sphere of social life should integrate society and determine the 
working of modem social systems? Because ethnic conflicts affect the workings of these 
systems, an answer to this question also determines which peacemaking approach is used 
to address these conflicts. Those analysts and policy-makers that believe that the ‘system’ 
(or the state) is more important than social relations tend to argue that peacebuilding 
activities must create state structures and market mechanisms in order to regulate the 
behaviour of social groups and individuals and re-order society according to its vision of
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strategic rationality. Alternatively, those that believe that lifeworld processes should 
direct the integration of society and determine its workings argue that peacebuilding 
activities must rehabilitate shattered inter-ethnic communicative networks. These 
processes will enhance the activities of civil society and allow individuals and groups to 
organise and transform society’s institutions according to their interests, values, and 
interests.
It is important to notice that both models are not entirely contradictory. Both 
argue that the system and the lifeworld or the state and the society are necessary elements 
of any social system. Notwithstanding, peacemakers using the strategic approach tend to 
reduce the importance of social relations and give primacy to the creation of state 
structures as a prerequisite for the institution of a self-sustaining peace. Unsurprisingly, 
these peacemakers tend to explain ethnic conflict and the outbreak of ethno-national 
violence through the lenses of the instrumental paradigm. They fail to see how ethnic 
discourses are constructed and reproduced in divided societies, how these challenge the 
established order, and how these mobilise group members to struggle for social change.
Explaining ethnic conflicts and the outbreak of violence via constructivism not 
only informs this thesis, but it confirms the view that the sources of ethnic conflicts are 
usually related to the way society is organised. Thus, peacemakers employing 
constructivism’s insights to explain ethnic conflict should also draw on the insights of the 
communicative approach to intervene in conflict situations. By focusing on how state 
structures and inter-ethnic competition can destroy the fabric that holds society together, 
these peacemakers tend to emphasise that a self-sustaining peace must give way to new 
social relations that permit individuals to work together in forging a new society that is 
representative of all forms of life and tolerant to difference.
II. STATE-CENTRED PEACECUILDING
Strategic peacemaking efforts are informed by instrumental explanations of ethnic 
conflict. Competition for resources and control over state institutions lead leaders of 
ethnic group to mobilise their communities to support secession or the transformation of 
the established order. The state’s failure to manage or settle this conflict permits these 
groups to pursue their objectives via violence. As a result, peacemakers create detailed
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peace initiatives that attempt to establish the foundations of new state structures, while 
providing incentives and disincentives to pressure the combatants to put down their 
weapons and to enter co-operative relationships with their former enemies. Seen from 
this perspective, peacemakers are in the business of re-making “failed states” into viable 
nation-states. Therefore, peacemaking efforts, especially those practices executed in the 
post-settlement peacebuilding stage, are closely associated to state-building projects.
From historical and theoretical perspectives, state-building and peacebuilding 
practices seem to be two different tasks. In the case of Bosnia and other contemporary 
post-conflict situations, the marriage of these two projects best explains the current 
actions of the international community. To understand the link between these two 
projects, it is first important to define the elements of state-building projects. This 
examination is conducted in section one, while section two presents how “traditional” or 
mainstream understandings of peacebuilding practices embrace aspects of state-building 
projects to achieve internal order and international stability.
A. Defining State-Building
Due to length constraints, it is difficult to conduct an in-depth review of state-building 
projects. However, it is important to note that these projects were not only the key to the 
economic, political and cultural development of advanced Western democracies, but they 
also have become the standard developing countries must adhere to if they want to reach 
the same levels of development. In many ways, state-building strategies enabled states to 
transform ‘state-nations’ (Saravamuttu 1989: 3) into nation-states.
While there is no such thing as a singular state-building project, it is important to 
highlight a number of common elements that most state-building enterprises share: (a) the 
centralisation and consolidation of state power; (b) nation-building strategies that enable 
the state to address the competing claims of universal and particular interests; and (c) 
economic modernisation projects.
It is essential to notice that this thesis’s definition of state-building differs from 
nation-building. Indeed, nation-building exercises are an integral part of state-building
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projects. In addition to these common elements, it is necessary to recognise how the 
constraints and opportunities the international system places on state-building initiatives 
affect their ability to attain their objectives. Whereas some international actors might 
support these state-building programmes, other actors, especially those that form part of 
an emerging global public sphere, have been calling for more humane ways of achieving 
the stabilisation of social orders and the institutions of self-sustaining peace. Nonetheless, 
the international community, especially its strongest members, have been supporting 
more robust state-building programmes in order to stabilise the international system and 
prevent the outbreak or proliferation of secessionist-armed struggles.
Building on these assumptions, state action is guided by a need to rationalise 
social relations in order to reduce complexity and increase the overall stability of the 
system (McCarthy 1981: 228-229; and Habermas 1975). Complexity becomes a threat to 
established social orders because social events that cannot be controlled can result in 
different crises that question the institutions and practices that administer society. Hence, 
the state and its administrative apparatus are means to an end (van Creveld 1999: 189- 
91). The end is social order, as order supports the rationalisation of social life, which is 
supposed to reduce social conflict and support processes of economic modernisation and 
collective self-determination; the former satisfying the material needs of society’s 
members, the latter permitting individuals to meet their self-interests with like-minded 
individuals via the state’s legal apparatus. As a result, the state and its legal system 
assume ‘a superordinate position vis-a-vis the socio-cultural and economic systems’ 
(Habermas 1975: 5).
It is also important to keep in mind that state-building projects were made 
possible by an important historical turning point. This was the Treaty of Westphalia, 
which’s provisions set the foundations of the modem international system. As Stephen 
Krasner notes (1993:235-36), the “Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is routinely understood to 
have ushered in or codified a new international order; one based on independent 
sovereign states rather than on some earlier medieval concept of Christendom, or 
feudalism, or empires.” In essence, the Treaty stipulated that territory, clearly controlled 
by a sovereign, was the ‘key requirement for participation in modem international 
politics’ (Knutzen 1992: 71). In order to assure that a sovereign would keep control of his
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or her territory, the Treaty also specified that a sovereign would be free to do as he or she 
pleased within the boundaries of the nation-state. As a consequence, the concept of 
sovereignty also ascertains that other nation-states cannot interfere in the domestic 
matters of other nation-states.
The reasoning for this non-interference standard is simple. It would minimise 
international conflict, help nation-states strengthen their capabilities, via state-building 
projects, and, in the end, strengthen the balance of power system set by Westphalia’s 
architects. While this chapter does not study the impact the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 
has had on international relations, it is important to keep in mind, as Charles Kegley and 
Gregory Raymond (2002) have recently argued in a recent book, that many contemporary 
practices in international relations stem from the ideals, concepts, and principles 
enshrined in this document. The question for the purpose of this study is the following: 
How did these principles, concepts, ideals, affect state-building projects in Western 
history? Seen from this perspective, the Treaty of Westphalia did not only set the 
foundations of the modem international system, but it also enabled new intra-national 
mechanisms to flourish and challenge “pre-modem” patterns of state-society relations 
(Ruggie 1993).
1. State-Society Relations and the State-building Project
The concept of territoriality allows for the establishment of the political boundaries of 
society. Armed by the principle of sovereignty, the state was in the business of 
establishing these boundaries. But, the state’s drive to organise society according to its 
visions has usually been opposed by different social classes or social groupings. The 
state, as Anthony Richmond suggests, has used different strategies to achieve its 
objectives. Historically speaking, the state has relied on two approaches (Richmond 
1984: 5).
The first represents societies as being held together by the coercive power 
of the dominant groups whose interests are, in the last resort, maintained 
through military force. This force is used to repel external sources of 
threat as well as for the maintenance of order within society. The 
alternative view emphasizes the importance of a common value system
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which binds people together in a social contract or consensus concerning
the necessity for order.
The first reflects Max Weber’s definition of political power, characteristic of modern 
statehood: a monopoly over all instruments of legitimate violence. Nonetheless, coercion 
can go so far as modem revolutions have demonstrated. The state needs to create policies 
that are attuned to citizens’ needs and interests, thus the alternative of permitting citizens 
to influence and participate in the process of societal integration. To this extent, the 
distinction of these two approaches is purely theoretical, as both ‘operate simultaneously 
and with varying degrees of emphasis’ (Richmond 1984: 5). For any regime to hold 
power in the long-term it needs to find way of legitimating its practices. Without a degree 
of legitimacy, integrating society to assure necessary conditions of stability and peace 
will not eventuate. Without these conditions, society would be economically 
impoverished and politically vulnerable to other visions emanating from within or outside 
its boundaries.
Richmond’s insights on the combination of these two practices correspond to Joel 
Migdal’s attempt to define modem society by way of an analysis of state-society 
relations. Migdal notes that there are at least two definitions. On the one hand, society 
can be understood as a site of contention between different elements or agents that want 
to dominate the organs of the state in order to institutionalise its ideal conception of 
social order. This definition views ‘society as fragmented, often conflictual, organizations 
exercising social control; the emphasis here is on the components of society -  its innards 
-  and how the parts of the melange interact’ (Migdal 1996: 93). The other definition notes 
that societies are cohesive units. ‘This is a definition that points to the unity of society 
and, in particular, questions of integration...’. To put it simply, this interpretation 
highlights the state’s ability to construct a sense of ‘boundedness, or that outermost 
structure’ (Migdal 1996: 93) that holds society together. Building on these two 
perspectives, Migdal’s definition is a synthesis of these two, holding that societies are 
essentially made up of conflicting elements that are brought into line by the institutions of 
the state. But, the opposite is true as well. The state’s hegemonic ambitions and its violent 
strategies can serve as a stimulant to counter-hegemonic struggles, leading to the 
disintegration of society. The end-result depends on the mechanisms the state employs to
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integrate society. As Kalevi J. Holsti (1996) points out, states’ that lack popular 
legitimacy are more likely to experience outbreaks of collective political violence, than 
states’ that have the support and approval of its citizens.
Migdal’s conclusions reveal an important reality: the dialectic between state 
power and social resistance means that society is essentially divided into public and 
private spheres. The state represents the interests of the public, while the private 
individuals make the other sphere. The clash of public and private spheres gives life to 
civil society, where discourses give life to social movements that support or counter state 
action (Habermas 1996a: 353). Ironically, while the clash can give rise to civil society, 
this does not mean that civil society can organize society independently of the state, as 
the state has to enable its workings by granting and protecting individuals’ rights and 
freedoms so they can come together in informal processes of political will-formation 
(Chandhoke 1995). It is important to notice how Migdal’s definition, as the other two, 
assigns the state a significant role in the integration of society. Consequently, the 
principal paradigm of societal evolution centres on the need of building a state and its 
institutions in order to establish social order. This project, which can be named state- 
building, ‘is the process by which the state not only grows in economic productivity and 
government coercion, but, also, in political and institutional power’ (Jaggers 1992: 29). 
In other words, a state-building project is a strategy used by the social elite to organise 
society according to their needs and interests, while forcing other social groupings, which 
might not necessarily approve of this undertaking, to support their project.
Ordering society according to the state’s vision is more than just creating social 
institutions to support the state-building process. In fact, the state must also create an 
ideology that specifies which acts are legitimate or illegitimate. This ideology must 
incorporate ‘cultural and political forms, representations, discourses, practices and 
activities, and specific technologies and organization of powers that, taken together, help 
to define public interest, establish meaning, and define and naturalize available social 
identities’ (Nagengast 1994: 116). State-building enterprises can be described as a form 
of colonisation. Instead, the colonising project is not implemented by foreign elements 
per se, but from within.
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State-building projects, though aimed at creating order, do actually foster social 
conflicts and acts of collective violence. As Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. 
K. Organski (1981: 902) find in their study of state-building projects in Western and non- 
Westem societies, ‘increasing central state claims for resources -  for the material means 
of state-making and domination -  intrude into and compete with preexisting structures of 
rights and obligations which tie those resources to sub-national collectivities and/or 
“polities.” Conflict, resistance, and violence are...often the result.’ However, this same 
study also reveals that in the long-term state-building projects can provide the basis for 
order by transforming their practices and permitting repressed voices to express 
themselves and influence the organisation of society. But, this is done once the 
protagonists of this project have been able to significantly secure their bases of power. 
Therefore state-building projects are paradoxical in nature. Stability can only be achieved 
after a period of violence conducted by the state against certain element in their societies.
The state’s centralisation of power and the monopolisation of force represent only 
one face of state-building projects. As Cohen, Brown and Organski suggest, the state- 
building project eventually establishes social order. How is this done? Once the state has 
consolidated its power base, it executes nation-building and economic modernization 
programmes. The reasoning behind these programmes is to demonstrate to society’s 
citizens that the attainment of the state’s interest will benefit them as well. To this extent, 
these strategies are designed to create support for the state-building enterprise. In the 
end, nation-building and economic modernisation projects are implemented to build 
legitimacy for the way society is organised. The former is instituted to allow people to 
participate in the state-building project and to satisfy an individual’s psychological need 
of being part of a community, while the latter is practiced in order to meet the material 
needs of society’s members. State-building projects aim not only to centralise and expand 
the state’s power base, but they also intend to establish an ideology that can solve the 
conflict between the universal and particular, bringing diversity into line with the state’s 
conception of uniformity.
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2. The State and the Integration o f Society
Nation-building strategies were a product of the challenges the Enlightenment presented 
to the absolute state and its state-building initiatives. The Enlightenment was aimed 
against totalising ideologies that infringed on individuals’ human rights and their abilities 
to achieve full self-determination and freely accomplish their full human potential 
(Habermas 1997: 89). The absolute state’s monopoly of political and military power was 
challenged through violent and non-violent revolutions. The bourgeoisie was asking for 
more participation and when the absolute state attempted to enforce order through force, 
the bourgeoisie rallied the masses to overthrow the “old regimes.” This was probably best 
exemplified by the French Revolution. The French Revolution, though legitimising many 
of the Enlightenment’s ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, did not weaken the 
institutions of the state or undid the importance of territoriality in the ordering of political 
spaces. In fact, these principles were strengthened.
The absolute state was not a nation-state, but what Paikiasothy Saravamuttu 
(1989: 3) calls ‘state-nations’. While the absolute state aimed at stripping power away 
from rivals that lived within the boundaries of its territory, augmenting its authority over 
the country, it dedicated little attention to define the integral components of the political 
community or the identity of its subjects. The new “enlightened state” had to build 
nations to support its state-building project (Seth 1995: 49-51). The by-product of this 
reality is nationalism or the doctrine, which ‘pretends to supply the criterion for the 
determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, 
for the legitimate exercise of power in the state...’ (Kedourie 1994: 1). Hence, 
nationalism was supposed to allow individuals to participate in the nation-state and 
achieve the individual self-determination promised by liberalism, one of the strongest and 
most influential political philosophies of the nineteenth century.
As it turned out, the state did not only define political space according to 
territoriality, but it also started to identify who could participate in society’s political 
processes. Generally, the state constructed political identities, often reflecting those of a 
stronger ethnic group or an elite class, which were to be imposed on the rest of society. 
The goal was the creation of a homogeneous society, where difference could be 
eradicated. The existence of heterogeneity was seen as a threat to the state’s control of
70
society, because those individuals or groups that desired to resist these homogenizing 
mechanisms could potentially challenge the state and its state-building project. How did 
the state conduct this homogenising or hegemonic project? Using “enlightened” 
administrative practices, the state apparatus grew by building legal systems based on 
positive law that would enforce its rules and values on its subjects (Knutsen 1992: 117). 
In addition, public schools were created and language was standardised and competing 
dialects were pushed out from the public sphere into the private sphere, where they 
eventually died. Police departments were assembled and national militaries were equally 
engendered. These new armed forces did not rely on mercenaries, but on regular citizens. 
Thus, the state permeated all social spheres and promoted its ideals and values as 
unquestioned truths.
Nation-building mechanisms were established to create a more homogeneous 
society that would be easier to rule. The aim was to forcefully create a social consensus 
that endorsed the state’s ideological project (Nagengast 1994: 117). As Stuart Hall argues 
(1988: 44): ‘Ruling ideas may dominate other conceptions of the social world by setting 
the limit to what will appear as rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable, 
within the given vocabularies of motive and action available...’ to society’s members. 
Nation-building strategies enabled the state to not only convince individuals that their 
interests and needs were actually taken into consideration, but more important that these 
initiatives satisfied the search for individual and collective self-determination. In the end, 
many individuals believed that the state’s actions resulted from the nation’s will.
The state has utilised these discourses to also satisfy individuals’ psychological 
need of being part of a community, while also assimilating them into a fabricated identity 
that would support the state’s agenda. Nation-building mechanisms also allowed the 
state to find ways to meet the material needs of society’s members. In fact, capitalism 
could not survive without these state-building and nation-building projects, as these set 
the foundations of a national economy. While it was expected that the state should not 
interfere in the workings of the market economy, the state had a role in establishing the 
superstructure to nurture capitalism, promote investment, and encourage industrialisation 
(Wicker 1997: 8). In other instances, the state employed protectionist economic policies 
to deter other national economies from taking advantage of any possible weakness in
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local markets or from undermining the development of key industries (Hobsbawn 1992: 
131-32).
Ellen Meiksins Wood has clearly described the nexus between the development of 
the nation-state and capitalism. She notes that the state became ‘a major player’ in this 
process (1999: 7). Even more provocative, her research suggests that ‘capitalism has 
spread not by erasing national boundaries but by reproducing its national organisation, 
creating a number of national economies and nation-states.’ (1999: 8). Thus, capitalism 
and the nation-state need each other. This can be contrasted with the old economic 
practices of mercantilism and bullionism. Leomard Tivey (1981: 62) maintains that these 
pre-capitalist types of economic organisation, practiced by the absolute state, did not 
support the state-building enterprise. These two economic doctrines supported 
fragmented economic spaces, hindering the state from gaining full control over its 
territory and its material and human resources. The creation of a national economy 
weakened the economic foundations of different regions and its leaders, strengthening the 
position of state institutions and the individuals that supported such state-building 
programmes.
The only problem for the state was that capitalism created more societal problems 
than solutions to old ones. Class conflict grew sharper, alienation of social groups grew 
more acute, and the increasing division of labour made it difficult for the state to keep 
society working as a single unit. Hence nation-building projects were a way of bringing 
dissatisfied groupings within the framework of the state, gaining their support, while 
assuring their role in economic production. This is one of the reasons that Karl Marx 
argued that nationalism was a by-product of the development of capitalism.
While nation-building projects were a way to protect the state and its state- 
building enterprise, the survival of the state was dependent on its ability to promote 
material equality or to better the material conditions of society’s members. Many nation­
states employed socialism and communism as a framework to order their economies and 
societies. Others decided to enable the masses to participate in political processes through 
mass democracy, while in the early twentieth century the democratic Western state, 
armed with Keynesian economic theory, started to not only interfere in the workings of 
market economies, but it actually saved the capitalist project from self-destruction by
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creating the foundations of mixed economies and put in place the foundations of the 
welfare state (Franck 1996: 363).10 In all, the state has taken more responsibilities in 
economic and related social matters (e.g. health care) in order to upgrade its ability to 
control society and hinder revolutionary forces from overthrowing the establish regime.
What is the result of these state-building projects? More specifically, how do 
these projects interfere in the social and manipulate cultural and economic matters? As 
Hans-Rudolf Wicker (1997: 9) observes, ‘the nation thus inserted itself between the 
individual and humanity; and by unifying state and capital, it ushered in the concept of 
totality. ’ Meaning that the state becomes the protagonist of this project, setting its basis 
and allowing for its reproduction by fabricating an ideology or a ‘civil religion’ to 
support its enterprise. The goal was not only to alter society, but to also transform the 
way people understood themselves (Eisenstadt 2000: 19). The importance was to build a 
historical consciousness that all people could relate to in order for these individuals to 
support the state and its societal project. The aim of this shared sense of consciousness is 
necessary for ideological purposes, because its strips individuals from their autonomy. 
Individual self-determination can only be achieved by way of collective self- 
determination, which needs to be translated via state-building mechanisms. In the end, 
this reconstructed understanding of the self, as an integral part of a political community, 
ushers a new understanding of society. As Bjom Wittrock observes (2000: 46), this 
‘entails a decisive shift from an agential -  some would say voluntaristic -  view of society 
to one that emphasizes structural conditions.’
Consequently, these historical changes and ideological reconstruction have 
converted the state into a social institution that is responsible in establishing the 
boundaries of the political, while defending the nation from endogenous and exogenous 
forces. In doing so, it constructs a vision of how society should be organised, while 
institutionalising social structures to achieve this vision. To assure that this project is 
achieved, the state creates social narratives, national sentiments, and in extreme cases it 
uses force to persuade individuals to accept this form of social organisation. Due to this
10 Habermas (1987: 77-111) also employs a similar usage of the term in his analysis of Emile Durkheim’s 
work on the ‘sacred.’
73
reality, the state has ‘the capacity to shape and control the lives of individuals in a way no 
other institution can’ (Chandhoke 1995: 46).
Although the state has been developing different strategies to cope with 
challenges to its rule and authority, the evolving post-1989 system has demonstrated that 
the state is in a moment of transition (Rengger 1997: 256-57). Will the state regain 
control or will it whither and give way to new strategies of societal integration that 
enables human beings to directly influence the organization of society? How does ethno- 
nationalism reinforce or transform this historical progression? If ethno-nationalism is 
such a threatening force, can the international community find new ways of addressing 
this challenge and find a way to prevent secessionist armed struggles or resolving 
existing ethnic conflicts.
B. Peacebuilding as State-Building
Are peacebuilding missions similar to state-building projects? In order to answer this 
question, it is important to first identify the common features of war-torn societies. 
Nicole Ball’s research (1996a: 17-24; and 1996b: 608-10) presents four main 
characteristics:
1. Institutional weakness. This refers to both to the vulnerability of state structures 
and the legal system in the first months of peacebuilding and to the lack of 
legitimacy these have in the eyes of certain individuals or groups.
2. A fragmented and destroyed economic base. War destroys the economic, 
communication, and transportation infrastructures of society. This not only means 
that peacebuilding must address economic issues, but that the lack of a working 
economy will present obstacles to the normalisation of social relations.
3. The lack o f security. This reality is prompted by the existence of different military 
organisations, a lack of neutral police forces, the general accessibility of small 
weapons, and the widespread existence of landmines. The lack of a secure 
environments puts undo pressure on new government structures, strengthens 
social fragmentation, and makes economic recovery difficult; it also supports the 
work of organised crime, discourages inter-ethnic cooperation, fuels corruption 
and inhibits foreign investment.
4. Contextual factors. These are unique to each case. In cases of war tom, 
multiethnic societies, the contextual factors are usually fragmented social orders, 
where trust and a shared sense of commonality among society’s members is low.
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As a consequence, traditional peacebuilding operations equal state-building programmes 
for two important reasons. First, peacebuilding missions contend with the same issues 
state-building programmes face. Second, and more important, peacebuilding missions, as 
Barbara Walter’s (1999: 133) research argues, underscore the importance of state 
institutions: ‘resolving a civil war requires more than reaching a bargain and than 
instituting a ceasefire. To be successful, a civil war peace settlement must consolidate 
previously warring factions into a single state, create a new government capable of 
accommodating their interests, and a new national, non-partisan military force.’ 
Consequently, the existence of a single state is necessary because it can implement the 
provisions of negotiated peace agreements and address the more immediate socio­
economic challenges faced by war-torn societies.
While the formation of state institutions is seen as an important pre-requisite for 
the successful integration o f society, it is important to remember that most ethnic 
conflicts are usually fuelled by a dissatisfied group’s decision to transform social 
institutions according to their needs and interests. Consequently, peacemakers need to 
create a new, inclusive state in which the main warring factions participate in its 
decision-making processes, while distributing political power in ways that produce co­
operative behaviour. For this reason, peacemakers endorse the separation of warring 
parties in the short term, while also instituting mechanisms to integrate society in the long 
term. The separation of warring parties is not only related to the physical separation of 
each party’s military, but also to the re-organisation of the country according to federalist 
principles. As Donald Horowitz demonstrates (1985: 623), the division of the country 
into different territorial units, each dominated by an ethnic group and having its own 
political structures and functions, provides an obstacle to parties that attempt to undo the 
peace agreement and take control of the political process. More important, the creation of 
these units presents an important incentive for the leaders of warring factions to keep 
implementing the peace agreement, as they would probably have control of these political 
units in the short-term.
Many scholars criticise these arrangements because they empower ethno-national 
leaders and create territorial units that can lead to the future partition of multiethnic
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societies (Kumar 1997: 1-37). However, peacemakers contend that the initial levels of 
separation experienced by war-torn societies can be reduced by an open and inclusive 
political system that permits the leaders of each ethno-national group to participate in the 
new central state. By including power-sharing mechanisms, offices and positions in the 
state’s political institutions can be proportionally divided between each community’s 
leaders. This proportionality can be reached by carefully, engineered electoral systems 
that can guarantee the representation of all ethno-national groups in decision-making 
institutions and constitutional provisions that secure the distribution of these offices.
While there are different types of power-sharing mechanisms, it is important to 
notice that the objective is to create an inclusive government that can create economic, 
political, and social policies that are beneficial for the entire country. In this way, the 
central state is seen as a mechanism that re-arranges the political organisation of society 
in order to push through important economic and social reforms. Building on 
modernisation theory and the effects of state-building programs in the Western political 
history, these reforms will increase overall living standards and foster more contacts 
between members of each ethno-national groups in order to create a sense of security that 
will breed economic interdependence and weaken existing ethno-national identities and 
give life to new identities centred around the new state (Hodson, Sekulic and Masey 
1994: 1535-37).
Paradoxically, even though this important objective is at the centre of 
peacebuilding operations, the process that produced the peace agreement challenges it. 
Peacemakers’ decision to negotiate the peace agreements’ provision with the political 
leaders that started the war legitimates their positions. More significant, peacemakers’ 
determination to end the war forces them to sideline moderate leaders that can safeguard 
the long-term success of peacemaking activities. As noted in the previous chapter, these 
moderate leaders are not invited to official negotiation processes because they do not 
have control over armed forces and because these leaders threaten the political positions 
of ethno-national leaders. This is an important observation because research has 
demonstrated that ethno-national leaders are not only more prone to stop implementing 
the peace agreement, but they also are more willing to re-start the war (Kamarotos 1995; 
Moravschik 1996; Stedman 1997; and Walters 1999).
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But, without their participation a settlement cannot be reached. It is for this reason 
that peacemakers make sure that the new country includes strong democratic 
mechanisms, human rights regimes, and confidence-building mechanism that weaken the 
position of extreme ethno-national leaders and their parties’ structures, at least in the long 
term. In theory, the holdings of regular elections, even if these are organised according to 
the principles o f proportionality, will force politicians to compete for votes and tone 
down their rhetoric, producing a political environment for political movements that are 
not centred around strict ethno-national issues, but on issues of concern to the entire 
country. Human rights regimes are included for two important reasons. First, these can 
help rectify the human rights abuses conducted during the war, bringing to justice those 
that perpetrated these crimes or discrediting those politicians that permitted these 
criminals to carry out these wanton acts (Akhavan 1996: 259-61). Second, and equally 
important, peacemakers tend to include strong human rights provisions in negotiated 
peace agreements in order to promote the rights of citizens, empower them to participate 
in the political process, and support society’s democratisation process (Kamaratos 1995: 
502-05; and Hampson 1996b: 545-47).
Confidence-building mechanisms tend to occur at different levels. The most 
important sets of confidence-building measures are usually conducted between the 
different military organisations that waged the war. The objective of these programmes is 
to encourage military and paramilitary organisations to demobilise their troops, to start 
disarmament, and commence the re-structuring of the armed forces so these are in line 
with the peace settlement’s provisions (Hampson 1996b: 542). While disarmament and 
de-mobilisation can increase confidence in both sides, the fear that one side will not carry 
its commitments necessitates the creation of special bodies that can monitor these two 
processes. These bodies are usually set-up by the international community and they 
include members of each of the warring parties (Walter 1999: 135-37).
Two other important confidence-building measures are the restructuring of the 
country’s police forces and the stationing of peacekeepers. During prolonged civil wars, 
police forces become directly involved in the war, rather than offering protection to all 
civilians and up-holding the rule of law (von Hippel 2000: 194; and Stanley and Call 
1997: 107-34). Maintaining the old police force, ‘many of whom were part of the
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problem rather than the solution, undercuts the credibility of the new order and could 
threaten the ability of the new government to manage the transition’ from war to peace 
(Kritz 1996: 592). Peacekeepers can play many roles in post-conflict situations, but their 
main function is to establish a secure environment that is conducive to inter-ethnic co­
operation, while supporting international civilian missions established to oversee and 
enforce negotiated peace agreements.
Each of these tools attempts to strengthen the new legal order and the political 
institutions established by the negotiated peace in order to weaken the position of 
extreme ethno-national leaders and groups that prefer not to implement the settlement. As 
Eva Betram’s research notes, peacebuilding is ‘nothing less than the reallocation of 
political power; it is not a neutral act.’ Thus, peacebuilding operations ‘inevitably favor 
some groups and disadvantage others; like wars, they have losers as well as winners’ 
(Bertram 1995: 394). This reality suggests that the transition from war to peace is not a 
smooth process; it actually is one that is unstable and prone to resumption of ethno- 
national violence.
For this reason, peacemakers remain directly involved in peacebuilding efforts. 
The most successful transitions from civil war are those in which the international 
community helps the parties establish the new state, select a new government, and 
prevent ethno-national leaders from re-starting the war. By sending military 
peacekeepers, police forces, and a civilian mission to monitor and assist local leaders in 
the implementation of the agreement, the international community monitors the parties’ 
willingness to enforce the negotiated settlement. In the more extreme cases, the 
international community assumes full responsibility over the implementation process. 
Under these circumstances, international agents, authorized by the United Nations’ 
Security Council, set-up a proxy government, where by the basic functions of the state, 
including security responsibilities, are performed by peacekeepers, international tribunals 
and civilian missions (Hampson 1996b: 547). The objective of this work is to strengthen 
state authority and to start the state-building process so the new state can take control 
over the peacebuilding process.
This point demonstrate the magnitude of international interests and the 
significance of state-building enterprises in the context of making self-sustaining peace in
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war-torn, multiethnic societies a reality. As peacebuilding missions tend to be founded on 
the tenets of the strategic approach, peacemakers’ interests defined these efforts, while 
sometimes sidelining those of the people peacebuilding efforts are supposedly helping. In 
order to understand how peacemakers’ interests guide these efforts, it is important to 
recognise that the implementation of a peace agreement is not pursued by an unchanging 
peacebuilding strategy. On the contrary, the strategy is adjusted so it can address the 
unforeseen challenges that obstruct the full implementation of negotiated settlements 
(Walter 1999). In other words, the means change, but not the end. The objective is still 
the institution of a new state that can create a variety of economic and social programmes 
that can successfully weaken ethno-national or communitarian structures that promote 
separation in order to integrate society and re-establish the social foundations of a viable 
nation-state. Hence, strategic conceptions of peacebuilding are not only similar to state- 
building projects, but the intended goal of both enterprises is the same
CONCLUDING REMARKS
According to instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict, state institutions have the 
ability of manipulating the organisation of society in order to manage social conflicts and 
even create a “nation” that supports its vision of social organisation. Thus, these 
explanations argue that state-building projects can manage ethnic conflicts and provide 
social stability. In this way, there is a strong correlation between ethnic war and state 
failure. This observation is important because many scholars and decision-makers argue 
that building state institutions, implementing economic modernization programmes and 
executing nation-building initiatives can reconstruct multiethnic societies wrecked by 
war.
As defined in this chapter, peacebuilding missions and state-building programmes 
are similar in nature, because they attempt to achieve social order. However, social order 
does not necessarily lead to the institution of a self-sustaining peace. It is essential to 
return to the questions posed in the previous chapter: does social order equate self- 
sustaining peace? Or, are supporters of this type of peacemaking practices ignoring other 
elements that can make negotiated peace agreements self-sustaining? These are important 
questions that must be answered, as the constructivist challenge suggests that other
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elements affect inter-ethnic relations and the stability of society. Indeed, the 
constructivist critique of mainstream theories of ethnic conflicts suggests that 
instrumental explanations are too simplistic because they fail to capture how the social 
context and changing social circumstances affect the patterns of inter-ethnic relations.
In many ways, the constructivist critique enables the critique of state-centred 
peacebuilding. Taking note of chapter’s one conceptualisation of communicative forms 
of peacemaking, the next chapter provides the theoretical foundations of society-centred 
peacebuilding practices, based on Habermas’s critical theory. As stated in the beginning 
of this chapter, this alternative form of peacebuilding suggests that state-centred practices 
are not conducive to a self-sustaining peace. In addition, chapter three also presents a set 
of propositions that will be used to test the argument that the Dayton peace initiative was 
crafted according to the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking.
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CHAPTER THREE
Society-Centred Peacebuilding: Defining the Theoretical Foundations
of Alternative Practices
INTRODUCTION
Historically speaking, state-building projects are supposed to solve the problem of social 
integration in multi-ethnic societies; meaning that a unitary conception of society 
dominated by the state can impose universal values and principles to bring ethnic 
particularianism, that is to say communitarianism, in line with the community’s universal 
interests. The new state generated by peacemaking efforts embodies international 
recognised principles of social organisation. Consequently, the state becomes a road to 
democracy, market economics and the basis of a self-sustaining peace. While state- 
building initiatives are an integral part of mainstream peacebuilding practices, a growing 
literature has criticised this conception of peacebuilding. The overall failure of this form 
of peacebuilding has led Krishna Kumar to argue that (1997: 33-34):
those charged with designing and implementing political rehabilitation 
interventions lack appropriate conceptual frameworks, intervention 
models, concepts, policy instruments, and methodologies for assistance 
programs to rebuild civil society, establish and nurture democratic 
institutions, promote a culture favourable to the protection of human 
rights, reconstruct law enforcement systems, or facilitate ethnic 
reconciliation in highly unstable political and social environments.
In this sense, there is a need to create alternative understandings of peacebuilding. This 
chapter argues that such mechanisms must move away from traditional initiatives that 
embrace state-building programmes to new ones that stress the importance of rebuilding 
society as a whole. It is important to notice that a society-centred approach does not 
invalidate the central state or the international community’s role to institute a self- 
sustaining peace. On the contrary, state institutions and the international community 
should also play an important role in peacebuilding processes, but this thesis strongly 
argues that international interests should give way to the interests of the people affected 
by the war.
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Building on the characteristics of communicative approach to peacemaking, 
developed in chapter one, this chapter provides the theoretical foundation of society- 
centred practices. It is divided into three parts. Part one presents a critique of strategic 
peacebuilding. Part two presents Habermas’s society-centred social theory. This serves as 
a theoretical foundation to construct a society-centred peacebuilding programme for post- 
Dayton Bosnia. Part three reflects on the examinations conducted in this and previous 
chapters and presents a number of questions and issues researchers must keep in mind as 
they examine the long-term viability of the Dayton peace initiative.
I. CRITICISING STATE-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING
At the most basic level, state-centred and society-centred understandings of 
peacebuilding differ on each approach’s adherence to a specific paradigm of social 
integration in post-settlement situations. State-centred approaches to peacebuilding 
emphasise that the creation of a state can manage and settle social conflict, while assuring 
order and stability. This view is in line with the tenets of the strategic approach. The twin 
objectives of order and stability can permit the state to expand its activity and create a 
new political culture based on state dependence. Thus, it becomes important for social 
groups to participate in the process of state-building as their work and co-operation with 
other groups will assure them a degree of influence over the state’s policy-making 
mechanisms. However, the danger that minority groups might be discriminated by more 
powerful groups always raises concerns about the long-term viability of the project.
In fact, a growing number of critical studies in the discipline of international 
relations and the field conflict analysis have found that state-building processes 
contradict democratic values and their emphasis on peaceful multicultural existence and 
tolerance (Jabri 1996: 157-59; Linklater 1998: 27-34; Smith 1997: 93-96; and Lawson 
1995: 116-36). The success of state-building process requires the state to control social 
processes and transform society according to its interests. From a socio-cultural 
perspective, state-building initiatives must legitimate the state’s actions by generating 
new national identities that tie the will of the people with that of the state. This nation- 
building process not only presents a single identity that is to be share by society’s 
members. More significant, the constitutive traits of this identity impel the transformation
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of other “traditional” identities. This is not to say that the national identity displaces other 
social identities, though this is possible, but existing social identities are brought into line 
with the state’s functional identity.
It is important to also notice that this understanding of peacebuilding does not 
directly deal with issues relating to the problem of inter-communal reconciliation. 
Proponents of state-centred theories of peacebuilding argue that reconciliation is a by­
product of state-building. This is so for two reasons. First, influenced by the instrumental 
explanations of ethnic conflicts, proponents of state-centred peacebuilding believe that 
establishing co-operative relations between each community’s leaders at the state level 
sets an example for the rest of society. These instrumentalist explanations argue that 
identity and the preservation of a particular way of life is not the driving force of ethnic 
conflicts. In this sense, ethnic identity becomes a tool of political change, employed by 
social elites’ who want to organise society in a way that favours their own ambitions. 
Thus, peacebuilding is an elite driven processes, by which peacemakers concentrate their 
efforts at satisfying the needs and interests of these elites in order to create a new state 
where all elites can satisfy their self-interests. If co-operation between leaders is possible, 
then co-operation between individuals at the communal level can be a reality as well 
because the elites will want to decrease the amount of conflict, so society can work 
efficiently.
Second, the legal system set by the state can institutionalise reconciliatory 
mechanisms. By prosecuting those individuals indicted for war crimes, the state starts to 
enable human beings to increase contact across communal lines (Colleta and Nezam 
1999: 4). The establishment of the rule of law, the protection of private property and the 
creation of new security apparatus, enable businessmen to open stores, cafes, and other 
enterprises that hire people and move individuals from thinking in terms of physical 
security and survival to the satisfaction of material needs. In many ways, this concern 
with economic development and the creation of a market economy are guided by the 
belief that individuals’ are motivated to satisfy material needs and interests, thus offering 
a incentive to increase contact among individuals of the different communities.
More important, many studies show that economic progress is a way of 
weakening the position of ethno-nationalism, as leaders of these movements have a
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harder time mobilising their members. However, William Easterly (2000) finds that 
societies divided along ethnic lines generally experience economic growth if there are 
strong state institutions that can enforce the law and create effective economic policies. 
Hence, building or strengthening existing state structures is seen as way of establishing 
the basis of a market economy, while also assisting in the integration of society. Thus, 
economic development should not only increase contact between groups, but also attract 
foreign investors and even set the foundations of civil society.
This state-centred understanding of peacebuilding is basically a trickle-down or a 
top-down social integration strategy. Not surprising, the international community 
attempts to dominate the implementation process by constructing a new state, so this can 
become a caretaker of the process once international agents exit these war-torn societies. 
In many ways, this paradigm of social integration equals this thesis’s understanding of 
strategic peacemaking. Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating (1999-2000: 85) find that 
‘peacebuilding reflect an interest on the parts of governments to maintain stability, or to 
gain influence in particular countries, in order to protect or advance the interests of the 
intervening government.’ The prevalence of this model of peacebuilding has been 
captured by Roland Paris’s (1997) study, a report written by Nat Colleta, Michelle 
Cullen, and Johanna Mendelson Forman (1998) of the World Bank’s Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Unit, and by Francis Abiew and Keating’s (1999-2000) review of 
peacebuilding practices in Haiti. However, these studies also capture the need to develop 
new conceptions of peacebuilding.
Colleta, Cullen and Mendelson Forman (1998: 8) argue that post-war 
reconstruction has been mostly ‘focused on rebuilding infrastructure; it is easier to 
rebuild roads and bridges than it is to reconstruct institutions and strengthen the fabric of 
society.’ In essence, their report notes that reconstructing the fabric of society should be 
conducted by increasing citizens’ participation in the process and by building the organs 
of a strong civil society. In a reflexive tone, they also argue that designing such strategies 
must be aware of the challenges to their effectiveness: ‘Yet to do so effectively, 
development agencies need to better understand how to define and bolster civil society in 
a post-conflict setting; that is, to be aware of how conflict affects civil society, what 
factors increase group cohesion under adverse conditions and which issues are most
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critical for civil society (human rights, health and others)’ (1998: 8). While this is an 
important observation, they fail to answer what values and principles should motivate 
their work in post-conflict situations.
In his criticisms of this traditional paradigm of peacebuilding, Ronald Paris (1997: 
56) notes that it ‘involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic 
organization into war shattered states in order to control civil conflict...’. Paris strong 
normative critique leads him to introduce an alternative strategy he calls: ‘Strategic 
Liberalization’ (1997: 81). Even though this strategy has interesting elements, such as the 
exclusion of extremists in the political process and funding social initiatives to increase 
‘social capital’, this paradigm still argues for the imposition of Western models of 
societal organisation to other parts of the world. Paris is correct to point out the 
deficiencies with this traditional strategy, but he does not consider the probability that his 
strategy’s elements may actually contradict the needs and interests of the people it 
attempts to assist. In addition, this strategy is problematic because it is still caught within 
the boundaries of state-building paradigms of social integration, as social order is still the 
study’s main concern.
Abiew and Keating (1999-2000: 105) agree with Paris, but their concern with the 
ethics of intervention argue that this type of peacebuilding has to be questioned, as 
outsiders might actually ‘become part of the problem rather than the solution. ’ For this 
reason, they do not only argue for new peacebuilding strategies, but they strongly argue 
that ‘outsiders adopt a simple but significant guiding principle when considering 
intervention.... That principle is: do no harm’ (1999-2000: 105). They also argue that the 
creation of new strategies must view peacebuilding as an internal matter ‘in which the 
primary role of outside agents should be directed, first and foremost, at not impeding 
local activities and toward supporting processes and institutions that emerge within 
societies’ (1999-2000: 106).
Building on these works, this thesis presents the theoretical foundations of a new 
paradigm of societal integration in post-conflict situations. This paradigm is influenced 
by Habermas’s investigation on social integration and the research conducted in the field 
of conflict transformation. Whereas the state-centred paradigm focuses on the creation 
and the strengthening of state structures, the society-centred paradigm sees society as a
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space where three social sectors interact and coexist: state, civil society and the market. If 
the former paradigm argues that the state has the ability to define the boundaries of the 
social, while establishing norms and values that regulate individuals and the work 
conducted by the other two sectors, the society-centred paradigm argues that such 
functions are not the state’s responsibility, but those of civil society. Hence, civil society 
becomes the prime social sphere as it empowers individuals and groups to create and 
challenge existing norms and values that give legitimacy to state actions and those of the 
market.
It is important to underscore that this paradigm does support the creation of state 
institutions and market mechanisms, as these provide a legal framework that regulates 
individual actions and provide mechanisms to satisfy material needs and interests. 
However, influenced by the communicative approach to peacemaking, as presented in 
chapter one, a society-centred paradigm of social integration finds that communicative 
processes ingrained in civil society can affect how society is organised by clearly 
influencing the state’s legislative branch and the overall decision-making process. Thus, 
implicit in this understanding of social integration is the belief that Habermas’s 
deliberative democracy can integrate society according to the needs and interests of 
individuals and groups participating in civil society’s communicative processes.
Consequently, the importance here is the building of a strong civil society. Of 
course, the problem with this view is that a strong civil society cannot exist if society is 
deeply divided. Thus, a peacebuilding programme based on this paradigm of social 
integration has to clearly transform the conflicting relations and build a new political 
culture, where all individuals regardless of their ethnic background can meet in civil 
society’s informal structure to discuss issues of importance.
II. HABERMAS’S SOCIETY-CENTRED SOCIAL THEORY
A constructivist approach to ethno-national conflict suggests that social structures play an 
important role in determining the intensity of these types of conflict. Such an approach 
embraces both primordial and instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict, which means 
that group members see themselves in essentialist terms, because leaders have changed 
society’s structures to breed and nurture such views. But, these are not static identities,
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but ones that have been invented and reproduced by different mechanisms; specifically 
by the way society is organised. In this sense, leaders mobilise ethnic groups to attain 
certain material objectives and the preservation of cultural traditions. In divided societies, 
the strategy is to gain control over state structures to define accepted social processes and 
curb the interests and needs of other groups that are competing for control of the same 
state apparatus. In this competitive environment, conflict is prone to turn violent and the 
divisions of society tend to fracture society’s communicative structures along communal 
lines.
In Habermas’s view, these communication structures are crucial in creating a 
‘lifeworld’ or Lebenswelt, which serves as a steering mechanism for the integration of 
society into a single working unit. In this sense, the lifeworld encompasses a background 
of shared knowledge and convictions that are understood by individuals as non- 
disputable. The significance of this concept is that it emphasises that communication and 
social interaction happens in the horizon of this lifeworld (Habermas 1984: 70). More 
significantly, this background of shared knowledge provides the structures of a symbolic 
world that enables the formation and reproduction of identities. In this way, personal 
identity is tied to the collective identity of the communication community at hand. This in 
turns means that societies divided along communal lines do not share a lifeworld. Instead 
each one has its own lifeworld contexts. Under these situations, each group objectifies the 
other and dehumanises11 it in order to present it as an enemy that must be controlled or 
exterminated. Accordingly, the challenge of peacebuilding is to re-build the 
communication structures of society in order to give way to new understandings of given 
a conflict situation and generate new lifeworld contexts that permit the transformation of 
divided societies in order to support inter-communal co-operation and the construction of 
new social orders reflective of the needs and interests of all citizens.
Because this society-centred understanding of peacebuilding is built on the 
theoretical tenets of the communicative approach to peacemaking, it is important to grasp 
how Habermas’s theory of communicative action, as presented in the first chapter, can be 
translated at a macro-sociological level and illustrate how it can induce a new inter- 
subjective politics of emancipation.
11 William Eckhardt (1991) presents an interesting review of de-humanisation processes.
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A. Communicative Action: Micro-Macro Linkages
Habermas argues that society is divided into the system and the lifeworld. The system 
can be separated into two subsystems: the state or the administrative apparatus and the 
market. These are supposed to operate within the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. In 
macro-sociological terms, the lifeworld is not only a background knowledge that makes 
communication and action co-ordination possible, but more important it also serves as the 
glue that holds society together. Moreover this view of society sees society divided into 
private and public spheres. The lifeworld is divided along these two spheres, while the 
market subsystem lies within the private, and the state in the public. Where does civil 
society fall? While this sector was not part of his early analyses, Habermas has placed it 
within the lifeworld, connecting both of its private and public spheres and influencing the 
work of the other two sub-systems (1996a: 366-67).
In many ways, this description of society is important because it enables 
Habermas to address the structure-agency debate. Some theorists argue that social 
structures shape the agent and its behaviour, paying little attention to how social actors 
can shape or transform social structures. Other theorists, in the other hand, argue that 
social actors have a key role in constructing and influencing social processes that affect 
the composition of society. Habermas’s stance is a synthesis of both perspectives. As 
Bernstein contends, ‘we cannot understand the character of the lifeworld unless we 
understand the social systems that shape it, and we cannot understand the social unless 
we see how they arise out of activities of social agents’ (Bernstein 1985: 22). In fact, 
Habermas’s model is not too different from the state-society model provided by Migdal 
in the previous chapter. The only difference, as it will be seen below, is that whereas 
Migdal’s analysis favours the state as a mechanism of social integration, Habermas tends
to support the informal communicative processes of the lifeworld.
The second volume of the Theory of Communicative Action starts with an 
analysis of George Herbert Mead’s social-psychology and Emile Durkheim’s sociology. 
Both these writers, Habermas contends, are instrumental in understanding the function of 
the lifeworld at a macro-sociological level. Mead’s research attempts to understand the
development of the self in society. His theory of symbolic mediated interaction 
establishes that the self is a product of social interactions, where an individual takes the 
role of the other in such a way that an individual internalises the attitudes and convictions 
of others. To put it more simply, ‘I ’ is in constant relation with ‘Me.’ ‘Me’ represents the 
ideals, norms, values, and attitudes of the social group that T  or the self belongs to. This 
role-playing becomes so customary in the behaviour of the self that the self internalises 
these norms and values. Role-playing is in itself a form of reflection that enables the self 
to produce and present these symbols (e.g. values, norms, ideals, etc.), serving as a ‘Me’ 
for other individuals to copy. Mead emphasises that the employment of language and 
symbolic communication frees human action from the natural determinism inherent in 
evolutionary theory.
In addition to this, Mead informs Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics 
(Outhwaite 1994: 84). This theory argues that individuals can join dialogical processes to 
validate, question or establish new moral criteria, responsible in guiding individual 
behaviour, and ‘to define aspects of the “good life’” (Outhwaite 1994: 54). This 
presupposes that individuals that participate in such processes of argumentation are part 
of what Mead called, an ‘ideal communication community.’ Individuals in this 
community are induced to partake on any issues (moral or ethical) that affect their lives. 
These issues retain a universalistic quality, which Habermas has called the principle of 
universalisation (U) (Habermas 1996b: 57-76). The aim of this process is twofold. First, 
argumentation enables the sociation of individuals. In argumentation, while new norms 
might be introduced and old ones might be re-established as legitimate, argumentation for 
it to be successful relies on the competence of speakers to validate their claims in order to 
reach consensus. In all, this process enables the collective will-formation of society, 
which becomes necessary to legitimise established social institutions. Related to this, the 
second objective demonstrates how argumentation processes induce the spread of 
democratic ideals. ‘To the extent that normative validity claims become dependent on 
confirmation through communicatively achieved consensus, principles of democratic 
will-formation and universalistic principles of law are established in the modem state’ 
(Habermas 1987: 96).
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In all, Mead’s theory fits within Habermas’s framework of analysis because it 
supports the significance of his theory of communicative action. It is important to notice 
that Mead contends that the development of the self, and the evolution of society, does 
not take place on the basis of a solitary subject confronting an object in a physical world, 
but on the level of subject-subject relations in a common lifeworld.
Durkheim is important for Habermas’s theory because his theory shows how in 
traditional societies religion renders a symbolic representation of society, where the 
beliefs and norms of the ‘sacred’ re-affirm the values of the community. More important, 
Habermas is interested on how the transition from traditional to modem social structures 
secularises the sacred, but replaces it with a ‘collective consciousness’ that serves the 
same role religion plays in traditional society. This collective consciousness is similar to 
Habermas’s description of lifeworld processes that give meaning and purpose to 
individuals’ lives. What is important to notice is that Durkheim, and Habermas agrees 
with this claim, believed that society could not function if all citizens behaved 
strategically in order to satisfy their own needs and interests at the expense of others. 
The ‘healthy’ evolution of society is therefore dependent on the existence of collective 
norms that guide an individual’s behaviour.
Like Habermas, Durkheim saw the paradoxical role the state could play in 
providing this new religion. This has been pointed out by Montseratt Guibemau’s essay, 
‘Marx and Durkheim on Nationalism.’ Her analysis shows that the reproduction of 
society is dependent on the moralisation, e.g. socialisation, of its individuals, so they can 
act according to established norms. While Durkheim disputed that the state is a social 
actor, which’s chief role is to expand justice within society, he also argued that it ‘needs 
to be restrained by the totality of secondary forces that are subordinate to it but without 
which like any unrestrained organism, it develops excessively and becomes tyrannical 
and forceful.’ (Cited in Guibemau 1997: 81). The solution then rests on his ‘secondary 
forces’ that lie between the individual and the state, thus pointing to civil society where 
individuals meet to regulate the actions of the state. This last point reflects Habermas’s 
sociological and political objective, as developed in Between Facts and Norms.
In this way, Mead and Durkheim ‘provide a kind of theoretical bridge to a fully 
developed theory o f communicative action.’ (Rasmussen 1990: 34). Both these writers’
90
individual investigations permit Habermas to use their work to expand his micro- 
sociological analysis into a macro-sociological one. Consequently, the lifeworld has to 
be comprehended as more than a ‘horizon’ or background were action geared at 
achieving understanding takes place. Now, the lifeworld is also a steering mechanism 
that reproduces the symbolic structures of society via mechanisms of social integration. 
As demonstrated in Mead’s and Durkheim’s analyses, these symbolic structures are 
significant in the evolution of society, in the socialisation of individuals into a set of 
inter-subjectively endorsed norms, and in the enhancement of an individual’s capacity to 
learn new ways of inter-subjective ly relating and communicating with other individuals. 
According to this interpretation, the lifeworld is responsible in producing meaning by 
way of establishing cultural values, norms and ideals of justice and individual and 
collective identities. In doing so, the lifeworld enhances human freedom by establishing 
procedures for individuals to change the composition of the lifeworld through processes 
of argumentation in practical, moral and ethical discourses. As a result, communicative 
processes, ingrained in lifeworld contexts, become a steering mechanism that guides the 
actions of the ‘system.’
In contrast to the lifeworld, the system refers to a social sphere in which processes 
reproduce the material conditions of society. While the lifeworld-system model seems to 
suggest that the lifeworld and the system ‘lie parallel to one another, they are 
interconnected: system mechanisms have to be anchored in the lifeworld, that is, 
institutionalised’ (McCarthy 1984: xxx). Conceiving society in this way allows 
Habermas’ to transcend the Frankfurt School’s analysis of reification in modem social 
systems. ‘What is needed,’ Habermas maintains, ‘is not just a critique of instrumental 
reason such as Horkheimer and Adomo developed, but rather a “critique of functionalist 
reason,” which can be obtained only when a systems perspective is integrated with a 
communicative model of action’ (White 1989: 104). By functional rationality, Habermas 
means the type of rationality that increases the complexity and the capacity of the system 
to take on driving functions in society. In essence, the augmenting complexity of the 
system enables the ‘uncoupling of the sub-systems of the economy and administrative 
activity from the lifeworld’ (Cooke 1994: 6).
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Empowering these two sub-systems, in the task of stripping the lifeworld from 
integrating society through the medium of communication, are the mediums of money 
and administrative power. In many ways, the sub-systems use their respective mediums 
to colonise and distort the composition of the lifeworld so they can achieve their 
particular interests. Because the co-ordination of action in the lifeworld is not conducted 
via communicative action, but by the functional integration of the system through money 
and power, society as a whole is deformed, reducing the ability of individuals to co­
ordinate their actions and to restructure society according to their visions. The 
consequence of this is the three-fold increases of alienation, reification and anomie, 
which accompany the loss of meaning and freedom and lead to the fragmentation of 
society. While these three outcomes seem to question the suitability and credibility of 
developing strategies of political emancipation, Habermas provides insights for the 
transformation of these social pathologies.
B. Deliberative Democracy
In a recent interview, Habemas was asked by Mikael Carleheden and Rene Gabriels to 
compare two of his models of political activism to stop the encroaching power of the 
state and the market and organise society according to the needs and interests of society’s 
citizens expressed via communicative action mechanisms. In the first model, developed 
in the second volume of the Theory of Communicative Action. Habermas argues that 
‘citizens must besiege the political processes of judgement and decision-making without 
intending actually to take it over’ (1997: 148). In the other model, introduced in Between 
Facts and Norms. Habermas maintains that ‘citizens must influence the center, that is 
parliament, the courts and the administration, the communication of influences has to 
pass from the periphery through the sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures’ 
(1997: 148). The former can be called the ‘siege model’ and the latter the ‘sluice model’ 
or deliberative democracy.
The difference between these two models is that Habermas’s first model was 
supposed to stop both the market and state’s attempts to colonise or re-programme the 
lifeworld. In this way, social movements, especially those struggling for environmental 
protection, gender equality and international peace, were supposed to go head on against
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this system forces. Habermas admits that this was an idealistic model because it did not 
specify how to protect the composition of the lifeworld and how to prevent this from re- 
occurring (1997: 148-49).
Habermas does not believe that these social forces, ingrained in the lifeworld’s 
public sphere, should overtake the state and the market. For Habermas, the state and 
market play important roles in society. However, he strongly points out that the state and 
the market have become detached from the lifeworld. This not only means that they act 
independent of individuals’ wishes, but more important they start colonising the 
lifeworld’s structures as means to achieve their own strategic ends. Habermas believes 
that this is dangerous because society then becomes a mechanisms to support the state’s 
or market’s own teleological projects, while minimising the ability of individuals to 
challenge such processes (Blaug 1999: 26).
As a result, the sluice model is introduced because Habermas wants to show 
practical ways social movements can change society’s legal and constitutional systems. 
Not surprising, the analysis is mostly directed at influencing the state’s administrative 
capacity and less on ways to restrict the encroachment of market forces. The emphasis is 
placed on civil society organisations and how they can participate in processes of 
political opinion- and will-formation so they change legal statutes that empower the work 
of the state and market forces. Habermas’s emphasis on the law is not accidental. Laws 
serve as a connection between the system and the lifeworld. In fact, he argues that laws 
are mechanisms system institutions employ to interfere in the workings of the lifeworld 
and rationalise it according to its strategic interests. Even though legal discourses can 
affect the composition of the lifeworld, it is crucial to stress the dual character of these 
discourses. Laws do not only empower the work of the state or make possible the 
efficient operation of market mechanisms, but more important they legitimate the actions 
of civil society organisations. To put it simply, the dual character of legal procedures 
affords state institutions with administrative power and civil society with communicative 
power. The former authorizes state institutions to enforce and use coercion to implement 
laws in order to safeguard the basis of social order and protect established social 
procedures, while the latter form of power grants individuals the freedom to come
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together with other individuals to address matters of mutual concern and to de-limit the 
power of state institutions.
In a democratic system, laws are enacted by the state, but it receives its legitimacy 
from its citizens. While the legal statute is neutral, in the way that it is factual and valid 
once it is employed, the act of writing and enforcing legal norms is a normative process 
that cannot rest solely in the hands of the state. The less legitimacy a legal order enjoys in 
the eyes of society’s citizens, the more coercion or repression of freedom is needed to 
enforce the rule of law. In this manner, Habermas believes that social integration can be 
either driven by ‘circumscribing communicative mechanisms’ that question the validity 
of established orders or by ‘giving these mechanisms unhindered play’ (Habermas 1996a: 
36). The first goes against the democratic ideal, while the latter is consistent with it. 
Faced with this dilemma, Habermas contends that it is important to institutionalise 
communicative mechanisms to keep in check administrative power, while permitting 
civil society processes ingrained in lifeworld contexts to reaffirm or transform society’s 
structures (Habermas 1996a: 147). Thus, he argues that: ‘Through a practice of self- 
determination that requires citizens to make public the use of their communicative 
freedoms the law draws its socially integrating force from the source of social solidarity.’
In The Inclusion of the Other. Habermas starts addressing issues closely related to 
societies that have been divided by ethno-national conflicts. While his work does not 
necessarily specify a peacebuilding agenda or mechanisms of conflict transformation, a 
review of these essays, when combined with his political project, as found in The Theory 
of Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms, do point to interesting ways of 
integrating society, which inform this thesis.
Habermas establishes that contending parties must come together to re-establish 
the legal foundations of society in order to activate public communication mechanisms, 
ingrained in civil society and to construct new definitions of political community. 
Habermas argues that laws serve as the fabric that connects the lifeworld with the system 
and its two sub-systems: the state and the market. It is not surprising that Habermas gives 
preference to the lifeworld over the other two sub-systems, as it is includes civil society 
institutions, which empower participants to freely come and question or reaffirm the 
validity and the facticity of established norms, values, and laws (Habermas 1996a: 366-
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73). Hence laws, as norms and values, are only factual and legitimate, if they reflect the 
needs and interests of society; that is to say if they are ‘able to prove their worth against 
any future objections that might be raised’ (Habermas 1996b: 35).
More importantly, the legal framework, which as noted above reflects the needs 
and interests of civil society, limits state actions and the behaviour of market forces by 
clearly defining their social responsibilities. In a multicultural society, civil society is 
characterised by an arena of competing interests, where no one group dominates policy­
making or implements policies that go against the needs and interests of any other 
groups. But in order for such notions to be effective, they must be made part of a political 
constitution that grants the necessary rights to ensure the equal participation of all 
citizens, regardless of their cultural or political affiliations, in all public processes 
(Habermas 1998: 221). The existence of a multicultural society is dependent on the 
system of rights that its constitution provides to its citizens. These rights empower 
citizens to participate in public networks, and allow for assemblages to contest the actions 
of those individuals or groups that attempt to dominate the political process and impose 
their will on the rest of society.
Consequently, Habermas challenges the notion that successful social integration, 
the ability to define the boundaries of the political community and create policies to solve 
societal problems, can be achieved through the mechanism of the state. He goes a step 
further, proposing that proceedings ingrained in civil society should be directing the 
social integration process, rather than the state and market forces. Even though the 
possibilities offered by Habermas are boundless, his political project does not spell out 
what are the final products of this political programme. It can be argued that 
communicative processes could fail to integrate society because in politics there has to be 
some kind of shared identity in order to truly secure the operation of legal and political 
mechanisms. This is an important observation as the notion of creating a shared identity 
might be the impetus to persuade groups, who are struggling for separation-based 
recognition, to engage alternatively in a reformulation of the nature of an existing 
political community.
In his more recent work, Habermas argues that his ideal society does not have a 
‘thick’ conception of national identity. Instead, he argues for ‘thin’ conceptions of civic
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or post-national identity, where citizens do not necessarily share cultural traits, but they 
share a faith in the democratic principles that make communicative action possible. 
Therefore, this identity is thus the product of a common political culture in which citizens 
recognise themselves as members of their polity (Habermas 1998: 225 and 2001: 60-63).
Because such an identity is directly connected to communicative processes it is 
always in flux and re-adapting to new situations and contexts. In Habermas’s society- 
centred model, civil society is the sphere of progress because it creates and re-fashions 
the boundaries of the political and the social, according to changing circumstances and 
evolving problems. No one person holds access to the ‘truth’ and no ‘truth’ can be 
endorsed until the political community has affirmed its validity through communicative 
mechanisms.
The strength of Habermas political project is its ability to re-align the particular 
interests of society, as expressed in the discourses of the lifeworld, with the universal 
requirements needed to have open democratic processes. This conception of deliberative 
politics points to the possibility of building a multicultural system that affords 
individuals, via legal statutes and constitutional mechanisms, the ability to participate in 
processes of political will formation regardless of their ethnic, economic, or ideological 
background. This envisioned society is not founded on an activist state that dominates 
and shape the boundaries of the social and political, but a decentred society where the 
state and market forces are being directed by discourses and interactions that occur in the 
context of the lifeworld; meaning that the conception of a unitary society dominated by a 
state or a fragmented society along communitarian lines fighting for the state can be 
displaced by a society that permits the satisfaction of individuals’ needs and interests via 
the communicative structures ingrained in the lifeworld’s civil society.
III. EXAMINING PEACEMAKING INITIATIVES
Having proposed the theoretical foundations of society-centred forms of peacebuilding 
practices, it is important to keep in mind that these have had little impact on peacemaking 
processes in the Balkans and other parts of the world. This is not to say that alternative 
peacebuilding practices have not being designed or implemented in post-conflict 
situations. Exceptions do exist. But, for the most part, the international community has
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ignored these alternative peacemaking practices. Is this also the case concerning the 
Dayton peace initiative?
This is an important question, but only in the context of another more critical 
question, what factors determine the success of a peacemaking initiative? As noted in 
chapter one, a successful initiative is one that establishes the foundations of a self- 
sustaining peace, which can be defined by a ex-combatants willingeness to work with 
each other to implement the provisions of a negotiated agreement and address possible 
conflicts associated this agreement’s implementation non-violently. Another element of a 
successful initiative is characterised by the outside actors ability to reduce its presence in 
post-settlement environment, allowing ex-combatants to assume control over their future.
Examining the success of see peacemaking activities is a complex matter because 
so many factors and challenges affect the peace process at different stages. For this 
reason, this thesis argues that peacemaking activities have to be analysis in a 
systemically. In other words, the success of any peace initiative can only be measured by 
its ability to achieve key objectives in its three constitutive stages: pre-settlement 
activities, settlement-making, and post-conflict peacebuilding. The first stage involves the 
political process that enables the international community to convince contending parties 
to stop fighting and meet to negotiate an end to their conflict. The settlement-making 
stage implies that contending actors, with the assistance of outside interveners, will 
negotiate the terms of a peace agreement that can settle the conflict and make the long­
term resolution of the conflict possible. The dilemma is to whether ‘first address the core 
issues in the conflict, which tend to be the most difficult, or to concentrate on peripheral 
issues in the hope of making early agreements and establishing momentum’ (Miall, 
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 1999: 164). Of course, which path is taken affects 
peacebuilding efforts, which are usually guided by outside interveners in order to secure 
the full implementation of a peace agreement and develop new mechanisms that can 
institute the foundations of a self-sustaining peace.
In this manner, peacemaking initiatives can only be successful if they address the 
following challenges at three different levels of analysis. At the international level, 
peacemaking initiatives will succeed, if a peacemaker or set of peacemakers can create a 
strong consensus of what has to be done in order to move contending parties closer to
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peace. This observation builds on the fact that many peacemaking initiatives are not 
driven by a single peacemaker, but by a host of third party interveners that often have 
their own interests. If not conducted in unison, these interveners’ particular initiatives 
may actually impede other peacemakers’ work. A first step towards creating a successful 
peace process entails the production of a single initiative that allows international actors 
to speak in one single voice. This is not only important in pre-settlement and settlement- 
making stages, but also in the peacebuilding stage, as research suggests that settlements 
that can stop the fighting will not necessarily establish a self-sustaining peace (Walter 
1999). Thus, international consensus must also prevail in peacebuilding efforts.
At the regional level, intrastate conflict, which is what is being analysed in this 
thesis, is not only a product of internal events. Regional actors, especially if they have a 
stake on the final outcome of the conflict, can play constructive or damaging roles. 
Peacemakers must be aware of these dynamics and create the proper mechanisms to 
either harness their resources or limit their role to ensure the success of their initiatives.
At the domestic level, because intrastate conflict is primarily driven by groups 
that are struggling for the transformation of established social structures or for the 
creation of new nation-states, the success of a peacemaking initiative needs to generate 
new social structures and co-ordination mechanisms that permit these groups to co-exist. 
Hence, it is important to understand the causes of the conflict to make sure that the 
peacemaking initiative does not establish a political order that re-ignites dissatisfied 
group grievances and allow each group’s political leader to mobilise its constituents 
against newly established structures (Stedman 1997). More important, a peace initiative 
must include mechanisms that integrate society and de-legitimise those political leaders 
that believe violence is the best tool to achieve their particular objectives. The success of 
a peace initiative is dependent on its ability to create and sustain the growth of a new 
constituency that supports non-violent mechanisms to solve issues of contention, while 
equally building new and re-adapting existing social structures to meet the needs and 
interests of all concerned parties in order to establish a self-sustaining peace. In addition, 
and as demonstrated by Lederach’s (1997) work, the domestic level is influenced by the 
dynamics of individuals working at three levels: grassroots, middle, and top.
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Breaking down the challenges peacemakers face into three levels is a useful 
analytic tool that allows researchers to examining if a peacemaking initiative is a failure 
or a success. However, it is important to re-state that this framework does not 
approximate Kenneth Waltz’s framework of analysis presented in Man. the State and 
War (1959). This thesis does not favour one level over the others. Instead, it specifies that 
a successful peacemaking initiative must address each level’s problems and challenges. 
This implies that peacemaking is a systemic process; where by a peacemaker’s work at 
one level can either have negative or positive consequences on overall peacemaking 
efforts. It also captures the complexity of issues, interests, and actors at play in conflict 
and post-conflict situations.
While this framework of analysis can assist research’s examination of peace 
process, there are still a number of unanswered questions that can help researchers 
evaluate the success of a particular peace initiative. It is important to notice that some of 
these questions have been raised in the burgeoning literature on peacemaking, but so far 
there is no consensus on whether these factors are necessary for successful peacemaking 
or if these are challenges to the establishment of a self-sustaining peace.
Noting that consensus between outside parties intervening in conflict situations 
may be the first step in stopping the fighting, start negotiations, finalize a peace 
agreement, and start post-conflict peacebuilding, is the presence of the United States or 
another great power necessary to secure an end to hostilities? More important, what 
mechanisms should outside interveners use to stop the fighting and start negotiations? 
Should outside parties use coercion, compellence, or non-violent mechanisms? I. William 
Zartman’s (2003) research shows that it is possible for non-violent practices to break the 
impasse, but only when contending parties perceive they are in a mutually hurting 
stalemate. As a result, they understand that continuing the fighting would not allow them 
to achieve victory, so they are willing to meet with their counterparts and third-parties to 
consider ways to settle the conflict. Zartman argues that at this stage the conflict is ripe 
for settlement, but he warns that mutually hurting stalemates do not hold for long and that 
peacemakers must quickly act, for if not contending parties would find new ways of 
achieving their interests violently.
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Other researchers have recognized the value of Zartman’s ripeness model, but 
raise normative questions concerning the timing of the intervention (Salla 1997). Should 
outside actors wait for a mutually hurting stalemate to develop, even though this may 
take several months or years and claim the lives of many innocent civilians? Some 
researchers believe that outside interveners can use their resources to drive contending 
parties to a mutual hurting stalemate (Rubin 1991: 239-41). But, should peaceful methods 
be used to create this condition or should coercion be employed? Violence can be used, 
but international pressure through United Nations mechanisms (e.g. sanctions) and public 
opinion campaigns can also be important factors affecting the willingness of outside 
actors to intervene in a given conflict situation.
Thus, some researchers argue that the context is not the deciding factor of whether 
third party interveners can successfully end the fighting and start negotiations that can 
lead to peacebuilding. Outside actors’s willingeness to intervene in a conflict can also be 
a crucial factor (Kleibor 1994 and Lederach 2003). Even though most researchers 
disagree on this issue, they do agree that outside players are important elements of 
peacemaking efforts, for it is highly unlikely that contending factions will solve their 
disagreements peacefully.
Even though third-party interveners are necessary, the literature captures another 
important dilemma: should the peace process be driven by the interest of outside 
interveners or of combatants (Mitchell 2003: 81)? To connect with the first chapter’s 
analysis of peacemaking, outside actors that behave according to strategic definitions of 
peacemaking would intervene according to their own interests. It is not clear, however, if 
their actions would necessarily override the interests of the contending parties or of the 
people directly affected by the fighting. Consequently, different actors would probably 
behave differently. A strong third-party, representing the interests of a powerful country, 
like the United States, may be a necessity in the peace process, but there is always the 
danger that its interests would be driving the process, sidelining the interests or concerns 
of other outside parties or even those directly affected by the conflict. A weaker third 
party, representing smaller countries, influential non-governmental organizations, or 
intergovernmental organizations, may be more willing to construct a peace process driven 
by the concerns of contending factions, but this will not secure an end to hostilities, as
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this type of third party may not have the resources to force the factions to stop fighting or 
prevent them from breaking a negotiated cease-fire (Du Toit 2003: 67-68 and Guelke 
2003: 60).
Who should outside actors invite to negotiate an end to the conflict? Usually, 
representatives of warring factions play an important role in settlement-making activities. 
But, should representatives from other political groups not involved in the fighting, but 
who could play an important role in peacebuilding, be invited to the negotiations? It 
seems that the decision of whether who gets invited to the talks is determined by the 
context of the situation. One argument is that outsiders meet with those that can assure 
and end to the hostilities and who are willing to start the peacebuilding process. In some 
cases, extremists are not invited at all, even though they can become spoilers of 
settlement-making and peacebuilding mechanisms. Stephen John Stedman’s (2003: 111- 
12) research on peace spoilers suggests that it is important to think of ways to reduce the 
potential of failure and secure the success of a peace agreement by paying more attention 
to who is representing the interests of those involved in the conflict.
As noted in chapter one, outside parties tend to engage the factions that started the 
fighting because they are the ones that can stop the fighting. In exchange for their co­
operation, their views are legitimated and they are given a chance to negotiate the future 
of that society, which they have attempted to forcibly reform or destroy. Because their 
participation is necessary and because outsiders want to see an end to the fighting, 
negotiations may produce a peace agreement that does not tackle all issues of contention. 
Outside parties may attempt to push the parties to consider ways to transform their 
societies according to new ideals and values, but fear that the parties would boycott the 
negotiations or not endorse the peace agreement provides a strong incentive to get an 
“incomplete” peace agreement and address other important issues of contention in the 
peacebuilding phase.
This raises questions regarding the role of outsiders in peacebuilding. As noted at 
the beginning of chapter two, this phase is the most important because a negotiated peace 
can only be viable if the parties are willing to put their weapons aside and work together 
to create new institutions that can secure the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. 
Because outside parties do not want to see a resumption of hostilities, they need to play a
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key role in post-settlement efforts. But, what should their role be? Should they administer 
the country, monitor the implementation of the peace agreement, or use their resources to 
force the parties to live up to their commitments? Outsiders’ role also raises questions 
regarding peacebuilding missions. Should these missions implement the peace 
agreement, even if some of people feel its provisions are illegitimate, or should these 
missions attempt to find a resolution to the conflict by transforming society?
From a theoretical standpoint, strategic forms of peacemaking would be informed 
by a need to settle the conflict. Nevertheless, a settlement can break down and fighting 
could start once again. The failure of peace settlements in Rwanda in 1994 and in 
Cambodia in 1997 serves as a reminder that a settled conflict is not necessarily resolved. 
In light of the questions and dilemmas raised above, how can peacemaking initiatives 
best secure the long-term viability of a peace agreement? Is resolution of a conflict the 
only way peace can become self-sustaining? Consequently, are the strategic and 
communicative approaches to peacemaking polar opposites or can they be complimentary 
in the process of transforming a negotiated settlement into a self-sustaining peace?
Keeping this framework of analysis and the many factors and dilemmas that 
complicate the establishment of a self-sustaining peace in mind, it is necessary to 
examine whether the Dayton peace initiative is a success or failure. If it is a success, 
lessons need to be extracted to guide researchers working in other conflict situations, but 
if it is deem a failure it is important to consider how it can be reformed to guarantee the 
long-term viability of the peace agreement. As noted earlier, an answer to this question 
will also shed light on an important theoretical issue: whether strategic and 
communicative approaches are opposites or complementary. This thesis’s concluding 
chapter will revisit these questions and issues once again.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the most complicated challenges the international community faces is not only the 
prevention or the resolution of ethnic-based conflicts, but also the reconstruction of these 
societies once the parties agree to end the fighting. Because the reconstruction of these 
societies starts in the realm of theory, chapter two presented three paradigms employed 
by international relations scholars and practitioners to understand the nature of ethnic-
102
based conflict and to device practices that can lead to the successful reconstruction of 
these societies after prolonged periods of violence. Note the significance of Robert Cox’s 
(1996: 87) oft-quoted assertion that: ‘Theory is for someone and for some purpose’; 
meaning that those individuals that explicate the causes of ethnic-based conflict via the 
lenses of one of these paradigms are more likely to create peacebuilding practices that 
closely resemble the insights of these explanations.
In this respect, peacemakers that examine the dynamics of ethnic conflicts 
through the lenses of the primordialism would intervene to partition society. As ethnic 
conflict is inevitable the possibility of peace can only be secure by separating the parties 
or allow them to fight until the strongest party eradicates the existence of the weaker 
other. Because primordialism tends to nullify the assertion that peacebuilding exercises 
can integrate society, this thesis does not address this any further.
On the other hand, peacemakers that believe that the instrumentalist paradigm 
best explains the origins of ethno-national conflict believe that peacemaking efforts must 
deal with political entrepreneurs responsible for the conflict so they can come together to 
create the foundations of a new society that enables these entrepreneurs to meet their 
needs and interests. Instrumentalism’s emphasis that identity is malleable suggest that if 
elites are willing to co-operate in order to build state institutions that can guarantee the 
elite’s access to power and material resources, then social relations will normalise as 
well. The fact that the conflict was started by political entrepreneurs ability of mobilising 
the masses equally means that they can de-mobilise them and foster new peaceful 
relations. Instrumentalists tend to advocate the importance of state-centred peacebuilding 
projects. Thus, it is based on the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking.
If the constructivist paradigm presents a more complicated picture of society, in 
which ethnic based conflicts are a product of the interplay between changing social 
circumstances and how these shape ethnic identity, then the motivation for human action 
may not only be about controlling another ethnic group, but also by a genuine concern to 
come to understanding of a given social situation with other individuals. This perspective 
finds that ethnic-based conflict results from the way society is organised. Consequently, 
peacemakers employing a constructivist analysis tend to employ the insights of the 
communicative approach to intervene in conflict situations. By focusing on how state
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structures and inter-ethnic competition can destroy the fabric that holds society together, 
these peacemakers tend to emphasise that a self-sustaining peace must give way to new 
social relations that permit individuals to work together in constructing a new society that 
is representative of all forms of life and tolerant to difference. While this chapter 
demonstrates the importance of society-centred understandings of social order and 
deliberative forms of democracy, it is important to note that this model does not 
invalidate the existence of state structures or the work of international organisations in 
post-conflict situations. Habermasian understandings emphasise that the proceedings of 
civil society, when grounded on open communicative processes, can serve as a steering 
mechanism to integrate society. Hence, the international community and state institutions 
should enhance the work of civil society organisations by providing a set of laws that 
enhances their work and their ability of influencing the administrative organs of society.
Having made clear the connections of these explanations of ethnic conflict and 
understandings of peacebuilding it is important to also stress the importance of the 
analyses conducted in part one of this thesis in the context of those investigations 
conducted in part two, which reviews the processes and events that shaped the creation 
and implementation of the Dayton peace initiative. Chapter one conducted a comparative 
analysis between the strategic and communicative approach to peacemaking. While it 
presented a framework that explained peacemakers' motivation to intervene in conflict 
situations, it did not address the problem of social integration in divided societies. This 
problem was addressed in chapter two and in parts one and two of this chapter. Chapter 
two demonstrated how traditional conceptions of peacebuilding were analogous to state- 
building programmes. This chapter presented the theoretical foundations o f a society- 
centred peacebuilding programme and provided framework analysis researchers can use 
to judge the success of peacemaking initiatives.
Part two of this thesis conducts an in-depth investigation of the events that led to 
the creation of the Dayton peace initiative and to its implementation in Bosnia. In doing 
so, it attempts to answer two important questions. First, has the Dayton peace initiative 
been a success or a failure? Second, are communicative and strategic understandings of 
peacemaking complimentary or just different techniques of addressing conflict 
situations?
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PART TWO:
THE DAYTON PEACE INITIATIVE
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Bosnian War, International Quarrels, and the Motivation for
American Action
INTRODUCTION
Part one introduced the theoretical debates and questions guiding this doctoral thesis 
assessment of the Dayton peace initiative. It argues that the strategic approach to 
peacemaking influenced the decision-making process that generated this peace initiative. 
It also contends that this peace initiative has been unable to realise a self-sustaining peace 
in Bosnia. Hence, this critical assessment attempts to answer the following question: Has 
the Dayton peace initiative succeeded or failed to institute a self-sustaining peace in 
Bosnia?
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a short review of the social 
dynamics that provoked the Bosnian war in the spring of 1992. This review introduces 
the domestic actors responsible for starting the war and demonstrates how Croatia and 
Serbia encouraged the conflict. Second, this chapter examines the interests that motivated 
the Clinton administration to take control and assume the leadership of international 
peacemaking efforts in Bosnia. This analysis gives weight to the proposition that the 
success or the failure of a particular peace initiative depends on a peacemaker’s ability to 
create a consensus among international actors of what must be done to move the 
contending parties closer to the negotiation table. This chapter is divided into two parts. 
Part one reviews the causes of the Bosnian war in the context of Yugoslavia’s violent 
dissolution. Part two explains the development of the Clinton administration’s response 
to Bosnia from 1993 to the summer of 1995.
I. THE BOSNIAN WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF YUGOSLAVIA’S UNMAKING
The national elections of 1990 secured an end to Yugoslavia and its state-building 
programme; a process that started with Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980 (Hayden 1996: 
790). Under Tito, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) had successfully 
managed Yugoslavia’s historical inter-ethnic rivalries and had painstakingly coerced
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ethno-national leaders from challenging the integrity of Yugoslavia. Ivo Banac (1992) 
writes that the unity of Yugoslavia did not only depend on the unity of its leadership, but 
also on the LCY’s ability to prevent ethno-nationalist leaders from challenging the LCY’s 
“official” historiography. Indeed, the LCY’s reconstruction of Yugoslavia’s history, 
specially the Partisan struggle during the Second World War, was not only necessary to 
forge new bonds between the ethno-national groups, but it also served as a mechanism to 
engineer a new supranational Yugoslav identity. In many ways, Tito’s famous slogan, 
‘Brotherhood and Unity’, encapsulated the meaning of this fabricated identity: historical 
brothers united for the same cause -  the unity of Yugoslavia (Godina 1998: 417).
Even though Tito vigorously campaigned for the creation of a strong unitary 
society organised around a strong state, Yugoslavia’s republics, especially Slovenia and 
Croatia, resisted such attempts. To the outsider, Yugoslavia seemed to be a federal 
system headed by a central state, but in reality it was a confederation of different 
republics held together by the LCY and the Yugoslav People’s Army. As in most 
communist societies, political and economic power resided in the LCY’s internal organs. 
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was deeply divided along ethno-communal lines. It is important 
to note that the conflict between the centre and periphery was compounded by intra­
republic tensions. While each republic, to a certain extent, attempted to preserve its own 
national identity and way of life, this identity and culture contradicted the identity and 
culture of minority groupings. This is not to say that all individuals refused to accept the 
Yugoslav identity. In fact, Steven Burg and Michael Berbaum's research (1989) shows 
how the acceptance of a Yugoslav identity grew from 1.3 percent of the total population 
in 1971 to 5.4 percent by 1981.
For Yugoslavia, the problem was that the state never achieved the full integration 
of society, because the republics resisted such programmes. There was an inherent 
contradiction in the political system, that is to say an institutionalised struggle between 
the Unitarians and the communitarians; the former campaigned for a strong central state, 
the latter struggled for its exact opposite. This is one of the reasons why Yugoslavia re­
wrote and amended its constitutions so many times (Ramet 1984). This fault line and 
ethno-communal struggle was reproduced in Bosnia, as it was a republic with not a single 
constituent nation, but with three recognised nations. The Bosnian Muslims were actually
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officially recognised as a constituent nation in the mid-1960s, which’s decision angered 
the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, especially the latter as they controlled Bosnia’s 
political system (Bougarel 1996: 93).
Shortly after Tito’s death, an economic crisis started to set in, communist 
ideology started to be questioned, the easing of the Cold War meant that international 
assistance decreased, and a new wave of liberalisation questioned the position of the LCY 
(Woodward 1995). Not only did the republics get more power, but also there was a 
revival of nationalism that started with historians’ re-interpretations of Yugoslavia’s 
“official” history (Denich 1994). Indeed, politicians would use these re-interpretations as 
fuel to mobilise the masses. For instance, Slobodan Milosevic’s move to power was aided 
by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts’ Memorandum that stipulated that ‘too 
many Serbian national interests had been ceded in exchange for bargains that were not 
longer being kept by the leaders of other republics’ (Denich 1994: 371). Serbian 
intellectuals started to propagate similar ideas, showing how they were the victims of 
many historical injustices. What happened in Serbia was soon to take place in the other 
republics, especially in Croatia. Denich (1993) argues that the rise of nationalism had 
served as an attack on the communist system. Instead of containing disputes within the 
organs of the LCY, each community’s leaders would appeal to their particular publics to 
support their struggle in order to put pressure on the other republics and the central state 
to change the political organisation of society.
Amidst all these controversies, the League of Communist of Bosnia (LCB) 
attempted to stabilise the republic’s political process by re-affirming its support of 
Titoism. Being the most divided of the republics, the LCB attempted to use all its power 
to hold everything together, but to no avail. This is not to say that the individuals in 
Bosnia did not believe in multi-ethnicity. Research clearly shows that Bosnia enjoyed one 
of the highest levels of inter-ethnic tolerance in Yugoslavia (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey 
1994). Even more important, Bosnia had the highest percentage of mixed marriages in 
Yugoslavia, which sociologist argue is an indicator of tolerance and commonality in 
divided communities (Weine 1999: 19-20; Hodson, Sekulic and Massey 1994; and 
Bringa 1993). Moreover, Anthony Oberschall’s (2000: 992) ‘content analysis of new 
stories published in Oslobdjenje for 1990 indicates that municipalities, youth and
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veterans’ organizations and trade unions repeatedly protested against ethnic polarization 
and hatreds.’ Even more critical, as Mary Kaldor demonstrates, it was in Bosnia where 
YUTEL, the Yugoslav television network that served as mechanism to spread and 
reproduce the Yugoslav values, ‘was most popular’ (1999: 41).
By September 1990, after the failed attempt to reconvene the XIV Congress of the 
LCY, Bosnia had three dominant political parties, mostly based along ethno-national 
lines. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), associated to the HDZ in Croatia, the 
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), closely associated to Milosevic’s party organisation, 
and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) competed with other 38 parties in the 
republic’s first democratic elections since the end of the Second World War. These took 
place on 18 November 1990, a couple months since the creation of a multiparty system in 
Bosnia. The results confirmed the communitarian nature of Bosnian politics. The SDA 
received 30.4% of the vote; the SDS received 25.2% and the HDZ 15.5%, while the rest 
was divided among the rest of the non-national, civic parties.
In light of the large quantity of data that supports the thesis that people in Bosnia 
supported cosmopolitanism, why did people in Bosnia vote along ethno-national lines? 
At least two reasons explicate this phenomenon. Xavier Bougarel (1996: 97) makes an 
excellent point.
Over a period of forty years, in the absence of political pluralism, the only 
chance the inhabitants of Yugoslavia had to express a free and individual 
choice was [...] in the census. These were held regularly, so that every 
individual had a regular opportunity to declare his nationality -  or to 
declare no nationality. This fed the rivalries and clientism of the 
competing political elites, in that the results of the census served as a base 
for the distribution of top posts, according to the principle of the 
‘nationality key’ (proportional representation of the various national 
communities)
In addition, Susan Woodward (1995: 124) argues that:
In a world of competing symbols and personalities, at a point of political 
transition, nationalism has a particular advantage. The message is simple, 
relies on the familiar, takes little resources, does not have to develop new 
political language to develop and explain the complexities of democratic 
institutions and market economy... nationalist appeals thus provide the
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easiest route to politics for politicians without established constituencies 
and party organizations.
Both opinions are accurate and may explain why individuals in Bosnia, which had shown 
support to the ideas of multi-ethnicity and tolerance, had voted for nationalist parties. An 
analysis of the results, demonstrates that the strongest ‘support for the nationalist parties 
was particularly strong in economically underdeveloped areas, in ethnically 
homogeneous areas, among the rural and neo-urban population, and among the lower and 
less educated socioprofessional groups’ (Bougarel 1996: 97).
In this way, the nationalist parties were successful because they represented a 
portion of the population that feared the possibility of being deprived of a better life, if a 
new government was created or dominated by one single group. Oberschall (2000: 995) 
notes that the nationalist parties had no trouble persuading people from their respective 
ethno-national community to support them because they made it clear that to vote for 
non-nationalist, civic minded parties would be detrimental to their community’s overall 
position, as the other communities would vote for nationalist representatives.
Nevertheless, 28.9 percent of voters supported non-nationalist civic-minded 
parties. These supporters compromised Bosnia’s individuals that had benefited from 
Yugoslavia’s self-management socialism. Members of trade unions, urban intellectuals, 
and working-class individuals that resided in the wealthiest areas of Bosnia strongly 
supported these parties. Even though the majority voted for the nationalist parties, it is 
important to also point out that most of these peoples were not nationalists. ‘The 
politicians elected were more nationalists than their voters’ (Oberschall 2000: 995).
While different identities existed, the existence of a cosmopolitan culture was still 
a reality. Even after the secession of Slovenia and Croatia and the rampant war that pitted 
Serbia against Croatia, the Bosnian government commissioned a demographic study in 
the spring of 1992 that concluded that ‘over 10 percent of Sarajevo’s population (56, 473 
people) [still] called themselves Yugoslavs’ (Glenny 1993: 142). But things started to 
change for the worse once Yugoslavia started to violently dismember.
As Serbs and Croats fought each other in the Krajina, the Bosnian Serbs started to 
call themselves Serbs. Some sectors of the Bosnian Croats started to assert themselves as 
plain Croats. It was these simple semantic changes that commenced the division of
110
Bosnia’s cosmopolitan culture into different ethno-national pockets. These changes were 
mostly sparked by Slobodan Milosevic’s and Franjo Tudjman’s territorial ambitions in 
Bosnia. Even though they were caught in a war, Tudjman and Milosevic met in private 
and committed to the projects of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia by working together 
to forcefully destroy Bosnia and divide its territory among them (Mahmutcehajic 1999: 
222). This is known as the Karadjordevo agreement and Bosnians that were committed 
to the unity of the territory impeded its actualisation.12 '
Since the beginning of the Yugoslav wars, the Bosnian Serb leadership was 
committed to the destruction of Bosnia, though the SDA had agreed, along with Bosnia’s 
other political parties, to preserve the integrity of its boundaries. In the summer of 1991, 
Radovan Karadzic, leader of the SDS, ‘began demanding the secession of large parts of 
northern and western Bosnia, which would then join with the [Serb populated] Croatian 
‘Krajina’ to form a new republic’ part of Greater Serbia (Malcom 1994: 224). Spectres of 
a civil war were made even more visible in Bosnia during Yugoslavia’s last days, when 
the Yugoslav Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, released evidence that Milosevic 
and his colleagues were supplying arms to the Bosnian Serbs.
Although sectors of the Bosnian Croat population did support the destruction of 
Bosnia and its annexation to Croatia, the Bosnian branch of the HDZ, led by the 
moderate, Stjepan Kljuic, campaigned for the preservation of Bosnia. Bosnian Croats’ 
desire to maintain the unity o f Bosnia was purely strategic however. As the smallest of 
the three ethnic groups, the Bosnian Croats made and informal alliance with the Bosniaks 
to fight for the conservation of Bosnia. It was argued that this alliance would counter­
balance future Serbian aggression and prevent their incorporation into Serbia. In January 
1992, Tudjman interfered in the workings of the HDZ and forced Kljuic out of power. 
Mate Boban, who shared Tudjman’s Greater Croatia, replaced the moderate leader (Sharp 
1997-98: 108-09).
The Bosniaks, whom mostly supported the SDA, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, did 
not only support the unity of Bosnia, but it also argued for its existence as a multi-cultural 
country. But even the SDA’s call for peaceful communal co-existent must be questioned,
12 Susan Woodward shows evidence that Milosevic and Tudjman had met in private several times before 
this meeting to talk about their plans to divide Bosnia (1995: 172).
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as Izetbegovic attempted to establish the strict ‘political organization [of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina] along communitarian lines’ (Kaldor 1999: 43). In this way, the SDA was 
committed to an ethno-national agenda that searched for the most practical means for 
Bosniaks to preserve their identity and the integrity of the country. Izetbegovic’s strategy 
attempted to accomplish this through constitutional means. He knew that if the SDA 
tried to put into action this strategy via illegitimate means, Bosnia’s state system, which 
he was trying to preserve, would crumble. The survival of the Bosniak community could 
only be achieved by way of the continued existence of the state, which was equally what 
Tudjman and Milosevic needed to destroy in order to annex parts of Bosnia 
(Mahmutcehajic 1999: 231-32).
Even though many social movements campaigned for the unity of Bosnia across 
the republic, these did not change the course of events. The nationalist parties had 
consolidated their power and through their control of media outlets and local government 
structures they started the mobilisation of their respective communities (Burg and Schoup 
2000: 62). Pressure was put on those that refused to support nationalist programmes. For 
instance, Bosnian Serbs that did not support the SDS’s struggle were fired from jobs and 
completely marginalised. In a United Nations report, published in 1992, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki (1992: 8-11) notes that those elected officials that attempted ‘to prevent acts 
of violence were dismissed or replaced by Serbian extremists.’
Because there was an absence of strong social structures that would protect the 
idea of cosmopolitanism or multi-culturalism, the nationalist parties were free to de­
construct the idea of unity and strengthen the divisions between the communities. The 
affirmation of separate ethno-national identities and competing political goals set the 
stage for one of the bloodiest and deadliest armed conflicts in recent European history. 
The communication structures that connected the three ethnic groups into a single society 
were destroyed months after Bosnia declared its independence in the spring of 1992. As 
a consequence the SDS proclaimed the creation of the Republika Sprska (RS). In July of 
the same year, Boban’s HDZ established the independent state of Herzeg-Bosna. The 
SDA for its part had to reaffirm the existence of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina and set up 
the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect the interests of the state and attempt to 
forcefully integrate the renegade regions. This goal was not to take place at the outbreak
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of hostilities, as the SDA, thanks in part to the arms embargo placed on the former 
Yugoslavia by the United Nations, had a tough time in arming its military. Their 
counterparts, the Croatian Defense Council (HOV) and the Republika Sprska Army 
(RSA), were being armed by Croatia and Serbia respectively.
After three years of war, the death of thousands of people, a clearly planned and 
carried out genocide by all conflicting parties, countless of broken cease-fires, and 
innumerable Western attempts to stop the fighting, the leaders of the three ethno-national 
groups were forced by the US and the members of the EU to stop the fighting and 
negotiate a settlement that would end this senseless war. The outcome of these 
negotiations was the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (GFA). With the cessation of hostilities, the international community faced 
a more difficult task: the reconstruction of Bosnia and the institution of a self-sustaining 
peace that would thwart each group’s aspiration of constructing an exclusive national 
community.
Why did the international community take so long to settle the war? Why did the 
United States’ Dayton initiative succeed at settling the war, when European ones failed? 
What were the motives and interests that influenced America’s foreign policy 
establishment to craft a response that eventually led to a settlement? Answers to these 
questions will be provided in part two of this doctoral thesis.
II. AMERICA’S DECISION TO INTERVENE
Campaigning against President George Bush’s domestic record, presidential candidate 
Bill Clinton’s rallying message was one of political change. In the summer of 1992 as the 
campaigns were getting ready for the party conventions, news networks and major 
newspapers were documenting the unfolding of the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia. 
With the assistance of Yugoslavia (Serbia, its provinces and Montenegro) and its 
military, the Bosnian Serbs forcibly gain control of 70% of Bosnian territory. 
Accompanying this military operation was one to cleanse the territory of non-Serb 
elements, including the destruction of cultural and religious sites.
At the behest of British Prime Minister John Major, official representatives of 
Bosnia’s ethno-national parties, Croatia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the United
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Nations, the European Community and the United States met in London to discuss ways 
to settle the Bosnian war. It is important to notice that the conference was not a 
negotiation session. Instead, it was aimed at drafting a set of principles that were intended 
to guide the peacemaking process and create an International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY), which’s objective was to set a number of working groups that would 
meet with the parties to bring the war to an end (Campbell 1998: 131). The ICFY would 
be co-chaired by the United Nations (UN), which was represented by Cyrus Vance, 
former US Secretary of State during the Carter administration, and European Community 
(EC), which was represented by Lord David Owen. The ICFY had an interesting division 
of labour. The EC would be responsible for the political processes to end the war and the 
UN for ground operations (von Hippel 2000: 142).
The significance of the London Conference was not only the creation of the 
ICFY, but the thirteen principles the ICFY had to follow in its peacemaking efforts. 
Among these principles, the most important was the one that called for the protection of 
Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This principle clearly contradicted the 
provisions of the EC’s Conference on Yugoslavia’s Carrington Plan of November of 
1991, which set the constitutional mechanisms to dissolve Yugoslavia non-violently, 
giving each republic its independence and its sovereignty (Campbell 1998: 128). In 
addition to this principle, and after experiencing the atrocious nature of the war in Bosnia, 
the international community instructed the ICFY to make sure that the peace process 
secured strong constitutional provisions that protected the rights of individuals and the 
collective rights of each ethno-national community.
Even though the Bush administration was one of the organisers of the London 
Conference, it decided not to intervene in Bosnia. It argued that Bosnia was Europe’s 
problem and should be solved by the newly created ICFY. As Secretary of State James 
Baker (1995: 651) noted in his memoirs, the administration had concluded that American 
interests had not been threaten enough to warrant a military mission against Yugoslavia 
and the Bosnian Serbs. This is not to say that the Bush administration ignored the 
unfolding events in Bosnia. It provided diplomatic support to the ICFY’s work and it 
even threaten the use of force against Yugoslavia if the Bosnian Serbs did not stop the 
siege on Sarajevo’s airport during the autumn of 1992 (Baker 1995: 648-49). Even
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though the American threat of air strikes quickly impelled the Bosnian Serbs to open the 
airport, demonstrating the important role the US could have play in the early days of the 
war, the Bush administration argued that the war should by settled by EC and the UN.
Challenging Bush’s strong foreign policy record, candidate Clinton’s foreign 
policy consultants advised him to openly criticise the Bush administration’s stance on 
Bosnia. In fact, Clinton went even a step further; proposing that if he was elected 
president, he would support the use of air strikes to stop human suffering and lift the arms 
embargo, which was placed on the former Yugoslavia in 1991, so the Bosnian 
government could defend itself (Daalder 2000: 6-7). In this way, Clinton argued that his 
administration would conduct its foreign policy in a more humane manner, stating at the 
time that: ‘the cynical calculus of pure power politics is ill-suited to a new era’ (Cited in 
Walt 2000: 78).
In the end, the American people did not re-elect President Bush. The new 
administration, which had vowed to tackle domestic problems, had inherited a worsening 
international crisis. Acts of ethnic cleansing were becoming more prevalent; the war had 
displaced many people, forcing some two million individuals to flee to other countries; 
and the Bosnian Serb forces were quickly moving to consolidate their hold on conquered 
territory. Even though Clinton vehemently criticised the Bush administration’s stance on 
Bosnia, the new administration played a similar role, though it was not as supportive of 
the ICFY’s work. In fact, the Clinton administration’s policy towards Bosnia was 
motivated by the strategic approach to peacemaking. Once the Clinton administration 
perceived Bosnia as an obstruction to its foreign policy interests in Europe, it decided to 
become more involved in peacemaking efforts.
A. American Reluctance and the Failure o f ICFY’s Peace Initiatives 
As the Clinton administration settled in the White House in early 1993, one of Clinton’s 
many presidential directives ordered his foreign policy team to review the Bush 
administration’s policy towards Bosnia and set the foundations for a new response. In 
short, the Clinton administration advised the President to support a tougher stance on 
Bosnia. Although the review stated that the administration should strongly support the 
ICFY’s initiatives, including sending US troops to monitor or implement a peace
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settlement, if the three warring parties agreed on one, it showed little support for the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) (Daalder 2000: 10-11).
While the Bosnian parties had not agreed to the VOPP, it was the must detailed 
peace plan of its kind. It included clear provisions on constitutional matters, a map that 
clearly defined the territorial organisation of the country, and the inclusion of a human 
rights regime. It is worth listing some of the principles incorporated in the VOPP, as 
some these were included in the GFA (original text cited in Campbell 1998: 139-40).
Tripartite negotiations shall proceed on a continuous basis in Geneva, 
under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia, in order to finalise a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in accordance to the following principles:
(1) Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a decentralized State, the Constitution 
shall recognize three constituent peoples, as well as a group of others, 
with most governmental work carried out by its provinces.
(2) The provinces shall not have any international legal personality and may 
not enter into agreements with foreign States or with international 
organisations.
(3) Full freedom of movement shall be allowed throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, to be ensured in part by the maintenance of internationally 
controlled throughways.
(4) All matters of vital concern to any of the constituent peoples shall be 
regulated in the Constitution, which as to these points may be amended 
only by consensus or these constituent peoples; ordinary government 
business is not to be veto-able by any group.
(5) The provinces and the central Government shall have a democratically 
elected legislature and democratically chosen chief executives and an 
independent judiciary. The Presidency shall be composed of three elected 
representatives of each of the three constituent peoples. The initial 
elections are to be United Nations/European Community/Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe supervised.
(6) A Constitutional Court, with a member of each group and a majority of 
non-Bosnian members initially appointed by the International Conference 
on the Former Yugoslavia, shall resolve disputes between the central 
Government and any province, and among the organs of the former.
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(7) Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be progressively demilitarized under United 
Nations/European Commission supervision.
(8) The highest level of internationally recognized human rights shall be 
provided for in the Constitution, which shall provide for the insurance of 
implementation through both domestic and international mechanisms.
(9) A number of international monitoring or control devices shall be provided 
for in the Constitution, to remain in place at least until the three 
constituent peoples by consensus agree to dispense with them.
Although the VOPP’s provisions were based on the London Conference’s principles, 
which the Clinton administration had demonstrated support for, Clinton did not support 
the plan. He argued that it rewarded Serbian aggression, legitimated ethnic-cleansing 
practices, and more important it felt that the VOPP did not provide any rewards to 
Bosniaks, which Clinton saw as the victims of the war. More important, Karen von 
Hippel (2000: 144) argues that the US did not support the plan because it was not ready 
to commit troops to Bosnia.
Because the ICFY was crafting a peace process that could have eventually forced 
the US to send soldiers to monitor a peace agreement and establish a political system that 
weaken the position of the Bosniaks, the Clinton administration decided to appoint an US 
envoy to the negotiations and argued that Russia be allowed to send its representative as 
well. As Susan Woodward (1995: 306) notes, the ‘effect of this was to favor national 
interests and bilateral patron-client relations over multilateral initiatives and norm-based 
approach.’ The US decision to fight for the interests of the Bosniaks and to allow Russia 
to protect the interests of the Bosnian Serbs undermined the work of the ICFY and the 
prospects that the VOPP would achieve its intended objectives (Owen 1995: 180-82).
It is important to note that the ICFY continued its negotiations with the Bosnian 
parties. While the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks reluctantly signed the VOPP, the Bosnian 
Serbs were unwilling to give up their campaign to create a Greater Serbia or relinquish 
conquered territory (the VOPP states that Bosnian Serbs would control 43 percent of 
Bosnia’s territory). More importantly, the ICFY was not willing to employ force to 
coerce the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. It did use a number of inducements to 
get the Bosnian Serbs to accept the agreement, including a promise to Milosevic that the 
trade embargo on Yugoslavia would be lifted, if he could convince the Bosnian Serbs to
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sign it. While Milosevic’s tactics proved fin it ful, General Ratko Mladic’s openly rejected 
the agreement, stating instead that his forces could win the war and make the dream of 
Greater Serbia a reality. This convinced Bosnian Serbs to vote against the measure in a 
referendum organised by the Bosnian Serb government on the VOPP.
In addition to the Clinton administration’s decision to thwart the work of the 
ICFY, the US government presented a new strategy to end the conflict in Bosnia. This 
strategy, known in policy circles as ‘Lift and Strike’, favoured the lifting of the arms 
embargo in order to arm the Bosniaks. Because of the Bosnian Serbs’s military 
superiority, the Clinton administration firmly claimed that it would use aerial 
bombardments to make sure that the Bosnian Serbs did not override Bosniak or Bosnian 
Croat positions after the lifting of the embargo. The strategy was not supported by the 
Europeans for fear that their troops, which were part of the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, would potentially be caught in the middle of an 
escalating war (Brune 1998: 99). Ironically, it was not European opposition to the 
proposal that weakened Clinton’s support for this response. It was the President’s new 
understanding of the conflict after reading Robert D. Kaplan’s Balkan Ghost: A Joumev 
Through History (Drew 1994: 155-57; Holbrooke 1999: 2; and Daalder 2000: 17). In 
essence, this book argued that the conflict between the ethno-national groups could be 
traced to ancient times, establishing that outsiders could not solve this conflict until the 
groups basically finished themselves in the battlefield.
Even though Kaplan's conclusions were influential, the Clinton administration did 
consider to unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, even though the Europeans did express 
their opposition to such a policy. In the end, the Clinton administration realised that 
implementing this policy could have had a negative impact on its domestic agenda, as 
Washington would have been solely responsible for the fate of Bosnia. This meant that it 
would have to actively promote the security of Bosniaks by arming and training them 
More controversial, US military experts believed that for the Bosniaks ‘to effectively 
oppose the Serbs,’ it needed to purchase sophisticated weaponry systems that could cost 
around $1 billion. Apart from having to finance this venture, the US would also have had 
to either send military advisers to instruct Bosniaks to use this weapons or bring them to 
the US (Schild 1996: 28). In any case, this policy was rejected because of its financial
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costs and because it would force the US to intervene in the conflict on behalf of the 
Bosniaks, if after being armed and trained they failed to defend themselves. The parallels 
between this policy proposal and the American response towards South Vietnam in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s reminded the Clinton administration of the dangers of such a 
course of action.
Without a clear international consensus on what should be done about Bosnia, 
Clinton was convinced that ending the war was impossible at this stage, so he asked his 
foreign policy team to find ways to reduce the human suffering and to actively search for 
diplomatic means to contain, to de-escalate and, if possible, to settle the war. In many 
ways, the administration faced a strong moral dilemma and a worsening humanitarian 
crisis as the Bosnian Serbs started to increase their attacks of Bosniak-held towns. To 
make matters worse, the informal cease-fire between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks 
started to dwindle, as fighting increased between them in central-western Bosnia (Glenny 
1993: 229-30). The Bosnian problem could not be ignored. Television images were 
constant reminders of the war and all its atrocious consequences. Nevertheless, the 
Clinton administration’s response was purely diplomatic.
While many would argue that American foreign policy to Bosnia during 1993 was 
influenced by humanitarian concerns, Susan Woodward (1995: 325) argues that this was 
‘a false humanitarianism. ’ She observes that: ‘Channeling moral concerns into 
humanitarian relief while refusing to confront the political causes of the conflict...was 
creating more war, more casualties, and more need for humanitarian assistance’ 
(Woodward 1995: 325). Indeed, the international community’s most significant policy 
responses during this year, such as the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the creation of safe havens, the institution of a no-fly 
zone, and the US’ air drops of relief supplies, did not stop the fighting or better the 
conditions of these people. Sadly, these policies enabled the US and the rest of the 
international community to argue that it was addressing the plight of innocent civilians, 
while at the same time ignoring the need to create a more comprehensive approach to end 
this war. In short, this feeble commitment was not motivated by humanitarian concerns, 
but by a lack of real threat to US security interests in the region.
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B. A New Commitment?
Apart from Bosnia, the other major challenge the US faced in Europe was the 
restructuring of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), so it could address the 
new realities of the post-Co Id War environment. In the Brussels Summit of January 1994, 
Clinton proposed a new vision of Europe, a vision of united and democratic continent 
(Clinton 1995). Hence, Clinton argued for the incorporation of the former communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe into Western European institutions. For this 
reason, Clinton unveiled his Partnership for Peace initiative, which aimed to increase co­
operation between the militaries of these former enemies and the Western alliance, 
serving as a first step for these countries to enter the circles of European market- 
democracies.
Although the allies supported Clinton’s proposal, the focus of the summit turned 
away from Clinton’s vision of post-Cold War Europe to the correct approach to address 
the Bosnian problem. Undeniably, the alliance was divided over Bosnia and this was 
creating division between the strongest powers. In a speech to the leaders attending the 
summit, Tansu Ciller, the then Prime Minister of Turkey and supporter of a stronger 
response to the Bosnian war, argued that NATO needed to find a way to adequately 
address the challenges posed by Bosnia in order to find a new rationale for its existence 
(1994: 6-7). This proved to be an important moment as Clinton realised that Bosnia was 
more than just ‘an obscure country with little strategic value’; it was a wider problem that 
questioned American leadership and demonstrated the ‘feebleness of [Western] 
institutions, NATO first among them’ (Danner 1997: 4).
As a consequence, the US decided to take a stronger position on this issue. The 
Clinton administration was convinced that diplomacy had to be complemented by force, 
especially the use of air strikes conducted by NATO. The Bosnian Serbs’ attack on 
Sarajevo’s Markala marketplace in 5 February 1994 gave the US a moral justification to 
back its tough rhetoric with force. NATO fighter jets were mobilised and these started to 
police the skies, preventing Bosnian Serbs from violating the no-fly zone or attacking the 
safe-havens. Diplomatically, the White House sought to end the conflict between the 
Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks. The result of this initiative was the Washington 
Agreement, which created the Croat-Bosniak Federation in Bosnia. Although this
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agreement hindered any attempts to move the three groups towards a peace settlement 
(Freedman 1994-95: 67), the creation of the Federation shifted the balance of power on 
the ground. More important, the Federation closely worked with Croatia to secure 
weapons for Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces (Woodward 1995: 315). While the US 
was aware of this reality, it decided to ignore it. The Clinton administration was 
convinced that this would change the military scenario, putting pressure on the Bosnian 
Serbs and moving the parties closer to a settlement, even though this decision permitted 
Iran to supply arms and to encourage Muhajedeens that fought in Afghanistan to settle in 
Bosnia.
The creation of the Croat-Bosniak Federation gave Croatia a great deal of power 
in Bosnia. In fact, the Washington Agreement established that the Federation was ‘itself 
incorporated into a confederation with Croatia’ (Glitman 1996-97: 74). By signing this 
agreement, Bosnia became part of Croatia’s sphere of influence. While this development 
was important because it re-aligned the region’s balance of power, the Bosniak controlled 
government was weary that the Washington Agreement could lead to the eventual 
annexation of Bosniak and Bosnian Croat held territories into Croatia. This as stated 
before was exactly what Milo §evie and Tudjman wanted before the Bosnian war started.
Consequently, the challenge confronting the US was to find a diplomatic formula 
that could force the Bosnian Serbs to relinquish parts of the 70 percent of the territory 
under their controlled. Shortly after the signing of the Washington Agreement, the 
Clinton administration had shown that ‘Europe’s hour had indeed come and gone’ (von 
Hippel 2000: 146). As a first step, the US sidelined the ICFY as the main Western policy 
forum, giving the Contact Group, originally established by Lord Owen during the failed 
talks on the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, control of the peacemaking process. The 
Contact Group, which formally met for the first time in London on 26 April 1994, 
included representatives from the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia 
(Owen 1995: 298). In July 1994, the Contact Group presented its plan to the parties.
The Contact Group Plan (CGP) recognised the strong position of the Bosnian 
Serb by stating that territorial issues were more important than constitutional issues. As 
Momcilo KrajiSnik, a Bosnian Serb leader had repeatedly stated during the ICFY’s 
efforts: ‘“the constitution should be left to the end, as once the map was agreed,
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everything else would fall into place”’ (cited in Campbell 1998: 152). Thus, the CGP, 
building on the territorial calculus of the European Union Action Plan of November of 
1993, argued that the Republic Sprska (RS) would compromise 49 percent of the 
country’s territory, while the Federation would control the remaining 51 percent 
(Freedman 1994-95: 67). While territorial issues would have priority over constitutional 
ones, the CGP also made clear that a settlement must include provisions that would 
guarantee the unity of Bosnia, even though this union was described as the existence of 
two mini-states (e.g. the RS and the Federation), with broad functions, held together by a 
set of common state institutions (von Hippel 2000: 147). In order to secure the 
participation of the Bosnian Serbs, the CGP included a provision that guaranteed each of 
the constituent units the right to secede after the implementation of a settlement; a 
provision, which was originally part of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace initiative of 1993.
In many ways, the Contact Group endorsed the Bosnian Serbs’ claim for territory 
and legitimated their government structures. As Ivo Daalder (2000: 28) points out this 
was basically ‘a compromise between justice and reality.’ But this proposal, though 
different from the VOPP, followed the same logic that complete justice could not be 
achieved. In the end, the Bosnian Serb leadership and the people via another referendum 
rejected the CGP. They did so, even though Milosevic attempted to force the Bosnian 
Serb leadership to accept the plan. Because Yugoslavia was being affected by the 
Bosnian war and because it could not control the Bosnian Serb leadership, Milosevic 
decided to close the border with the RS and isolate its economy from the rest of the world 
(von Hippel 2000: 147). Whereas the CGP failed to end the war, it had transformed the 
relationship between the Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic, who was seen in 
Western capitals as the person responsible for the wars of the former Yugoslavia. With 
the signing of the Washington Agreement, Tudjman had become an influential figure in 
Bosnian affairs. Hence, the US and the Contact Group realised that a settlement of 
Bosnia’s war had to include the active participation of these two political figures.
C. Changing the Balance of Power on the Ground
The road to Dayton was a bumpy one. Increasing bickering between the United Nations 
(UN), the US, and the rest of the alliance furthered hampered the search for peace. The
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US Congress, controlled by members of the Republican Party, sent the White House a 
bill ordering the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. Clinton vetoed it, but members of 
the NATO alliance strongly criticised the US, which decided in the end to not enforce the 
arms embargo in order to appease the Republicans in the legislature. Having taken this 
decision, the Clinton administration permitted the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, with the 
assistance of Croatia, to upgrade their military capabilities. The objective of this decision 
was to affect the military balance of power on the ground, forcing the Bosnian Serbs to 
end the conflict and accept the settlement designed by the Contact Group.
The ceasefire, brokered by Jimmy Carter in December 1994, was falling apart, as 
the snow started to melt in the spring of 1995. The Bosnian Serbs stepped their attack on 
Sarajevo causing waves of international criticism, but military action was not conducted 
against them. The Bosnian Serbs, knowing that the Federation forces had upgraded their 
military capabilities during the winter, decided to seize their heavy armaments from UN 
arms depot. Strongly backed by the US, the UN authorised NATO to conduct air strikes 
against Bosnian Serb positions. The Bosnian Serbs retaliated by taking peacekeepers 
hostage. Much to the disappointment of the US, the UN called-off the air strikes.
The ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR troops created a series of debates in France 
and Britain. They argued that UNPROFOR could only fulfil its mandate if it was 
bolstered with heavy weapons. The French government proposed the deployment of a 
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), similar to the force proposed by UN Secretary Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (Kumar 1997: 88). Along with France, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands decided to supply most of the troops for this force. Moreover, the French 
government wanted the US to play a more active military role in Bosnia. It asked the US 
to provide a squadron of attack helicopters that would be used to provide cover for 
UNPROFOR in case it came under attack. Although Clinton ardently rejected the 
French’s proposal to include a wider role for the US military, it also expressed its 
willingness to provide: (a) $50 million to finance the operation of the RRF (Kumar 1997: 
88); and (b) intelligence and other logistical support (Daalder 2000: 45), including the 
stationing of an aircraft carrier and eight warships with 2,500 US Marines in the Adriatic 
Sea (Brune 1998: 104).
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In a recent study, Daalder explains that Washington’s demonstration of support 
for the RRF plan served to hide the Clinton administration’s fear that the RRF was being 
deployed to enable the extraction of UNPROFOR (Daalder 2000: 51). Richard 
Hoolbroke, who headed the American team that crafted the Dayton peace initiative, 
comments in his memoirs that the extraction of UNPROFOR was unacceptable, as its 
withdrawal would have been organised and directed by NATO. In other words, US troops 
would have had to invade Bosnia in order to assist UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. While 
Clinton had publicly stated that it would assist its allies in the event that the UN decided 
to withdraw UNPROFOR, ‘he had never formally approved OpPlan 40-140’ (Hoolbroke 
1999: 66); a planning document that included every facet of NATO’s task in supporting 
the removal of the UN from Bosnia.
While Clinton argued that he would “‘decide the troop issue if and when the times 
comes,”’ (Cited in Holbrooke 1999: 66) NATO’s North Atlantic Council had already 
shown considerable support for OpPlan 40-140.13 By backing the planning document, the 
Clinton administration was in a very difficult position. On the one hand, if the mission 
had taken place, the US would have had to contribute 25,000 troops and due to NATO 
rules of engagement an American general would have commanded the mission 
(Holbrooke 1999: 65). On the other hand, the US public would not have been supportive 
of such an operation.14 However, in the event that the UN asked NATO to extract its 
forces, the US would have had to endorse this operation, because the consequences of not 
supporting it would have proven to be a disaster for America’s vision of Europe and 
would have furthered question the significance of NATO in the post-Cold War era.
13 There is a bit of controversy surrounding the North Atlantic Council's view of the planning document. 
Holbrooke (1999: 65-68) argues that the plan was already endorsed, thus it had to be put in operation once 
the UN asked NATO for assistance. Daalder (2000: 56-61) argues that the Council had demonstrated its 
support for the initiative. In many ways, the US Department of Defense was instrumental in drafting the 
document, as it depended on US military assets in Western Europe. While this controversy is important to 
note, it is also important to mention that the US was forced to support the plan, as not backing it could 
challenge its position in NATO and question the raison detat of the organization.
14 In a private talk, Holbrooke told Carl Bildt, the EU’s representative in Dayton, that he believed that the 
Bosnian conflict could bring down the Clinton administration. Indeed, as the debates on NATO’s planning 
document were taking place, a US F-16 fighter jet, piloted by Captain Scott O’Graddy, monitoring the no- 
fly zone was shutdown by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 surface to air missile (Bildt 1998: 69). The American 
public was angered by the whole situation (Bildt 1998: 14; and Brune 1998: 104).
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Even though American diplomacy was working hard to avoid the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR, the fall of Srebrenica in early July 1995 and the massacre that shortly 
followed did not only question the role of the military mission, but it made many policy­
makers in both sides of the Atlantic Ocean call for radical changes to the UN operation’s 
mandates and capabilities or its extraction. These cries became stronger as the safe haven 
of Zepa fell to Bosnian Serb forces. Trying to achieve a total victory, the Bosnian Serb 
forces started to threaten Gorazde and Sarajevo.
Sensing growing discord among the allies, Prime Minister Major invited the 
members of the Contact Group to London for an emergency meeting. Due to President 
Jacques Chirac’s irritation with the alliance’s inability to stop the war or prevent the fall 
of Srebrenica, the French government expressed its willingness to organise a military 
operation that would re-capture Srebrenica and deter Bosnian Serb forces from attacking 
the remaining safe areas. While the Contact Group members did not support France’s 
proposal, the European members of the Contact Group, which had a substantial number 
of troops in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR, agreed that they could not stand idle as 
genocide took place and the Bosnian Serbs conquered the rest of Bosnia.
As a result, the French government believed that it would be better to withdraw 
UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo, if UNPROFOR could not take a stronger stance 
against the Bosnian Serbs (Bert 1997: 221). The British government argued for the status 
quo. Major did express his inclination to use artillery attacks and other forms of ground 
force in order to uphold UNPROFOR’s mandate, but he was reluctant to support air 
strikes (Bert 1997: 222), stating that these might push Bosnian Serbs to take hostage 
UNPROFOR troops once again.
Facing public pressure and the possibility of extracting UNPROFOR, the Clinton 
administration proposed the use of air strikes as means to stop Bosnian Serb forces from 
capturing Gorazde and Sarajevo. US military experts maintained that air strikes would 
destroy the Bosnian Serb military’s air defence system, command and control facilities, 
communication hardware, and the infrastructure that supported its war-making 
capabilities. It also argued that modified rules of engagement and the termination o f the
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‘dual key’15 approach was necessary in order to stop the Bosnian Serb offensive. More 
critically, the Clinton administration contended that once force was used it would not stop 
until the objectives were met, regardless if the Bosnian Serbs took UNPROFOR 
peacekeepers hostages (Gow 1997: 275; and Daalder 2000: 73).
After much debate, the Contact Group agreed to the following three policy 
prescriptions to deter the Bosnian Serbs’ offensive. First, the Contact Group modified the 
‘dual key’ arrangement. The UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali delegated his 
responsibility to authorise NATO air strikes to UNPROFOR military commanders soon 
after the end of the London Conference (Calic 1996: 129). Essentially, the UN’s political 
influence on the overall peacemaking process was reduced, as the US showed its 
willingness to take control of the situation and device a political framework to end the 
war. Second, the Contact Group agreed to modify the existing rules of military 
engagement so that UNPROFOR could employ ‘military force above and beyond pure 
and self-defence’ (Calic 1996: 129). Finally, the Contact Group delivered an ultimatum to 
the Bosnian Serbs, warning them of NATO air strikes if they attacked Gorazde and 
Sarajevo.
Following the London Conference, representatives of Croatia and the Federation 
met in Split to form a military alliance against Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs that had 
proclaimed the Republic of the Krajina (Calic 1996: 128). This proved be an important 
diplomatic act as the Croats started their military campaign against the Krajina Serbs. 
With Bosnian Serb forces busy fighting Bosniak’s and Bosnian Croat’s militaries, they 
could not come to support the Krajina Serbs. In fact, Croatia reclaimed 95 percent of the 
Krajina in two days! Eastern Slavonia was the only piece of the territory left 
unconquered. Subsequently, Croat forces joined their Bosniak and Bosnian Croat 
counterparts in western Bosnia.
The victories of the Croat army convinced Washington that the time was ripe for a 
diplomatic solution to the Bosnian war and to other regional problems. Clinton ordered
15 Prior to July 1995, NATO air strikes could only be conducted if the UN Secretary General Boutrous 
Ghali and NATO's commander ordered the attack. The problem with this system is that it gave the UN 
power to dictate when military power was going to be used. This was unacceptable to the US.
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his national security team to review the existing policy to Bosnia and devise a US-led 
peace initiative. Guiding this initiative were seven points.16
1. A comprehensive peace settlement founded on Contact Group 
proposals and the creation of a united Bosnia based on the 49:51 
calculus of the EU Action Plan and a federal state compromised of 
two entities. Although Bosnia was not to be partitioned into two or 
three countries, the US was willing to reconsider the Contact 
Group’s map so this could fit the realities of post-Srebrenica 
events. Moreover, Sarajevo was not to be divided.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia would recognise each other’s sovereignty.
3. Lifting of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and an 
American-sponsored initiative to equip and train the Muslim-Croat 
Federation forces, if a settlement was attained.
4. The peaceful transfer of Eastern Slavonia from Yugoslavia to 
Croatia.
5. The need to reach a cease-fire and end all military operations in the 
region in order to start the peace talks.
6. A comprehensive regional economic plan to reconstruct the 
economies of this region and move them towards the path of 
regional integration and economic interdependence financed by the 
international community -  a smaller version of the Marshall plan.
7. An outline of constitutional arrangements for Bosnia that would 
secure its unity, but at the same time permit the Croats and Serbs to 
form special parallel relationships with Bosnia’s entities. But this 
was not set in stone, as the US would be willing to discuss the 
possibility of holding a future referendum to determine Bosnia’s 
integrity.
After Clinton’s national security team drafted these points, he ordered Anthony Lake, his 
National Security Adviser, to travel to Europe and sell this plan to the members of the 
Contact Group and the rest of the allies. After a lengthy debate, the administration also
16 In their individual works, Bildt (1998: 83), Daalder (2000: 112-13), and Holbrooke (1999: 74) present 
these points. Each version of the negotiating framework’s points is different. My seven points merge these 
versions together.
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decided that Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs 
at the time, was going to head the US negotiation team.
It is important to mention that the US was ready to support the extraction of 
UNPROFOR, the lifting of the arms embargo, the equipping and training of Bosniak 
forces, and the use of air power to assist the Bosniak’s war efforts if this approach failed 
(Daalder 2000: 113). At the time, the Clinton administration was under much pressure, as 
the failure of its initiative would have led to the escalation of hostilities, affecting the 
livelihoods of non-combatants and the stability of the region. While the Europeans 
questioned the willingness of the US to end the war, they were ready to abandon their 
peacemaking approach and embrace the US proposal. They knew that this would be the 
last attempt to secure a peace in Bosnia and while they did not agree with all the points 
presented by Lake, they were pleased with the increasing American commitments to end 
the war.
On 28 August 1995, Bosnian Serb forces tested American willingness and the 
unity of the Contact Group by attacking a marketplace in Sarajevo, claiming the lives of 
30 civilians. After two days of diplomatic activity, NATO commanders were ordered to 
start Operation Deliberative Force, a massive air campaign directed against Bosnian Serb 
positions, which destroyed the Bosnian Serbs ability to wage war and enabled the 
Federation’s forces to strengthen their military offensive (Gow 1997: 278). Around two- 
third of all sorties were conducted by American planes (Bert 1997: 224). These air 
strikes enabled the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces to acquire more territory and 
systematically ‘cleanse’ this from Bosnian Serb elements. However, the US did not stop 
these cleansing campaigns, even though members of the Contact Group objected.
Although the US had earlier expressed its willingness to reach a cease-fire on the 
ground in order to start the peace process, US foreign policymakers argued that ‘for 
fruitful negotiations to take place, force must be applied’ (Bert 1997: 224). The air strikes 
were helping the Bosniak-Croat offensive, dramatically changing the balance of power on 
the ground. Even though the Bosnian Serbs were asking for a cease-fire, so they could re­
organise their military units and safeguard their positions, and although the European 
members of the Contact Group had told the US that the aerial bombardment had gone too 
far and should be stopped, the US vehemently argued that it a was necessary step in the
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search of peace. Because the ‘American option’ (Bert 1997: 225), which the Europeans 
had accepted during Lake’s visit, was built on the conclusion of the London Conference, 
it can be said that American foreign policy-makers, especially Holbrooke and Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, believed that force and diplomacy should complement each 
other in the interest of achieving a lasting settlement (Holbrooke 1999: 145).
Why did the US decided to take control of the peace negotiations, even though it 
had disregarded this role before the fall Srebrenica? The answer to this question is 
twofold. First, Bosnia became, what Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the 
‘problem from hell’ (Cited in Daalder 2000: 83). Bosnia was not only questioning the 
reputation of NATO and the UN, but after the fall of Srebrenica it was questioning ‘U.S. 
credibility as a world leader, its credibility in NATO, in the United Nations, and at home’ 
(Daalder 2000: 108) Second, the Clinton administration was anxious of the possibility to 
send American troops to extract UNPROFOR. The loss of American lives was a huge 
concern for the administration, especially after the death of servicemen in Somalia and 
the 1996 presidential elections (Bert 1997). An end to the conflict would mean that 
American troops, rather than extracting UNPROFOR, would go to Bosnia to implement a 
peace plan. This would have been not only more acceptable to the American public, but 
assisting the contending parties to settle their war would have enabled the US to regain its 
credibility, while allowing it to secure its national interests.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The violent unraveling of Yugoslavia tested the resolve of the international community, 
its values, and the interests of its strongest actors. The Bosnian war demonstrated the 
general incapacity of Cold War regional and international security organisations in the 
post-Co Id War era (Woodward 1995: 273). In doing so, the Bosnian war became what 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the ‘problem of hell’. The war started at a 
time when the European Community was finalising the Maastricht Treaty on the 
European Union and the United States wanted to dedicate more time to its internal 
problems. Thus, the Europeans placed Maastricht before Sarajevo, even though the US 
was pressuring them to take a pro-active role in the former Yugoslavia. In the end, the
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self-interests of the EC/EU prevented it from devising a peace initiative that could secure 
an end to the conflict or convince the US of the approach’s merits.
Indeed, Washington blamed the Europeans for failing to prevent the war, but it 
also hinder their ability to implement a peace plan, such as the one crafted by Vance and 
Owen in 1993, for fear that the possible settlement would hurt its interests. This changed 
in 1994 when the US started to play a more pro-active role in the peacemaking process.
The Clinton administration’s foreign policy to Bosnia, from February 1993 to 
August 1995, was motivated by self-interests. Even though some could say that it was 
influenced by humanitarian concerns, this was, as Woodward notes, a ‘false 
humanitarianism. ’ Indeed, humanitarian action was conducted to ease international and 
domestic criticism of the administration’s unwillingness to end the war. Humanitarian 
ideals were repeatedly ignored in cases that favoured the US national interest. For 
instance, the ethnic cleansing campaigns that accompanied the Croat and Bosniak-Croat 
offensives were not criticised or stopped by the administration, even though most 
European governments raised serious questions about the US decision to ignore these 
acts.
The decision to condemn Bosnian Serbs for their war crimes, but ignoring the 
violations committed by the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government do 
reveal the strong nationalist interest guiding American foreign policy. Even when there 
were signs that a cease-fire could be signed to start the peace negotiations, hampering the 
Bosniak-Croat offensive from re-taking lost territories, Holbrooke (1999: 166) states in 
his memoirs that he encouraged the forces to keep reclaiming land as long as the 
offensive did not override Banja Luka. The rationale for this strategy was that this would 
make things easier in the negotiations to end the war.
In the end, the importance was not necessarily the welfare of these peoples caught 
in war. The motivation for action was directed by the fear that the Clinton administration 
would not fulfil its vision of Europe and by the fact that the Bosnian war was not only 
questioning NATO’s credibility, as it searched for a new role in the post-Cold War era, 
but also American leadership. As Madeline Albright argued in a June 1995 policy 
memorandum, titled Elements of a New Strategy: ‘reluctance to lead the effort to resolve 
a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership in the post-Cold
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War world.’ She continued by saying that: ‘Chirac’s statement that “the position of 
leader of the Free World is vacant” has been chilling my bones for weeks’ (Cited in 
Daalder 2000: 93). This view helped the Clinton administration realise the importance of 
leading military and diplomatic efforts to settle the war.
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CHAPTER FIVE
America’s Dayton Peace Initiative: The False Promises of the 
Strategic Approach to Peacemaking
INTRODUCTION
On 21 November 1995, the parties to the conflict initialled the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA). Eleven annexes complement the 
GFA. Each explains in detail how different aspects of the agreement are to be 
implemented by international agents and local institutions.
This agreement is unique in many ways. For instance, Paolo Gaeta (1996: 149), 
an international legal scholar, argues that this is one of the few treaties in the history of 
international law that entered into force once the parties initialled the document. Another 
interesting trait is that the parties to the Bosnian conflict were not given the right to 
interpret or re-negotiate the GFA’s provisions. This right was reversed to the Peace 
Implementation Council, the Contact Group and other international bodies working in the 
GFA’s execution.
The negotiations leading to the initialling of this document started in September 
1995, shortly after the beginning of NATO’s Operation Deliberative Force. Many of the 
document’s principles and the strategies used by the United States (US) to secure this 
agreement were developed by the Contact Group’s work, conducted since it was set-up in 
March 1994. At the same time, this ad hoc body’s efforts were based on the peace 
initiatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). 
Consequently, the Clinton administration’s peace plan shared many traits found in the 
ICFY’s peace plans (Szasz 1996: 302-03).
The diplomatic process that produced the Dayton peace initiative was orchestrated 
by the Clinton administration. The European members of the Contact Group, which had 
headed the workings of the ICFY, were sidelined. While this initiative is based on 
American interests, it is important to notice that the Clinton administration was divided 
on the initiative’s intended objectives. Whereas this debate affected Washignton’s
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response, divisions within the Contact Group also affected the search for peace in the 
autumn of 1995. Thus, the GFA is a product of these debates and divisions.
The Clinton administration’s foreign policy team was divided into tow camps: the 
minimalists and maximalists. The minimalists argued that the ‘immediate objective was 
to end the war and reduce the likelihood of it restarting’ (Daalder 2000: 144). Hence the 
motive for action was to separate each side’s military forces and create a balance of 
military power in the area to deter each group from re-newing the armed struggle. The 
maximalists, on the other hand, maintained that the ‘immediate objective was to build a 
lasting peace in Bosnia, one that required not just an end to the war, but the construction 
of a multi-ethnic, democratic, and prosperous state’ (Daalder 2000: 144-45). The 
minimalist perspective argued that a balance of power in the region was important, but a 
settlement to the conflict would be difficult to achieve if the international community did 
not design a peacebuilding strategy that assisted the parties to reconstruct their shattered 
economy and society.
As said before, this debate was further complicated by conflict between the US 
and the Contact Group’s other members. The US did not only want to take leadership of 
the diplomatic process, but it also demanded to be in charge of the GFA’s 
implementation. This view was shared in Washington by maximalists and minimalists 
alike. Agreeing with maximalists in the Clinton administration, the Europeans required a 
broader peacebuilding mission. However, they also desired to organise and direct the 
peacebuilding mission. After all, Richard Holbrooke had already informed Carl Bildt that 
the US required the European Union (EU) to finance most of this mission (Bildt 1998: 
115). This created much anger within the EU, fracturing the international consensus the 
US needed to successfully settle the conflict.
This chapter continues the investigation conducted in the previous chapter by 
explaining the impact the US had on peacemaking efforts. The Clinton administration’s 
desire to take control of the diplomatic process, while hailed by many European 
diplomats as a step in the right direction, created a series of new complications that 
forced Holbrooke to initially weaken the position of the maximalist clique within the 
Contact Group and strengthen the stance of minimalist supporters. In other words, if the
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US was not to control the peacebuilding phase, then it was imperative to limit the role 
and influence of the other members by creating a less ambitious peacebuilding agenda.
Noticing the anger of European mediators, the US negotiation team was forced to 
broaden the scope of the proposed peacebuilding mission during the negotiations at 
Dayton. However, this enlargement was accepted as long as it furthered American 
interests in Europe. Whereas the US would continue to pursue a minimalist agenda, the 
agreement had the intentions of supporting an expanded peacebuilding mission that could 
be administered by agents of the international community, especially the European 
Union, if the minimalist project failed to make the peace in Bosnia self-sustaining. The 
peace process and the peace agreement was never intended to be administered by the 
conflicting parties in Bosnia (Gaeta 1996).
As a result, the peacemaking process and the agreement were a product of the 
Clinton administration’s decision to employ the tenets of the strategic approach to 
peacemaking. Rather than instituting a peace that empowered Bosnia’s conflicting 
parties to build a new society that re-captured the multi-ethnic character of its past, the 
peace seems to be, as Gaeta argues, a ‘pax americana\ As he explains, even though 
European leaders were quick ‘to appear as contributors to the peace process’ it was 
really the product of American power (Emphasis added, Gaeta 1996: 150). For the 
Clinton administration, the agreement served to end the war and permit it to 
materialise its vision of Europe. The importance was not necessarily the political 
details of the agreement, but those details that addressed military matters that enabled 
the Contact Group to prevent the resumption of the armed conflict.
I. THE ROAD TO DAYTON
Once the Contact Group accepted the Clinton administration’s use of coercive diplomacy, 
the US was free to direct the diplomatic process that eventually led the parties to sign the 
GFA. This process can be divided into two phases. The first phase was the participant’s 
selection. The obvious strategy was to include the three warring factions, as previous 
efforts had done, but the Contact Group had other plans. Also important to notice was the 
division of labour in the Contact Group. While all Contact Group countries would send a
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team of diplomats, the question was: which of its members were going to play a bigger 
role in the process? The second phase involved the organisation of a series of pre­
negotiation sessions to produce a negotiation agenda, that is to say a ‘set text’ (Rubin 
1995: 9), which would guide the peace talks at Dayton.
A. Phase One: Selecting the Participants
Building on the diplomatic work of US Envoy to the Contact Group, Robert Frasure, 
who, along with S. Nelson Drew and Joseph Kruzel, died in a tragic accident when their 
armored personnel carrier ‘bounced over the road* (Emphasis in original, Holbrooke 
1999: 11) on Mount Igman in mid-August 1995, the Contact Group decided that for 
meaningful peace negotiations to take place it was necessary to solely negotiate with 
Slobodan Milosevic rather than with the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group had 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the Bosnian Serbs, as they did not support the 
Group’s plan or desired to consider any negotiation efforts that revolved around this plan 
(Holbrooke 105-06). Although Milosevic demonstrated support for Frasure’s approach in 
the spring of 1995, primarily because he understood that his co-operation to negotiate a 
peace agreement was the only way the international community was going to lift the 
economic sanctions crippling his country’s economy (Glitman 1996-97: 75), the Bosnian 
Serbs were not ready to surrender their negotiating power to Belgrade.
The success of the Croat and Bosniak-Croat offensives had a dramatic 
psychological impact on the Bosnian Serb leadership. The leadership clearly started to 
understand that its decision to support the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa were a big 
mistake. Instead of ending the war in their favour, as General Madlic argued, it energized 
the international community’s efforts to settle the conflict by employing military force 
against Bosnian Serb positions; a strategy that would only favour the Bosniak-Croat 
offensive and affect the Republika Sprska’s (RS) ability to defend their territory. Noting 
that something had to be done in order to protect the RS and its territory, James Gow 
(1997: 278) argues that the Bosnian Serb leadership ‘had little choice other than to accept 
Milosevic would represent them in the negotiations, short of facing further armed actions 
from either the international community or their foes in Bosnia.’ This is not to say that 
the Bosnian Serbs did not use force to try to challenge the international community’s
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resolve. In fact, Bosnian Serb forces did target the “safe havens” and kept fighting against 
the Bosniak-Croat forces during this time. The only problem was that NATO air strikes 
had severely crippled their ability to organise an effective counter-offensive. In the end, 
the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed to give Milosevic the authority to head the Serbian 
negotiation team and to even decide the fate of the RS, if the joint delegation of Bosnian 
Serbs and members of the Yugoslav government could not agree with the provisions of a 
draft peace agreement.
More critical, the Serb delegation was informed by the Contact Group that 
Radovan Karadzic and Mladic would not be able to join the delegation, as the 
International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia had indicted them for planning and 
executing crimes against humanity. This angered Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb 
leadership, but the US repeatedly stated that they had to understand that if Mladic and 
Karadzic decided to come to the negotiations, they would be arrested and tried by the 
Tribunal at The Hague once they set foot in American or Western European soil. While 
Holbrooke knew that this decision was to create problems in the short term, he also knew 
that the negotiations would be much smoother if they did not participate.
Representing the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government’s claim to Eastern 
Slavonia was a Croat delegation headed by Tudjman. Representing the Bosniaks and 
Bosnia was a delegation led by Izetbegovic, who at the time was the president of the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman participation was critical because the Bosnian 
Croats distrusted the Bosniaks and they thought that Tudjman was their best hope to 
secure their interests.
The Contact Group members were also an integral part of the negotiations. A 
delegation or a team of negotiators represented each member country. This is not to say 
that all of these teams had the same amount of power. In theory, Carl Bildt, the EU 
Special Negotiator, and the Russian Deputy Minister Igor Ivanov’s status were equal to 
that of Holbrooke, but this was not so in practice. As for the Western European 
negotiators, they would be subordinated under Bildt’s authority (Neville-Jones 1996-97: 
48). The UN was not involved in this process, except in the delicate negotiations 
concerning Eastern Slavonia. While this angered some European governments, they
136
accepted the American plan. In all, Holbrooke and his team of negotiators and military 
experts directed the entire pre-settlement and settlement-making process.
B. Phase Two: Setting the Agenda
The negotiation agenda was based on the seven points initiative presented by Anthony 
Lake to the Contact Group in mid-August 1995. The problem was that these points were 
vague and mostly represented American interests. Even though the US wanted to 
dominate peacemaking efforts, the success of its initiatives depended on European 
participation during this process and for the duration of the implementation of a peace 
settlement. Consequently, the Clinton administration started to search for a strategy that 
would be directed by US national interests, but endorsed by the rest of the Contact 
Group.
Having determined the peace process’s participants, the US negotiators, and 
Bildt’s team playing a supportive role, set out a series of discussions with leaders in 
Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, leading to the Basic Agreed Principles, signed in Geneva 
on 8 September 1995. This document proved to be a crucial phase in the process leading 
to Dayton. Endorsed by the Croatian Foreign Minister, Mate Granic, the Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister, Milan Milutinovic, and the Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed 
Sacirbey, the document established three negotiation principles (OHR-D 1995e).17
1. It stated that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal functioning 
within the present borders and it will be internationally recognized’ as such.
2. It recognised that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be composed of two 
entities -  the Federation founded by the Washington Agreement of 1994 and 
the RS. Based on the Contact Group, it was agreed that the former would 
hold 51 percent of the territory while the latter will hold the remaining 49 
percent. The agreement also pointed that each entity would keep its 
constitution for the time being and that each could conduct special parallel 
relations with neighboring states, provided that these relationships did not 
threaten the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.’ Finally, this principle established that ‘either entity will take 
the reciprocal obligation’ to hold elections at all levels under the 
international community’s supervision and to adopt and respect human
17 It is important to note that these are not being directly cited from the original document. They are a 
summation of these three principles.
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rights and obligations, including the freedom of movements and the ability 
of dislocated individuals to reclaim their properties.
3. It maintained that the entities agreed to appoint the following: (a) a 
Commission for Dislocated Persons, (b) a Commission of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for Human Rights, and (c) a Commission for Conservation of 
National Monuments. In addition, it was agreed that public enterprises 
would be created and a system of arbitrage would be instituted to resolve 
any disputes between the entities.
Although the Geneva summit proved to be a success, many other issues were not 
addressed in this pre-negotiation session. As Holbrooke (1999: 141) argues, the ‘major 
omission’ of the agreement was ‘the lack of any agreement on a central government’ that 
would connect the two entities. Nevertheless, the document was a first step that showed 
that the parties’ were willing to address contending issues in order to settle the war. After 
all, the document’s principles recognised Bosnia as an independent and sovereign state 
that included Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. It is important to remember 
that this was an issue that led the leadership of both the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb 
communities to see war as viable mechanism to secure their needs and interests (Bildt 
1998: 100).
This document’s acceptance was extremely controversial in Bosnia, especially in 
Sarajevo. The legal recognition of the RS and the country’s new name, ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,’ from the ‘Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ did not please many, 
including Izetbegovic (Holbrooke 1999: 130-31). In Pale and Banja Luka, the 
controversy was the 51-49 calculus agreed by the parties, as well as the acknowledgment 
that the RS was part o f a sovereign Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999: 177). Although many 
politicians in Bosnia were displeased with the Basic Agreed Principles, these were just a 
foundation for future peace negotiations. The vagueness of each principle allowed the 
contending parties to search for ways to secure more power, and in the case of the 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaderships the partition of Bosnia via the negotiation 
process.
The Contact Group was aware of this dilemma and it decided to launch a new 
diplomatic initiative to secure Bosnia’s integrity. After Holbrooke’s and Bildt’s tours of 
Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade and even Pale, the parties met in New York on 26 September
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1995 to strengthen the Basic Agreed Principles. Three issues tested the resolve of the 
Contact Group, almost ruining the summit and the entire peace process. These issues 
were the following: (a) the Bosnian delegation wanted assurances against the partition of 
the country; (b) the Serb delegation wanted to prevent the creation of strong central state 
structures; and (c) there were questions about the election process in itself and the 
presence of international monitors -  the Bosnian delegation wanted a direct process 
monitored by international organisations, the Serb delegation preferred an indirect 
process without international supervision (Holbrooke 1999: 179-184; and Bildt 1998: 
107-08).
In the end, the parties agreed to three new principles that were to be added to the 
Basic Agreed Principles. These were the following (OHR-D 1995c).18
4. Each entity ‘will honour the international obligations of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,’ so long as ‘the obligation is not a financial obligation 
incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.’
5. Free and democratic elections are to be held in both entities ‘as soon as 
social conditions permit.’ For elections to take place, it is necessary for each 
entity: (a) to permit the freedom of movements, (b) to extend to dislocated 
persons the right to reclaim their property or receive ‘just compensation for 
it,’ (c) to safeguard and promote the freedom of speech and press, and (d) 
the protection of human rights. Including to this provision was the 
Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor the 
compliance of each entity’s eagerness to create these social conditions and 
determine when the time is right to hold the elections. According to this 
principle, the elections would take place 30 days after the OSCE determined 
that the social conditions were conducive to hold free and democratic 
elections.
6. The following institutions would conduct Bosnia and Herzegovina’s affairs.
First, a ‘parliamentary or assembly, two-thirds which would be elected by 
the territory of the Federation and one-third from the Republika Sprska. 
Second, a three-person Presidency. Individuals would elect two members 
from the Federation and residents of RS would elect the third member.
Third, a cabinet was to be created, though there were not instructions on 
how big or small this should be. Finally, a Constitutional Court would be 
created and it would have jurisdiction over all matters dealing with the 
amended constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This principle also 
included a provision that stated that other issues such as the responsibility of
18 Again, this is a summation of the three principles, not a direct citation.
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each institution and its operation was still to be negotiated. The only power 
these institutions would have was foreign policy.
Though not mentioned in this document, the Contact Group and the parties also declared 
in a Joint Statement that territorial issues, such as Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia’s map, 
and the future of foreign troops in Bosnia (e.g. the Yugoslav army, Muhajedeens, and 
Croatian forces) were extremely significant and that these would have to be addressed in 
future peace talks (OHR-D 1995d). As a result, the New York and the Geneva summits 
mostly addressed issues concerning the composition of Bosnia and its institutions, while 
leaving controversial territorial issues on the side.
The New York summit and the final document did not deal with three crucial 
issues of contention. For instance, addressing Bosniak’s fear of the country’s possible 
partition, Holbrooke asked Clinton to call Izetbegovic to re-assure him that the US would 
not support any proposals that partitioned the country. In a speech later that day, Clinton 
also pointed out the importance of keeping Bosnia together. This served as a confidence- 
building mechanism, as Sarajevo trusted the US government’s intention to support the 
integrity of the country. Even though Clinton’s remarks persuaded the Bosnian 
delegation to accept the new principles, the Basic Agreed Principles did not include a 
clear statement that inhibits the RS or any other region to secede from Bosnia.
As seen on the fifth principle, the type of election process was not specified 
either. It proved to be too controversial. The Contact Group decided to keep the wording 
extremely vague, while gaining a crucial concession from the Serb delegation that the 
international community, via the organs of the OSCE, would monitor social conditions 
and determine when elections would take place. This proved to be an important step, as 
the Contact Group was actually showing sings that it wanted to set strong provisions to 
assure that international agencies would dominate, supervise, and administer the peace 
settlement’s implementation.
In addition, the agreement did not indicate how ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ was the tissue 
connecting the entities. In the same vein, it did not establish the actual responsibilities of 
these institutions. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the Serb delegation that foreign policy 
would be a matter related to the central institutions was a substantial step forward, as it 
basically showed the delegation’s acceptance that RS is an integral part of a Bosnian
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state. Although other issues were not tackled, the New York summit proved to be an 
important event, as it did finally secure the basic principles that would set the tone and 
issues to be negotiated at peace talks.
The New York summit’s success should not be overstated, as both Holbrooke and 
Bildt privately expressed their concerns that securing a peace agreement was going to 
prove harder than they had originally expected. More important, there was another facet 
of the negotiations that were not addressed. This was the matter of who would be 
responsible for the implementation of an agreement and who would finance the 
reconstruction of Bosnia. While the US wanted Europe to finance these initiatives and let 
it control the implementation process, including the OSCE mission, the European Union 
rejected this proposal. Following the Geneva summit, the Bosniak-Croat offensive was 
winning major battles, increasing its overall percentage of territory. Noting the low 
morale of its troops and the onslaught of the offensive, the Bosnian Serbs asked for a 
cease-fire. At first, the US rejected this request because it favored its diplomatic 
initiative; the more land the Federation acquired, the easier the negotiations on the map 
would be. However, international pressures for a cease-fire started to grow after the New 
York summit and American intelligence reports argued that the Bosniak-Croat offensive 
was running out of steam, partially because Croat forces were unwilling to support 
Bosniak forces. Thus, Holbrooke believed that a cease-fire was needed to secure the 
offensive’s territorial acquisitions (Holbrooke 1999: 193-95), which amounted to 51.6 
percent of the territory at the time (Bildt 1998: 112).
The Clinton administration’s support of a cease-fire angered the Bosnian 
government. Izetbegovic and his commanders believed the offensive had been the most 
successful military operation, since the war’s start. Nevertheless, US officials convinced 
Izetbegovic to sign the cease-fire, which was agreed to on 5 October 1995. The parties 
established that it would last for sixty days, giving enough time for the US to hold its 
peace negotiations. Shortly after the cease-fire was announced, President Clinton 
declared that it would host peace talks in the US and he extended an invitation to the 
Serb, Croat and Bosnian delegations, as long as they accepted three conditions 
(Holbrooke 1999: 199-200):
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1. Each delegation should be headed by the Presidents of Serbia, 
Croatia and Bosnia and they should come with the ‘full power to 
sign agreements, without further recourse to parliaments back 
home;’
2. They prepared ‘to stay as long as necessary to reach agreement, 
without threatening to walk out.’
3. They did not ‘talk to the press or other outsiders’ during the talks.
Having agreed to these conditions and pledge to uphold the Basic Agreed Principles the 
parties met with the Contact Group at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, 
Ohio on 1 November 1995.
II. THE ‘PROXIMITY’ PEACE TALKS AND THE FINAL AGREEMENT
Reflecting on the Dayton peace talks, Pauline Neville-Jones, the chief British negotiator, 
stated that: ‘The Dayton negotiations were complex in structure and agenda’ (Neville- 
Jones 1996-97: 48). Building on the Basic Agreed Principles, finalised in New York, and 
the Joint Statement, written at this meeting, the ‘proximity talks’ addressed five major 
issues: (a) Eastern Slavonia; (b) the Federation; (d) territorial issues; (d) constitutional 
and legal issues concerning Bosnia; and (e) civilian and military implementation.19
Another important observation made by Neville-Jones was that these negotiations 
were controlled and directed by the US team (1996-97: 48). On the first day of the peace 
talks, as the leaders of each country arrived at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Warren Christopher met with the members of the Contact Group and told them that the 
US would conduct the “real negotiations.” By this he meant that the members of the 
Contact Group’s role in the negotiation was to support the process when needed and 
approve it once an agreement was reached. Knowing that this would not please the 
European members, Christopher told them: ‘Some of you might not be happy with every 
aspect of the negotiations, but we are all pursuing the same result together. Let us not 
loose sight of that’ (Cited in Holbrooke 1999: 236).
While the American team argued that it was necessary for them to lead the 
negotiations, in order to minimise friction among the members of the Contact Group, this
19 This list is a combination of Holbrooke’s (1999: 240) list of important issues and that presented by 
Neville-Jones (1996-97: 48-49).
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was not always achieved. The European and Russian delegations did intervene in the 
process because they found that the process was not only hurting their interests, but, more 
importantly, because they also feared that the agreements being made would not solve 
Bosnia’s problems and cause them further problems in the future. Although they 
criticised the process, they eventually endorsed it. Consequently, the final agreement 
tends to reflect America’s peacemaking approach instead of the European approach.
Can this American approach be blamed for some of the problems the international 
community faces in the phase of post-settlement peacebuilding? There are not easy 
answers. The US cannot be completely blamed. European acquiescence during the peace 
talks to important issues and their continuance of the policies constructed and endorsed 
shortly after the signing of the peace agreement are also to blame. However, the fact is 
that Holbrooke’s decision to control the negotiating agenda and the nature of the talks are 
responsible for some of the peace process’s shortcomings. To further demonstrate the 
effect of American preponderance in this phase of the peace process, it is necessary to 
analyse the dynamics and interactions of the Contact Group negotiators and the 
delegations of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia at Dayton. The following sections will address 
the five major issues listed above, but these analyses are preceded by an examination of 
the negotiation agenda, explaining how the American team set the ‘proximity peace talks’ 
to their own advantage.
A. Setting the Negotiating Agenda
Holbrooke argues that the negotiations at Dayton could be best described by the term: 
‘proximity talks.’ He argues that the term originated in the late 1940, when the United 
Nations held one of its first negotiation sessions on the Middle East’s conflicts. In 
‘proximity talks,’ the negotiator shuttles between the parties, ‘who rarely meet one 
another face to face -  a sort of “shuttle diplomacy by foot’” (Holbrooke 1999: 207). 
President Jimmy Carter used this approach successfully during the negotiations that led to 
the Camp David Accords.
In fact, only one negotiation session was held with all the leaders and their 
delegations. Held the first day of the peace talks, the session proved the utility of the 
concept, as Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic seem to disagree on all the issues. The
143
great distance between the delegations convinced Christopher that Holbrooke’s approach, 
though somewhat disorganised or complex, seemed to fit the circumstances. More 
important, the complexity of the approach in many ways benefited the American 
diplomats because they could assess the mood of conflicting attitudes among each 
delegation and develop strategies to deal with contentious issues and assure the peace 
talks’ success.
For instance, in the first session, which involved all parties, Christopher asked 
each President to make his priorities clear (Holbrooke 1999: 236). For Tudjman, it was 
Eastern Slavonia, though he also stated that strengthening the Federation was necessary, 
as this would enhance Croatia’s strategic position in the region. The lifting of economic 
sanctions against Yugoslavia was Milosevic’s primary concern, whereas Izetbegovic 
called for ‘peace with justice’, by which he meant a united Bosnia with strong central 
governmental institutions and a permanent peacekeeping force headed by NATO (Borden 
and Hedl 1996). With this information, the American team started to think of incentives 
that could be provided to speed-up the negotiation process and secure a settlement. Thus, 
Christopher told Milosevic that the international community would start to suspend 
‘sanctions upon initialling an agreement, instead of waiting for its formal signing’ 
(emphases in original, Holbrooke 1999: 236). It was hoped that this would give 
Milosevic another reason to make important concessions, which American negotiators 
knew the Bosnian Serbs were unwilling to make.
Similar to Christopher’s tactic, the American team started to set an agenda to 
increase the incentives for each delegation, so they could agree on controversial issues. 
One of the European mediators told Anthony Borden and Drago Hedl (1996) that: ‘Each 
morning the Americans would bring the day’s schedule, with precise arrangements about 
which delegates would work together, who would speak, and for how long.’ For the 
American team, the importance was not necessarily the issues, but whom would deal with 
each issue and when would this take place. Consequently, the American team decided 
that before discussing Eastern Slavonia, it was necessary to first deal with the 
strengthening of the Federation. There was fear that an agreement on Eastern Slavonia 
would take away the incentive for Tudjman to pressure the Bosnian Croats in this phase 
of the talks.
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It was argued that once the Federation was addressed then, it was time to not only 
deal with Eastern Slavonia, but also with territorial, constitutional and legal issues 
relating to Bosnia. The American team was obsessed with the negotiations relating to the 
map of Bosnia, while the Europeans stressed the importance of constitutional matters. 
This does not mean that the Europeans thought that the map was not a crucial aspect of 
the peace talks. Instead, they feared that once ‘the map was ready, the constitution would 
also be declared ready’ (Bildt 1998: 145). Lurking in the shadows of these negotiations 
was a fight of words among the Contact Group’s members on the particular details 
concerning the peace agreement and the peacebuilding agenda. While this debate started 
shortly after the New York summit, it became more pronounced at Dayton.
B. The Federation and Eastern Slavonia
Michael Steiner, German Deputy Representative to the Contact Group, and Chris Hill, 
Director of the US State Department’s Office of South-Central European Affairs, headed 
the negotiations on the deepening of the Federation’s structures. While Holbrooke 
considered the Federation an important element of the peace process, he did not become 
directly involved in this phase of the negotiations because he felt that the talks should 
secure a settlement, rather than becoming immerse in detailed political questions (Borden 
and Hedl 1996).
On the second day of the proximity talks, Steiner and Hill met with Tudjman, 
Izetbegovic and Kresimir Zubak, the Federation’s president. It took eight days to 
negotiate an agreement that would give a new face to the Federation. The problem with 
the Federation was that it was mostly a fiction. The US created it in March 1994 to end 
the fighting between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, to increase cooperation between 
Bosnia and Croatia, so the latter could arm the former, and to change the balance of 
power on the ground. While it did put the intended pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, the 
Federation never came into being. The Bosnian Croats, especially the more extreme 
nationalist elements, showed no desire to disband the structures of Herceg-Bosna 
(Holbrooke 1999: 241). Although this was a clear violation of the Washington 
Agreement, the Contact Group did not reprimand the Bosnian Croats for fears it would 
incite another round of fighting.
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Even more problematic, Izetbegovic did not trust Tudjman’s intentions. Before 
the talks at Dayton, Clinton had to meet with Izetbegovic and Tudjman in New York to 
ask them to put their differences aside and co-operate in the name of peace. Both 
Presidents agreed. However, this non-binding agreement did not make the negotiations 
concerning the Federation any easier. At the heart of the problem was this mistrust. While 
the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian government argued that the Federation should be 
very strong and Bosnia’s central government very weak, this was unacceptable for the 
Bosniaks. The Bosniaks argued that yielding on this point would solidify the Bosnian 
Serbs’ case for a weak central government. Their rationale for this attitude was that a 
weak central government would set the road to Bosnia’s partition; the Federation falling 
under Croatia’s sphere of influence and the RS under Milosevic’s tutelage (Borden and 
Hedl 1996). The fear was the materialisation of the infamous Karadjordevo agreement.
As a result, the negotiations on the Federation’s structures started to spill into the 
constitutional and legal issues surrounding the central government proposed in the Basic 
Agreed Principles. In the end, German and American pressures moved the parties closer 
to an agreement, which was signed on 10 November. While some in the Contact Group 
saw this as a considerable step in the right direction, the Dayton Agreement, like the 
Washington Agreement, was a promissory note. Among its many provisions included the 
unification o f Mostar, the establishment of a customs union with Croatia and the 
dissolution of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna (OHR-D 1995b). Eventually, Izetbegovic 
gave into Bosnian Croats’ view of a strong Federation and weak central government, 
angering Bosnia’s Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. Commenting on the agreement an 
European mediator told Borden and Hedl (1996) that: ‘In the end they [the Bosniaks] had 
to recognise that the Federation was a prerequisite for Western policy, and they couldn’t 
hold up the whole of Dayton for something they were expected to agree.’
Once the negotiations on the Federation were completed, the Croat delegation 
moved to work on Eastern Slavonia. WTiile Eastern Slavonia was an important issue for 
Tudjman, the American negotiation team understood it as a pre-text to Bosnia’s un­
resolved territorial issues. In fact, it seems that Tudjman and Milosevic had secretly 
agreed that Croatia would keep Eastern Slavonia, while the Bosnian Serbs would keep 
the disputed Posavina region in Northwest Bosnia, which was originally inhabited by
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Bosnian Croats and cleansed by the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of the war (Gow 
1997: 283). This pact infuriated Bosnian Croat leaders because they considered their 
control of Posavina as one of their principal aims at Dayton.
In the end, Eastern Slavonia was not discussed or solved at Dayton. The UN’s 
representative to the ICFY, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter 
Galbraith, flew from Dayton to Eastern Slavonia to negotiate with local Serb leaders a 
peaceful transfer of the territory. An agreement was eventually reached, where the UN 
would set up a transitional authority to oversee the transfer of the territory, to guarantee 
the rights of the Serbs living in this territory, to start the process of de-militarisation, and 
to commence the painful process of economic and social reconstruction. The Basic 
Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia. Baranja and Western Sirmium was signed 
in Erdut on 12 November and in Zagreb on 14 November. It is important to emphasise 
that this agreement is not part of GFA, the end product of the peace talks.
B. Constitutional and Legal Matters
This facet of the negotiation was very controversial. Not only because the parties to the 
talks were the RS’s representatives, the Federation, and the Republic of Bosnia, but 
because of the rift it caused within the ranks of the Contact Group, among the European 
representatives, including Bildt, and the American negotiators. For the Americans, 
especially for Holbrooke, the peace talks had to produce success. Failure was not 
accepted because it could hurt America’s credibility and hurt Clinton’s re-election 
campaign (Daalder 2000). For these reasons, the American negotiation approach was 
designed to maximise the opportunities for success by avoiding issues that could derail 
the peace talks. American negotiators understood that legal and constitutional matters 
could be an obstruction, as these negotiations were aimed at creating a single political 
community to enable all the groups and individuals to achieve their self-determination, 
while also limiting the claims of ethno-national leaders arguing for the partition of 
Bosnia. This section analyses two important controversies relating to the nature and the 
role of the elections in post-settlement Bosnia and other important constitutional issues.
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1. The Elections
Linked to the talks addressing Bosnia’s constitutional structures were unanswered 
questions relating to the nature of the elections (e.g. direct v. indirect) and voter 
participation. It is important to remember that the former proved to be one of the issues 
that almost wrecked the New York summit. While the Contact Group won a major 
concession relating to the OSCE’s role from the Serbian delegation, the question relating 
to the direct or indirect nature of the elections were not adequately addressed.
It is not surprising that this was a divisive aspect of the negotiations. The growing 
discord between the parties at Dayton was becoming so pronounced that in one of the 
Contact Group meetings the American team expressed their disposition ‘to throw the 
towel on provisions for elections’ and create an electoral commission that would answer 
these questions after the signing of the peace agreement (Bildt 1998: 146). The German 
representative to the Contact Group, Wolfgang Ischinger, expressed his anger with the 
idea, stating that he had not seen any serious attempts to solve this important issue (Bildt 
1998: 146). Holbrooke (1999: 275) believed that Ischinger’s anger was understandable, 
as Germany gave refugee at the time to over three hundred thousands Bosnian refugees. 
For the German diplomat, the negotiated settlement had to provide incentives for these 
people to return to their homes and elections were part of this envisioned incentive 
package.
Bildt had clearly articulated his concern that setting the elections debate aside for 
the time being was an error. He argued that if this issue were not addressed at Dayton, it 
would not be addressed after the agreement’s signing. The Bosnian Serbs wanted quick 
elections ‘based on where people were living at the time.’ The Bosniaks objected to this, 
insisting that ‘refugees [had to be] entitled to record their votes in the places from which 
they had been forced to flee.’ The debate, as Bildt rightly argued, ‘was not a purely 
“technical” question that could be referred to some commission. In fact, it was the core of 
the entire political conflict. Was ethnic cleansing to be accepted or not?’ (Bildt 1998: 
147).
In the end, Annex 3 of the GFA, which addresses this issue, did not only create 
the electoral commission envisioned by American negotiators, but it also increased the
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role of the OSCE.20 Rather than just monitoring social conditions to determine when the 
elections could be held, it was established that the OSCE would have the authority to 
assist the parties to create these social conditions (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.1.2) and to 
supervise and prepare the elections (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.II.2). The agreement also 
stated that the elections would take place ‘six months after [the agreement’s] entry into 
force... or if the OSCE determines a delay necessary, no later than nine months after 
entry into force’ (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.III.2). Increasing the OSCE’s responsibility in 
Bosnia proved to be another factor that divided the Contact Group. While the Europeans 
did support the monitoring of the elections, they believed that the OSCE should not 
organise them (Holbrooke 1999: 290).
The American team ignored the Europeans’ view on this matter because Clinton 
instructed Holbrooke to use the peace talks as means to increase the OSCE’s role in the 
post-Cold War era. Two important reasons justified this decision. First, Clinton’s vision 
of an undivided and democratic Europe included the expansion of the organisation’s 
responsibilities. Its work in Bosnia would set the stage for the organisation’s role in 
democratising the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union (Holbrooke 1999: 290-91). Second, and as demonstrated in more detailed below, 
the US military and the Department of Defense were arguing that it could meet its 
objectives in less than a year, having US troops back before Christmas 1996. Organising 
and holding the elections would create a legitimate government that could take over 
Bosnia’s affairs and permit US troops to exit the country before the 1996 US presidential 
elections. As a result, the Clinton administration insisted that an American should direct 
an OSCE mission in Bosnia, as this was the best insurance for the elections to take place 
before or on September 1996. This proved to be an area of controversy, as France 
expressed its intention to appoint the head of this mission.
Regarding the thorny debate of who could vote and where, a German proposal 
eventually resolved it. It was a very controversial issue, especially with the Bosnian Serbs 
because the Article covering this provision directly states that (GFA 1995: Annex 3, 
Art.IV.l):
20 Annex 3, Art. Ill creates a Provisional Election Commission, while Article V of the same Annex 
expresses the parties’ commitment to create a Permanent Election Commission.
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Any citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older whose name appears on 
the 1991 census for Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be eligible, in accordance with 
electoral rules and regulations, to vote. A citizen who no longer lives in the 
municipality in which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected 
to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in that municipality, provided that the 
person is determined to have been registered in that municipality as confirmed by 
the local election commission and the Provisional Election Commission.
Such a citizen may, however, apply to the Commission to cast his or her ballot 
elsewhere. The exercise of a refugee’s right to vote shall be interpreted as 
confirmation of his or her intention to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By 
Election Day, the return of refugees should already be underway, thus allowing 
many to participate in person in elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Commission may provide in the electoral rules and regulations for citizens not 
listed in the 1991 census to vote.
Subsequently, this provision gave refugees the power to decide the political fate of the 
municipalities that had been cleansed by the Bosnian Serbs. While this is true, it is 
important to also recognise that the Bosnian Serbs also won a concession. Refugees and 
displaced persons can cast their ballots in new municipalities, as long as they registered 
with the Commission, alluded to above. The significance of this concession must be 
stressed because it gave those Bosnian Serbs, forced from their homes, now living in the 
RS, a say in local and entity elections.
Concerning the nature of elections, a compromise between the Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Serbs was reached. It was agreed that the 42 members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly’s lower chamber, the House of Representatives, would be elected directly via a 
system of proportional representation that carefully guaranteed the equality of all ethnic 
groups (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.IV.2[a]). However, the upper chamber, the House of 
Peoples, would be elected indirectly; that is to say five of the 15 members would be 
elected by the RS’s National Assembly, while the remaining would be elected by the 
Federation’s House of Peoples. It is important to mention that Bosnian Croat members of 
the Federation’s House of Peoples would elect five Bosnian Croat members to the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s upper chamber, while the Bosniaks would vote for the 
remaining five members (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.IV. 1 [a]). The same held true for the 
election of the three-member Presidency. Each group would be able to vote directly for a 
presidential candidate.
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For the Contact Group, the elections were significant because they would serve as 
a mechanism to advance ‘other, more ambitious objectives: ousting suspected war 
criminals from power; defeating the nationalist parties; and laying the groundwork for an 
independent media, personal freedoms, and other requisites of civil society’ (Schear 
1996: 88). As Francine Friedman (2000: 22-25) argues, the elections would not only 
advance these important objectives, but these would also foster political stability, validate 
the peace agreement, and affirm Bosnia’s sovereignty. Therefore, the elections would 
provide a degree of legitimacy to the undemocratic nature of the GFA and its 
constitutional system (Yee 1996: 180), which is discussed in more depth in the next 
section.
2. The Constitution
Attempting to minimise any conflicts that could derail the peace talks, and some 
commentators also add because of the influence of the US constitutional model (Neville- 
Jones 1996-97: 49), the American team ‘proposed an extremely decentralised 
governmental structure creating hardly any effective central powers’ (Borden and Hedl 
1996). While the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats quickly endorsed this proposal, 
the Bosniaks and the Europeans were outraged. A European mediator told Borden and 
Hedl (1996) that:
We were in favour of a stronger centralised power because we live on the same 
continent with these people, and we are going to have to deal with them over a long 
term. If the European Union is going to do any business with them -  and they won't 
settle down until they do have relationships with the larger entities around them -  
then we've got to have institutions in the centre which can represent them to the 
outside world and can translate commitments that they make internationally into 
domestic policy.
In his memoirs, Bildt conveys his frustration with the proposal by recounting a story of a 
confrontation between him and an unnamed US negotiator (1998: 145): ‘I asked someone 
from the US team if he would like to live in a country with a constitution of the kind 
which was beginning to emerge. He just laughed. Clearly not!' Bildt’s assertion, that the 
American team irresponsibly handled the issues surrounding the constitution, is correct. 
In their hands lied the fate of a country. However, the American team considered military
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imperatives, the map of Bosnia and the exit strategy to be more important than 
constitutional matters or, for that matter, the interests of Bosnia’s citizens.
After much debate between the delegations and among members of the Contact 
Group, the new constitution secures the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its 
sovereignty and independence (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.I.l). Bosnia’s new central 
institutions were ‘defined as being the state of three constituent peoples [Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs] and others, and compromised of two entities, The Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska’ (Gow 1997: 288). According to Article 
III, the Bosnian state would have responsibility over the following areas: foreign policy; 
foreign trade policy; customs policy; monetary policy, which was clearly delineated in 
Article VTI of the constitution; finances for the international obligations of the country; 
immigration, asylum and refuge policies; inter-entity criminal law-making and 
enforcement; inter-entity transportation policy; communication policy; and air traffic 
control (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. III.l). Other important policies, usually performed by 
a state, such as education, health, defence, tax, judicial, and fiscal, was the responsibility 
of each entity (Woodward 1999: 142). Even more important the constitution did not 
envision the combination of the entities’ military forces into a single force for the whole 
country. As a result, rather than creating the strong state the Europeans were lobbying 
during the negotiations; the end product is what Bildt described as ‘the most 
decentralised state in the world’ (Bildt 1996). Echoing this view, Susan Woodward 
(1999a: 142) argues that the constitutional framework ‘resembles more the European 
Union than most modem states.’
In fact, the institutional system created at Dayton could only operate if leaders of 
each party were willing to co-operate and arrive at all inter-entity decisions by way of 
consensus. The constitution establishes six government institutions: the Presidency; the 
Parliamentary Assembly; a Council of Ministers; a Constitutional Court; a Central Bank; 
and a Standing Committee on Joint Military Matters (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. IV, V, 
VI, and VII respectively). To safeguard each constituent people’s interests, the Bosnia’s 
state institutions were organised on the basis of a power-sharing arrangement that 
guaranteed the representations of these peoples by way of ethnic keys and provisions to 
protect ‘vital interests’ (Chandler 1999: 67). This arrangement, while securing the equal
152
participation of all the ethnic groups in these institutions, gives ‘each ethnic group the 
ultimate decision-making power in any matters it considers important to it. In this sense, 
each group enjoys sovereignty’ (Yee 1996: 187).
Supporting Woodward’s comparison between the EU’s constitutional system and 
Bosnia’s constitutional arrangement is the way citizenship is conferred to individuals. 
This is not only the responsibility of the central state, but of each entity as well. Article 
1.7 (GFA 1995: Annex 4) stipulates that: ‘There shall be a citizenship of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, to be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each 
Entity, to be regulated by each Entity....’ The constitution also states that the entities 
have the power to issue passports. These provisions are not only strange, but they seem to 
cement the legal division of the Bosnian state.
In the same vein, the constitution grants the entities a degree of power in foreign 
affairs. According to Article II.2[d] (GFA 1995: Annex 4), the entities may enter into 
agreements with other states and organisations, as long as the Parliamentary Assembly 
endorses these agreements. This provision also states that ‘Parliamentary Assembly may 
provide by law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent.’ This 
provision is in addition to the one stating that each entity has ‘the right to establish 
special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ These relationships can be negotiated 
and agreed to without the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly or any other state 
institution.
Another interesting and unique feature of the constitution is its adherence to a 
number of international and regional human rights treaties (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art.I). 
One of the most important human right treaties included to the constitution is the 1950 
European Convention and Protocols. Although the countries that observe this treaty are 
members of the Council of Europe, Bosnia was not a member at the time. As Paul Szasz 
(1996: 306) notes, the Contact Group included this in the list of human right treaties 
Bosnia had to abide by because it was trying to move Bosnia closer to Europe. By 
observing and adhering to the 1950 European Convention and Protocols, the Contact 
Group started the process by which Bosnia could join the Council of Europe and 
eventually obtain membership in the EU.
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It is important to notice that the constitution makes clear that these treaties have to 
be also observed by the entities (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. III.2[c]). In addition to these 
treaties’ provisions, the constitution also enumerates a number of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms all Bosnia’s citizens hold (see GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. II.3[a- 
m]). Why did the negotiators list these, when these rights and freedoms are part of these 
treaties’ provisions? It seems that the negotiator’s intent was to clearly present these to 
Bosnia’s citizens, so they could be aware of their basic rights and freedoms, without 
having to consult with each of the treaties (Szasz 1996: 307). For instance, freedom of 
movement and the right to property were strongly underscored because the Contact 
Group wanted to send a clear signal that ethnic cleansing and a divided Bosnia were 
unacceptable. Nevertheless, the decision to list some of the rights seems to create a 
problem. Are these listed rights and freedoms more important than those listed in the 
international and regional human rights treaties annexed to, but not listed in the 
constitution? The fact that some are explicitly listed in the constitution and that others are 
implicitly stated in the document means that the former list has ‘higher value than those 
merely incorporated by reference to human rights instruments’ (Szasz 1996: 307).
Furthermore, because discrimination was an important tool used by the parties to 
divide society, the constitution makes it clear that all individuals regardless of their ‘sex, 
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’ (GFA 1995: Annex 4, 
Art. II.4) will equally enjoy these rights and freedoms.
Ironically, this document, which repeatedly makes mention of the importance to 
guarantee individual rights and freedoms, establishes a political system that breeds 
discrimination. The best example is the issue of the requirements candidates must meet in 
order to hold certain offices in the Bosnian state. For instance, the constitution clearly 
stipulates that ‘the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: 
one Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and 
one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska.’ (GFA 1995: Annex 
4, Art. V). The same holds true for the members of the Parliamentary Assembly’s upper 
chamber, the House of Peoples (GFA 1995: Annex 4, Art. V.l). In this manner, a 
Bosniak or a Bosnian Croat living in Republika Sprska or Bosnian Serb living in the
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Federation cannot represent his or her entity because his or her background does not 
mirror that of the entity. The discrimination is even more pronounced for those that do 
not think of themselves as belonging to one of the three ethno-national communities (e.g. 
a Romi or a Jew) (Woodward 1999: 143). What about those individuals that have a mix 
background? Are they eligible for these positions or do they have to ignore their 
background and declare one ethnic identity in order to run for a position?
This apartheid-like system seems to point to two inherent problems with the 
constitution crafted at Dayton. First, as Zoran Pajic (1998: 135) points out, the 
constitution, though with many safeguards to ensure the protection of individual rights 
and freedoms, ‘does not favor the protection of individuals in their own right.’ He (1998: 
136) notes that the ‘Preoccupation with the rights of ethnic groups reflects the transition 
from communist to nationalist collectivism, where the despotism of one and only ruling 
party is replaced by the despotism of group (ethnic) interests.’ Second, the constitution, 
while uniting the two entities under a new central state, gives a number of responsibilities 
and powers to the entities that sub-state units usually do not have. It seems that the 
constitution enables both the partition and the unification of the country.
Consequently, the constitution resembles a compromise between realism and 
humanitarianism (Kaldor 1999; and Kaplan 2000). The realities of the war and the ethno- 
national leaders’ interest to secure their power were more important than the 
humanitarian provisions of the constitution. Also important was the American team’s 
desire to achieve success at all costs, even if this meant that it had to moderate the 
influence of these humanitarian ideals, which supposedly were guiding the Clinton 
administration’s foreign policy. Although the constitution is a product of this compromise 
it is important to note that many hoped that with time the humanitarian provisions would 
override the realist tenets and construct the multi-ethnic democratic Bosnia envisioned in 
the constitution’s pre-amble. This is something that has yet to be seen, but the 
international community believes that the constitution is a legal mechanism that can be 
used to unify Bosnia in the long-term.
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C. Territorial Issues
Before departing for Dayton, Holbrooke was asked by an American journalist to explain 
what he thought was going to be the toughest aspect of the peace talks. Holbrooke replied 
that the map was going to be the most contentious issue (USDS-D 1995). As Borden and 
Hedl (1996) maintain, ‘constitutions are just paper, and agreements just promises. But 
maps are land -  the core issue of the war.’ In many ways, territorial questions were not 
only the toughest phase of the negotiations, but also the disagreement on the map of 
Bosnia nearly ruined the peace talks. Indeed, an agreement on this matter was not reached 
until the last day of the talks -  hours before they were supposed to conclude.
If at the time of the cease-fire, signed of 5 October 1995, the Federation 
controlled 51.6 percent of the territory, and the RS the remaining 48.4 percent, why were 
the negotiations on the map so conflict-ridden? The problem was that the parties had to 
be ready to swap territory in order to ensure each entity’s viability. Negotiations 
concerning the map started in earnest on the thirteenth day. They were controlled by the 
American team and it was one of the areas Holbrooke dedicated most of his energies. A 
displeased European mediator told Borden and Hedl (1996): ‘The Europeans did not play 
a role when it came to negotiations over the maps. Holbrooke didn’t want it. He wanted it 
all to himself.’
There were four major issues of contention.21 The first was Sarajevo. At the time 
of the negotiations, it was divided between the Federation and the RS. Both sides laid 
claim to the city and the Contact Group emphasised that a final peace agreement had to 
secure its unity. To settle the conflict, the American team proposed that Sarajevo become 
a sort of District of Columbia, where it would not be part of either entity, but be a neutral 
city, controlled by all groups. The Bosniaks objected to this idea and Milosevic argued 
that implementing this would prove to be too complicated. As a result, Milosevic told 
Holbrooke to forget about the ‘D.C. model’ and let him deal with the situation, providing 
that Holbrooke or any member of his team did not inform the Bosnian Serbs of what he
21 Holbrooke (1999: 272-73) mentions six issues in his memoirs. Two will not be discussed here. These are 
Bosanski Novi and the fate of Srebrenica and Zepa. The latter towns were symbols of ethnic cleansing and 
the Bosniaks had expressed their desire to re-acquire them at Dayton. Although the delegation pressed 
Milosevic for the cities, he did not cede them. Both cities are currently in the RS. Like the other two, 
Bonsanski Novi remained within the jurisdiction of the RS, though the Croat delegation had expressed its 
desire for it to return to the Federation. Both issues were mostly used for leverage during the negotiations.
156
was doing (Holbrooke 1998: 291). In the end, Milosevic agreed to give up Sarajevo, 
including the suburb of Grbavica, a predominantly Bosnian Serb area. The rationale for 
this decision was either because he wanted to weaken the political position of the Bosnian 
Serb leadership, or because he had a respect for Izetbegovic’s courage during the war. 
Milosevic told Izetbegovic: ‘You deserve Sarajevo. You were living in holes while you 
were being shelled by those in the hills’ (cited in Borden and Hedl 1996). Whichever the 
reason, Milosevic’s decision to cede Sarajevo signalled his disposition to finish the 
negotiations and finalise an agreement.
The second issue was Gorazde. The city had been surrounded by Bosnian Serb 
territory. The Bosniaks wanted to connect the city with the rest of the Federation. General 
Wesley Clark proposed a corridor, more commonly known as the “Scotch Road” or the 
“Clark Corridor.” After having a couple of drinks with some US negotiators, Milosevic 
agreed to cede a small sliver of land, where a road could be built to connect Gorazde with 
the rest of the Federation (Borden and Hedl 1996; and Holbrooke 1998: 285). In order to 
secure the approval of the Bosnian delegation, NATO agreed to build a new road 
between Gorazde and the Federation (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. IV.2[c]).
The third issue of contention was the Posavina pocket, a small sliver of land on 
Croatia’s Eastern Slavonia border, which includes Zubak’s hometown. This became a 
thorny issue as the American team had pushed Milosevic so far that he accidentally gave 
the Federation 55 percent of the territory. Once he realised what happened, he asked 
Holbrooke to change this. Even though the American team was tempted not to do so, it 
agreed to stick to the 49-51 principle, because they feared this would result in the failure 
of the talks.
Believing that Silajdzic would be more flexible, Holbrooke asked him to meet 
with Milosevic to re-negotiate a new formula that gave the RS more territory. Once this 
effort produced the 49-51 calculus, Izetbegovic was asked to comment on the Milosevic- 
Silajdzic arrangement. Although he supported the agreement, the American negotiators 
noticed their mistake of not having included members of the Croat delegation in this 
matter. When Mate Granic, Croatian Foreign Minister, learned of the arrangement, he 
became extremely angry because Silajdzic had given territories liberated by the Croat
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army (Bildt 1998: 152; and Holbrooke 1999: 300). Instead of ending the talks 
successfully, the omission of a Croat representative almost derailed the entire process.
Even though Tudjman was angry he was ready to concede some of that territory 
in exchange for the Posavina pocket. Milosevic agreed, but for the 49-51 calculus to be 
achieved, the Bosniaks had to concede one percent o f ‘theoretical territory’; that is to say 
territory that they had received in the negotiations, not territory that had been militarily 
acquired or defended during the war. After much deliberation and American threats to 
end the talks and publicly blame the Bosniaks for the failure of Dayton, the Bosniak 
delegation proposed to give up the one percent with the condition that Milosevic cede to 
the Federation the town of Brdko. Subsequently, Brcko and its strategic position became 
the fourth issue of contention in this facet of the negotiations.
Another condition was not what Holbrooke wanted to hear, so he decided to send 
the delegations a memorandum, which stated that the talks had failed and that a press 
conference would be held at eleven o’clock in the morning of 21 November 1995 to 
announce it to the world (Holbrooke 1999: 304-06), while reminding the Bosniaks that 
the US would not arm them if war re-started. The next morning, Milosevic met with 
Holbrooke and Christopher. Noticing that he would have to return to Belgrade without 
the lifting of the sanctions, Milosevic agreed to a proposal made by Granic that stated that 
the status of Brdko should be left to an arbitration commission, which could decide if the 
disputed town should be part of the RS or the Federation after the signing of the 
agreement (Borden and Hedl 1996).22 Tudjman agreed with Milosevic’s offer. Holbrooke 
and Christopher then went to meet with Izetbegovic, who under a lot of American 
pressure accepted the proposal, but he still emphasized that the agreement was not ‘a just 
peace’ (Cited in Holbrooke 1999: 309).
D. The Debate on Military and Civilian Implementation
Since the Clinton administration started to craft its peacemaking strategy, the 
administration envisioned a peacemaking process that would be completely directed by 
the US. American influence affected the nature and the mandate of the military and 
civilian aspects of the implementation provisions of the peace agreement. As Daalder
22 For more on the details of the arbitration, refer to: Annex 2, Art. V.
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shows (2000: 144), two perspectives dominated this debate. First, the UN had to be 
sidelined. It should not play a leading role in the implementation of a peace agreement as 
it had previously enjoyed in Haiti or Somalia. While much of the Clinton administration’s 
position against the UN resulted from its debate with UN Secretary General Boutrous 
Boutrous-Ghali’s decision to limit the use of force against Bosnian Serb position in May 
1995 and then in August 1995, another factor was the US Congress’s strong discontent 
with Boutrous-Ghali’s resistance to reform the UN according to American interests. For 
these reasons, officials in the Clinton administration, who feared that UN involvement 
could affect NATO’s mission, were also concerned that UN involvement could create 
more problems between the White House and Congress (Daalder 2000: 154).
Second, the Clinton administration, heavily influenced by the military 
establishment, wanted to limit the military mission to the separation of the forces and to 
establish a balance of power in Bosnia that prevented the war from re-starting. As a 
result, military commanders argued that negotiators needed to craft an agreement that 
clearly stated the mission’s objectives. In return, the military would provide a clear 
timetable to achieve these objectives, setting a clear exit date and a strategy to remove the 
troops out of Bosnia. As stated before, for this to materialise, senior military advisers 
wanted to make sure that the UN or any civilian body would not interfere with the 
military aspects of peace implementation. The US military asked for ‘A single chain of 
military command [that] lead from soldier on the ground to the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, General George Joulwan, who would report to North Atlantic 
Council only’ (Daalder 2000: 154).
This did no sit well with the Europeans. They envisioned a strong role for the UN, 
arguing that the UN’s experience in peacebuilding would play an important role in 
translating the peace agreement’s provisions into reality. After lengthy negotiations 
between the European and American members of the Contact Group, US officials agreed 
to a compromise that gave the UN a degree of power in the peacebuilding process, while 
creating a series of ad hoc bodies, supported by a web of regional, international, non­
governmental organisations, to implement the civilian aspects of the peace agreement.
The UN would have a major role in the creation of an International Police Task 
Force (IPTF). The IPTF would basically ‘police the police’ forces of each entity
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(Chandler 1999: 51). In this way, it would advise law enforcement agencies, train law 
enforcement personnel, facilitate the entities’ ‘law enforcement activities,’ and assist ‘the 
law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities’ (GFA 1995: Annex 11, 
Art.III.l[a-g]). In addition to the IPTF, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees was given the responsibility to design and implement, with the consultation of 
‘asylum countries and the Parties,’ ‘a repatriation plan that would allow for an early, 
peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees and displaced persons... ’ to their homes 
(GFA 1995: Annex 7, Art.1.5). In both cases, the US team accepted a role for the UN due 
to its experience in these two areas.
If the UN was not heading civilian implementation, like it had done in previous 
situations, then what organisation was responsible for the overall implementation of the 
civilian aspects of the peace agreement? According to Annex 10 of the peace agreement, 
a High Representative would be responsible for these efforts. This is truly one of the most 
interesting aspects of the GFA. The High Representative’s mission, though authorised by 
a UN Security Council Resolution, is not responsible to the UN, but to an ad hoc body 
called the Peace Implementation Council.
Once the US informed the Europeans that the EU had to be ready to finance most 
of Bosnia’s reconstruction projects, the EU’s Council of Ministers instructed European 
negotiators to make sure that the High Representative was a European (Neville-Jones 
1996-97: 50). In mid-October, Europeans negotiators informed Holbrooke that they had 
decided that Bildt would be the High Representative. Holbrooke (1999: 209) agreed, 
stating that: ‘To do otherwise would have opened a wide breach within the Contact 
Group.’ Interestingly, Holbrooke failed to inform Robert Gallucci, who drafted Annex 
10’s first version, of his decision.
Believing that the High Representative was going to be an American, Gallucci 
originally drafted a strong mandate for the High Representative. He shared his draft with 
members of the Contact Group a couple of days prior to the start of the peace talks and 
received their strong support for his plan. When Gallucci learned that Holbrooke had 
already agreed to Bildt’s nomination, he and other individuals of the American team 
started to re-write the proposal in order to restrict the High Representative’s authority and 
responsibilities. The rationale behind this decision was the Clinton administration’s fear
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that ‘a powerful person whom Washington could not control might fumble the 
implementation effort or, worse still, interfere with the military effort’ (Daalder 2000: 
157). Consequently, the High Representative was provided little power. While he did 
have the authority to monitor the agreement’s implementation and play an important role 
in creating the conditions for elections to take place, the High Representative had no 
power over NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.9).
Although the powers and responsibilities of the High Representative will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapters, it is important to emphasise that the debate 
over the High Representative’s authority and his role in post-settlement Bosnia clearly 
demonstrates the different perspectives European and American negotiators held. ‘For the 
US, [the peacebuilding mission] was a military operation with some form of civilian 
annexe, while the Europeans tended to see it the other way round, with the political issues 
and perspectives in the centre, and the military measures supportive within this 
framework’ (Bildt 1998: 131). Even European military leaders agreed with their civilian 
counterparts that a viable peace was only possible, if the military aspects of the peace 
agreement would support the civilian aspects. Although European military advisors met 
with their American counterparts, they failed to convince the American team about the 
need to strengthen the High Representative’s mandate (Bildt 1998: 132).
Consequently, the US perspective directly influenced the peace negotiations. The 
GFA’smilitary provisions are extremely detailed, clearly explaining NATO’s 
Implementation Force’s (IFOR) powers and the responsibility. The object was to create a 
balance of military power that could deter each entity’s military forces from re-starting 
the war. In order to achieve this objective, the US had proposed to ‘equip and train’ the 
Federation’s forces. Although Izetbegovic had expressed his interest in this programme, 
serving as an incentive to sign the peace agreement, the allies believed that this was a bad 
idea (Holbrooke 1999: 277).
The debate in the White House was even more pronounced. Like the allies, the 
military leadership believed that equipping and training the Federation’s forces would 
only heighten the situation. As a result, military advisors lobbied for the reduction of 
armaments levels. This ‘build-down,’ as the Clinton administration called it, would not 
only de-mobilise each entity’s militaries, but also provide a mechanism to weaken the
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entities’ war-making capabilities (Holbrooke 1999: 277). Clinton’s position, which was 
heavily influenced by the views of Senators Robert Dole (MR-R), Joseph Lieberman 
(CT-D), and Joseph Bieden (DE-D), supported the ‘equip and train’ programme on the 
basis that the Federation’s forces lacked heavy weaponry. With their virtual monopoly of 
heavy weapons, it was feared that a re-ignition of hostilities would permit the Bosnian 
Serbs to quickly overrun Federation positions. After all, many in the Clinton 
administration believed that many of the Federation’s military gains were achieved with 
the assistance of the Croatian military. Arming and training Federation forces was the 
best chance to achieve a lasting peace on the ground.
Facing increased allied opposition to the plan, the White House reached a 
compromise. It would support both the ‘build-down’ of armament levels in Bosnia and 
the ‘equip and train’ programme. The latter was not part of the agreement. Instead it 
became a bilateral agreement between the Federation and the Clinton administration 
(Woodward 1999: 147). If the parties did not meet the provisions of the ‘build down’ 
initiative, which are described in detail in Annex 1-B of the GFA, then the US would 
increase its support for the Federation forces. If the reverse took place, the US would 
decrease the amount of equipment and training offered to the Federation (Holbrooke 
1999: 278).
Annex 1-B also included other confidence-building measures in order to reduce 
the level of tensions between the Federation’s forces and the Army of Republika Sprska. 
The OSCE was given an important role ‘to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the 
risk of conflict, drawing fully upon the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiation on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures of the OCSE’ (GFA 1995: Annex 1-B, 
Art.II). For instance, the OSCE would assist the parties to establish military liaison 
missions between the leadership of both entities’ militaries. The OSCE would also ask 
the entities to identify armament manufacturing sites, to notify all concerned parties of all 
military activities, and to de-mobilise each side’s military (GFA 1995: Annex 1-B, 
Art.n.[a-I]).
Annex 1-A of the peace agreement sets out in much detail the mandate of IFOR 
and clearly spells out the entities’ responsibility and obligations regarding this operation. 
In essence, IFOR would have control of all military matters within Bosnia (GFA 1995:
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Annex 1-A, Art.VI.5). It would be present in both entities and it would have the authority 
to employ all necessary means, including the use of force, against those that threaten 
IFOR troops (GFA: Annex 1-A, Art. IV.4.[b]). IFOR would also be responsible for the 
supervision of the ‘Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation, and the Inter- 
Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation’ (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. IV.4.[c]) 
and for the de-mobilisation of each entity’s troop levels. In addition, IFOR was ordered 
by the North Atlantic Council (NAC): (a) to secure the movement of organisations 
conducting humanitarian work; (b) to assist UN High Commission for Refugees and its 
humanitarian mission; (c) to help create the conditions for free and fair elections; (d) to 
prevent the interference against the movement of refugees, displaced peoples, and 
civilian populations; and (e) to monitor the clearance of mines and other obstacles that 
may hamper the freedom of movement (e.g. checkpoints) (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. 
VI.3.[a-e]).
In order to further bolster his authority, the IFOR commander was ordered to 
create a Joint Military Commission (JMC). This military commission was not only 
supposed to increase co-operation between the IFOR commander and each entity’s 
military leaders, but it would also serve as a mechanism to carry out the IFOR 
commander’s decisions. The JMC would also include civilian personnel. The High 
Representative was authorised to attend its meetings and provide advice on politico- 
military matters (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art.VIII). It is important to add that the IFOR 
commander was given the authority to implement this body’s decisions via all necessary 
means.
Although the NAC had the sole authority to give IFOR further duties and 
responsibilities to implement the military provisions of the peace agreement (GFA: 
Annex 1-A, Art. VI.4), the IFOR commander was given the power to be the final 
interpreter of these provisions (GFA 1995: Annex 1-A, Art. XII). This clause was 
important because it gave the IFOR commander the authority to decide when and what to 
do in cases the civilian and the military aspects of the peace agreement’s implementation 
became blurred. This clause satisfied the interests of maximalists and minimalists alike. 
The former argued that the IFOR Commander and the High Representative could work 
together to achieve a self-sustaining peace that secured the unity of Bosnia as a multi­
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ethnic democracy. The latter argued that this would enable IFOR to prevent ‘mission 
creep’ and dedicate its energies to military matters, ignoring possible problems arising 
from the implementation of the agreement’s civilian provisions. Under this provision, for 
instance, the IFOR commander could decide if to arrest or not those that had been 
indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
US military advisors argued that the implementation of the military aspects of the 
peace agreement could be achieved in 12 months. The Clinton administration strongly 
argued that IFOR would start to withdraw no later than in December 1996. Although 
Holbrooke feared that this decision could weaken the implementation process, the 
Clinton administration had to agree to the one-year limit because Democratic and 
Republican senators strongly voiced their concerns to send troops without a clear exit 
strategy (Holbrooke 1999: 210-11). Even more important, 70 per cent of Americans were 
strongly opposed to the deployment of American troops in Bosnia. It is important to 
remember that the operation was to take place in the background of US presidential 
elections (Holbrooke 1999: 219).
The High Representative’s mandate was expected to last until Bosnia’s state 
institutions started to operate after the country’s first elections. The agreement also 
stipulated that the High Representative would also participate in meetings regarding the 
economic reconstruction of the Bosnian economy. The World Bank, the European Union, 
other international financial institutions, and several nation-states earmarked $5 billion to 
achieve the rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of Bosnia. This sum of money 
would be allotted to Bosnia during a five-year period (Holbrooke 1999: 258). While it 
seems that the intention was to have the High Representative end its mission shortly after 
IFOR’s exit, it was also argued that the High Representative had to assist the 
international donor community to disperse these funds. In this way, the peace agreement 
was not clear about the length of the High Representative’s mandate.
The High Representative received its orders from the Peace Implementation 
Council and the Contact Group. He is also the final interpreter of the peace agreement’s 
civilian provisions. Although there are some similarities between the IFOR commander 
and the High Representative, the main difference between these two individuals was that 
the IFOR commander had more power than the High Representative. Not only because
164
IFOR had more resources than the High Representative at his disposal, but because the 
military provisions of the agreement were clearly spelled out in the peace agreement. The 
High Representative’s mandate was ambiguous. This ambiguity resulted from the 
combination of the American view of the peace process, which argued that it was 
primarily a military mission supported by civilian personnel, and the European view that 
it was the other way around.
In the end, the debate on the implementation of civilian and military provisions 
reflect American national interests. While it is true that the Europeans did influence these 
provisions, the provisions seem to confirm the American team’s view of the peace 
process. More important, the wording of the provisions represents a compromise between 
minimalists and maximalists within the Clinton administration and the Contact Group. 
Was the international community supposed to conduct an expanded peacebuilding 
mission or a limited one? The answer to this important question was to be provided by 
the IFOR commander, the NAC, the High Representative and the Peace Implementation 
Council. These bodies would determine the nature of peace implementation once the 
agreement was signed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
After 21 days of gruelling negotiations, the parties initialled the GFA. After Dayton, 
Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman left for their respective countries and started to 
justify to their respective publics why they supported this peace agreement. For 
Milosevic, the problem was getting the signatures of the Bosnian Serbs, who expressed 
their dismay once they learned of what he had negotiated on their behalf. During the 
peace talks, Milosevic kept the Bosnian Serbs members of his delegation in the dark. He 
knew that they would not have ceded their territorial acquisitions. They could potentially 
derail the negotiations and cost Milosevic his prize for co-operating with the Contact 
Group: the lifting of economic sanctions. Although Karadzic strongly disapproved with 
the provisions of the initialled agreement, Milosevic coerced him to sign it.
For Tudjman, the negotiations had assured him Eastern Slavonia, while securing 
Croatia’s geo-strategic position in the region by creating a stronger Federation and a 
weak Bosnian government. Tudjman had always believed that Bosnia was a mere fiction,
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but his co-operation guaranteed him a special place within the Western alliance. Even 
though Tudjman had committed as many crimes against humanity as the Bosnian Serb 
and Serb leaderships, the West, especially the US, looked the other way and permitted 
him to ethnically cleanse the Krajina. If Tudjman faced any problems, it was to get the 
support of some Bosnian Croats that were angered with his decision to exchange the 
Posavina, which had a large Bosnian Croat population before the war, for Eastern 
Slavonia and for his support to permit the dissolution of Herceg-Bosna’s structures. Like 
Milosevic, Tudjman forced the Bosnian Croats to sign the agreement.
For Izetbegovic, the war was finally over, but the peace was not the just peace he 
wanted to achieve at Dayton. Although the Bosniaks secured the US sponsored ‘equip 
and train’ programme and Clinton’s commitment to prevent the partition of Bosnia, the 
peace agreement’s seemingly division of Bosnia created much anger within the Bosnian 
delegation. Some members repeatedly stated throughout the talks that the delegation 
should purposely derail the talks in order to open a new round of negotiations in Europe, 
sponsored by the European members of the Contact Group, where they could get a more 
comprehensive peace accord. Izetbegovic seemed to support this position until it became 
evident that the US would blame him and the delegation he headed for the failure of the 
Dayton initiative, thus pushing the American to cut all economic and military aid to the 
Bosniaks. In many ways, Izetbegovic signed the negotiated agreement as a way to secure 
the gains attained at Dayton, but within the delegation there was hope that the peace 
agreement could be modified in the future to address issues that threatened the 
sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia.
For the Contact Group, while the Europeans and Americans did disagree on many 
issues, the Europeans endorsed the peace agreement, arguing that it reflected European 
principles and proposals that actually built on previous European sponsored peace plans. 
Indeed, the French government, which hosted the signing ceremonies, strongly 
maintained that the agreement also reflected the European Union’s commitment for peace 
in the region (Holbrooke 1999: 318). More important, the European members of the 
Contact Group, though loosing their battle on the role of the OSCE, did make sure that a 
European would head the Office of the High Representative and direct the process of 
civilian implementation. Moreover, the vagueness of the peace agreement supported the
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maximalist peacebuilding strategy favoured by the European members of the Contact 
Group.
While the Contact Group’s European members and the Russian government, 
could claim credit for the success of the peace talks, the final agreement is a product of 
American diplomacy and military prowess. Based heavily on the strategic approach to 
peacemaking, the American negotiation team tactically structured the talks according to 
its interests and needs. Consequently, the nature of the process and the wording of the 
peace agreement reflects the interplay between three variables: domestic constraints the 
Clinton administration faced, especially the Republican opposition in the Congress; the 
division within the administration (maximalists v. minimalists); and Clinton’s vision of a 
united and democratic Europe, which included an expanded role for NATO and an active 
OSCE.
It is important to notice that this list of variables does not include the parties’ 
needs or interests. Indeed, the losers are the individuals that lived in Bosnia and those that 
lived as refugees throughout the world. A review of the GFA’s constitution provisions’ 
suggests that multi-ethnicity and democracy were just rhetoric, as the document had 
virtually introduced an apartheid-like system, fuelling the nationalist parties* non- 
inclusive agenda. Even more critical and due to America’s insistence of sticking to the 
strategic approach, the participants of the negotiations were the leaders responsible for 
the war. The peace process sidelined those individuals that campaigned against the war 
and wanted to build a Bosnia modelled on democratic and multi-ethnic values (Udovicki 
and Stitkovac 1997: 199). Would the inclusion of moderate voices arguing for the 
creation of a multi-ethnic democratic order have produced another peace agreement?
More interestingly, and supporting the claim that the peace agreement resembles a 
sort of pax americana, is that the ‘authentic’ interpretation of the agreement rests solely 
in the hands of the IFOR commander and the High Representative. As Gaeta (1996: 157) 
notes, most agreements of this nature are supposed to be interpreted by the signatories to 
the agreement. The international community clearly intended to control the peace 
implementation process to prevent the re-occurrence of the armed conflict. However, the 
fact that the parties do not have the ‘authentic’ right to interpret the agreement only 
underscores the fact that the agreement is a product of the strategic approach to
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peacemaking. Hence, the process in itself has been undemocratic and more crucially the 
agreement strips individuals in Bosnia from re-fashioning the peacebuilding process so it 
can fit their needs and interests.
While there is no doubt that the initialling and signing of the GFA started a new 
chapter in Bosnia’s recent history, several questions surfaced in the first year of peace 
implementation. Did the new established social order face the same challenges Bosnia 
faced before the outbreak of hostilities: nationalist forces dominating the political agenda 
and carving Bosnia according to their self-interest? Would the international community 
allow this to happen once again, especially after it devoted so much time and resources to 
secure the peace agreement’s viability? Or, could the international community, via the 
GFA, actually solve Bosnia’s problems by directly addressing the causes that led the 
parties to war in 1992? All these questions will be answered in the next two chapters’ 
review of the work of the Office of the High Representative’s and its peacebuilding 
strategy.
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CHAPTER SIX
From Military to Civilian Conceptions of Peacebuilding: The Rise 
of the Office of the High Representative
INTRODUCTION
While the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA) 
seemed to introduce a new social order in Bosnia, it did not fix the problems inherent in 
the old system In fact, post-Dayton Bosnia is very similar to Bosnia in 1990-92. The 
problem of communitarian politics still persists. Bosnia’s state institutions are weak. 
Corruption is rampant. The nationalist parties, which overwhelmingly won the first post- 
Dayton elections, are still undermining the peace process, though their ability to achieve 
their goals has been recently challenged by international community’s peacebuilding 
strategy.
A factor questioning the GFA’s validity is the high level of social distance among 
the individuals of each ethno-national group and the marginalisation of Bosnian citizens 
in the peacebuilding process. In all, Bosnia’s peace process is enormously dependent on 
the international community’s willingness to keep NATO’s presence and maintain high 
levels of economic and political assistance (Daalder and Froman 1999: 106; and ICG 
1999). Hence, the political system crafted at Dayton works because the international 
community, through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other international 
bodies, has bullied the parties to ensure that the system operates.
In some ways, the GFA has failed. It has not introduced the self-sustaining peace 
the Contact Group members envisioned. Many leaders in the international community 
accept that the peace agreement’s implementation has not been conducted as swiftly as 
originally imagined. In an open letter to Bosnia’s citizens, the current High 
Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, expressed his dissatisfaction with the process and 
has proposed to radicalise the strategy in order to achieve the objectives set out at Dayton 
(OHR-PS 1999). Since May 1997, the international community has decided to grant more 
power to the High Representative, so he can institute a state-building strategy that can
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create a viable Bosnian state. By creating a strong state, the international community 
expects that its institutions can take ownership of the implementation process, address the 
country’s many domestic challenges, reform the economy and integrate Bosnian society. 
Therefore, the international community is trying to weaken the communitarian nature of 
Bosnian politics.
The previous two chapters have delineated the main features of the peacemaking 
efforts that produced the GFA. Chapter three demonstrated how Woodward’s ‘false 
humanitarianism’ constructed a response to Bosnia that furthered American interests. 
Chapter four re-emphasised this reality by showing how the US negotiators relied on the 
insights of the strategic approach to peacemaking to set the foundations of a peace 
agreement that not only favoured American national interests, but more important it 
created a political system that is not representative o f the needs and interests Bosnia’s 
citizens.
This chapter continues to show the strength of this claim, highlighting how the 
international community has had to assume further responsibility over the peace 
implementation process. The Contact Group’s over-reliance on the strategic approach 
forced it to legitimate the nationalist parties that organised and conducted the war effort. 
Without their approval, the international community faced even greater challenges in its 
resolve to settle the war, forcing it to re-adjust its peacebuilding strategy.
Surprisingly, academics and practitioners have devoted little attention to the 
OHR’s role in Bosnia. This gap in the literature is baffling, as the mandate and the 
actions taken by this organisation have been controversial. Because it is generally 
accepted that a bold state-building strategy may be the best hope to achieve the objectives 
set out at Dayton, it seems that the success or failure of current peace implementation 
efforts in the region rests, in part, on the shoulders of the High Representative and his 
organisation’s ability to monitor and implement the GFA’s civilian provisions.
This analysis is in two chapters. The objective of this chapter is twofold. First it 
explains the structure created by the international community to start the implementation 
of the GFA’s civilian provisions. Second, it shows the reasons why the international 
community started to change its peace implementation strategy. Instead of being a 
military mission supported by civilian organisations, the peace implementation strategy
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was transformed into a civilian mission backed by NATO forces in order to pursue 
maximalist goals. Why did this shift in strategy take place? It was motivated by the many 
challenges the international community faced during Carl Bildt’s tenure as High 
Representative. Thus, part two of this chapter offers a detailed analysis of Bildt’s work in 
Bosnia.
The next chapter continues this analysis, but it mostly explains the reasons behind 
the international community’s decision to strengthen the mandate of the OHR and 
actively craft a state-building programme to integrate Bosnian society according to 
European standards. As a result, this chapter explains the rise of the OHR, while chapter 
seven assess the impact the OHR has had on the integration of Bosnian society, the 
implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions, and the possibility of instituting a self- 
sustaining peace in this war-torn country.
I. CIVILIAN PEACE IMPLEMENTING BODIES
The OHR is one of the most unique features of the GFA. Having decided to not authorise 
the United Nations as the lead organisation in the post-settlement peacebuilding phase, 
the Contact Group decided to create an ad hoc body that would direct civilian 
implementation efforts. While the United Nations’ Security Council was asked to pass a 
resolution supporting the work of the High Representative, this position was to be 
nominated by another ad hoc body created for the purposes of carrying out the GFA’s 
many provisions.
Created on 8 December 1995 in London, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 
is an informal body that meets regularly to address issues concerning the GFA’s 
implementation. Because it was created to take over the work of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the PIC is composed of all the countries, 
international organisations, and agencies that attended the ICFY (OHR-D 1995: par. 21). 
It meets at the ministerial level. Apart from discussing issues related to the execution of 
the GFA, the PIC ‘acts only through the mandates of its members. Once decisions have 
been reached, the organisation must then request the UN Security Council, the North 
Atlantic Council, the OSCE, World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other 
international institutions ‘to agree to proposals for involvement’ (Chandler 1999: 55-56).
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The PIC is basically a “talk-shop”, as it cannot take any decisions without the support of 
the main international organs directing the overall implementation process.
The PIC also includes a Steering Board, which serves as the PIC’s executive arm. 
It meets on a regular basis at the level of political directors, though once a year the 
Steering Board meets at the ministerial level. The High Representative chairs its 
meetings. Its main functions are to offer the High Representative ‘political guidance on 
peace implementation’ and identify problems that the PIC and other international 
institutions must tackle in order to fully execute the provisions of the peace agreement. 
Apart from the High Representative, the Steering Board includes a representative from 
the following countries and organisations: the US, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey -  representing the Organisation of Islamic 
Countries, the European Union’s Presidency, and the European Commission. Depending 
on the issues being discussed in its monthly meetings, the Steering Board also invites 
concerned parties or institutions to its meetings. The OSCE and the UN, while not formal 
members of the Steering Board, are authorised to attend all meetings (OHR-D 1995: par. 
21).
The PIC also elects the High Representative. As deemed necessary in Annex 10 
of the GFA, a UN Security Council Resolution subsequently authorises the PIC’s 
decisions (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.1.2). The functions of the High Representative are 
the following: (a) to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement; (b) to certify 
that the parties completely comply with civilian aspects of the peace agreement; (c) to co­
ordinate the activities of international and regional institutions in Bosnia in order to make 
sure that the civilian aspects of the peace agreement are implemented efficiently; (d) to 
‘facilitate... the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian 
implementation’; (e) to participate in meetings of international donor institutions; (0  to 
periodically report the progress of the implementation of the GFA to the UN, EU, US, 
Russian and other interested organizations and governments; and (g) to offer guidance 
and ‘receive reports’ of the Commissioner of the UN’s International Police Task Force 
(GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.l[a-g]).
In addition to these functions, the High Representative also chaired the Joint 
Interim Commission and the Joint Civilian Commission. Both Commissions, which
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included representatives from the Federation and Republika Sprska (RS), the IFOR 
commander and other representatives from other international and regional organizations, 
were transitory bodies that were replaced after the state institutions were established 
following the country’s first elections. Their function was to establish communication 
networks and problem-solving mechanism, so their members could exchange ideas and 
inform each other of the progress or challenges the peace agreement’s implementation 
faced in the first months (Chandler 1999: 61-62).
At the request of the US, Annex 10 clearly maintains that the High Representative 
has ‘no authority over the IFOR’ and he cannot in ‘any way interfere in the conduct of 
military operations or the IFOR chain of command’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.9). In 
order to assure the highest level of co-operation between the IFOR commander and the 
High Representative, the agreement authorises these two individuals to create the 
necessary liaison arrangements ‘to facilitate the discharge of their respective 
responsibilities’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.n.5).23 The agreement also stipulates that the 
High Representative is a member of the Joint Military Commission and provides counsel 
on political-military matters to NATO forces in Bosnia (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.II.7).
The peace agreement does not specify how the OHR should be organise or how to 
fund its activities. While the High Representative has the authority to appoint his 
personnel, as he deems necessary (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.III.l), other crucial issues, 
such as the mechanisms to fund the OHR, are determined by the PIC. The GFA also 
specifies that the OHR is a diplomatic mission, treated as such by the contracting parties. 
Accordingly, the High Representative and the professional members of his ‘staff and 
their families [have the] same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic 
agents and their families...’ (GFA 1995: Annex 10, Art.III.4[a-b]). This is an important 
provision because it highlights that the OHR and the High Representative, like other 
diplomatic missions in Sarajevo, are working on behalf of the international community’s 
interests and not necessarily those of Bosnia’s citizens. Reinforcing this reality is Article 
V of Annex 10 that states that the ‘High Representative is the final authority in the theatre 
regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace
23 Also see: Art.II.6, which calls the High Representative and IFOR commander to exchange information 
on matters of concern (GFA 1995).
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settlement’ (GFA 1995). Consequently, the final interpretation of the peace agreement is 
not in the hands of the contracting parties, but on two individuals, and their organisations, 
that represent the international community, more specifically the trans-Atlantic alliance 
(Gaeta 1996).24
Originally, the High Representative’s mandate was for a year. It was expected that 
once the Bosnia’s new state institutions started operating, the Office of the High 
Representative could start to be disbanded (Chandler 2000: 273). It is important to 
mention that the international community believed that the negotiated peace agreement 
had established the foundations of a self-sustaining peace. Once it noticed that this was 
not the case, the PIC has allowed the OHR to expand its services and has allotted the 
High Representative more power to enhance his mandate in order to secure the full 
implementation of the peace agreement’s civilian provisions. Thus, post-Dayton 
challenges forced the international community, including the Clinton administration, to 
support a stronger High Representative.
While post-Dayton events demonstrated the need of a stronger mandate for the 
High Representative, Bildt had initially secured an important source of power in the first 
PIC meeting of 8-9 December 1995, a year before the international community started to 
accept the GFA’s inherent weaknesses. Due to the PIC’s structure, this body’s most 
powerful organ is the Steering Board. Bildt’s insistence that the High Representative 
chair the Steering Board was not a mere symbolic act to re-emphasise the importance of 
the High Representative. Instead, the High Representative’s ability to control the Steering 
Board’s agenda and demonstrate the important issues the PIC has to address in its 
meetings enable the High Representative to directly influence the PIC’s decision-making 
process. This is not to say that the High Representative has always obtained what he 
wants, but it has assured him an important role in shaping the nature and objectives of the 
peacebuilding strategy. While the subsequent strengthening of the High Representative’s 
mandate was not only a by-product of post-Dayton challenges in Bosnia, it was also an
24 Bertram (1995: 394) argues that to interpret agreements is in itself a source of political power. Her 
survey of nine UN peacebuilding missions demonstrates that one of the impediments to peace rests with the 
parties’ ability to re-interpret the provisions of a negotiated peace settlement so it can enhance their own 
particular agendas. The High Representative’s and the IFOR commander’s power to be the final interpreter 
of the GFA shows the international community’s intent to minimize bickering between the parties in order 
to secure their co-operation and the full implementation of the agreement.
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objective that was being supported by maximalists, such as Bildt, since the position of the 
High Representative was proposed by the French government in the North Atlantic 
Council in late September 1995.
II. THE CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL & ECONOMIC POWER
The GFA proposed a confusing peacebuilding mission. For the Clinton administration, it 
was purely a military mission complemented by a civilian element that would work with 
the parties to establish a process that provided legitimacy to the peace agreement. For the 
Europeans, on the other hand, the mission was primarily a civilian undertaking, supported 
by the military. Thus, the latter view envisioned a process where the IFOR commander 
and the High Representative would co-operate in order to create the multi-ethnic 
democratic society captured in the spirit of the peace agreement. Which interpretation 
was most accurate?
The vagueness of the GFA gave credence to both interpretations. Supporting his 
preference for the latter interpretation, Bildt (1995a) argued at the first PIC meeting that:
While military implementation is the key to stopping the war, it is civilian 
and political implementation that is the key to building a genuine peace. If 
the first were to succeed and the latter to fail, we would have achieved 
little more than the division of Bosnia, and we could be certain that the 
war was to restart sooner or later.
Bildt believed that the OHR had to do more than just monitor and provide political 
direction to the implementation of the GFA’s civilian components. It was necessary for 
the OHR to actively promote inter-ethnic reconciliation. Without reconciliation, he 
strongly argued that a ‘true peace’ would not be possible, Bosnia would remain divided 
and at risk of renewed hostilities (1995b). Although Bildt did not present a clear 
reconciliatory strategy, he pointed to how France and Germany put their historical 
differences aside in order to build a common future within the process o f European 
economic and political integration (1995b).
Bildt was therefore convinced that co-operation between the leaders of each 
community in the Joint Interim Commission, the Joint Civilian Commission, and 
Bosnia’s state institutions could assist the process of reconciliation. Other mechanisms
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that could assist this process were: (a) the holding of free and fair elections; (b) the 
promotion and protection of human rights, including the right of refugees and internally 
displaced persons to return to their homes: (c) the prosecution of war criminals, and (d) 
the re-construction of Bosnia’s war-torn economy (1995a). In his view, the OHR and the 
international community had the responsibility to provide economic and political 
incentives to assure that these four objectives were met. But, to achieve these, the OHR 
would not only require diplomatic support, but also the international community’s 
financial backing.
Bildt’s plea for financial resources set the tone for the first year of the 
peacebuilding mission. The PIC’s first meeting did not address this issue. For this 
reason, Bildt met with UN Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali to see if he and 
his staff could use some of the UN’s resources until the PIC created the mechanisms to 
fund the OHR’s activities (Bildt 1998: 166). Even though the OHR is not under the UN 
system’s direct authority, it provided some support to Bildt and his staff. However, Bildt 
was told that UNPROFOR’s financial resources, assets, and office hardware were off- 
limits, as these were already designated to the IFOR commander (Bildt 1998: 172).
Without any resources, Bildt and his staff of five professionals faced many 
obstacles to make ends meet. The Swedish Embassy lent him a car. For the first weeks, 
most communication was handle via Bildt’s personal mobile phone (Holbrooke 1999: 
324). ‘[Sjince NATO had occupied [Sarajevo’s] few hotels [Bildt and his staff] had to 
sleep on the sofas and floors of the [Swedish] ambassador’s tiny apartment’ (Bildt 1998: 
172). To make matters worse, the US and other countries were ignoring Bildt’s calls for 
financial support. ‘They all demanded a budget approved by the Steering Board and some 
influence over personnel decisions before they made any funds available’ (1998: 173).
This condition had been pressed by the Clinton administration, as Bildt informed 
the Contact Group that Jack Covey, who was in charge of the US consulate in Berlin, was 
not be appointed to the OHR’s number two position. While Covey had experience in 
conflict management, Bildt argued that he preferred Michael Steiner, the German 
diplomat that negotiated the Federation agreement at Dayton, for this position (Bildt 
1997: 166-67). Although the US was angered by this decision, it could not do much as 
the GFA clearly states that: ‘The High Representative shall appoint staff, as he or she
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deems necessary, to provide assistance in carrying out the tasks herein’ (GFA 1995: 
Annex 10, Art.HI.l). The Clinton administration, which was obsessed with the GFA’s 
military provisions, worked hard to directly influence the work of the OHR by either 
appointing the organisation’s number two or by limiting its resource base, so it could not 
interfere with IFOR’s military mission. It is important to mention that Covey did become 
a member of the OHR, but he was not the Principal Deputy High Representative.
Ironically, each ethno-national grouping’s leaders did not present Bildt’s first 
obstacle. Instead, the conflict between the American vision and Europeans’ 
understanding of peace implementation hampered the first weeks of the civilian mission. 
It is not surprising that the OHR’s initial funding was provided by the European Union. 
The EU provided 300,000 German marks. With this money, Bildt was able to lease office 
space close to the Presidency Building.25 Having found an office, Bildt started to 
determine the OHR’s priorities for his tenure.
It is important to underscore that the OHR’s mandate was not only vague, but that 
it also had to work on more issues than those addressed by the IFOR commander. 
Military officials in the Clinton administration started to criticise the OHR in mid- 
January 1996 for not implementing important provision of the peace agreement (Sells 
2000: 185). Not only did this anger Bildt, but also it complicated matters for the OHR. 
While IFOR had the resources to impose its will on the parties, Bildt lacked these 
resources or the mechanisms to force the parties to implement the peace agreement’s 
civilian provisions. The Clinton administration and the US military’s criticism of the 
OHR undermined its authority. In fact, the OHR and the IFOR commander, Admiral 
Leighton Smith, sometimes contradicted each other on important issues. These 
differences had a negative impact on the execution of the agreement’s civilian elements. 
While this conflicting relationship can be blamed for many developments that unfolded 
during the first year of peace implementation, most of the blame rests with the Contact 
Group and the United States’ over emphasis on the use of the strategic approach to 
peacemaking.
25 The rented office space was less than desirable, but it was the only thing that Bildt could afford at the 
time. He recalls in his memoirs that they needed to work with overcoats and gloves, as the building did not 
have any central heating. To make matters worse, the walls were full of bullet holes (Bildt, 1998: 173-174).
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For instance, the Clinton administration’s stressed that IFOR’s mission should 
only last for a year. This idea deterred the parties from working with Bildt in the Joint 
Interim Commission and the Joint Civilian Commission or from amending the entities’ 
constitutions so these were in line with the country’s constitution, created at Dayton. This 
and other examples would be furthered discussed in the following sections, which detail 
the challenges the OHR faced during Bildt’s tenure as High Representative from January 
1996 to June 1997.
A. The Unification of Sarajevo
Remembering that Bildt believed that the OHR’s mission had to bring the leaders of each 
ethno-national community together in order to integrate Bosnia, he informed his staff that 
Sarajevo was going to be the OHR’s first priority (Bildt 1997: 175). The peace agreement 
stipulated that Sarajevo was to be Bosnia’s capital city and be located within the 
Federation’s jurisdiction. This meant that parts of the city under the RS’s control had to 
be transferred to the Federation. According to the peace agreement, the transition had to 
be completed forty-five days ‘after the Transfer of Authority from the UNPROFOR 
Commander to the IFOR Commander’ (GFA 1995: Annex 2, Art. VI), thus the transfer 
process had to start by 3 February 1996. The ‘exchange of civilian authority, including 
the police, was not due until’ ninety days after IFOR Commander took control of the 
military mission (Bildt 1998: 180).
After meeting with leaders of the Bosnian Serb community in Sarajevo, Bildt 
started to realise that this transfer of territory and power could turn violent. While 
Milosevic was ready to give up Sarajevo at the peace talks, the Bosnian Serb leadership 
in Pale expressed their disapproval with his decision. It argued that if Bosnian Serbs 
could not rule their city, they should be encouraged to move to the RS (OHR-R 1996d).
Fearing the reprisal of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats and without any assurances 
that this would not occur, some Bosnian Serb leaders told Bildt that he should delay the 
transfer of the territory for one year or secure ‘international financial support to build a 
new, Serbian Sarajevo, just across the Dayton boundary line’ (Sells 2000: 186). While 
Bildt decided to dismiss these proposals, as they countered the GFA’s promise of 
tolerance and multi-ethnicity and they undermined the agreement’s provisions, he
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promised Bosnian Serb leaders in Sarajevo and Pale that the OHR would work hard to 
create the proper measures to protect the rights and property of Serbs living in Sarajevo, 
while building a number of political mechanisms that assured them a role in the 
administration of these suburbs (Bildt 1998: 175-76).
After a lengthy process, the OHR and the concerned parties concluded an 
agreement that secured the unity and multi-ethnic character of Sarajevo. Its provisions 
granted the Bosnian Serb community four important measures. First, the agreement gave 
its political leaders a role in the administration of these neighbourhoods, while allowing 
the existing local assemblies to continue their work until the holding of local elections. 
Second, it guaranteed the Bosnian Serbs’ right to use the ‘Serb language and Cyrillic 
alphabet in local administration’ (Sells 2000: 190). Third, they were granted the right to 
use a Serbian curriculum in local schools. Lastly, it included a controversial provision 
that argued that although the territories would be under the jurisdiction of the Federation 
45 days after the signing of the GFA (3 February 1996), the Bosnian Serb police force 
could remain in place until 90 days after signing of the agreement, when all Bosnian Serb 
territory in Sarajevo had to be transferred to the Federation (Bildt 1997: 187-188). In day 
91, the Federation police force would take full control of these territories. As a 
confidence-building measure, the negotiated plan on Sarajevo included a set of provisions 
that stated that the Federation police would hire Serb police officers, not indicted by the 
International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, to patrol these suburbs’ streets.
Although many politicians, in both sides of the divide, privately opposed the 
agreement, which was ‘approved in principle’ by Izetbegovic and Momcilo Kraji§nik, the 
agreement challenged by the IFOR Commander on legal grounds (Sells 2000: 190-91). 
IFOR lawyers opposed it they argued that the GFA clearly established that all Serb forces 
had to withdraw by 3 February 1996. IFOR decided to not distinguish between police and 
military forces. Because the IFOR Commander wanted to prevent “mission creep”, he 
also decided that IFOR troops would not police these suburbs (Holbrooke 1999: 328-29). 
This is not to say that he could not order his troops to do so, but he preferred to not take 
such actions. Louis Sells, who at the time worked for Bildt, argues that once news broke 
out that IFOR had its doubts about the OHR’s Sarajevo agreement, extreme nationalist
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elements in both sides of the divide undermined its provisions and created a tense 
atmosphere (2000: 191).
Although the IPTF had to monitor Federation police forces once these areas came 
under Federation control, attempting to convince the Bosnian Serb population that they 
could trust the police, Bosnian Serb and Bosniak media outlets broadcasted a number of 
messages that called on Bosnian Serbs to leave their homes and move to the RS. As 
Bosnian Serbs left their homes and apartments, many set their apartments on fire. Those 
few thousands Bosnian Serbs that decided to stay were harassed by hard-line Bosnian 
Serb gangs, while Bosniak authorities did not lend them a helping hand. Even worse, 
IFOR forces did not stop these attacks from occurring or stop the looting of stores and 
factories (Sells 2000: 196; and Holbrooke 1999: 336). At the end of the crisis, around
100,000 people had fled these areas and re-located across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line 
(IEBL) in the RS (Bildt 1997: 197).
IFOR cannot be completely blamed for this exodus. The Federation is also at fault 
because its politicians did not take the necessary steps to re-assure the Bosnian Serb 
community that their rights would be assured, if they had decided to stay in their homes 
and apartments. Blame can also be placed on the international community, especially the 
US, as it did not intervene, even though Bildt had told Warren Christopher, US Secretary 
of State, that the handover would turn violent.
In many ways, the Sarajevo crisis showed the peace process’s inherent 
weaknesses. First, the IFOR Commander’s decision to narrowly interpret his mandate 
and question the validity of the OHR’s agreement weakened the OHR’s political 
authority and permitted nationalist forces to dominate the political scene. It became 
evident to the parties that the OHR and IFOR were not in the same wavelength. This 
reality encouraged the parties to execute the GFA’s military provisions, but ignore its 
civilian provisions. As result, the strategy, especially for the Bosnian Serbs, was to 
comply with IFOR and once they left at the end of 1996, as originally envisioned by the 
US, it would move to secure the sovereignty of the RS, undermine the authority of 
Bosnia’s state structures, and probably unite the RS with Serb-controlled Yugoslavia.
Second, the exodus demonstrated the power nationalist political parties and their 
leaders had in their communities. This meant that reconciliation between the contending
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parties would occur once the nationalist leaders’ authority could be weakened. More 
important, the strength of the nationalist parties proved that their defeat in the elections 
called by the GFA were probably was not to take place, hampering the creation of social 
movements and political parties calling for inter-ethnic co-operation and political unity. 
Third, and related to the former, the lack of independent media outlets allowed the 
nationalist parties to mobilise their respective communities and incite extreme elements 
within these neighbourhoods to create insecure environments that scared Bosnian Serbs 
from their homes. It also illustrated that the parties would exchange the barrel of the gun 
for control over media outlets in their struggle to achieve their wartime goals.
Finally, the international community, including the OHR and IFOR, did not put 
enough international pressure on the parties. The US could have forced the Bosniaks to 
moderate its strong nationalistic rhetoric, or ordered Admiral Smith, IFOR Commander, 
to take a more proactive role. Instead, Christopher, who was visiting Sarajevo in the first 
days of the crisis, decided not get involved (Bildt 1998: 187). In many ways, the Sarajevo 
crisis demonstrated the challenges peace implementation faced. The Clinton 
administration decision to ignore events in Bosnia and concentrate on other pressing 
issues, and IFOR’s intention to avoid any scenario that might put in danger the strict 
military timetables negotiated at Dayton, meant that the OHR’s already complicated task 
were to be even more difficult.
B. Establishing the Human Rights Mechanisms
The OHR’s second priority was to establish the commissions and human rights 
mechanisms negotiated at Dayton. Bildt (1996b) strongly argued that: ‘The history of the 
conflict in Bosnia - as well as in all of former Yugoslavia - is the history of the most 
flagrant violations of human rights we have seen in recent European history.’ For this 
reason, Bildt believed that establishing these institutions would create an atmosphere 
conducive to inter-ethnic reconciliation and enable refugees and displaced persons to 
return to their homes. While Bildt underscored the importance of setting up the human 
rights organisations called by the GFA, he also noted that international bodies in Bosnia 
had to make ‘people aware of their rights,’ and ‘inform them on how they can exercise
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them’ so this human rights regime could assist the democratisation process and the 
building of local civil society (1996b).
The Sarajevo crisis demonstrated the challenge the human rights regime faced. 
Bildt established the Human Rights Coordination Center (HRCC) as an integral element 
of the OHR. The HRCC’s has three functions. First, it coordinates the activities of 
international bodies in order to guarantee that resources are used efficiently to set up and 
assist the work of the GFA’s human rights institutions and eliminate duplication. Second, 
the HRCC has provided a forum to exchange information between local non­
governmental organizations and these international bodies. This forum has not only 
strengthened indigenous non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) capacity to monitor 
local events, but it has also enabled Bosnia’s human rights regime and concerned 
international agents to be informed of what is happening on the ground. Lastly, the 
HRCC has helped the OHR make its assessment of the human rights situation and make 
its findings public via the High Representative’s periodic reports to the UN Secretary 
General (Bildt 1996e).
In the first year of peace implementation, Bildt’s reports to the UN Secretary 
General confirmed the challenges the human rights regime faced. While the Human 
Rights Chamber, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human Rights 
started to operate by early March, the parties committed themselves to respect and 
guarantee human rights, but only in word and not in deed. The Human Rights Chamber’s 
1996-97 Annual Report states that many of its decisions were not carried out by the 
parties, even though the GFA clearly specifies that the parties must comply with this 
institution’s decision (HRC 1997). Most human rights violations during this period were 
related to attacks against refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their 
homes. Others were more serious, as human rights monitors described how local 
authorities, including the police, discriminated, both covertly and overtly, against 
minority populations (PIC. 1996b). In his last report of 1996, Bildt stated that 
discrimination, harassment, intimidation and so forth were prevalent in both entities 
(OHR-R 1996a: pars. 61-63).
In trying to explain why these violations were so common, Bildt argues that these 
can partially be blamed on the entities. Not only were they slow to transform their legal
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structures or amend their constitutions according to GFA’s human rights provisions, but 
they also were reluctant to consider legislation that would ‘support local human rights 
institutions’ (OHR-R 1996a: par. 63). International bodies such as the OHR and the 
Council of Europe proposed most of these bills. One such area was property legislation 
that would protect the property of returnees and force individuals claiming the same 
property to either surrender it or contest the returnees’ claims in the court system (OHR- 
R 1996b: par. 53). Another area were the entities were not co-operating with the human 
rights regime was concerning the hand over of indicted war criminals to the International 
Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia.
Like the Sarajevo crisis, the challenges faced in the creation and implementation 
of the human rights regime demonstrated the relative amount of power the parties had 
vis-a-vis international bodies implementing the GFA’s civilian provisions. Even though 
the PIC condemned these violations in its June meeting, the parties’ behaviour did not 
change. It is for this reason that Bildt called on the PIC in its December meeting to 
engender new mechanisms to force the parties to stop these violations and start 
complying with the human rights regime (1996a). While the first year of implementation 
had not really change the behaviour of the parties or drastically change the situation, it 
did establish a series of legal and political mechanisms to monitor and prevent human 
rights abuses. The OHR’s reports convinced the PIC of the need to re-adjust 
peacebuilding efforts to address these human rights challenges. These changes were 
executed in mid-1997.
C. The Reconstruction of Bosnia’s Economy
A third priority was the reconstruction of Bosnia’s war-torn economy. While the GFA 
does not make ‘any specific reference to economic assistance for re-construction’ 
(Vayrynen 1997: 162), these efforts were crucial, as these would secure the long-term 
survivability of Bosnia. Bildt argued that economic reconstruction was an instrument to 
increase co-operation between the ethno-national communities and their leaders and 
promote the unity of Bosnia (OHR-R 1996c). Although not mentioned in official 
speeches or reports, it was also expected that economic recovery and the promise of
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prosperity would attract foreign investment and convince the refugees to return to Bosnia, 
especially those living in Western Europe.
Whereas the High Representative has had the authority to direct all civilian 
aspects of peace implementation, his function in the areas of economic reconstruction and 
rehabilitation were ‘not entirely clear’ (Bildt 1998: 242). It is for this reason that the High 
Representative works in conjunction with the international donors community, especially 
the World Bank and the European Commission. Although the former has more 
experienced in these areas, the latter had more influence because it has had to finance 
most of these projects. Once the GFA was signed, the PIC organised the first Donors’ 
Conference on 20 December 1995. This meeting was a success, as it secured pledges 
from different countries and international institutions totalling $550 million. These funds 
were to be used to repair ‘key infrastructure needs in the areas of power and electricity, 
telecommunications and road and rail links’ to enable the international bodies to start 
implementing the peace agreement in early 1996 (OHR-R 1996d: par. 41).
Because reconstruction and rehabilitation would involve many actors and a series 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements, the OHR decided to set up the Economic Task 
Force (ETF). It coordinates the activities of the donors and makes sure that the 
duplication of projects does not occur. Due to the many economic issues at play, the work 
of the ETF was carried by Sectoral Task Forces (STFs) (Bildt 1998: 247). While the 
STFs were designed to coordinate the activities of international donors, they have also 
provided assistance and expertise to Bosnian institutions in order to guarantee the highest 
level of efficiency. At the same time, the STFs have monitored these institutions’ 
activities and have ensured that economic assistance was meeting its intended targets. 
While this structure was put into place in mid 1996, it was not until the end of the year 
that this started to work smoothly (OHR-R 1996a: par. 72).
Bosnia faced many economic challenges at the end of the war. The war claimed
200,000 lives and divided the country into three communities. Each had its own currency, 
laws, financial institutions and control of working industries (Vukadinovic 1997). At 
least 80 percent of the population was dependent on humanitarian food aid, industrial 
output was five percent below 1990 figures and the annual income per capital decreased 
$500 (OHR-R 1996d). Even more crucial, about 60 percent of the ‘housing stock’ was
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damaged, some of it irreparable (Bildt 1996d). To make matters even worse, ‘the rate of 
unemployment stood at nearly 70 percent’ (Vayrynen 1997: 174).
The OHR with the international donor community, including the World Bank and 
the European Commission, estimated that $1.8 billion was needed in 1996 to jump-start 
the economy and start the reconstruction of infrastructure. In April 12-13, the World 
Bank and the European Commission sponsored another Ministerial Donors’ Conference. 
Conference participants pledge to contribute the estimated $1.8 billion requested for 
1996, despite the fact that this money was not completely disbursed in 1996. These funds 
were to be used to support three objectives: (a) post-conflict reconstruction, (b) 
implementation of the peace agreement, and (c) economic transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy (Hurtic, Sapcanin & Woodward 1999: 10).
From these three areas of economic assistance, Bildt argued after the April 
Donors’ Conference that funds should be targeted primarily to the reconstruction of key 
infrastructure needs, mentioned above. However, he also stated that it was important to 
fund other projects that increased co-operation between the parties and generated 
employment. Not only would these promote the integration of Bosnia, but it would also 
show the parties and Bosnia’s citizens that co-operation and implementing the peace 
agreement was the vehicle towards economic prosperity. This message was even more 
important in light of the upcoming elections, which’s success depended on the ability of 
the parties to co-operate and create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue and the non­
violent exchange of opinions. While the intention of these projects was clear, economic 
assistance created a number of difficulties.
First, and foremost, the RS decided not to participate in the Ministerial Donors’ 
Conference. Karadzic, who was still president of the RS, probably played an important 
part in this decision. He had publicly expressed his decision to prevent any type of 
contact with the West. This is not to say that the RS did not receive any economic 
assistance, as Banja Luka received modest amounts. This city in northwestern Bosnia was 
the stronghold of moderate Bosnian Serb leaders. Their desire to co-operate in exchange 
for funds was seen by many in the West as a way of splitting the RS and strengthening 
the anti-Karadzic bloc. However, the RS received only two percent of all the money 
awarded to Bosnia during 1996. The Federation received 84 percent of total funds, while
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14 percent was used to finance cross-entity projects (OHR-R 1996a: par. 74). Rather than 
fostering cross-entity and inter-ethnic co-operation, the unequal level of funding 
amplified the economic differences between the entities.
Second, the disbursement of funds hardened the positions of the nationalist 
parties. For instance, donor institutions’ attempts to reconstruct housing in order to 
encourage refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes heighten the 
already precarious social situation in many towns and cities throughout the country. 
Motivated by nationalist leaders, gangs in each community started to destroy these 
reconstructed houses or made the lives of these people impossible. A European Stability 
Initiative (ESI) report also argues that ‘local leaders benefited materially from the aid 
programme through control of local companies contracted for reconstruction work and 
through the supply of goods and rental premises to international agencies’ (ESI 2000c). 
Rather than weakening existing power structures in order to support the development of 
new ones that encouraged inter-ethnic co-operation and the integration of Bosnia, 
economic assistance reinforced these structures (Vukadinovic 1997).
Third, the OHR learned the painful lesson that a pledge is only a commitment and 
does not necessarily guarantee that these funds will be disbursed. For instance, the 
Clinton administration offered $550 million for reconstruction efforts, but it did not give 
out these funds because of its budget battle with the US Congress. As a result, Bildt 
dedicated most of his time lobbying the international community for money in order to 
fund these projects. In fact, the OHR repeatedly asked the IFOR Commander to order its 
engineers to finish important infrastructure improvements. Bildt argued that this was a 
reasonable plea, as IFOR would use these roads and bridges and benefit from upgraded 
communication networks (Bildt 1998: 318). In all, the OHR spent an increasing amount 
of time making sure that international actors distribute the funds they had pledge.
These three problems were not the only ones. For instance, if money was not 
available for these projects, it was even more difficult to fund the de-mining programme. 
There were more than 3 million land mines in Bosnia. Needless to say, it was important 
to clear these as soon as possible. Throughout the first year of peace implementation, the 
OHR lobbied international donor agencies so they would also fund this programme, as it
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would also help clear roads and promote the freedom of movement: two elements 
consistent with the international community’s economic objectives (OHR-R 1996d).
D. Establishing the Central State
The OHR’s fourth priority was to establish the country’s central state institutions and to 
assist the OSCE’s task of organising the elections. While the central institutions were to 
be set up after the elections, the OHR had to make sure that the parties to the agreement 
amended each entity’s constitution ‘to ensure conformity’ with the new, Dayton 
constitution (OHR-R 1996d: par. 85). While the parties had expressed their disposition to 
amend these, the process was slow and it was actually not completed by the elections. As 
noted before, the Joint Civilian Commissions and the Joint Interim Commissions handled 
public and foreign policy matters for the period between the signing of the peace 
agreement and the establishment of the common institutions. Foreshadowing the future 
gridlock of the country’s central state, both Commissions’ work was hampered by 
bickering between leaders of each ethno-national community and by political conflicts in 
both entities.
The growing conflict between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks worried many 
in the West, as the Federation is a central element of the peace process (OHR-R 1996d). 
Throughout 1996, the leaders of the Party of Democratic Change (SDA) and the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) prevented the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement in 
the Federation. There were many areas of disagreement, but three were probably the most 
important. First, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) was unwilling to dissolve the para- 
state of Herceg-Bosna and merge these structures with the Federation’s structures. 
Second, the joint administration of the divided city of Mostar was contested by the HVO, 
as the city has been its political and economic stronghold since the 1990s (Bildt 1996c). 
Violent clashes between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were commonplace. Lastly, and 
related to the former, the merging of defence structures and the creation of a Federation 
police force were being postponed, if not completely ignored by both sides. 
Consequently, the OHR, with the assistance of Contact Group diplomats, dedicated a lot 
of time to secure the viability of the Federation. In 1996 alone, seven meetings were held 
by the international community to pressure the parties to implement the provisions o f the
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Dayton Agreement. While these negotiations produced a number of mechanisms to 
resolve these conflicts, these did not have much of an impact during Bildt’s tenure.
In the RS, the problem was Karadzic’s constant defiance of the peace agreement. 
The UN’s Security Council had granted the High Representative and the IFOR 
Commander the authority to request the Security Council to re-impose sanctions on 
Yugoslavia and the RS, if one of them consider that the Bosnian Serbs were violating the 
peace agreement. This was Bildt’s source of “real” power. Although the GFA clearly 
states that indicted war criminals could not hold public office, Karadzic remained as 
President of the RS. Even though Bildt had repeatedly raised his concerns that the RS 
was violating the GFA with Slobodan Milosevic, the Serb president dismissed these 
objections, arguing that Bildt had no power in this area (Bildt 1998: 209).
Enraged by constant Serb challenges to his authority and the implementation of 
the peace agreement, Bildt decided to construct a strategy that would secure the ousting 
of Karadzic from power, while giving more power to moderate forces within the RS, 
mostly located in Banja Luka. The proposed strategy would not only limit Karadzic’s 
influence, but also guarantee the RS’s co-operation in peace implementation matters. His 
strategy was to be implemented in three phases. First, Bildt decided to open a branch 
office in Banja Luka and indicated that economic assistance would be given to those that 
co-operated and were willing to implement the peace agreement. This assured him 
political allies in the moderate wing of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which had 
publicly expressed their displeasure with Karadzic’s attempt to completely isolate the RS 
from the rest of the world (Bidlt 1998: 214).
Second, Bildt, expecting a challenge by Karadzic’s forces, concentrated around 
the town of Pale, decided to pressure the SDS leadership by threatening Milosevic with 
the re-imposition of economic sanctions on the RS and Yugoslavia. This forced 
Milosevic to force Karadzic and his colleagues to accept two important conditions: 
Karadzic’s resignation as President of the RS and of the SDS, and his disappearance from 
public life; which meant that the SDS could not put up Karadzic’s pictures in public 
places, permit him to attend government and parliamentary meetings, and guarantee that 
he would not run for public office (Bildt 1998: 225). In the end, Milosevic forced
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Karadzic to resign, giving Biljana Plavsic, who was one of RS’s two Vice Presidents and 
a moderate who was willing to co-operate with the West, all presidential powers.
Finally, Bildt knew that Karadzic’s departure from public life did not mean that 
he would not have influence over the political system. Consequently, he asked the IFOR 
Commander to limit his movement within the entity by sending more of its assets to the 
streets of Pale. Although Smith expressed his disposition to not get involved in Bildt’s 
political strategy, the OHR started to inform the Contact Group and the PIC of IFOR’s 
unwillingness to play an active role in the GFA’s implementation.
As Bildt demonstrates in his memoirs, he ordered the OHR to keep a record that 
compared IFOR activities in the Sarajevo area and in the Pale area (Bildt 1998: 226). Not 
only did the OHR demonstrate the absence of IFOR in Pale, but it also started to mobilise 
support within NATO’s North Atlantic Council to order IFOR to take a more pro-active 
role. As a result, the presence of IFOR troops in the Pale area forced Karadzic 
underground, minimised his influence over the political system in the RS, and allowed 
more moderate forces in Banja Luka to govern the territory, increasing co-operation with 
the OHR and other bodies to implement important provisions of the peace agreement. 
While Bildt’s strategy ousted Karadzic from power, it was not until the summer of 1997 
that these moderate forces actually took control of the entity’s political and economic 
structures.
More controversial than the entities’ political conflicts was the holding of 
elections. During the peace talks, the Contact Group argued that these would create new 
government structures that could administer Bosnia, starting the international 
community’s departure. For the US, the establishment of these structures could permit 
American troops to return home before the Christmas holidays, bolstering President 
Clinton’s foreign policy credentials during his re-election campaign. This was even more 
important in light of the challenger’s, Senator Robert Dole, strong record on Bosnia. It is 
for this reason that the Clinton administration made it clear that an American was to head 
the OSCE’s Bosnia mission and organise the elections. Thus, ‘control over the OSCE 
mission for Washington meant control over its own “exit strategy’” (Bildt 1998: 256).
Although Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE’s Bosnia mission, was 
directly responsible for the elections, the peace agreement gave the High Representative a
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seat in the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), which was in charge of the whole 
election process: from setting the rules of the game to the certification of the official 
results once the elections took place. Because the PEC faced an enormous task, the peace 
agreement stipulates that its Chairman, Frowick, can take binding decisions, when the 
parties could not agree on election related issues. Bildt rarely attended this body’s 
meetings, appointing Eugene Hutchinson, an Irish diplomat, as his representative to the 
PEC (Bildt 1998: 256).
Organising the elections was plagued by controversial decisions. Most of these, 
such as the rules that specified who could vote and where and those that specified the 
standards political parties had to follow to participate in the elections, were taken by 
Frowick without the consent of local parties. As contentious as these decisions were, the 
main obstacle to the holding of the elections was a contradiction within the peace 
agreement.
The GFA clearly stipulates that the elections are to take place six months after the 
agreement takes force, or no later than nine months if the OSCE decides a delay is 
necessary (GFA 1995: Annex 3, Art.II.4). But, the agreement also states that (GFA 1995: 
Annex 3, Art.I.l):
The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free 
and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall 
protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation; 
shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and
encourage freedom of the association (including of political parties); and
shall ensure freedom of movement.
While it was generally accepted that the OSCE could not hold elections in June, deferring 
them until 14 September, Flavio Cotti, the OSCE’s Chairman in Office, informed Bildt 
about the possibility of postponing the elections to a later date because the conditions for 
fair and free elections could not be guaranteed for the proposed September date.
Bildt publicly argued that this was an error because ‘to delay the elections [was] 
to delay the setting up of the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Bildt 
1996b), which would in turn signal the international community’s approval of Bosnia’s 
eventual partition and legitimate the nationalist parties’ political programmes. He also
noted that it was ridiculous to expect the country’s first post-war elections to be
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completely fair and free (OHR-R 1996c). Bildt (1996b) also reminded the OSCE that 
post-Dayton conditions were better than those that existed during the war. To support his 
views, Bildt proposed a political strategy that would enable Cotti to certify the holding of 
elections on 14 September, while enabling the OHR to mobilise international money to 
create and fund a series of mechanisms to weaken the nationalist parties and enable 
moderate, civic-minded political parties to influence the country’s decision-making 
processes.
Learning from the Sarajevo crisis and understanding the power of the media, 
especially the role of television, the OHR, with the PIC’s consent, decided to create a 
network of independent television stations, IN-TV or what is more commonly known as 
the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), and radio stations, Radio FERN (Free Elections 
Radio Network), to oppose the HDZ TV, SDA TV, and SDS TV. With the financial 
assistance of the US, the Soros Foundation and the European Commission, the OBN 
started its broadcast on 7 September, a week before elections day.
While the OHR wanted the OBN to start broadcasting sooner, the Sarajevo 
authorities, controlled by the SDA, denied the OBN the necessary permits to start its 
operations. The OHR took the matter to the PEC, which ruled that Bosnia’s political 
authorities had to grant the necessary licenses and permits to the OBN (Chandler 1999: 
128-29). In Banja Luka, the network’s transmitters were under the control of IFOR, so 
the OHR and the OSCE argued that the RS had no authority on the matter (Bildt 1998: 
261). Even though the OBN went on air a week before the elections, it had little impact 
on the electoral process. In many ways, the nationalist parties successfully blocked the 
OHR’s attempts to weaken their position.
In reaction to these challenges, the OSCE and the OHR encouraged the creation 
of opposition, multiethnic, civic-minded political parties. In the RS, some opposition 
parties, including the Union for Peace and Progress, which enjoyed Milosevic’s support, 
challenged the SDS. These opposition parties, while better than the hard-line SDS, were 
not exactly what the OHR and the OSCE considered to be civic-minded. However, these 
were willing to co-operate with the international community and even implement aspects 
of the GFA as long as the RS could receive international aid to finance the reconstruction 
of their shattered economy and social infrastructure.
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In the Bosnian-Croat areas, the HDZ ran virtually unopposed. The HDZ, an arm 
of Tudjman’s HDZ, had access to funds and propaganda resources from the Zagreb-based 
party. The opposition parties in these areas, as Bildt notes, were even more extreme than 
the HDZ’s brand of ethno-nationalism (1998: 265-66). In the Bosniac-controlled areas of 
the Federation, several multi-ethnic, civic-minded parties, including Haris Silajdzic’s 
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Zlatko Lagumdzija’s Social Democratic Party, 
challenged Izetbegovic’s SDA. Concerned with Silajdzic’s decision to oppose the ruling 
party, SDA operatives made sure that it would win the elections at all costs. It used 
intimidation and government resources to get its message across. SDA supporters also 
beat Silajdzic nearly to death, while the SDA used police forces to paint ‘SDA symbol 
along all the streets and roads in [Sarajevo]’ (Bildt 1998: 265).
The widespread use of intimidation tactics and manipulation of electoral rules to 
benefit the nationalist parties in the RS and in the Federation, especially in the Bosniak- 
dominated areas, forced Frowick to postpone the municipal elections until the spring of 
1997. This decision angered the Clinton administration, as the postponement meant that 
the international community’s presence, especially that of NATO, would have to be 
extended until the holding of these elections.
The national elections were held on 14 September, as the PIC pressured the OSCE 
to do so in its Florence meeting in June 1996. These were not free or fair. The nationalist 
parties successfully hindered ‘the opposition parties from gaining access to the media’ 
(ICG 1999: 13) and intimidation and attacks against opposition figures were pervasive all 
across the country. The end result was the victory of the main nationalist parties.
Even more problematic, the International Crisis Group finds that ‘widespread 
fraud resulted in a voter turnout of 105% of the eligible electorate’ (IGC 1999: 13). The 
OSCE’s Elections Appeal Sub-Commission (EASC) studied complaints from 
international agents and domestic groups that questioned the validity of the results. While 
the EASC did recommend a re-count of all votes, the PEC, under the chairmanship of 
Frowick reversed this position stating that ‘it was “neither practical nor a necessary 
response to the concerns reported’” (Riley 1997: 1210). In his memoirs, Bildt agrees with 
Frowick’s decision, stating that: ‘the nationalist parties had won the elections across the
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board, and the margins of victory were overall of such a magnitude that even major 
corrections of the elections figures would be unlikely to change much’ (Bildt 1998: 270).
Following the PEC’s reversal of the EASC’s recommendation, it ordered the 
destruction of all cast ballots a week after the elections results were certified. The 
rationale behind this decision was to prevent outside groups from investigating these 
results and questioning the legitimacy of the democratic process put in place by the 
OSCE (ICG 1999: 12-13). Christopher Riley also argues that it was important for 
Frowick to take these controversial and seemingly anti-democratic actions for practical 
reasons. A re-count could have ‘cost Izetbegovic the chairmanship of the presidency. In 
such a case, Krajisnisk would assume the chairmanship, a situation some American and 
European policymakers described as a “nightmare”’ (Riley 1997: 1211). Thus, the OSCE 
decided to certify an election process marred by voter fraud and intimidation, giving the 
‘stamp of approval of “democratic” legitimacy to many of those who had led [Bosnia] 
into the war, and whose wartime behaviour left many of them with the reputation of 
gangsters, ethnic cleansers and war criminals’ (ICG 1999: 13).
With the election results certified, the OHR met with elected officials and the 
three members of the Presidency and international institutions to establish the common 
state institutions, designed at Dayton. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights 
appointed the international members of the Constitutional Court. The International 
Monetary Fund also selected the head of the country’s Central Bank. The Parliamentary 
Assembly faced some obstacles, as the Bosnian Serb members prevented it from holding 
regular sessions until early January 1997 (OHR-R 1996a: par. 29). While Bildt had held a 
number of meetings, prior to the elections and pushed for changes in each entity’s 
constitution so they would be in line with Bosnia’s new constitution, Bildt faced many 
challenges from the three members of the Presidency: Izetbegovic, Krajisnik and 
KreSimir Zubak.
The major challenge was the Presidency’s establishment of the Council of 
Ministers (OHR-R 1996a: par. 28). While the OHR had argued that a Bosnian Serb 
should head the Council, so this person could ‘feel an affinity with the state’ and work to 
secure the unity of Bosnia (Bildt 1998: 294), the Bosniaks vehemently opposed this plan. 
The OHR, with the assistance of the Contact Group, crafted an agreement that allowed
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for a Bosnian Serb to serve as Prime Minister, while allowing a Bosniak to serve as co- 
Chair of the Council of Ministers and a Bosnian Croat to serve as a vice-Chair. Although 
Bildt did not like this arrangement, he decided to approve it for two important reasons. 
First, the deal was acceptable to the Parliamentary Assembly, which has the power to 
certify the Presidency’s nominees to the Council. Second, and more significantly, this 
arrangement assured a working government that could start the next stage of the peace 
implementation: the consolidation of the peace, which’s main objective was to establish a 
self-sustaining peace in Bosnia (OHR-R 1996a: par. 94)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The OHR’s work in the first 18 months of peace implementation showed mixed results. 
The OHR’s role was that of a crisis-manager rather than the envisioned chief protagonist 
in matters related to the implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions. In many ways, 
Bildt played the same role he had played before the agreement’s signing. The only 
difference was that while Bildt worked side by side the US, which was willing to use 
military force to coerce the parties to carry through their commitments, Bildt had no 
support from the IFOR commander or the US once he was High Representative. While 
IFOR had repeatedly questioned the OHR’s political authority during the first year of 
peace implementation, the changing circumstances in Bosnia would force NATO 
members, the Contact Group and the PIC to reconsider the peace implementation strategy 
and allow the PIC’s Steering Board, chaired by Bildt, to craft a new peace 
implementation strategy.
At the centre of the new strategy was NATO’s decision to stay in Bosnia until the 
summer of 1998, albeit at a decreased size. The OSCE’s decision to postpone the 
municipal elections until mid-1997 meant that IFOR could not entirely leave Bosnia. The 
force was supposed to leave by 20 December 1996. Instead, NATO commanders decided 
to downgrade the force from 32 to 24 battalions and reduce the number of heavy 
equipment. The military mission was re-named the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and was 
headed by General William Crouch of the U.S. Army.
More importantly and illustrating the dissatisfaction with the implementation of 
civilian matters, one of General Crouch’s first acts was to establish stronger relations
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with the OHR (OHR-R 1996a: par. 86). In many ways, the international community, 
mainly influenced by Bildt’s assessment of the first months of peace implementation, 
realised that the most important aspect of the peacebuilding process was the 
implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions. In the end, it was Bosnia’s citizens and 
its institutions that would make the agreement’s full implementation a reality (Bildt 
1997). Thus, increased co-operation between SFOR and the OHR would increase the 
OHR’s credibility, while assisting it to persuade the contracting parties to carry through 
their commitments in times of crises.
Having established the Bosnian state institutions and having strengthened 
relations with SFOR, the OHR drafted the Quick Start Package, a legislative package that 
the Parliamentary Assembly, the Presidency, and the Council of Ministers had to consider 
in order to kick-start economic growth, attract foreign investment, and reform the 
country’s economy according to market principles (OHR-R 1996a: par. 76). It also 
included a set of proposals to better social conditions and enable the flourishing of civil 
society. The OHR’s intent was to ensure the operability of Bosnia’s state institutions, as 
these would not only secure the unity of Bosnia, but would also integrate the two entities 
(OHR-R 1997c: par. 132). It is important to remember that among Bildt’s biggest worries 
was that the peace agreement had created a weak central government that favoured 
nationalist parties, which vigorously campaigned against the GFA’s full implementation.
Consequently, Bildt dedicated his efforts to undermine nationalist parties’ efforts 
by continuing his previous strategy, creating the necessary social conditions to hold free 
and fair municipal elections, which the OSCE decided to hold on 14-15 September 1997. 
The OHR, with the assistance of the OSCE, continued its drive to strengthen the OBN 
and increase the power of opposition parties, while further weakening nationalist parties 
sources of power. For instance, Bildt complained that the parties had not disbanded social 
structures that contradicted the GFA’s constitution or terminate relations with 
neighbouring countries that questioned the unity of Bosnia (OHR-R 1997c: par. 154- 
156). Clear examples of these structures were nationalist parties’ control of payment 
bureaus, which were a relic of the communist years. ‘In each area, the payment bureau 
holds a monopoly on all financial transfers, and collects and distributes taxes’ (ESI 
1999). Not surprising, these bureaus funded nationalist parties’ illegal activities and
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assured that businesses did not contradict the political and economic goals of each party. 
They also hindered market reforms favoured by the international community, directly 
challenging the OHR’s work.
Bildt’s last months as High Representative was influenced by his desire to weaken 
nationalist parties’ control of political processes and strengthen the OHR’s authority so it 
could fully implement the GFA’s civilian provisions. Bildt’s views shaped the PIC’s 
Sintra Communique of 30 May 1997. Based on events in Bosnia, the PIC, meeting in 
Sintra, Portugal, granted the High Representative the power ‘to curtail or suspend any 
media network or programme whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of 
either the spirit or letter’ of the GFA (PIC 1997b: par. 70). While this power was offered 
to the OHR in hopes that it would deter the nationalist parties’ media outlets from 
dominating the airwaves, it represents the international community’s support for a 
maximalist mission, where the OHR would take a leading role in assuring the viability of 
Bosnia and the GFA.
In addition, the PIC also declared that economic assistance would be conditional; 
the parties would receive financial resources if these were willing to fully co-operate with 
the peace agreement’s execution. Hence, the international community made it clear that it 
was moving away from humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction of essential 
infrastructure to the creation of a market economy, nurtured by a burgeoning Bosnian 
state. While this gave the World Bank and the European Commission a considerable 
amount of power, the OHR was the one institution that benefited the most from this 
decision. Its ability to collect information and track the process of peace implementation, 
and the High Representative’s important role as Chairman of the PIC’s Steering Board 
meant that the OHR had the economic power to coerce the parties to implement the 
GFA’s more controversial provisions.
Although Bildt has to be credited with the transformation of the peacebuilding 
mission from a military operation supported by civilian agencies to a civilian one backed 
by military personnel, he did not directly benefit from these decisions (Hedges 1998). 
After more than two years of work on Bosnian peace, Bildt decided to retire. At the PIC’s 
Sintra meeting, Carlos Westendorp, a senior Spanish diplomat, was appointed to continue 
Bildt’s work.
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Bildt’s tenure is a controversial one. Many have criticised him for his efforts, 
while others have praised him for creating a series of mechanisms that secured the GFA’s 
initial implementation. Although he was concerned with inter-ethnic reconciliation and 
while he arduously worked for the unity of Bosnia, when he left office Bosnia was still 
divided along political and social lines. The challenges that his successor faced were as 
challenging as the ones Bildt faced. The only difference between them was that 
Westendorp enjoyed more diplomatic support, enabling him to further strengthen the 
mandate of the OHR and move the peace implementation process forward.
The support the OHR received after Bildt’s departure transformed the 
peacebuilding operation from a military mission supported by a civilian component to a 
civilian operation supported by NATO peacekeepers. The failure of the American 
peacebuilding strategy allowed the PIC’s European members to take control over peace 
implementation matters and design a new set of projects to establish a self-sustaining 
peace in post-Dayton Bosnia. Was this new peacebuilding programme founded on the 
tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking? It will be argued in the next chapter that 
it was. However, Wolfgang Petritsch’s, the third High Representative, ‘ownership 
approach’ questions aspects of these peacemaking efforts, suggesting that communicative 
forms of peacemaking may be needed to make peace in Bosnia self-sustaining.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Strengthening the Office of the High Representative’s Mandate: 
Peacebuilding as State-Building
INTRODUCTION
From July 1997 to August 1999, the streets of Sarajevo were filled with the music of 
Julio Iglesias. Carlos Westendorp, a experienced Spanish diplomat and the second High 
Representative, not only took a little bit o f his culture to Bosnia, he also brought a 
diplomatic style that mixed strong rhetoric and great negotiating skills that helped him to 
get his way in Bosnia and within the structures of the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC). In choosing Westendorp, the PIC was clearly signalling its intention to change the 
course of civilian peace implementation. While Bosnia would not become a protectorate, 
as some Bosnian politicians contended during his term as High Representative, 
Westendorp became the de facto viceroy of the country (The Economist 1998).
Wolfgang Petritsch, an experienced Austrian diplomat, became the third High 
Representative in August 1999. Petritsch has also opposed the idea of turning Bosnia into 
an international protectorate. However, he admits that the international community, 
especially the Office of the High Representative (OHR), is too involved in Bosnia’s 
internal affairs. If Westendorp behaved as a viceroy, his successor has attempted to 
behave more like a political counsellor. Although Petritsch has argued that he wants 
Bosnia’s citizens and officials to take more control over the administration of their own 
affairs, nationalist politicians and their repeated obstructions to the implementation of the 
peace agreement have strongly hindered him from putting into practice his “ownership 
approach”. But, Petritsch has used the powers granted to the position of High 
Representative in December 1997 more than Westendorp did. Indeed, many people have 
compared Petritsch and his work with that performed by Austro-Hungarian 
administrators sent to Bosnia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(Ljiljan 2000).
This chapter continues the analysis conducted in the previous chapter. It 
demonstrates the changing internal and external dynamics that forced the international
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community to strengthen the OHR’s mandate, while clearly demonstrating this decision’s 
effects on the OHR’s ability to implement the peace agreement during Westendorp’s and 
Petritsch’s tenures. More important, it delineates the evolution of the international 
community’s state-building strategy and its attempts to correct some of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (GFA) errors, including 
the agreement’s creation of a weak central state. The chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first covers developments under Westendorp’s term in office (June 1996 to July 
1999), while the second part covers events during Petritsch’s tenure.
I. STRENGTHENING THE OHR’S MANDATE
Thanks in part to the changes Carl Bildt had secured in his last months as High 
Representative, Westendorp quickly showed the parties that he was not going to play his 
predecessor’s role of crisis-manager. Instead, the OHR acted to ensure that nationalist 
political parties and their supporters collaborated with international agents and 
implemented the international community’s favoured peacebuilding strategy. NATO’s 
Stabilisation Force’s (SFOR) willingness to play an active role in peace enforcement and 
implementation translated into the arrest of war criminals, the demolition of illegal 
checkpoints in the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL), and the protection of those that 
desired to return to their homes, enhancing the OHR’s political activities. The SFOR- 
OHR relationship was an important part of the peace implementation programme charted 
by the PIC after the country’s first elections.
While the OHR’s priorities during Westendorp’s term were the same ones tackled 
by Bildt’s team, that is to say the creation of a strong state, Westendorp’s no-nonsense 
style, coupled with the PIC’s dissatisfaction with the peace implementation process and 
General Wesley Clarke’s, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, understanding 
of the importance of civilian implementation, enabled the OHR to clarify its mandate and 
set out a clear strategy that gave the OHR more power to enforce the GFA’s full 
implementation of its civilian provisions. The overall objective of Westendorp’s OHR 
was to move Bosnia past the consolidation period to the institutionalisation of a self- 
sustaining peace that could allow the international community to exit Bosnia and dedicate 
their resources to other areas of international concerns.
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A. Reasons for a Stronger Mandate
While Bildt had established Bosnia’s state institutions, according to the provisions of the 
GFA, these were not operating to full capacity. Many in the international community, 
especially in the European Union, were concerned that a weak state could not undertake 
the economic reforms needed to promote self-sustaining economic growth. Because the 
international community had faith that economic development could successfully 
integrate the divided country and even serve as a tool of inter-ethnic reconciliation, 
Westendorp was instructed to strengthen the state’s structures. Such a state-building 
project, as argued in chapter two, meant that Westendorp was ordered to weaken the 
position of nationalist political parties and their local structures of power, while also 
finding a way to persuade and even coerce the parties to co-operate in order to strengthen 
the existing state institutions.
Like his predecessor, Westendorp was quickly challenged by hardliners in the 
Republika Sprska (RS). As Bildt was finishing his tenure, Karadzic attempted to 
strengthen his position within the SDS’s (Serbian Democratic Party) ranks. In his last 
report to the UN Secretary General, Bildt pointed out that Karadzic was starting to openly 
challenge the GFA. More worrying, the RS was establishing political and economic links 
with Serbia that contradicted the Bosnian constitution and the GFA’s provisions (OHR-R 
1997c: par. 62-68). Empowered by the conclusions of the PIC’s meeting in Sintra, the 
OHR started to cut economic assistance to the Serb entity. The OHR’s repeated criticisms 
and the threat of decreasing economic assistance created a rift within the SDS between its 
Banja Luka faction, headed by President Biljana Plav§ic, and its Pale faction, headed by 
Karadzic and his colleagues (Cohen 1998: 106).
President Plavsic decided to challenge Karadzic’s supporters in order to move the 
entity’s centre of political power from Pale to Banja Luka, which was already the RS’s 
centre of economic activity. The international community supported such a move. Indeed, 
the Clinton administration had proposed making Banja Luka the entity’s capital during 
the Dayton in order to limit Karadzic’s base of power (Holbrooke 1999: 293). In a 
brilliant political move that strengthened her position in the RS, Plav§ic did not challenge
200
the SDS’s nationalist ideology, which many Bosnian Serbs were fond of. Instead, she 
made the case of political change on the basis that Pale loyalists were corrupt and were 
squabbling money that could be used to improve Bosnian Serbs’ living conditions 
(Holbrooke 1999: 349). Her populist rhetoric was embraced by people in the RS, forcing 
Karadzic and his supporters to find ways of deposing her from power. For its part, the 
international community, especially the Clinton administration, saw an opportunity to 
change the anti-Dayton SDS leadership. Consequently, SFOR was ordered to assure 
Plavsic’s security and to disband police forces loyal to Karadzic. More surprising, British 
SFOR personnel started to arrest war criminals in the RS (OHR-R 1997a: par. 53-57).
The OHR started to counter Karadzic loyalists by opposing the content of SDS 
controlled media outlets, which were attempting to mobilise Bosnian Serbs against 
Plavsic through misinformation and inflammatory rhetoric. Even more critical were SDS 
TV’s call on Bosnian Serbs to attack UN and NATO personnel in the divided town of 
Brdko. With the situation worsening, Westendorp requested SFOR to intervene and 
shutdown these media outlets. In an emergency meeting, the North Atlantic Council 
accepted Westendorp’s request and SFOR was ordered to take control of these 
transmitters. With the support of SFOR, Westendorp’s office started to restructure the 
RS’s media organisations leading to the signing of the Udrigovo Agreement (OHR- 
SFOR-PS 1997).
Although OHR-SFOR co-operation did strengthen the OHR’s ability to 
restructure the Bosnian Serb media, it did not push Karadzic’s supporters out of power. 
Nevertheless, the SDS was weakened as Plavsic decided to break ranks and form the Serb 
Popular Party (SPP). At the entity level, the SDS agreed to a new round of elections for 
the entity’s National Assembly. These were administered and supervised by the OSCE 
and were held on 15 November 1997. In many ways, OHR-SFOR co-operation did send 
an important message to the parties that the international community was willing to 
employ all necessary mechanisms to implement the GFA’s provisions and that the OHR 
was to play the leading role in the peace implementation process. Hence, the OHR’s 
authority and respect quickly increased in Bosnia (ESI 2000b).
The OHR’s participation in the RS’s power struggle was not the only act it took 
against the SDS or other nationalist parties. Learning from the 1996 elections the OHR
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and the OSCE decided to cut funding to political campaigns of nationalist parties and 
started to give financial support to ‘select opposition parties’ in the RS and the 
Federation. This strategy failed in both entities, as the nationalist parties won 129 out of 
Bosnia’s 136 municipalities in the municipal elections of 13-14 of September 1997 (ICG 
1999: 15). In the RS, the OHR-SFOR’s intervention in the entity’s politics, its decision to 
regulate the RS’s media outlets, and its open support of Plavsic angered many Bosnian 
Serbs, leading them to cast their votes for the SDS as a protest against the GFA and the 
international community’s actions against Bosnian Serb sovereignty.26 In the Federation, 
the votes for nationalist parties were cast as a protest to the international community’s 
policy that allowed refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. In 
short, the municipal elections were another setback for the international community’s 
peacebuilding efforts.
At the national level, Bildt’s Quick Start Package was passed during the summer, 
but work on other important legislation, such as citizenship and passport laws, was slow. 
Part of the problem was the RS’s determination to block important bills and delaying the 
enactment of key legislation. This commitment to derail the policy-making process 
forced the OHR to ask the European Union (EU) to not accept the passports of senior 
Bosnian Serb public figures. While the EU did approve this request, it had little impact 
on the overall process.
Enraged by an ineffective system of government and increasing cases of 
corruption, Westendorp started informing the PIC that he wanted to take a stronger stance 
on critical issues affecting the GFA’s implementation (Slobodna Bosna 1997). Thus, 
Westendorp started to publicly campaign for the extension of his mandate, so he could 
fulfil his duties and responsibilities.
In a unanimous decision, supporting Westendorp’s request (Klarin 1997), the PIC, 
meeting in Bonn in December 1997, decided to extend the OHR’s mandate by conferring 
the High Representative two new powers. First, he had the power to take decisions when 
the Bosnian state did not or could not do so. According to this power, the High 
Representative could also re-write existing laws so these could be in line with the spirit
26 Plavsic’s SPP could not participate in the elections because it was created after the Provisional Elections 
Commission’s date to register new parties.
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of the GFA. Second, the PIC authorised the High Representative to dismiss public 
officials that obstructed the peace agreement’s execution or carry out the OHR’s 
decisions (PIC 1997b: Art. XI.2b-c). In addition, the PIC’s Bonn Conclusions 
emphasised that SFOR would actively support the work of the OHR (PIC 1997b: Art. 
IX. 1 .e), and enforce its decisions.
The fact that the High Representative’s mandate was extended unanimously 
showed the international community’s acceptance that peace in Bosnia is a long-term 
development that needs to be directed by international bodies. The minimalist position 
backed by the Clinton administration at Dayton was ignored, thus encouraging increased 
co-operation between the OHR and SFOR. In many ways, the PIC’s Bonn Conclusions 
reflect the international community’s frustration with the slow pace of peace 
implementation and low levels of inter-ethnic co-operation. It is for this reason that the 
PIC instructed Westendorp to propose a new approach, if months following the Bonn 
meeting the social conditions in Bosnia had not changed for the best (Klarin 1996). As a 
result, the international community reinstated its support for the GFA and confirmed its 
trust in the High Representative as the final arbiter of the peace agreement in civilian 
matters, while also conveying to the parties that SFOR was to actively support the OHR’s 
work. As repeatedly stated by Westendorp and his colleagues at the OHR in several 
interviews after the Bonn meeting, the PIC’s Bonn Conclusions was a turning point in the 
nature of peace implementation in post-Dayton Bosnia.
B. The Effects of the Bonn Powers
The PIC’s Bonn Conclusions were pronounced in the backdrop of two important debates: 
the Bosnian national elections, to be held in September 1998; and SFOR’s scheduled exit 
in June 1998, which never took place as the US and its European allies decide to keep the 
troops for an undetermined amount of time. During 1998, the OHR dedicated its 
resources at passing key legislation that would strengthen the Bosnian state and enhance 
the integration of the two entities into a single cohesive unit. For this reason, Westendorp 
asked the common state institutions to adopt: (a) a new flag; (b) currency; (c) common 
license plates; (d) citizenship laws; (e) a new passport; and (f) a permanent law on 
customs. The OHR also wanted the state to consider the following legislative projects: (a)
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foreign investment laws in order to encourage further investment; (b) property laws that 
enabled refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes; and (c) an 
election law to organise and hold elections following the 1998 national elections (OHR-D 
1998d: pars. 17-28). For its part, the OHR expressed its intention to curtail corruption at 
the state, entity, and municipal levels, while vowing to undermining nationalist parties’ 
power base by encouraging new non-ethnic, civic-minded political parties that could 
serve as the basis of a dynamic and a healthy civil society (Westendorp 1997a). The 
OHR, pressured by European nation-states, also started to consult with other international 
organisations to promote the return of many refugees and better Bosnia’s dire human 
rights situation.
The common state institutions did meet in order to discuss the proposed 
legislative package, but the members of these institutions failed to reach a decision, 
prompting Westendorp to use his Bonn powers. In the end, the High Representative 
decided to impose the entire legislative package. Although Westendorp repeatedly stated 
that he preferred if the country’s institutions took these important decisions, he also 
expressed a sense of satisfaction, knowing that his interventions guaranteed progress in 
the peace agreement’s implementation.
The first half of 1998, as expressed by Westendorp in a speech delivered at the 
PIC’s Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg, held on 9 June 1998, produced many positive 
results. The most important result was the institution of a moderate government in the 
RS, headed by President PlavSic and Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, a pro-Western 
Bosnian Serb politician. As one of its first acts, the National Assembly decided to move 
the entity’s capital from Pale to Banja Luka, indicating the RS’s resolve to co-operate 
with the OHR and implement the peace agreement. In exchange, the international donors 
community started to finance economic reconstruction projects across the entity and 
awarded an emergency instalment of $29 million to the government to finance its non­
military budgetary obligations. Even more significant, the National Assembly elected its 
first Bosniak to the position of Vice-Speaker (OHR-R 1998b: par. 58).
The increased plurality of the RS’s political scene improved its relations with the 
OHR and the rest of the international community. However, Bosnian Serb authorities still 
obstructed the GFA’s fiill implementation, especially the property laws that would have
204
enabled refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Although the 
National Assembly had elected a Bosniak Vice Speaker, this did not mean that multi­
ethnicity was a principle the Bosnian Serb authorities wanted to translate into reality. It 
seems that the RS was willing to co-operate with the international community in matters 
were it would have benefited its economic welfare, whereas in areas where international 
policies could have affected the RS’s high degree of political autonomy or the 
demographic composition of its town and cities, the Bosnian Serb entity vigorously 
resisted the international community and the OHR’s work.
Events in the Federation challenged the peace agreement’s execution as well. In 
his report to the UN Secretary General, Westendorp complained that the structures of 
‘Herceg-Bosna’ were still in operation (OHR-R 1998c: par. 22). Conflicts between the 
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats also continued, weakening the Federation’s institutions. 
More appalling were the numerous attacks against returning refugees and displaced 
persons and their homes. In Drvar, returning Bosnia Serbs found their reconstructed 
house completely destroyed, while individuals that opposed these returns attacked 
international organisations’ offices, including the OHR’s office in the town. Two Bosnian 
Serbs were also murdered and the Serb mayor of the town was attacked. Consequently, 
the OHR asked SFOR to intervene and secure the environment (OHR-R 1998b: par. 53- 
55). Westendorp also used his Bonn powers to dismiss public officials that opposed the 
return of refugees and displaced persons.
Economically, Bosnia’s entities were doing better. The launch of the {Convertible 
Marka symbolised the first step towards the creation of a single economic space. In mid- 
1998, Westendorp believed that Bosnia was entering a new stage in its economic 
development. To make this reality, he argued that the international donors community 
should start to support projects and fund initiatives that enabled the harmonisation of tax 
systems, the closing of payment bureaus, the privatisation of state assets, and the 
strengthening of state institutions (Westendorp 1998b), especially those responsible for 
managing the country’s economic agenda and those responsible for the oversight of 
justice (Westendorp 1998a). In many ways, Westendorp believed that the international 
community was driving Bosnia’s economic improvements. The rise in productivity, 
declining unemployment, and higher living standards was made possible by foreign aid.
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For this reason, Westendorp stressed the importance of pushing market reforms so Bosnia 
could attract foreign investments, strengthen local businesses and foster new firms that 
could secure the foundations of a self-sustaining economy (OHR-R 1998d: pars. 103- 
110), which would in turn support activities attempting to institute a self-sustaining peace 
(Woodward 1999: 148-49).
Even though economic developments had dramatically improved the lives of 
Bosnia’s citizens and though the international community increased financial and 
logistical aid to non-nationalist, civic-minded parties, while also denying funds to 
nationalist parties, nationalist parties won the 1998 national elections. The result of the 
elections was a clear indication that economic progress was not going to break Bosnia’s 
social divisions. In the RS, Plav§ic lost the elections to Nikolas Poplasen, who was an 
active leader of a paramilitary organisation during the war, member of the Radical Party 
and staunch opponent of the GFA (ICG 1999: 15). While Poplasen’s victory signalled the 
strength of nationalist sentiment, the OHR argued that the 1998 elections had also 
weakened the nationalist parties’ and strengthened non-nationalist civic-minded parties, 
such as the Social Democratic Party (OHR-R 1998a: par. 52-53). Nevertheless, the 
victory of Poplasen, as well as the easy victories of the SDA and the HDZ, meant that a 
majority of Bosnia’s citizenry did not support the peace agreement’s implementation.
While not openly admitting so, the elections had not produced the breakthrough 
the international community was hoping for. Consequently, the PIC’s meeting in Madrid 
clearly set out a new programme for 1999. Apart from continuing projects in economic 
development, the enforcement of human rights provisions, democratisation, the return of 
refugees and displaced persons, and so forth, the PIC argued that meeting these 
objectives could only be done by way of stronger state institutions. Even though this call 
was not new, the PIC clearly called for a departure from the past strategy. If the 
international community could not weaken the nationalist parties via democratic process, 
then it had to do so by destroying the nationalist parties’ sources of political and 
economic power. In other words, it was not only necessary for the OHR to impose 
legislation on the parties or dismiss officials that blocked the peace agreement’s 
implementation; it was also necessary to carry through the following changes.
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1. The reform o f the country’s militaries. The international community wanted to 
limit the ties between the country’s military forces and each nationalist party and 
merge these into a single cohesive army under the control of the Bosnian state. 
There was evidence that military forces, especially Bosniak and Croat forces, 
were being deployed to intimidate voters (OHR-R 1999d: par. 103), thus the 
importance of reforming military structures and placing these under the complete 
authority of the state, the OHR and SFOR.
2. The creation o f an apolitical civil service. The PIC wanted the members of the 
civil service to be chosen according to professional competence rather than their 
loyalty to the platforms of nationalist parties. Many of the individuals that served 
in the burgeoning state bureaucracy were not working on behalf of Bosnia, but in 
the interest of these parties (PIC 1998: III.3).
3. The destruction o f parallel structures (PIC 1998: III.7). Examples of these are 
pension systems (OHR-R 1998a: par. 43), police and paramilitary organisations 
not endorsed by the GFA (ESI 1999), and payment bureaus that funded the 
nationalist parties’ illegal activities (OHR-R 1999b: par. 76).
4. The enforcement o f the rule o f law and the creation an independent judiciary. 
The existing judicial structures could not adequately combat corruption and other 
criminal activities, which supported nationalists’ efforts. One of the reasons for 
this was the influence nationalist parties have in staffing these positions. Hence, 
an independent judiciary could expose the connections between criminal activities 
and nationalist parties. For instance, SFOR has documented how illegal Bosnian 
Croat ‘intelligence services were engaged in criminal activities, including child 
pornography, for the purposes of raising revenues’ (ESI 2000d: A.3). Other 
research shows the connection between criminal organisations and political 
parties in both the RS and the Federation (ESI 1999: V.b).
5. Pushing the privatisation o f publicly owned industries and utilities. In the 
Federation, the SDA had retained ‘control over the selection of personnel’ and 
continued ‘to exercise political direction’ over their activities. Even more 
important, these publicly owned utilities financed the activities of the SDA 
backed Agency for Information and Documentation, which were being used to 
block certain aspects of the peace agreement (ESI 1999: V.c).
6. The institution o f an independent civil society. The rationale for the creation of 
this sector is to encourage moderate voices to influence the organisation of 
society. The OHR wanted to encourage the creation of new local NGOs by asking 
the country’s Council of Minister with the advise from existing NGOs and 
international experts to draft a Law on Associations and Foundations (OHR 
1999d: par. 73).
7. The creation o f a new election law that establishes the Permanent Election 
Commission. The OHR, the OSCE and the Council of Europe believed that
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Bosnia needed a new election law that would make clear the process by which the 
people can elect the members of the Presidency and the Parliamentary Assembly. 
For this reason, Westendorp selected seven individuals to create an independent 
committee to draft such a law (OHR 1998a: par. 54).
8. The creation o f new mechanism to fund the activities o f the Bosnian state. The 
OHR, under Westendorp’s administration, repeatedly complained that the entities 
were not funding the state’s work. This was a way of blocking its work and 
hampering the peace agreement’s implementation (PIC 1998 III.3).
While many of these activities were started by the OHR during Westendorp’s 
tenure, they started to materialise under Petritsch’s term as High Representative. At least 
two reasons explain why the Madrid Declaration’s objectives were not instituted in early
1999. First, political developments in each entity compromised these institutions’ ability 
to address these issues. In the RS, Poplasen opposed the candidacy of Milorad Dodik for 
the post of RS Prime Minister, as Dodik was willing to co-operate with the international 
community. He also refused to sign important bills approved by the National Assembly, 
and repeatedly challenged the High Representative’s and SFOR’s authority. For this 
reason, Westendorp decided to dismiss him on 5 March 1999 (OHR-D 1999), the day 
Brdko was proclaimed a district administered by both entities.
The decision on Brcko and the political vacuum left by Poplasen created an 
environment that hampered the international community’s capacity to implement the 
PIC’s objectives. In the Federation, Bosnian Croat organisations started to question the 
legitimacy of the Federation and started to campaign for the creation of a third entity 
within Bosnia. The HDZ also voiced its concerns that the Bosnian Croats were being 
treated unfairly by Bosniaks. Even more critical, the Deputy Interior Minister Jozo 
Leutar of the HDZ was assassinated (OHR-R 1999c: pars. 32-34). While there is no 
evidence that shows that the assassination was a reaction to Bosnian Croats’ complaints, 
HDZ hard-liners used this as an excuse to take a non-co-operative stance vis-a-vis their 
Bosniaks counterparts and hamper the work of the Federation’s House of Peoples. 
Hence, political instabilities within each entity barred international agents from carrying 
out its agenda (OHR-R 1999b: par. 14).
Second, NATO’s military operation against Yugoslavia over Kosovo not only 
furthered anger Bosnian Serbs, but the heightened regional situation also threw
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international agents off message. Actually, the offensive prompted mobs of Bosnian 
Serbs to attack the offices and vehicles of international agencies in Banja Luka. Even 
though these attacks were not intense or frequent, as many Bosnian Serbs expressed their 
dissatisfaction non-violently, Westendorp made the following statement in his report to 
the UN Secretary General that during the Kosovo crisis: ‘it has been a turbulent few 
months for BiH [Bosnia]. Recent events beyond our control may have slowed the pace of 
peace implementation.’ While the OHR did not reduce the scope of its activities, 
NATO’s military offensive and the changing strategic regional dynamics challenged the 
OHR’s ability to carry out its duties and responsibilities.
C. A Stronger OHR and Peace Implementation: On the Right Track?
While many have argued that Westendorp’s tenure was more successful than that of 
Bildt, it is important to note that both administrations were unable to fully implement the 
GFA’s civilian aspects. While it is true that international agents accomplished more 
under Westendorp’s term, it the international community, fearing a resumption of 
hostilities if it pre-maturely exited Bosnia or worried by the possibility of its long-term 
presence, decided to take on a more maximalist approach. The increased ability of the 
OHR to implement key parts of the GFA was dependent on the international 
community’s realisation that the minimalist position championed by the Clinton 
administration was not going to mend Bosnia’s fractured relations. For this reason, the 
PIC decided to enhance the High Representative’s powers and set out a clear state- 
building agenda.
By the time of his departure, Westendorp had imposed or re-written 45 pieces of 
legislations that strengthened the state institutions, creating the foundations of a state 
identity (e.g. imposition of a flag, coat of arms, anthem, licences plates, the design of the 
Konvertible Marka, citizenship laws, passports and so forth) and starting important 
economic reforms. Nevertheless, international agents were unable to foster inter-ethnic 
reconciliation or weaken the position of nationalist parties, though he removed 16 public 
officials from power (Westendorp 1999). For all these actions, the OHR just reinforced 
the importance of the international community and the inability of local actors to control 
and administer their own affairs (Hayden 1998 and 1999).
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In many ways, the problem with the GFA’s implementation, the PIC repeatedly 
argued, was not the agreement’s provisions, but the parties that resisted the 
implementation of the peace accords. While this is one of the reasons that impelled the 
PIC to widen the OHR’s mandate, the problem with the Bonn powers was that it 
contradicted the democratic ideals that supposedly inspirited the GFA. The imposition of 
laws drafted by the OHR or other international agents meant that the activities of the state 
and entity structures did not directly represent the interests of Bosnia’s citizens, but rather 
those of the international community. International rhetoric argued that Bosnia’s officials, 
especially those of the main nationalist parties, worked against the interest of Bosnia. 
While there might be some truth to this argument, these officials were elected to their 
post and many in Bosnia do not hold the negotiated agreement in the highest regard. This 
even holds true with moderate politicians that have openly criticised the peace process.
Furthermore, the repeated dismissals of public officials that resist the GFA’s 
implementation or speak against its execution raised questions about the democratic and 
open nature of Bosnian society. The European Stability Initiative has accurately 
demonstrated this problem by documenting Dragan Cavic’s legal challenge to 
Westendorp’s decision to dismiss him from his position in the RS’s National Assembly 
for making a speech that maintained that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo could incite 
violence against SFOR in the RS. Cavic took his appeal to the Human Rights Chamber 
on the grounds that his right to freedom of speech was violated, but this body found that 
it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the High Representative (ESI 2000d: D.2). 
Indeed, Izetbegovic’s remarks linking these dismissals to Josip Broz Tito’s oppressive 
tactics to assure social stability are not only telling, but these also showed the two- 
facedness of international engagement in Bosnia.
‘[Rjemember the communist times: they would arrest a Chetnik or an 
Ustasha and with them they would throw in some Muslim, not because 
[they were] guilty but for the sake of peace in the house... In Sarajevo 
they remove a man, label him as dishonest, [did] not present any proof of 
this and then they [the international community] talk to us about human 
rights... They want us to take their word for it’ (Cited in ESI 2000d: D.2).
Had the OHR overstepped its boundaries or did the implementation o f the peace 
agreement become an end that was more important than the liberal democratic values and
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humanitarian ideals that supposedly inspirited the peace process? While many in the 
international community have praised Westendorp’s efforts, the fact is that the 
peacebuilding process contradicts the political system crafted at Dayton. As David 
Chandler (2000: 274) notes in his insightful analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia:
The constantly expanding role of the multitude of international 
organisations has inevitably restricted the capacity of Bosnian people to 
discuss, develop and decide on vital questions of concern. At state level, 
the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb representatives can discuss 
international policy proposals under the guidance of the OHR, but, at 
most, can make minor amendments or delay the implementation of 
externally prepared rules and regulations. Even this limited accountability 
has been diminished by the High Representative, who has viewed 
democratic consensus-building in Bosnia’s state bodies such as the 
tripartite Presidency, Council of Ministers and State Parliament as an 
unnecessary delay to imposing international policy.
Instead of building the necessary political culture so the parties can start administering 
their own affairs, international agents are creating a system of more dependence in both 
economic and political fields (Bugajski 2000). The greatest challenge has been the 
creation of a new formula that gives the parties more participation without limiting the 
power or the influence of the OHR. This was exactly the task that Westendorp left to his 
successor, the Austrian diplomat, Wolfgang Petritsch.
n. CHARTING A NEW DIRECTION?
Petritsch is probably the most qualified of the High Representatives. He holds a doctoral 
degree in Southeastern European history. He was bom in a small village near the 
Austrian-Slovenian border. He speaks the language fluently and understands the cultural 
dynamics of the region and Petritsch emphasises he also was educated in multi-cultural 
schools (Lovrenovic 2000). Prior to his post at the OHR, he was the European Union’s 
Special Envoy to Kosovo and its chief negotiator at the Rambouillet and Paris peace 
talks. In essence, Petritsch’s nomination can be understood as the international 
community’s attempt to correct some of its past mistakes and start its disengagement 
from Bosnian affairs. The PIC’s Madrid Declaration, as seen above, had to still be 
implemented. Petritsch however was asked to design a new peace implementation
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approach that secured the foundations of a self-sustaining peace, while also continuing 
with Westendorp’s efforts.
Westendorp’s agenda was influenced by the tenets of the strategic approach. The 
international community, as explained above, came to the conclusion that if the parties 
were not going to implement the peace agreement, then it was the responsibility of 
international agents to impose its provisions; hence the PIC’s decision to make 
international financial assistance conditional on the support of the peace process, and the 
augmentation of the High Representative’s power to assure the GFA’s full 
implementation. It is important to remember that it was originally envisioned that the 
international community was to play a dominant role in Bosnia for a year, until Bosnia’s 
citizens elected the members of Bosnia’s central institution (Chandler 2000: 273). While 
the PIC did not explicitly state that its strategies had deviated from the original intention 
of negotiators at Dayton, Petritsch’s first article as High Representative argued that the 
international community needed to create a new approach based on the concept of 
‘ownership’ (Petritsch 1999). As noted by the PIC’s Steering Board’s Communique after 
the New York meeting on 22 September 1999, ownership meant that the process had to 
make Bosnia’s citizens and officials ‘owners of their progress in implementation of the 
Dayton/Paris Accords and the eventual entry of Bosnia-Herzegovina into European 
institutions’ (PIC 1999).
This did not mean that the international community was to go back on its policy 
of conditionality, as set out in the PIC’s Sintra meeting, held in 1997. Conditionality was 
enlarged to include other areas outside international assistance. For instance, the PIC’s 
Steering Board’s New York Communique established the significance of setting a course 
where Bosnia could join the process of European integration. The entry into Europe’s 
institutions was dependent on Bosnia’s commitment to fully implement the GFA’s 
provisions. Broadening this approach in order to include the entry of Bosnia in these 
institutions was also necessary, as the international community started to decrease its 
financial commitments. With less financial assistance, the international community 
needed to offer other incentives in order to enhance co-operation between the parties, 
strengthen the state institutions, and implement needed economic and political reforms.
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While conditionality, as a peace implementation approach, was enlarged, 
Petritsch’s ownership approach was a way of radicalising the existing policy in order to 
achieve the PIC’s objectives, as set out in the Madrid Declaration. Consequently, 
Petritsch vowed to continue the work of his predecessor and use the Bonn powers when 
necessary. The only difference was that his approach was a way to convey to Bosnia’s 
citizens that the implementation of the peace agreement was not only in their interest, but 
that it could also be affected by their participation. If the OHR and other international 
agents were being criticised for implementing the provisions of an agreement that many 
perceived as unfair, then Petritsch argued that pushing through the reforms started by 
Westendorp was not enough. Instead he believed that it was necessary to foster a change 
of attitude that would increase popular support for peace implementation. Only if this 
could take place, he argued, the citizens of Bosnia would start supporting moderate non­
nationalist parties and open the doors to economic prosperity, integration into Europe, 
and a self-sustaining peace (Petritsch 2000c).
In many ways, Petritsch’s peace implementation strategy, while controversial, 
was accepted because it strongly endorsed past strategies, while seemingly correcting 
their errors. In other words, if the state-building agenda pushed by Westendorp increased 
the dependency of Bosnia and questioned the strength of liberal-democratic values and 
humanitarian ideals that supposedly influenced the making of the peace agreement, then 
the concept of ownership was to continue the agenda, but via what seemed to be more 
democratic means. More important, the emphasis on ownership was supposed to start the 
disengagement of the international community, which had repeatedly expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the peace implementation process and the amount of resources lost 
trying to institute a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.
Even though Petritsch’s ownership approach is currently guiding the international 
community’s re-organisation of its presence in Bosnia, this approach was downplayed in 
2001, strengthening the PIC’s state-building programme. Petritsch’s term as High 
Representative has seen setbacks and breakthroughs. This has affected the PIC’s 
recommendations and the OHR’s actions. It is necessary to analyse the feasibility of the 
approach in the context of the PIC’s decision to present a bolder state-building 
programme, which echoed the Madrid Declaration’s agenda. It is important to emphasise
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that this chapter’s examination of Petritsch’s work is until 1 January 2002, when the 
international community started to voice strong support for Petritsch’s proposals to 
realise a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia by the end o f2007.
A. Ownership: A Failed Approach?
Like his predecessors, Petritsch inherited a country that was divided along social, 
political, and economic lines. While many non-governmental organisations had been 
operating in Bosnia, trying to foster reconciliation, Bosnia’s communities still did not 
trust each other. At the time, the World Bank published a study that found that the level 
of social distance was still very high (Dani, et. al. 1999). These social divisions 
toughened the position of nationalist parties and undermined the international 
community’s efforts to strengthen non-nationalist, civic-minded political parties.
At the economic level, individuals in the Federation were in a stronger economic 
footing than their counterparts in the RS. This was determined by the higher levels of 
international assistance the Federation had received and by Kosovo war’s impact on the 
RS’s economy, which was dependent on Yugoslav markets. Even though individuals in 
both entities had prospered since the signing of the GFA, they strongly supported 
nationalist parties, questioning the international community’s peacebuilding strategy. On 
a positive note, the World Bank study found that although individuals from different 
groups distrusted each other, it also showed that they were willing to work alongside 
members of other ethno-national backgrounds.
The political divisions were even stronger within each entity. In the Federation, 
the Bosnian Croats kept blocking the work of Federation institutions, while contending 
relations between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in Mostar intensified. Attempting to 
preserve its power, the HDZ did not dissolve Herceg-Bosna’s structures, as Westendorp 
and other agents of the international community demanded. In Drvar, returnees, mostly 
Bosnian Serb, faced strong opposition from local authorities. Except for the signing of 
the Special Relations Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation, the 
latter half of 1999 was characterised by political turmoil, hampering the work of the 
Federation and the GFA’s implementation (OHR-R 1999a: pars. 24-28). These violations 
forced Petritsch to dismiss the deputy mayor of Drvar, a Bosnian Croat, and suspend
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Radio Mostar’s broadcasting license for three months for calling war veterans to prevent 
SFOR’s Operation Westar. This operation was carried in order to crackdown on illegal 
Bosnian Croat and Croatian military intelligence organisations that were spying on 
international officials and administering criminal networks, used to finance the operations 
of Herceg-Bosna’s structures (ESI 2000e: A.3).
In the RS, even though Westendorp dismissed Poplasen, he still was an important 
political force, trying to undermine the work of Dodik’s caretaker government. A 
constitutional battle had also challenged Dodik’s government, as Poplasen was not 
replaced. The Vice President, Mirko Sarovic, of the SDS, wanted to assume the 
presidency, but the international community repeatedly prevented him from doing so by 
threatening to cut all aid to the RS. Furthermore, the OSCE and the OHR did not certify 
Poplasen’s SRS and the SSRS in the April municipal elections, as they had failed to take 
the necessary steps to meet the criteria for certification. Both parties threatened to further 
disrupt the political process in the RS (OHR-R 1999a: par. 35).
At the national level, the work of the Council of Ministers was affected by a 
ruling from the Constitutional Court that found that ‘the current system within the 
Council of Ministers that established a co-chair and vice-chair’ unconstitutional (OHR-R 
1999a: par. 20). The Presidency’s operation was also disrupted by the Serb member’s 
invocation of the “vital interest” clause in the constitution, which assigns each 
community the ability of stopping any Presidency decision from taking place. While this 
created some problems for a time, the Presidency ‘continued to carry out its planned joint 
activities’ (OHR-R 1999a: par. 17), signalling the amount of success the international 
community’s state-building programme had achieved. The biggest obstacle in the 
country’s Parliamentary Assembly was the disposition of the RS political parties to vote 
as a bloc in order to obstruct legislation that would have given more power to state 
institutions, undermining ‘the very concept of a unitary sovereign state’ (OHR-R 1999a: 
par. 15).
More surprising, criticism against the GFA’s implementation started to be voiced 
by moderate politicians in the Federation. Haris Silajdzic (1999-2000) and KreSimir 
Zubak, both present at the Dayton peace talks, were asking the international community 
to reconsider its position regarding the GFA. In addition, a group of journalist from the
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influential Bosnian magazine, Dani. asked Petritsh to declare Bosnia an international 
protectorate for a year so the OHR and other international organisations could push 
through the necessary economic and political reforms to make peace in Bosnia self- 
sustaining (Lovrenovic 2000). While Petritsch recognised these political leaders’ 
criticisms and these journalists’ proposal, he argued against them by re-emphasising the 
importance of ‘ownership’ as an approach to influence the nature of peace 
implementation.
In reaction to all these developments, and complementing SFOR’s Operation 
Westar, Petritsch decided to use his Bonn powers to dismiss 22 officials for obstructing 
the implementation of the peace agreement (1999a) and he imposed a package of 
property and housing laws in order to harmonise the laws of each entity and allow 
returnees to reclaim their properties (1999c). While these decisions might seem to 
contradict Petritsch’s approach, it is important to note that he believed that these were an 
integral part of it. In a speech to the UN Security Council, he explained that these 
decisions were necessary to create ‘a “level playing field,” before stepping back and 
letting the players get on with the game’ (1999b).
Other draft laws were prepared by the OHR with the assistance of international 
agents, local groups, and representatives of the major political parties. The most 
important of these were: (a) the Election Law, (b) the Rule of Law and Judicial Reform, 
and (c) the Border Service Law. This last draft was not part of the PIC’s Madrid 
programme; it was an outcome of the negotiations that led to the New York Declaration 
of 15 November 1999, which was signed by the members of Bosnia’s Presidency. By 
signing the document, the members of the Presidency re-affirmed their commitment to 
work with the international community and to fully carry out the GFA’s provisions. In 
addition, the document strongly criticised those public officials that resisted these efforts 
(OHR-D 1999).
While the Presidency agreed to create a Border Service, the country’s 
Parliamentary Assembly voted against the bill. Petritsch was forced to impose it on 13 
January 2000 (OHR-D 2000). Another set back for the international community was the 
Parliament’s decision to vote down the Electoral Law (OHR-R 2000b: par. 3). Instead of 
imposing the Electoral Law, Petritsch decided that the parties should continue to work on
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the draft with interested parties (2000b). Hence, the April municipal elections and the 
November national elections were to be organised according to the provisional electoral 
law, which was amended, so its provisions could approximate those of the draft Electoral 
Law presented to the Parliamentary Assembly (OHR-R 2000b: par. 7).
In the economic field, the entities’ legislature and the central state structures were 
hampering privatisation efforts and blocking important economic reforms. While this 
angered Petritsch, he decided not to impose any decisions and asked the OHR’s 
Economic Task Force to meet with local officials in order to break the impasse.
Petritsch also decided to let the Presidency decide how to reform the Council of 
Ministers, so this operated according to Constitutional Court’s decision, which found that 
its organisation was unconstitutional. It seems that Petritsch’s decision was controversial, 
as he had to defend it before the UN Security Council (2000a):
In the affair of the Council of Ministers, I have deliberately kept out of the 
fray, stressing the strong desirability of a solution arrived at by purely 
domestic consensus. The results are, I freely admit, a little depressing at 
the first sight -  although I believe that the policy of insisting on 
Ownership is still the right one. Bosnia and Herzegovina is -  and must 
always remain -  their country.
While the Presidency met to consider this issue, its first proposals were 
unacceptable because it still attempted to appoint ministers according to principles of 
‘ethnic parity rather than by the efficient running of Government’ (OHR-R 2000b: par. 
5). Meaning that the creation of the three new ministries -  Human Rights, European 
Integration and Stability Pact and Treasury for State Institutions -  were created in order 
to assure that each community had an equal amount of members in the Council of 
Ministers. While this was not entirely unacceptable, as Petritsch and other officials 
welcomed the creation of the new ministries, the Presidency’s arrangement, which also 
included the rotation of the Chair every eight months, demonstrated the difficulties of 
breaking nationalist parties’ hold on power.
Because of all these difficulties, the concept of ownership came under attack at 
the international level. The results of the municipal elections held on 8 April 2000 finally 
forced the international community to reconsider Petritsch’s original strategy and institute
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a new state-building programme, closely based on the PIC’s Madrid Declaration’s 
conclusions.
B. Re-Committing to the State-Building Programme
While the concept of ownership called on Bosnia’s political leadership to start assuming 
responsibility for peace implementation and the administration of their country, it also 
called on Bosnia’s citizenry to affect the process by actively campaigning for a new 
political environment that fostered openness, tolerance, and multi-ethnicity. Even though 
the OHR assembled a number of working groups to draft legislation on the Law on 
Associations and Foundations, these were not completed until autumn 2000. This is not 
to say that indigenous non-governmental organisations and other groups did not operate 
at the local level. Their work however was hampered by nationalist parties and by the 
lack of a legal framework that protected their activities.
Shortly before the 2000 municipal elections, Petritsch called on the country’s 
citizenry to take control of the peace process by supporting moderate, civic-minded 
parties. He believed that the death of Franjo Tudjman and the victory of the opposition 
party in Croatia could show Bosnia’s citizens the possibility of moving away from 
nationalism to democracy. These requests did not materialise as the nationalist parties 
won the elections, securing their powerful positions. While the OHR repeatedly argued 
that the elections results point to the weakening of the nationalist parties, this conclusion 
was exaggerated.
The SDP did increase its overall share of the vote in the Federation, but it only 
weakened the SDA’s position, as the majority of its supporters are Bosniaks in urban 
areas. The HDZ however convincingly won Croat controlled regions of the Federation. In 
addition, the OHR argued that the elections produced more pluralism in the RS. Although 
this is true, these parties were all pro-Serb and while they differed on their views on 
peace implementation, they were strong advocates of a weak central state. Even more 
critical, the SDS regained control of most municipalities, while Dodik’s Independent 
Social Democrats (SNSD) made very small gains (OHR-R 2000a: pars. 10-12).
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The disappointing election results, plus the events that hampered the execution of 
the PIC’s Madrid programme, forced the PIC to reconsider Petritsch’s strategy at the PIC 
Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 23-24 May 2000. In many ways, the Brussels 
Declaration calls for a more robust state-building programme. While the document 
expressed its satisfaction with the strengthening of Bosnia’s state institutions, the 
increasing number of refugee returns, and the end of the reconstruction of economic 
infrastructure, it equally emphasised that ‘these achievements [were] largely the result of 
intensive international efforts’ (PIC 2000a). Firmly articulating its ‘dissatisfaction with 
the slow pace of domestic peace implementation since its Madrid meeting in 1998,’ the 
PIC blamed Bosnia’s nationalist political parties for the repeated obstructions and urged 
the High Representative ‘to use his authority in accordance with his mandate to ensure 
full and accelerated implementation in all sectors of civilian implementation, including 
removing obstacles that stand in the way of economic reform’ (PIC 2000a).
The PIC, in many ways, expressed its impatience with Petritsch’s ‘ownership’ 
approach, though it endorsed his ‘efforts to streamline co-ordination of the international 
community in [Bosnia] and accelerate peace implementation for the good o f  Bosnia’s 
citizens (PIC 2000a). However, the Brussels Declaration makes no mention of Petritsch’s 
‘ownership’ approach. Instead, it clearly delineates, what the PIC (2000a) called an 
‘accelerated phase of peace implementation’, which was to end with the 2002 elections 
for the Presidency of Bosnia. In this way, the document affirms ‘the growing concern that 
international resources will not be available at their current levels for much longer’ (ESI 
2000a), thus emphasising the importance of its state-building agenda in a ‘accelerated 
phase of peace implementation.’
This agenda was divided into three interdependent policy areas.
1. Economic reform. The PIC expected the OHR to play an active role: to create an 
integrated Bosnian economy; to craft and implement measures to enable market 
sector growth; to develop mechanisms to fight corruption; and to increase the 
pace of privatisation (PIC 2000a).
2. Return o f refugees and displaced persons. It called for the full implementation of 
all property laws. To streamline the return process and minimise the conflicts this 
have caused, the PIC called on the parties, with the assistance of the OHR, to set 
up the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees at the national level (PIC
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2000b). It also called on international agents to combine their efforts to construct 
and re-build housing in order to accommodate returning refugees or displaced 
persons (PIC 2000a).
3. Strengthening the state’s capabilities. The PIC re-stressed the importance of 
creating an apolitical civil service, reforming local government structures in both 
entities, and engendering mechanisms to fund the work of the Bosnian state 
structures. It also called on the Parliamentary Assembly to accept the Electoral 
Law, the Law on Associations and Foundations, and the Law on the State Court, 
which aimed to create a new judicial mechanism to address criminal and civil 
disputes at the national level (PIC 2000c).
While these requirements reflect those demanded by the PIC’s Madrid 
Declaration and its objectives, it is important to note some important differences. First, 
the PIC set deadlines for the implementation of certain policies. For instance, it stated 
that the payment bureaus had to be dismantled by December 2000, while ordering the 
Parliamentary Assembly to adopt the Law on Civil Service and the Law of the State 
Court by September 2000 (PIC 2000b). Second, the PIC called on the international 
community to channel all international financial assistance through the organs of the 
state, that is to say via the newly created Ministry of the Treasury. The intent was not 
only to increase the scope of state institutions, but also to create a dependency between 
state structures and the different regions of Bosnia, which would in turn enhance efforts 
to construct a single economic space.
Third, and following the same integrationist logic, the PIC ordered the drafting of 
initiatives that transformed ‘the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) into a 
State defence structure.’ The PIC argued that the integration of defence policy was 
necessary in order to guarantee Bosnia’s entry into European structures ( PIC 2000a):
[Bosnia] now must think about its place in wider European security. If the 
authorities are to make progress towards their objective of Euro-Atlantic 
integration, there must be fundamental changes, the current high levels of 
defence spending cannot be sustained. [Bosnia] needs to have armed 
forces with a unified command and control capable of joint deployment 
and action under international and regional security organisations. The 
Council urges [Bosnian] authorities to put intelligence services under 
democratic control and to consolidate them
220
Fourth, the PIC instructed the High Representative to create a Public Broadcasting 
System (PBS). This body was not to affect the OBN, as this was a private corporation. 
While the PIC noted that increased competition between the PBS and ‘private viable 
competitors’ would ensure the public’s right to know and stimulate vigorous public 
debate and a culture where public opinion serves as a check and balance on institutions’ 
(PIC 2000a), many studies had showed that most people did not watch the OBN’s 
programmes, but those owned and operated by nationalist parties (Chandler 1999). These 
systems were not only preventing the OBN from increasing its market share, but more 
important these were transmitting information that contradicted the international 
community’s peace implementation programme. In order to assure the objectivity of the 
PBS, the nature of its programming was to decided by a ‘Telecommunications 
Regulatory Agency for Bosnia’ (OHR-R 2000a: par. 57).
Lastly, but equally important, the PIC asked Bosnia’s state authorities to start 
submitting detailed reports on the implementation of this agenda to the Steering Board 
every six months (2000a). The PIC did not explain the rationale behind this last request, 
but it seems that Petritsch’s ownership approach had some influence after all. Echoing his 
call for Bosnia’s politicians to be more accountable, the reports forced them to continue 
to fully execute the peace agreement’s provisions.
For the most part, the Brussels programme’s legislative package was not approved 
or considered by Bosnia’s legislative bodies during the summer and fall of 2000. One of 
the main reasons was that nationalist parties were preoccupied with the general elections, 
which took place on 11 November 2000. In light of political changes that had occurred in 
Croatia after Tudjman’s death and the democratic revolution that led to Milosevic’s 
downfall in September, nationalist parties in Bosnia devoted their energies and resources 
to strengthen their positions and secure their hold of power. With Tudjman’s HDZ out of 
power, the Bosnian Croat HDZ enjoyed less financial support. The same held true for 
Bosnian Serb parties. The general weakness of the new democratic government in Serbia 
and the Serbs desire to dedicate more time to their growing domestic problems meant that 
these parties could not rely on Belgrade’s support. As for the SDA, the challenge it faced 
was not only Izetbegovic’s retirement and his resignation as member of Bosnia’s
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presidency, but also the increasing evidence that linked the SDA to a number of 
corruption charges (Domi 2000).
The shifting political landscape were seen by many officials in the international 
community as an opportunity to finally undermine nationalist parties’ agendas (Domi 
2000; ICG 2000a; and Kovac 2000). Dissatisfaction with these parties and their inability 
to address economic and social issues had made people in Bosnia question their 
legitimacy. Indeed, the high level of unemployment, coupled by corruption at all levels 
of government, budget deficits, cuts in pension plans, decreasing production outputs, and 
a diminishing amount of foreign aid and investment was causing people in both entities to 
consider switching their support to other political parties (Kovac 2000). It seemed that 
material concerns were overriding other non-material interests, such as fear of 
assimilation into a majority culture, domination of other ethno-nationalist groups, or 
demographic changes in towns and cities prompted by the return of refugees or displaced 
persons. In fact, the summer months saw the highest rate of refugee return since the 
GFA’s signing. While these refugees did cause some unrest in deeply divided towns, 
these individuals were strongly wanted Bosnia’s authorities to pay more attention to the 
worsening economic situation (Komsic 2001).
As a result, the OSCE and the OHR started to increase assistance to moderate 
political parties and to directly lobby Bosnia’s electorate to support these younger and 
more progressive politicians. The OHR and the OSCE organized a public information 
campaign that linked corruption charges and other economic and social problems to 
nationalist politicians. Officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Union joined the OHR and OSCE’s campaign and declared that future 
levels of financial support for Bosnia would be dependent on the election results. 
Conveying the message weeks before the elections took place, Petritsch informed Bosnia 
that: “‘We are nearing the end in many ways. What we are talking about is that the 
international community might eventually move out of Bosnia. Many parts have already 
moved out intellectually and politically because they consider Bosnian politicians simply 
so irresponsible they cannot go on helping”’(cited in Becirevic and Buturovic 2000).
Another important reason why the Brussels programme was ignored by Bosnia’s 
political bodies was related to the controversies produced by the Constitutional Court’s
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ruling on the ‘constituent peoples’ case. After months of deliberation, Bosnia’s highest 
court established that ‘no ethnic group constituent on the territory of [Bosnia] shall be 
excluded from exercising his rights in the Entities’ (OHR-R 2000a: par 10). It also 
affirmed that Bosnia’s constitution is the country’s supreme law and that the 
Constitutional Court is not only the country’s highest judicial body, but also that its 
authority must be observed by both entities. This ruling required the entities to amend 
their constitutions, so their provisions are in line with Bosnia’s constitution, stressing that 
Bosnia is a single political body, with a single legal system and led by central state 
institutions.
The opinion, which was made public in early July 2000, was not published until 
14 September. More contentious, the ruling was strongly opposed by the two Bosnian 
Croat and Bonian Serb judges. The two Bosniak judges and the three international judges 
backed the ruling (OHR-R 2000a: par. 10-11). The Court’s division is not surprising as 
Izetbegovic brought the case to its attention, while the interests of the other two ethno- 
national communities were threaten by this decision. Similarly, the international judges 
wanted to rectify some of the issues that were not adequately addressed at Dayton.
The OHR formed two constitutional commissions. Composed of representatives 
from each community, plus a group of individuals representing ‘Others’, these 
commissions’ mandate is to discuss and to amend the entities constitution according to 
new principles of equality and multi-ethnicity. However, the Bosnia Croat and Bosnian 
Serb nationalist parties undermined these commissions’ work, as the ruling challenge 
their ability of fulfilling their objectives. It is important to remember the Bosniaks 
supported the ruling, as it enabled Bosniaks in the RS to have more say in its political 
affairs and it could diminish the HDZ’s objective of further weakening the Federation 
structures.
Although the ruling and the organisation of elections obstructed the Brussels 
programme’s execution, the Constitutional Court’s decision also allowed international 
agents to conduct a bolder strategy to convince Bosnia’s citizens to vote for moderate 
political parties. Consequently, the OSCE’s Provisional Elections Committee (PEC) 
decided in October 2000 to use the Draft Electoral Law, called by the Brussels 
programme and rejected by Bosnia’s legislature during the summer of 2000, to organise
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the November general elections (Hasovic 2000). These new rules and regulations, as 
Nedzida Salihovic, the Provisional Elections Commission’s (PEC) Legal Counsel noted, 
were supposed to severely weaken nationalist parties’ hold on power and help moderate 
parties win the elections (OSCE-I 2000).27
While the new rules were supposed to affect all nationalist parties, it seems that 
the OSCE wanted to put more pressure on the SDA and the HDZ than their Bosnian Serb 
counterparts. The OSCE altered the way people were to be elected in the Federation’s 
bodies. Rather than just representing an equal number of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, 
the new rules stipulated that the House of Peoples would also represent a number of 
‘Others’. Thus, Bosnian Serbs living in the Federation could directly affect the political 
process by electing their own representatives. Lacking strong nationalist parties and 
wanting to diminish the power of the SDA and the HDZ, the new rules gave Bosnian 
Serbs and people from other minority groupings a strong incentive to vote for moderate, 
non-nationalist parties. While these new rules were in line with the Constitutional Court’s 
decision, the OSCE did not apply its provisions to the RS. The RS still had a political 
system that discriminated against non-Serbs (Hasovic 2000). This decision angered non­
nationalist politicians, because they strongly believed that the OSCE should have equally 
applied the ruling on both entities.
The combination of the OHR and OSCE’s public campaigns, the international 
community’s threat that funding would be scaled if nationalists won a majority in the 
elections, the anger many voters expressed about nationalist politicians inability to deal 
with Bosnia’s mounting social and economic problems, and the OSCE’s imposition of 
new electoral rules should have produced a victory for non-nationalist parties. This 
however was not entirely the case. The general elections did produce a coalition of non­
27 The Electoral law included a number of electoral mechanisms (e.g. preferential voting system, which was 
to be used in the election of the President and Vice President of the RS, a proportional system for 
multimember constituencies, and a use of open list systems) in order to secure a more proportional 
representation of political parties in all institutions. Moreover, the new rules also ordered political parties to 
report their finances in order to make sure that the ftmding used to finance their campaign activities were in 
accordance with legal standards. In addition to this, the PEC required that all candidates must not posses 
another person’s property. Those that were found in violation of this rule could not hold any political 
position. In order to ensure the independence of economy from the intervention of the political parties, the 
PEC also instituted a rule that stipulated that elected officials could not be members of a state-owned 
enterprise’s Steering Board. In all, the new rules were designed to break the nationalist political parties’ 
hold on power and permit civic-minded political parties to take control of the political process.
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nationalist parties, named the Alliance for Change, to run the country’s central 
government and the Federation. In the RS, Mladen Ivanic’s Progressive Democratic Party 
(PDP) entered a coalition with the SDS, which received the majority of the vote, which 
meant that the SDS had to tone down its nationalist rhetoric.
Even though these results have been seen as encouraging signs, the international 
community was stunned by the nationalist political parties’ performance. A spokesman 
for the Council of Europe stated days after the election results were publicised: “We are 
disappointed and mystified that people want a better life and financial support from the 
West, and yet they are not prepared to vote for the parties, which could have made it 
happen’” (cited in Cvijanovic 2000) At this time, it was not sure if a non-nationalist or 
moderate government could be established in Bosnia. It took the OHR, with the 
assistance of the US and British ambassadors to Bosnia, almost two months of difficult 
negotiations to put together the SDP-led Alliance for Change.
Why did people support nationalist parties when people had expressed their 
dissatisfaction with their performance? Ozren Kebo (2000), a Sarajevo based political 
analyst, argues that the international community’s active interference in the process drove 
many to cast their votes for these parties. The International Crisis Group (2000a) concurs 
with this view. Both studies emphasise that the OSCE’s decision to change election 
procedures in the Federation, while not doing so in the RS, enabled the HDZ to mount a 
strong nationalist campaign that called on the international community to create a third 
entity within Bosnia. A referendum on the creation of such an entity was also held on 11 
November 2000, even though it violated OSCE’s election procedures and the GFA’s 
provisions.
Different public opinions polls, conducted prior to election day, found that the 
SDS was increasing its support. It is important to keep in mind that the OHR, in an effort 
to weaken the anti-GFA SDS and other extreme nationalist parties, decided to back Prime 
Minister Dodik’s SNSD. Even though Dodik was more willing to support GFA’s 
implementation, his government had failed to adequately address the entity’s social and 
economic difficulties. While the international community has admitted that it was an 
error to support Dodik, this strategy enabled the SDS to increase its popularity. As Zejlko
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Cvijanovic (2000b) states, ‘Instead of banging the nationalist drum, it [the SDS] devoted 
much of its time to accusing Dodik’s government of corruption and incompetence.’
Further strengthening the SDS’s position, Richard Holbrooke went to Bosnia to 
ask the OSCE and the OHR to ban the party. While his request might have been 
influenced by the SDS’s re-invigoration, Holbrooke made the case that the it was a 
‘criminal organisation’ that harboured war criminals (ICG 2000a). The OSCE and the 
OHR dismissed his request, fearing that the controversy could lead to civil and political 
unrest in the RS, but Holbrooke’s appeal angered many Bosnian Serbs. More important, 
Holbrooke’s comments probably convinced supporters of the banned Serb Radical Party 
to participate in the elections and cast their votes for the SDS. In all, the SDS did better 
than expected, though it still had to share power with the Ivanic’s PDP.
Keeping in mind that the SDP had achieved huge gains in the municipal elections 
of April 2000, many experts had predicted a weak showing for the SDA in the November 
elections. With help from the OHR and the OSCE’s public information campaign, many 
newspapers in Sarajevo, Dnevni Avaz being the most influential, printed a number of 
scandals that clearly demonstrated that the SDA politicians’ ‘misuse of funds and corrupt 
practices, bore significant responsibility for the poor economy, non-payment of pensions, 
lack of assistance for war invalids, the squandering of international assistance, and the 
abuse of the privatisation process, all to the detriment of ordinary Bosnians’ (ICG 2000a). 
But these accusations made the SDA even more determined to stay alive. With opinion 
polls showing that the majority of Bosnian Serbs would support the SDS and Bosnian 
Croats the HDZ, the SDA built their campaign around the following slogan: “‘Each has 
selected his own: What about you?”’ The SDA also compared the SPD to the communist 
party that allowed Bosnian Serbs to control Bosnia’s political structures (ICG 2000a). In 
the end, the SDA won by a small margin most Bosniak votes, but the SDP emerged as 
one of the strongest parties because it garnered votes from Bosnia’s diverse citizenry.
Non-nationalist and moderate parties, such as the SPD, SilajdZic’s Party for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ivanic’s PDP in the RS, won sizeable parts of the 
electorate, but not as much as experts had predicted. However, for the first time in 
Bosnia’s short history, nationalist parties had garnered less than 50 percent of the vote 
(Kovac 2001). Although these moderate parties’ increasing strength was seen as a
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positive sign, the elections also demonstrated that nationalist parties’ support remained 
strong. Even more troubling is the fact that these moderate parties acquired more strength 
in Bosniak-controlled areas of the Federation. As seen during the April 2000 municipal 
elections, Bosniaks have been more inclined to support non-nationalist parties, than 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.
Once the OSCE confirmed the election results in late November, one question had 
to still be answered. What parties would administer Bosnia’s central government and its 
entities political system? As noted before, after several weeks of tense negotiations, the 
OHR did produce a coalition government led by the SDP, called the Alliance for Change, 
in the Federation and at the national level. These coalitions held a slim majority over 
nationalist parties. Hence, the coalitions face many challenges from nationalist parties 
(Komsic 2001) and within its members, as each party has different objectives and visions 
of Bosnian society (Kovac 2001). For this reason, Petritsch called on the international 
community not too pressure these fragile coalitions (OHR-R 2001c):
The election results have resulted in legislatures at the State and Entity 
levels where majorities are extremely fragile. It is essential that this 
situation is not abused for narrow political interests to destabilise 
democratically elected governments faced with fundamental and difficult 
reforms. For [Bosnia] to move forward, the country needs a high degree of 
political consensus. The onus is not only on the newly elected 
governments, but also on those parties now in opposition to prove their 
maturity.
Hence, Petritsch announced his intention to help strengthen these coalitions, while also 
fully implementing the Brussels programme’s package of reforms. This is in line with the 
international community’s state-building strategy, as the original intention of the peace 
implementation programme was the establishment of a government that would support 
the implementation of the GFA’s civilian provisions. For this reason, Petritsch used his 
Bonn powers and imposed most of the Brussels programme, while asking the 
international community to stay engaged in Bosnia (2001c), especially when the newly 
elected US president, George W. Bush, was calling for a decreased role for US troops in 
the Balkans.
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Sensing the international community’s impatience and the uncertainties created 
by the aftermath of the general elections, the OHR started to play a stronger role. 
Petritsch imposed over 20 laws to ensure that economic reforms continued in Bosnia and 
another series of human rights protection and property laws to further weaken the power 
of nationalist parties. With American calls to restrict its responsibilities in the Balkans 
and donor fatigue setting-in, Petritsch felt that Bosnia had to do more to fulfil the 
requirements of the ‘EU Road Map’, negotiated between EU officials and Bosnia in the 
spring of 2000. The EU’s requirements were essentially the same to those found in the 
Brussels programme. Shortly after the elections took place, Bosnian officials met with 
EU representatives in Zagreb to discuss the implementation of the ‘Road Map’. It was 
agreed that Bosnia’s fulfilment of these requirements would start the Stabilisation and 
Association process, which would is the first step in Bosnia’s drive to become a EU 
member, and Bosnia’s membership in the Council of Europe (OHR-R 2000c).
Another reason that forced Petritsch to take a stronger role in Bosnia was the 
challenges the new Alliance for Change faced from the HDZ and the new government in 
the RS. Both felt threatened by the new coalition. Even though Ivanic’s government 
pledged to support the Alliance for Change, he obstructed the work of the Council of 
Ministers because he felt that its ‘legislative agenda [invaded] the RS’s competencies’ 
(OHR-R 2001c: pars. 1-2). As it turns out, he was also strongly against the strengthening 
of Bosnia’s state institutions. This led Petritsch to impose more laws that strengthened the 
state, while threatening the RS for its lack of co-operation.
The HDZ challenge was more serious. Even though the HDZ did not accept the 
outcome of the general elections, because it felt that the OSCE’s imposition of new 
procedures was an illegitimate act, its decision to boycott the work of the Federation’s 
bodies and Bosnia’s central government frustrated the international community’s efforts. 
When the international community ordered the HDZ to participate in these institutions, 
the HDZ’s leadership chose to create a third entity in Bosnia. This prompted the OHR 
and SFOR to take action. With strong support from the US, the EU, and the UN, the 
OHR decided to dismiss Ante Jelavic, the presidency’s Croat member, and other HDZ 
officials throughout the Federation (Kebo 2001). The decision also barred them from 
holding any public office or party post (OHR-PS 200 li). In addition, SFOR troops raided
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Hercegovacka Banka, as this institution was financing the operation of illegal Bosnian 
Croat structures. While the raid was a success, many people got hurt as extreme Bosnian 
Croat nationalists called on the people to stop SFOR troops from entering the bank 
(OHR-PS 200 lh).
Whereas the OHR and SFOR contained the HDZ challenge, it also prompted 
many in Bosnia to question the credibility of the GFA as a tool of peacemaking. In fact, 
during the crisis, Jelavic had written to President Bush to ask him to organise a new 
conference ‘to hammer out a “new order” in Bosnia’ (Kebo 2001) Even though the US 
and the international community supported the OHR’s and SFOR’s actions, the PIC 
called on the OHR to work with the new government to strengthen Bosnia’s state 
institutions and weaken nationalist movements (PIC 2001c) and organise a series of 
meetings with Bosnian Croat officials to address their issues of concern.
The same message was conveyed once again in 10 May 2001 (PIC 2001b, 
following the outbreak of violence in Banja Luka and Trebinje. Both incidents were 
sparked by the international community’s commitment to re-build the Ferhadija Mosque 
in Banja Luka and the Osman Pasha Mosque in Trebinje (OHR-PS 200lg; and OHR-PS 
200If). The attacks started during the ceremonies commemorating the reconstruction of 
these holy sites. These had to be cancelled, as a mob started to attack international 
officials participating in the event. Although the ceremonies were finally held on 18 June 
2001 and organised by the RS authorities, the outbreak of organised violence indicated 
that high-ranking Bosnian Serb officials were not willing to support the peace process, 
almost six years after the signing of the peace agreement.
Consequently, Petritsch had no choice but to employ the Bonn powers to execute 
the Brussels programme and continue dismissing individuals that obstructed the process 
of peace implementation. The enforcement of the Brussels programme maintained afloat 
the international community’s objective of strengthening Bosnia’s central state. 
Nonetheless, its execution has not reconstructed Bosnia’s fractured social relations. The 
international community’s dissatisfaction with the pace of peace implementation and the 
constant challenges posed by nationalist leaders impelled it to also work for the reduction 
of its support to this country. At the PIC’s behest, Petritsch was asked in 21 June 2001 to 
draft a plan that sets ‘the stage for the final phase of peace implementation’ (Petritsch
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2001b). What were the objectives of this plan? Did it include provisions to make 
Petritsch’s ownership approach into reality?
C. Recommitting to the Ownership Approach?
For the second half of 2001, Petritisch drafted a plan to streamline the presence of the 
international community in Bosnia and start its disengagement. After lengthy discussions 
in the PIC and between the OHR, the OSCE, the UN and the EU, it was decided that the 
international community would stay in Bosnia until 2007. Different scenarios had been 
presented to the PIC, including plans that required the international community to be 
directly involved in Bosnia for periods of seven to eight years or twelve to fifteen years. 
On 13 September 2001, the PIC supported a plan that would allow international organs to 
start withdrawing from Bosnia in 2005, ending the mission in 2007.
According to this proposal, the objectives of the international community for this 
period were: (a) institution building, (b) refugee return, (c) economic reform, and (d) 
strengthening the rule of law (PIC 2001a). These were basically the same objectives the 
international community declared when the Brussels programme was unveiled on 24 May
2000. The only difference between the PIC’s Brussels Communique of 13 September 
2001 and the Brussels programme was that it backed Petritsch’s ‘ownership approach’, 
while strongly supporting the execution of these reforms in order to meet the 
requirements set by the EU Road Map. It is important to remember that the Brussels 
programme did not make mention of the ‘ownership approach’. Why did the PIC decide 
to support Petritsch’s approach once again?
The PIC’s approval or disapproval of Petritsch’s approach had been related to 
political developments in Bosnia. If the Brussels programme did not make mention of 
this approach, it was because nationalist political parties had won the April 2000 
municipal elections. This was seen as a setback to international efforts in Bosnia. Thus, 
the Brussels programme asked Petritsch to take a stronger stance against nationalist 
parties and to make use of his Bonn powers to translate the Brussels programme into 
reality. The Brussels Communique, however, was proclaimed in the backdrop of one of 
the greatest accomplishment of 2001. Bosnia’s Parliamentary Assembly approved an 
Election Law in 23 August 2001, similar to the one the OSCE used to organise the 11
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November 2000 general elections. This enabled the creation of a Permanent Elections 
Commission to organise and monitor election proceedings at both national and entity 
levels, while also scaling-back some of the OSCE’s responsibility in Bosnia. The 
Alliance for Change had demonstrated that it could addres issues of international concern 
(PIC 2001a). As the International Crisis Group observed, the international community 
‘has come out of “war mode” and now stresses its commitment to “partnership” with the 
Bosnian authorities: communicating, negotiating, and bargaining rather than conspiring, 
commanding or imposing’ (ICG 2001a).
Not to say that nationalist parties and their politicians did not obstruct the process 
of peace implementation or that Petritsch did not rely on the Bonn powers to enforce the 
objectives of the Brussels Communique. Indeed, the passing of the election law was 
supposed to be shortly followed by the creation of the Permanent Elections Commission 
and the funding of this body. Petritsch appointed the ‘four national members of the seven 
member Election Commission’, as the parties had failed to fulfil this task (OHR-PS: 
200Id). In addition, Petritsch continued to impose laws in the fields of refugee return 
(mostly concerning private property legislation), judicial reform, and economic reform. 
However, he did not dismiss any individuals for obstruction in the period between 1 July 
2001 and 1 January 2002.
Petritisch also started to translate his ownership approach into a number of 
informal structures, designed to increase Bosnia’s citizens’ and government officials’ 
participation and to aligning international and local interests. He first established the 
Partnership Consultative Forum. Having complimented for this informal body, Petritsch 
created the Civic Forum, which brought together civic leaders and international officials 
to talk about the peace agreement and its implementation. These fora will be further 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. But, their formation did not mean that 
international support for the state-building strategy decreased. In an open letter to 
Bosnia’s citizens, Petritsch emphasised the central state’s importance. It also reminded 
the RS that a strong central state is not an enemy, but a structure from which the [RS] 
will benefit because, via the State, it will enter Europe’ (Petritsch 2001c).
The message also called on all Bosnian Croats to join other people in the country 
to address issues of common concern. He also argued that the Bosnian state is the only
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instrument that could provide for the protection and advancement of their culture and 
interests. To strengthen the Bosnian state and to emphasise the importance of its 
existence, the High Representative asked the country’s Parliamentary Assembly to pass a 
law on Bosnian Holidays, to commemorate important dates such as the GFA’s signing. 
From this perspective, the international community was still in the business of state- 
building, though the task was simpler as there was a new government that was willing to 
execute, with the help of the OHR, the necessary reforms to make Bosnia a viable state. 
More importantly, Petritsch’s fora sent a clear message that state-building agenda could 
also be affected by the active participation of Bosnia’s civic leaders and government 
officials. Will conditions in Bosnia change and prompt these Bosnian leaders to question 
this strategy and call for new ones that are not in line with the GFA’s provisions or the 
PIC’s objectives?
Even though the latter part of 2001 had produced great achievements, the 
challenges to establishing a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia are still enormous. In the 
economic field, the Parliamentary Assembly did not consider many laws. The judicial 
process has been under-funded, while the Bosnian state does not have the ability to 
finance its activities without the contributions of each entity. Inter-group relations are still 
precarious. Many Bosnian Croats are still dissatisfied with the current state of affairs; 
elements in the RS have increased their opposition to the return of non-Serbs; and to 
complicate matters more, the arrest of suspected Islamic fundamentalists in Bosnia for 
possible connections to the 11 September 2001 terrorists attacks on the US have had 
detrimental consequences on inter-communal relations. In addition, the entities have not 
imposed or upheld important laws. For instance they did not fund the Permanent Election 
Commission and they failed to nominate three of its non-nationalist members.
In the end, Petritsch’s willingness to combine the PIC’s state-building strategy 
and his ownership approach created a peacebuilding programme that was more 
democratic, than those executed in the past. Nevertheless, this programme put a heavier 
premium on the strengthening of the state’s structures. A strategic approach to 
peacemaking has been widely used in Bosnia since the GFA’s signing, even though 
Petritsch’s approach included some mechanisms that are in line with this investigation’s 
conception of communicative peacemaking. Therefore, the international community’s
232
performance in post-Dayton Bosnia is mixed. On the one hand, it settled the conflict, but, 
on the other hand, it has not been able to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. The 
time might be right to consider what the communicative approach to peacemaking can 
offer, especially now, as the PIC seems to be more receptive to new ideas that can help it 
achieve its objectives.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The OHR has evolved from an organisation compromised of five officials and a small 
budget with an office in Sarajevo and Brussels to a complex institution that currently 
hires 701 people -  203 international personnel and 498 local staff, supported by a budget 
totalling 25 million euros. Since the signing of the GFA, the OHR has opened ‘three 
regional offices - in Banja Luka, Mostar and Brcko, eight field offices and Special Envoy 
offices in seven municipalities’ (OHR-I 2002). Also important is the list of powers the 
OHR has received since its inception, such as the power to impose and re-write existing 
legislation and the authority to remove public officials that obstruct the implementation 
of the peace agreement.
Since December 1997, the High Representative has imposed or rewritten over 100 
laws and remove over 75 individuals from public office. While the PIC made these 
powers available to Westendorp, he hardly used them. The main reason was because the 
international community’s programme was not as extensive as the one the PIC drafted in 
its Madrid meeting in December 1998. In fact, Westendorp, while using the Bonn powers 
throughout 1998, started to heavily rely on them in his last six months as High 
Representative. Petritsch, who had to implement the Madrid programme, continued to use 
the Bonn powers when he felt it would complement his ownership strategy. Nonetheless, 
the general failure of his ‘ownership’ approach and the Madrid programme’s slow 
execution, coupled with international agents’ frustration with the process, forced the PIC 
to draft the Brussels programme and order Petritsch to make use of the Bonn Powers.
It is ironic that the international community’s has failed to fully implement the 
peace agreement’s provisions or the PIC’s programmes, which have been designed to 
correct the GFA’s deficiencies. Over $5 billion has been spent, financing economic 
reconstruction programmes. Even more has been spent on the NATO force. Although
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many foreign policy-makers have openly expressed their frustration with this phase of the 
peacemaking process, the international community has stated that it will stay involved in 
Bosnia until at least November 2007, though it will re-calibrate its organisational 
structure to streamline the process of peace implementation and fulfil all the objectives in 
this time period.
The PIC unveiled its plan to restructure the international community’s presence in 
Bosnia in March 2002. The OHR, modelled on its Economic Task Force, and copying 
the international presence in Kosovo will create a number of ‘policy coordination task 
forces’ to address issues in the following policy areas: ‘the Rule of Law, Institution 
Building, Economic Policy, and Return and Reconstruction’. Like in Kosovo, a specific 
international body will lead each of these task forces. For instance, the OSCE has been 
designated as the lead agency in matters relating to ‘Rule of Law,’ while the OHR is 
responsible for strategies in the area o f ‘Institution Building’ (PIC 2001a).
The High Representative will coordinate the work of these task forces to ensure 
that each achieves its objectives. While the envisioned structure will help the 
international community achieve its objectives in a more efficient and cost-effective 
manner, the powers of the High Representative’s will not be diluted by these reforms. If 
anything, the High Representative’s power serve as a guarantee that the objectives set out 
by the Brussels Communique will be realised. In fact, the role of the High Representative 
is so important that the PIC and the EU seem to have decided to send Lord Paddy 
Ashdown, former leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in the United Kingdom, to 
Sarajevo as the next and probably last High Representative. This is the first time the PIC 
selects an individual from one of the Contact Group countries. Indeed, Ashdown’s no- 
nonsense style and strong character may prove to be important traits, if the current 
peacebuilding strategy fails. Thus, the new strategy seems to be based on past lessons as 
state-building is still an important part of this strategy, while the OHR is expected to play 
the dominant role in the process of peace implementation.
Since the beginning of the peace implementation process, the OHR has attempted 
to correct an important deficiency in the GFA. The GFA left in power the nationalist 
political parties that started the war and opposed the integration of Bosnian society. Even 
more important, the central state institutions crafted at Dayton were extremely weak, so
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they could not carry out the integration of society, as other states have been able to do so 
in Europe’s history. For this reason, the PIC decided to strengthen the mandate of the 
High Representative, ordered NATO forces to support the OHR’s operations, and created 
a set of state-building programmes to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.
Not only was it important to fully implement the peace agreement, but also it was 
necessary to build a strong state that could administer Bosnia’s affairs, integrate society, 
create a national identity (though a thin conception of one), and conduct important 
economic reforms. Noticing that elections did not break the monopoly of nationalist 
political parties, but reinforced them, the PIC ordered the High Representative to become 
the unofficial ruler of the country. While this new strategy has enabled the High 
Representative to enact and enforce important legislation, this rule by international decree 
completely contradicts the liberal-democratic principles that supposedly inspirit Bosnia’s 
new constitution. Even worse, the international community’s strategies have not been 
able to integrate Bosnian society. Will the new strategy, as outlined in the PIC’s Brussels 
Communique, finally achieve this important objective? If not, what should the 
international community do next?
It is argued in this thesis that instead of enforcing the current strategy, the 
international community should craft a new approach to peacebuilding. Many have noted 
how the GFA cannot guarantee the future unity of Bosnia. The PIC’s decision to 
strengthen the High Representative’s and the many programmes it has developed to solve 
Bosnia’s problems affirm this reality. If the state-building strategy, with its nation- 
building and economic modernisation elements, has failed then it might be necessary to 
create new strategies that include communicative forms of peacemaking. The next 
chapter provides a review of some communicative inspired peacebuilding projects 
executed in Bosnia since 1996.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Specters of Society-Centred Peacebuilding in Bosnia
INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters have documented how the international community has 
pursued a state-building strategy in Bosnia. This strategy stresses that building strong 
state institutions and introducing market reforms can serve as mechanism to establish a 
self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. In some ways, the international community has faith that 
a “top-down” peacebuilding strategy will not only create a viable state, but it will also 
restore an ethos of multiethnicity, promote democracy, and champion human rights. This 
strategy closely follows the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking, as described 
in chapters one and two.
Even though the international community has spent more resources on this 
strategy, it has also funded “bottom-up” peacebuilding projects and under Wolfgang 
Petritcsh’s tenure it has experimented with an “ownership” approach to peace 
implementation. Two reasons explain the international community’s interest in fostering 
civil society and ownership, which as seen in the previous chapter became an important 
objective for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) following the PIC’s meeting 
in Madrid in December 1998. First, since the GFA’s signing, many governments and 
international organizations have called on Bosnia’s citizens to support the international 
community’s peacebuilding strategy by electing non-nationalists political parties and by 
putting aside their differences in order to create a new Bosnian society. For this reason, 
civil society organizations could counter nationalist parties and allow the OHR to 
continue its peace implementation programme.
Second, the expansion of civil society organisations would also support the 
international community’s economic reforms. The creation of a single economic space 
for Bosnia and the transition from a war economy to a peace economy requires 
interethnic cooperation, communal reconciliation, and further steps toward 
democratisation. Moreover, international donors’ reduction of aid to Bosnia has forced 
international administrators to look for ways to increase the level of foreign direct
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investment to finance the country’s frail economy. But, the levels of foreign investment 
are quite low. Not only has increasing cases of corruption and cronyism kept investors 
away (Singer 2000: 33-34), but also visible lines of divisions in Bosnia have forced many 
investors to question the country’s long-term stability (Civilitas 2002).
In addition, because Bosnia’s economic reforms are in line with neo-liberal 
ideology, the international community is restricting the entities’ ability to provide social 
services. Even though the international community wants the central state to assume 
more responsibility for the administration of Bosnian society, it has also ‘insisted on 
public sector contraction, reductions in welfare spending, the stripping of socially-owned 
assets and the privatisation of essential services’ (Pugh 2001: 8). Consequently, the 
international community has attempted to reduce economic hardships by funding 
international and indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), so these can 
provide basic social services (Belloni 2001: 173). The international community has also 
attempted to empower the local population, via civil society development strategies 
(Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2001: 88; and Chandler 1999: 111), so they can pressure politicians 
and make sure they execute important reforms.
To this effect, the international community has supported the work of 
international NGOs, indigenous NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations attempting 
to foster interethnic reconciliation, promote civic activities and deepen democratization 
and economic development efforts. But not all these efforts will establish a self- 
sustaining in Bosnia. David Chandler’s work (1998 and 1999) shows how civil society 
programmes are not achieving their intended objectives, but allowing the international 
community to use the rhetoric of civil society promotion to assume more control over 
Bosnian affairs. Robert Belloni (2001), building on this research, concludes that the 
international community has funded activities that have not increased civic participation 
or interethnic reconciliation. He argues that the following three reasons may account for 
this reality:
1. Bosnia’s growing civic sector represents the interests of the international 
community, rather than those of its citizens’. He argues that civil society has been 
transformed ‘into a set of regulatory agencies that implement donors’ changing 
priorities’ (Belloni 2001: 176). Thus, the international community lacks a long­
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term approach; as its priorities changes, so does its funding for different 
initiatives.
2. Even though ‘NGOs are usually praised and valued for their connections with 
local and grass-root communities, decisions about who can participate and be 
empowered are made through a top-down approach, where local communities lie 
at the receiving end of the process’ (Belloni 2001: 174). In many ways, this 
approach ‘places the international community’, not Bosnian citizens, ‘squarely at 
the center of the development process’ (Belloni 2001: 175).
3. Many people in Bosnia question the need for advocacy networks, interest groups, 
and other types of political pressure groups. Most decisions are eventually taken 
by the OHR and other international agencies in Bosnia, not by Bosnia’s 
authorities. Because these international bodies are not accountable to the people, 
many are not interested to join these types of social mechanisms.
Consequently, most of the work the international community labels as ‘bottom-up’, is not 
necessarily in line with the ideals of the communicative approach, as developed in 
chapters one and three of this thesis.
A quick glance of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies’ Directory of 
Humanitarian and Development Agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates the 
large number of local and international NGOs conducting peacebuilding projects. Many 
of these organizations’ projects are influenced by the ideals of conflict resolution, conflict 
transformation, and participatory theories of development. These projects tend to be in 
line with the tenets of communicative peacemaking. This chapter provides a review of 
some of these projects. Its review is organized according to John Paul Lederach’s 
pyramid model, which explains how different peacebuilding practices, targeted at 
different societal levels, affects peacebuilding processes. It is important to remember that 
Lederach argues that society can be divided into three levels: top, middle, and grassroots. 
The first level represents the top of the pyramid and the third its base. The review of these 
peacebuilding practices is conducted in part two of this chapter and it evaluates different 
programmes at each of these societal levels. Part one re-introduces some of the 
communicative approach’s elements.
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I. ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS
Chapters one and three presented the theoretical underpinnings of the communicative 
approach to peacemaking. As stated earlier, communicative peacemaking has had little 
impact on peacemaking processes. In the case of the Dayton peace initiative, the General 
Framework Agreement (GFA) did not include any specific provisions to support ‘bottom- 
up’ approaches to peacemaking, though its provisions did not prohibit outside agents to 
experiment with these practices. While these practices were not at the centre of the 
Dayton peace initiative, the international community’s many setbacks in the first years of 
peace implementation forced them to consider the values of this approach to 
peacebuilding.
Habermasian insights, as reviewed in chapters one and three, are important 
elements of communicative peacemaking. Conflict resolution and conflict transformation 
intervention mechanisms are also fundamental to this approach. The basic premise of this 
approach is that Bosnia’s integration will not be achieved by ‘functional reason,’ the use 
of money and the state’s administrative power to bring about a false sense of social unity 
that is dependent on the strategic interaction of individuals, but on a communicative 
model that reconstructs lifeworld contexts, making social integration possible in an non- 
strategic way. For this reason, communicative peacebuilding practices rely on three, but 
interdependent efforts: (a) reconciliatory mechanisms of conflict transformation; (b) 
process of political will-formation; and (c) the institution of reflexive structures of 
governance.
Before reviewing some examples of ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding programmes in 
Bosnia, it is necessary to first specify how these three efforts may promote non-strategic 
social integration. In many ways, chapter three’s review of Habermas’s society-centred 
theory provides an intellectual foundation to these peacebuilding programmes, his theory 
does not explain how to integrate an ethnically divided post-war society. It is important to 
link his society-centred theory with practitioners’ experiences using conflict 
transformation and conflict resolution mechanisms in different conflict situations. While 
the importance of these mechanisms were review in chapter one, it is essential to keep in 
mind that the success of these conflict intervention mechanisms is in their ability to 
translate any success achieved at the micro-sociological level, that is to say between
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individuals in a group setting, at a macro-sociological level, affecting the overall structure 
of society. Influenced by constructivist understandings of ethnic conflict, dialogical 
engagements, supported by changing social circumstances, can provide an incentive for 
individuals from competing communities to question their conflict’s dynamics and build 
new understandings that can promote interethnic reconciliation and social change.
A. Reconciliation: A First Step in Social Integration
The integration of Bosnia’s society is one of the many objectives the international 
community has pursued since the signing of the GFA. As presented in chapter two, 
traditional peacebuilding missions have attempted to integrate war-torn societies via 
state-building programmes. Heavily influenced by instrumental explanations of ethnic 
conflict, peacemakers argue that if wars are started by ethno-national leaders’ desire to 
fragment an established social order as means to mobilise its community to struggle for 
the transformation of existing state structures or the creation of a new nation-state, then 
peace must be instituted by increased co-operation between ethno-national leaders at the 
top level of society and by state structures, based on power-sharing principles. Only a 
state can push through important political and economic reforms that support the 
execution of a negotiated peace agreement. More importantly, co-operation in a society’s 
elite sector will trickle-down to the rest of society, creating new social environments 
where interaction among former combatants is possible. However popular these notions 
are, the peacebuilding experience in Bosnia, as documented in the previous two chapters, 
proves that this is not enough.
The OHR and the PIC have recently recognized the limitations of state-building 
strategies. In many ways, Petritcsh’s ownership strategy attempts to bring the PIC’s peace 
implementation plan closer in line with the communicative approach’s ideals. However, 
while this strategy has been revised, it is still strongly influenced by strategic values. Not 
only did the PIC embrace the High Representative’s ownership strategy once Bosnia’s 
citizens elected a non-nationalist government into power, but the new programme 
attempts to fulfill Bosnia’s social integration via functional reason.
This is troubling, as many studies, including two critical World Bank reports 
(Dani, et al 1999 and Poggi et al 2002), document the deep social divisions in Bosnia. In
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Bosnia’s cities, the studies note that pre-war social networks that made multi-cultural 
existence possible have not been rehabilitated in the post-Dayton period. Participants in 
focus groups repeatedly said that a ‘low level of interpersonal trust’ has led to ‘a decline 
in socialization and mutual help’ (Puggi et al 2002: 8). Hence, one of the biggest 
casualties of the war has been the country’s low level of social capital. Noting these 
trends, how can social integration be achieved?
Much social psychological research demonstrates how perceptions influence 
human behaviour. Influenced by constructivist explanations of ethnic conflict, it is 
necessary to de-construct the images that inhibit peace and find ways of constructing and 
nurturing new attitudes that foster inter-communal dialogue and co-operation. It is 
therefore maintained that attitudes and political identities are mutable. Just as each 
ethno-communal leader supported the creation of negative images of ‘other’ groups, so 
can conflict transformation processes break these images and foment a culture based on 
tolerance, co-operation, and empathy (Eckhardt 1991). This is what Benjamin Broome’s 
(1993: 111) research on ‘relational empathy’ identifies as a ‘third culture’.
Outside actors have organized a number of dialogical mechanisms in order to 
construct and nurture this ‘third culture’. These include: problem-solving workshops, 
conflict resolution training programs, truth and reconciliation commissions, youth 
programs, trauma relief efforts, and so forth. These efforts are targeted at any social level: 
grassroots, middle, or top (Lederach 1997: 41-42). However, as Lederach demonstrates, 
those directed at middle-level leaders seem to be most fruitful ‘because they are 
knowledgeable about the conflict and because they have access to the top policymakers’ 
and are more willing to support reconciliatory and peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots 
level (Lederach 1997: 48).
In attempting to de-construct the negative images and the ethnic identities that 
divide Bosnia, the organisers and facilitators of these dialogical mechanisms should not 
only be selective of the people that they include in these processes, but they must also 
employ Lederach’s elicitive approach (1995: 68), where the participants are encouraged 
to use their cultural context as resources to craft their own solutions to their problems. 
Organisers of these mechanisms must understand that even though violence has affected 
the pattern of pre-war inter-communal relations, there are still discourses, ideas, and
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institutions that these communities share that may provide a first step to reconciliation 
and to long-term social integration (Pouligny 2000: 25).
Internationally-backed norms and values cannot be forced on participants of 
these conflict resolution mechanisms, as the purpose of these exercises is not only de­
constructing identities that have fostered social separation, but to also provide an 
environment where participants can critically reflect on their own social condition, so 
they can create their own mechanisms of social change. This is not to say that outside 
conveners cannot propose ways of achieving social change. In fact, a healthy discussion 
of the shortcomings and potentials of proposed strategies can be a way of inciting 
participants to judge the viability of these proposed practices, or to create new measures 
that might support the search for peace.
In short, a transformation of public consciousness will encourage people to 
interact with members of other communities. The potential of these mechanisms is that 
they can build new communication networks by transforming negative attitudes into a 
culture of trust and co-operation. Inviting middle-range level leaders of each community 
to take part in these reconciliatory mechanisms will create the foundations of a ‘third 
culture’ (Broome 1993: 111) that will enable a new peace constituency to work together 
and start the process of integrating the groups into a new lifeworld context.
B. Political Will-Formation: Micro-Macro Linkages
Once the foundations of a shared or multi-ethnic lifeworld commence to develop and 
individuals from each community, especially at the middle-range and grassroots levels, 
begin to communicate, then the foundations of civil society will start taking hold in 
Bosnia. In many ways, the biggest challenge that reconciliatory mechanisms face is to 
translate their achievements in macro-sociological terms. Just because individuals in 
small group settings vow to co-operate does not mean that they will be able to do so. 
Social structures may inhibit social change from occurring.
An integrated civil society will not only evolve, but it will also dismantle 
nationalist and separatist movements by de-constructing the political identities that fuel 
these struggles. As noted above, reconciliatory mechanisms can break these images and 
foster new ones based on shared histories and values. These mechanisms must be
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connected to programmes designed to support and strengthen a civic sector. To this 
extent, civil society empowers people to voice new political identities and enables them 
to create new social movements to shape society according to their needs and interests. 
As a consequence, new non-ethnic political parties will evolve and ones in power will 
have to change their stance to get the electorate’s support. Economic organisations, non­
governmental organisations, community groups, women groups, and interest-based 
groups, to name some, will also emanate from civil society’s proceedings, influencing the 
work of municipal, entity, national authorities in Bosnia.
Civil society will permit the creation of a cohesive political community based on 
dialogue and co-operation, leading to the institution of a new social order that its citizens 
can feel part of. Establishing ‘a legal order,’ Carla Hesse and Robert Post (1999: 20) 
argue, ‘requires the prior existence of a community cohesive enough to justify the law’s 
claim to speak, within its jurisdiction, in accents that are authoritative and universal’ 
While the GFA established a legal order in Bosnia, this does not reflect the needs or 
interests of the people. As documented in chapter five, the peace plan follows the 
interests of a group of nationalist politicians and members of the international 
community.
An active civil society serves as tool to strengthen the ‘third culture’ that results 
from reconciliatory processes and permits people to come together to express their 
opinions, to voice their hopes for a better fixture, and to influence the way society is 
organised. Civil society’s mechanisms of political will-formation should have an 
important effect in Bosnia. These new social movements will force political leaders to 
change their actions or quit their positions of power. In all, the organs of civil society 
delimit government prerogatives, allows the formation of political groupings, trains 
future political leaders, and, most important, they counter and de-legitimise the political 
identities, social narratives, and political discourses constructed by the institutions of the 
state or the international community.
C. Instituting Deliberative Structures
The last phase of this programme will materialise once the forces of civil society institute 
new social structures of governance that reflect the needs, interests and values of
243
Bosnia’s citizens. This should usher a true deliberative democracy and establish an open 
social system. The present state-building strategy practiced in Bosnia has produced a 
closed social system, where people, other than through elections, cannot effectively affect 
the way society is organised. The danger of a closed system is that it is vulnerable to 
political and economic crises and outbreaks of political violence because it lacks any 
‘safety valves’ (Vayrynen 1991: 12).
In essence, the institution of a deliberative democracy where Bosnia’s citizens, 
regardless of their ethnic lineage or religious beliefs, can influence the way society is 
organised is consistent with the task of establishing a self-sustaining peace. It is 
important to remember that the cause of the conflict that divided Bosnia along ethnic 
lines and led its constituents to war was a product of the manipulation of political 
identities according to the interests of each community’s nationalist leaders. 
Manipulating these identities and de-humanising the ‘other’ was accomplished with 
relative ease due to the decay of political institutions that had averted opportunists from 
challenging the established order during the communist era. The success of these 
mobilisation strategies was consequently dependent on the destruction of the structures 
that held ethno-communal groups together, and in the fabrication and spread of enemy 
images. While moderates leaders attempted to stop these dehumanisation projects, they 
could not voice their messages because chauvinists and nationalists controlled Bosnia’s 
social structures and media outlets (Snyder and Ballentine 1996: 28-29). In essence, there 
was not a civil society that could enable moderates to challenge these projects. More 
importantly, media outlets, such as television, radio, newspapers and magazines, were 
mostly controlled by people that adhered to these views (Milo§evic 1997: 108-29). In all, 
the war in Bosnia can be partially blamed on the closed nature of the society, which 
inhibited moderates from repudiating these false images and from challenging the 
construction of competing ethnic identities that first led to the disintegration of Bosnia’s 
multicultural ethos and then to war (Burg and Shoup 2000: 11-13).
Fostering a strong and vibrant civil society requires more than just that capacity- 
building efforts. It also requires for the international community and Bosnia’s central 
state institutions to accept an expanded role for Bosnia’s citizens to shape how society is 
structured. If building civil society means ‘getting people to communicate in a
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constructive way and believe that change is possible’, then they must also be allowed to 
be ‘responsible for making change’ (McMahon 2001: 21). Once people in Bosnia 
understand that their opinion matters, they will not only support peacebuilding processes, 
but they will also be willing to actively participate in them.
In light of this reality, preventing the recurrence of interethnic violence will take 
place once Bosnia’s citizens, through the organs of civil society, can establish a social 
order that reflects their various needs and interests and not those of a self-appointed 
minority. The institution of reflexive structures of governance, often legalised by re­
writing or amending the constitution, or in the case of Bosnia, by transforming the 
structures set-up by the GFA, serves as a conflict prevention procedure that will assure 
that co-operation between ethnic groups actually takes place. Nonetheless, attaining this 
social condition and increasing co-operation between leaders of each community is 
dependent on the success of reconciliatory mechanisms, the spread of a “third,” civic- 
based culture, and the flourishing of civil society.
Part two of this analysis will review some “bottom-up” peacebuilding efforts that 
approximate the communicative approach’s ideals. Before conducting this review, it is 
important to keep in mind a central aspect of Habermas’s society-centred theory. Even 
though his theory values the ‘lifeworld’ over the ‘system’, Habermas also emphasizes 
that the system, composed of state and market structures, can play an important role in 
society. Without a state and its legal system, civil society, which is ingrained in the 
lifeworld, could not exist. The market creates mechanisms that allow people to meet their 
material needs. More importantly, the state provides a secure environment where the 
market and civil society can operate. Habermas’s research stresses society’s integration 
should not be led by system imperatives, but by citizens’ active participation in civil 
society. Habermas’s other contribution is his work on democracy and legal systems. He 
points out that while the state use laws to organize and regulate society, laws also 
regulate the actions of the state. In a democracy, the legitimacy of laws is connected to 
the deliberative process that gives life to them. In this manner, civil society can regulate 
state actions by playing an active role in the legislative process. Political legitimacy, in 
turn, is a product of civil society interaction with state institutions and their ability to
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work together to construct laws that regulate society, while also establishing 
communication structures that give meaning to social action.
In light of Habermas’s findings, the Bosnian state and the international 
community’s support of these dialogical mechanisms is crucial for their success. They 
can provide security and prevent groups from using violence to resolve issues of 
contention. Only then can people engage with others in processes of interethnic 
reconciliation. The state and the international community can also finance the work of 
civic organizations and promote similar initiatives. The international community should 
also monitor the work of state institutions to make sine that it is attempting to limit 
political movements in civil society.
n. EXAMPLES OF SOCIETY-CENTRED PEACEBUILDING IN BOSNIA
A number of international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations have partnered 
with local NGOs and other groups to organize and implement ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding 
programmes in Bosnia. Many of these efforts are in line with the communicative 
approach’s ideals, in the vein of this doctoral thesis’s understanding of society-centred 
peacebuilding.
Due to length restrictions, it is impossible to review all these programmes. 
However, a sample of these initiatives will be presented below. Although some of these 
have been directed at society’s different levels (e.g. top, middle and grassroots), they all 
employ the elements of society-centred peacebuilding discussed in part one of this 
chapter. Therefore, these initiatives stress the importance of reconciliation, social 
empowerment, and civic deliberation as means to achieve social change and establish the 
foundations of self-sustaining peace.
A. Grassroots-Level Efforts
Grassroots initiatives stress the importance of working with average people that have 
been directly affected by the conflict. Their primary aim is to achieve social change at the 
local level, rather than at the national level, via reconciliation mechanisms. It is important 
to stress that these initiatives can indirectly influence peacebuilding efforts conducted at 
other social levels. As a secondary aim, these initiatives try to empower people so they
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can create social groups that can address political, economic, or social issues in their 
communities. In so doing, these initiatives provide basic social and humanitarian services 
that the state or local governments cannot provide. In many ways, an important aspect of 
the work conducted by these intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies is 
training community leaders in building the capacities to establish non-governmental 
organizations and other social groups that can have a direct impact on their communities.
Three grassroots projects will be reviewed in this section. They are: the Gomji 
Vakuf Project in the Federation and the work of the Youth Center; Conflict Resolution 
Catalysts’ Neighborhood Facilitators Program and the Youth Community Center in Banja 
Luka, Republika Sprska (RS); and Projekt Dijakom organized by the Karuna 
Peacebuilding Center and Foundation for Community Encouragement in Prijedor in the 
RS and Sanki Most in the Federation.
1. The Gomji Vakuf Project and the Youth Center
Even though the United States forced Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks to end their war in 
1994, pressuring them into an alliance to limit and turn back Serbian power, the conflict 
between these two communities is very pronounced. As noted in the previous chapters, 
most of the conflict centres in Mostar, which many Bosnian Croat nationalist describe as 
the capital of ‘Herceg-Bosna.’ Research on Mostar’s divisions and attempts to build a 
peace between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats is well documented.28 For this reason, it is 
important to review the Gomji Vakuf Project, started by the United Nations Office in 
Vienna in the summer of 1995.
The town of Gomji Vakuf in Central Bosnia experienced some of the most 
intense fighting in the Bosniak-Bosnian Croat war of 1993-1994. Before the war, 
Bosniaks made up 53 percent of its population, while the Bosnian Croats compromised 
43 percent. By summer 1995, the Bosniak population increased by 12 percentage points 
to 65 percent, while Bosnian Croats decreased by nine points. Most Bosniaks live in one 
side of the town, while Bosnian Croats live in the other. Apart from Mostar, Gomji Vakuf 
is “one the few divided towns of the Federation” (Felleisen 1997).
28 See for instance, Sumatra Bose’s book, Bosnia After Dayton (2002), and Steve Gillard’s article in 
International Peacekeeping (2002), which document his participation in Mladi Most, a grassroots youth 
reconciliation programme (2001).
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The Gomji Vakuf Project was initially started by the United Nations Office in 
Vienna (UNOV) as an ‘experiment in peace-building.’ Building on the lessons of 
UNOV’s Volunteer Social Reconstmction Project in Pakrac, Croatia, the UNOV 
partnered with several international NGOs and indigenous organization to develop a new 
peacebuilding programme that combined different development and conflict resolution 
practices to foster economic reconstmction, reconciliation, and social empowerment 
(Wilson 2001). In this manner, although the UNOV played an important part in 
organizing these efforts, it only funded half of its work. The other half was raised by the 
Project’s administrators, which included eight outsiders, experienced in the field of 
peacebuilding, and 17 local volunteers. Many international relief organizations, charity 
trusts, and governmental agencies funded its efforts, including: OXFAM, U.S. Agency 
for International Development, British Quaker Peace and Service, Komitee filer 
Grundrechte und Demokratie, and the Austrian government, among many others 
(Felleisen 1997).
During the first months, the Project provided basic humanitarian aid and then it 
started to focus on the reconstmction of housing. It established a training program that 
taught participants, from both ethnic groups, how to lay bricks and to install and repair 
plumbing. In exchange, the participants had to agree to work together and reconstmct the 
houses of ‘10 especially vulnerable individuals’ (Felleisen 1997). The Project also 
offered them funds to buy material to reconstmct their own houses.
As part of its social empowerment and reconciliation strategy, the Project 
established a number of programmes, with the intention that this would become 
‘independent NGOs’ (Felleisen 1997), administered by local community leaders. These 
include: the Youth Center, Youth Club 96 and Federalna Zena, a women’s NGO. While 
this section will pay close attention to the work conducted by the Youth Center, it is 
important to briefly describe the other two’s efforts.
The Project created Youth Club 96 for older individuals from the ages of 16 to 30. 
Noting that young adults were probably the most affected by the war, Youth Club 96 
offers training in some fields and encourages young adults to attend conflict resolution 
seminars to promote interethnic reconciliation. This organization is still in operation and
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while offering these services, it also organises social events, such as concerts, to foster 
contact between Gomji Vakuf s young adults.
Similarly, the Project also started a group composed of women from both 
communities. Even though Federalna Zena increased contact between women, they have 
also devoted much of their time in training individuals in ‘business skills, management, 
marketing, accounting for small business, tax-laws and fund-raising as well as on 
participatory leadership, conflict management, and group building.’ Federalna Zena also 
addressed important women health issues. They even had a ‘mobile gynecological clinic 
at the cease-fire line’ (Felleisen 1997). The group also empowered women by setting up 
income generating schemes (Mertens 1997) and providing English, agriculture, and 
computer courses. Since 1997, the UNHCR has been funding this organisation’s work 
(UNHCR 1999).
Finally, the Project established a Youth Centre (YC), on the ceasefire line that 
divides the two communities. It became an independent NGO in 1997. One of the reasons 
that this section reviews the work of this NGO in depth is because the YC is one o f the 
most inclusive NGOs in the area. Although its target audience is children between 5-18 
years old, its activities also allow parents and teachers to come together and address 
issues of concern. Also, because the war destroyed the town’s library and its collection, 
the YC’s library has attracted other people to its building, becoming familiarized with its 
programmes (Lippman 2000).
Like the other two groups discussed above, the YC works to increase contact 
between the communities, to foster interethnic reconciliation, and to empower people to 
directly address issues of mutual interests. Because the war created segregated school 
systems, with different curricula, the Youth Center’s original intent was to bring children 
together so they could share their experiences in a secure setting. With the help of the 
United Methodists Committee on Relief, the YC’s administrators contacted teachers in 
both communities to encourage them to participate in its activities and to encourage their 
students to enrol in the YC’s courses (Felleisen 1997).
Currently, the YC offers courses in: English, German, computers and music. In 
the first months of operation, Bosniak teachers would only teach Bosniak students and 
Bosnian Croats teacher Bosnian Croat students. But, the classes were integrated once
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students and teachers felt that the environment was conducive to learning and open 
dialogue (Lippman 2000). Enrollment figures show that 60 percent of students are 
Bosniaks, while the rest are Bosnian Croats (OC 2001a).
The YC also provided a secure environment where children can play and establish 
new friendships. It organizes a number of informal activities, such as a mountaineering 
club, the organization of plays and recitals, and the holding of art and crafts workshops. 
Teenagers are also encouraged to participate in writing and preparing YC’s newsletter to 
the community (OC 2001a). Another core component of the YC’s programme is its 
‘Youth Initiative’, which include a number of weekend workshops were young people 
learn conflict resolution skills, building trust among participants so they can jointly 
address questions of fear, power and prejudice in their community. Some of these 
participants also were part of an UNDP sponsored programme on Trust Building, where 
they worked for several days with young people from all over Bosnia.
YC’s ‘Youth Initiative’ also provides participants with the skills to carry out their 
own projects. For instance, 10 participants conducted surveys of young people’s attitudes 
to drugs and other teen’s issues in the town’s high schools. One of these surveys 
addressed questions concerning ‘joint education’ or a de-segregated school system for the 
town of Gomji Vakuf. The findings showed the level of social divisions in the town 
among young people. The survey, which was conducted in schools in both communities, 
finds that: 47 percent of students do not want to be taught by a teacher from a different 
nationality; 31 percent would feel uncomfortable in ‘joint schools’; and 54 percent are 
against going to school with people from other ‘nationalities’ (OC 2001b). One could 
question the validity of the findings, as the document does not reveal the size of those 
interviewed or the methods used to obtain this information, but it does show that while 
the YC has made some positive changes, these have not yet impacted interethnic tensions 
in the town.
In an attempt to make their mark, young people decided to design and carry out 
project ‘Fontana’. ‘This concerned the rebuilding of the town fountain as a symbol of 
unity in the town, which was inaugurated amongst great celebration and to which people 
from both communities came’ (OC 2001a). Moreover, teenagers that have participated in 
the Youth Initiative programme held a number of workshops in primary schools on
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peacebuilding in the community, attracting more people to YC’s activities. Similarly, the 
YC has been offering training to teachers, from both communities, on non-violent 
communication and in conflict resolution, so they can teach their students how to address 
issues of contention with people of different ‘nationalities’ peacefully (Lippman 2000).
It is difficult to say if these projects have had any impact on interethnic tensions 
in the town. In fact, Jasminka Drino-Kirlic expressed her frustration with interethnic 
problems outside of the center: “‘We take a step forward, and then politics sets us back.’” 
She believes that (in Lipmman 2000):
The Croat and Muslim parties want [to] separate municipalities. When we 
try to make something happen between the two communities, it’s very 
hard. Our best success is when people go out of town to seminars -  
especially for women’s projects and youth projects. The basic thing 
restraining reconciliation is politics. The politicians can’t agree, nor do 
they want to. Now, people feel safest with others of their own ethnicity.
The politicians make use of that feeling and we all loose.
In many ways, the YC has been able to construct an enabling environment where 
participants feel they can address controversial issues. Nevertheless, YC administrators 
do note that it is difficult to measure how much progress they have made since the 
organisation was founded, but they are quick to point out that children’s willingness to 
openly interact with each other suggests that the YC has met their objectives (OC 2001). 
But, these objectives have been accomplished within the YC’s walls. Even though the 
YC has attempted to transform the conflict that separates the town, it has found the same 
obstacles other intergovernmental agencies and NGOs have encountered in Gomji Vakuf 
and the rest of Bosnia.
2. Conflict Resolution Catalysts and the Youth Communication Centre 
Based in Montpelier, Vermont, Conflict Resolution Catalysts (CRC) established two 
youth centers in Bosnia, one in Banja Luka and the other in Ilidza, a suburb of Sarajevo. 
This section reviews CRC’s work in Banja Luka, as the chapter already analyzed 
grassroots efforts in the Federation. In addition, poor management has affected the Ilidza 
program. While this program became an independent NGO called Danas za Bolje Sutra 
in 1998, its staff has had problems securing funding for its programmes.
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CRC founded the Ilidzia centre in July 1994 and the one in Banja Luka in January 
1995. It was one of the first international NGOs working in the Federation and the RS 
(CRC 2003). The Banja Luka centre is located in one of the city’s remaining multiethnic 
neighborhoods, not too far from NATO’s regional headquarters. While Banja Luka did 
not experience major fighting, its minority populations were cleansed and the physical 
structures that pointed to their existence, such as the Ferhadjia Mosque and Catholic 
churches, were destroyed. Indeed, before the war 30 percent of the population described 
itself as Bosnian Croat or Bosniak. After the war ended, only 4 percent of this population 
remained (Stubbs 2001). Yet, Banja Luka, as covered in previous chapters, is the seat of 
the RS’s moderate nationalist politicians and the entity’s economic centre.
Paul Stubbs (1997), who has assessed the Banja Luka centre and other grassroots 
initiatives in the past years, has described CRC’s work as ‘pioneering in the field of peace 
building and community development’. He argues that ‘rather than looking for quick, 
technical, solutions to problems,’ CRC uses a flexible, but non-traditional approach that 
emphasizes the importance of social empowerment, capacity-building, and interethnic 
dialogue. Gary Shapiro (1999), CRC’s founder and Director, argues that the programme, 
which he calls the Neighborhood Facilitators Project (NFP):
sought primarily to engage people in understanding and dealing with 
conflict and problems in a more empowered way. This meant work with 
them to see their responsibility for their role in the conflict (including that 
of total victims), providing resources and connections to help them solve 
it, rather than seeing themselves as helpless with nothing they can do.
Even though CRC was tempted to provide technical expertise to help people in 
Bosnia address contending issues and to build democracy, its international staff noticed 
that people in Bosnia ‘didn’t care about that at all. They weren’t trying to change the 
system or society, although many agreed it was needed’ (Shapiro 1999). In fact, what 
could have produced an end to CRC’s project, as donors wanted the NFP to address these 
questions, provided CRC’s staff in Banja Luka an opportunity to understand why these 
attitudes prevailed and to adjust the NPF’s original mechanisms to achieve CRC’s 
objectives. This was not a smooth process, as there were strong disagreements between 
CRC staff in Banja Luka and Vermont and between local volunteers and participants
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(CDR Associates 1998). The fact that arguments did take place and that CRC had to 
readjust their own approach suggests that they valued the opinion of the participants and 
the local staff, who would eventually administer the programme once CRC left.
Many of these volunteers and participants, were young adults, though the centre 
was open to anyone. Rather than facilitating mediation seminars between participants to 
search for ways to solve the conflict, CRC staff employed an indirect approach, where 
they would attempt to achieve reconciliation by providing a “meeting ground” or a 
“bridge” between participants. Like the YC in Sanski Most, the Banja Luka Centre 
offered English and computer classes, provided by volunteers, who were working for 
other international NGOs or for intergovernmental agencies, including NATO’s SFOR 
(Stubbs 1997). It also helped young adults in Banja Luka establish an independent radio 
station and a student newspaper, attracting teenagers from all ethnic groups (CDR 
Associates 1998) and giving voice to new social meanings that challenged established 
definitions provided by nationalist politicians in the Serb entity (Stubbs 1997).
Unlike other NGOs in Bosnia, CRC worked ‘with other institutions of social 
welfare rather than to set up parallel projects’ (Stubbs 1997). CRC staff encouraged 
participants to spend some time in the local orphanage and with refugee children living in 
and outside Banja Luka. This experience taught participants of the importance of social 
participation and it also allowed them to reflect on the war, encouraging them to work 
with participants of other ethnicities in rebuilding a common future.
As said before, NFP attempted to achieve its original objectives via indirect 
mechanisms. CRC did not conduct work in ‘teaching democratic values, citizen advocacy 
and participation, communication, problem solving, diversity appreciation, or conflict 
resolution.’ But, while this is true, a professor at a university in Banja Luka, told a team 
of evaluators that CRC’s indirect approach is the key reason it has so much respect in the 
local community and it may be a factor that explain why it was able to promote 
interethnic dialogue (cited in CDR Associates 1998):
UNHCR and many of the internationals have had problems because of 
their lack of cultural sensitivity. They try to make people cooperate at the 
local government level who were responsible for the problem to begin 
with. CRC focused locally -  not on ‘political stuff.’ CRC said in effect
253
‘we want help the people of Banja Luka’ not ‘we want to establish 
multicultural cooperation’, and then they helped the people.
Gary Shapiro emphasizes that many people in Bosnia were reluctant to attend conflict 
resolution workshops or any facilitated exercises. CRC was forced to listen to the 
participants’ needs and interests and achieve its interests indirectly, even if this meant 
angering the Charles Steward Mott Foundation, which funded the initiative, or other 
potential donors (Shapiro 1999).
In many ways, Gary Shapiro’s objectives are slowly being materialized. As part 
of its original strategy, the NFP gave birth to the Youth Communication Centre (YCC), 
one of the most active and respected NGOs in Banja Luka. The YCC became an 
independent NGO in February 1997. By August 2000, the YCC expanded its activities, 
which include the following programmes (Stubbs 2001).
1. Media Development. It still operates an independent radio station, but the student 
newspaper, because of a lack of funds and because some of its staff left to ‘pursue 
formal training and/or journalistic careers’, is no longer being published.
2. Psycho-Social Support. It expands on CRC’s insistence that the centre engage 
with the local orphanage and refugees’ children by also dealing on how to 
integrate these children into society. While it has partnered with other 
international and local NGOs to achieve this programme’s objective, many of the 
people administering it are psychology university students.
3. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. As stated before, work in this area was 
pursued indirectly. YCC has 15 conflict resolution trainers, recognized by the UN 
Development Programme as an important resource in the community. ‘The team 
has been willing and able to take risks and push difficult issues, in multi-ethnic 
groups, which much other training, less intensive, avoid.’ Apart from offering 
training seminars in conflict resolution and non-violence, the programme also has 
two very active projects: ‘High School Student Council Development’ and the 
‘Advocacy Youth Training Experience’. The former works with high school 
students and professors to give students an opportunity to influence the school’s 
decisions. Similarly, the latter project encourages young people to organize 
groups to lobby local and entity authorities on different issues. It also has created 
an ‘Observation Parliament’ were young adults are given the opportunity to attend 
sessions of the RS’s Parliament, as observers.
4. Educational Programme. With the support of the RS’s Ministry of Education, the 
YCC offers courses in English, computer applications, and radio administration. It 
also provides education on democracy and human rights. Other projects include:
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organizing of theatre productions, art exhibits and other extracurricular activities. 
It also hosts a number of seminars on the importance of volunteerism.
5. Global Partnership. The YCC has made contacts with youth organization all 
around the world and has actively participated in youth conferences in Europe. It 
has used these networks to seek funding for their initiatives and to learn new 
approaches in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, volunteerism, and social 
empowerment.
The European Union, the UN Development Programme, the Aspen Institute, the Stability 
Pact for Southeastern Europe, the Council of Europe, the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and many other charity and foundations have financially supported its work.
As seen above, Gary Shapiro’s vision of a NGO training in conflict resolution and 
democracy building is possible, but only in the long run. CRC’s work was mostly in 
bridging young people from different ethnic backgrounds in the city. While Shapiro and 
CRC’s staff in Banja Luka expressed their frustration with the Centre, since it became an 
independent group, it has closely realized CRC’s original objectives. CRC’s success in 
this strategy, however, is not only its willingness to adjust its approach to peacebuilding 
to meet local needs and interests. In addition, CRC’s local staff, which still administers 
the YCC, has remained loyal to CRC’s values and ideals, while still addressing issues of 
contention in Banja Luka and adjacent towns.
3. Projekt Dijakom
In early 1997, Emsuda Mujagic, a survivor of the Tmopolje concentration camp, asked 
Paula Green of the Karuna Center of Peacebuilding to come to Bosnia and facilitate a 
series of healing and empowerment seminars in Sanki Most (Green 1997). Before the 
war, Sanki Most was a mixed town of Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs. It lies close to the 
inter-entity boundary line. During the war, many Bosnian Serbs were pushed from their 
homes, while most Bosniaks from Prijedor in the RS settled in Sanki Most.
Green teamed with Anne Hoewing of the Foundation for Community 
Encouragement, based in Seattle, Washington, to organize and conduct these seminars. 
These seminars were held in Sanki Most and participants were Bosniak women. After 
several trauma relief sessions, it was decided to offer seminars on ‘skill development in 
local organizing with women NGO leaders’ (Green 2000: 442). After three visits to Sanki
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Most, Green and Hoewing were approached by some of the participants to see if they 
could help them contact Bosnian Serb women in Prijedor and other villages in the RS. 
The Bosniak participants explained that they wished to ‘reconnect with their neighbors as 
a cautious first step’ toward their return to their old homes (Green 2000: 442).
Even though Green and Hoewing expressed their reservations of trying to connect 
Bosniak and Bosnian Serb women, they decided to travel to Prijedor to find out if there 
was any possibility of starting interethnic dialogue. Although very few Bosnian Serb 
women met with Green and Hoewing and less welcomed the idea of engaging with 
Bosniak women, a few did decide ‘to travel to Sanki Most for a five-day dialogue group’ 
(Green 2002: 443). The meeting was extremely emotional and after much talk the women 
agreed that Green and Hoewing develop a new programme to increase dialogue between 
Bosniak and Bosnian Serb educators, as they felt that the success of repatriation and 
reintegration initiatives depended on their views and behaviour (Green 2000: 444).
This initiative was created in 1998 and has been called Projekt Dijakom. Green 
and Hoewing have facilitated more than 5 inter-ethnic educators’ seminars in the last 
years. Each ‘dialogue seminar lasts 3-5 days and welcomes 20 participants in a mix of 
Serbs and Muslims from both cities, including teachers, school counsellors, principals 
and administrators, some new to the seminars others returning participants’. These 
seminars teach participants ‘theories and skills of communication and peacebuilding’. 
Hence, the objective has been to help schoolteachers and administrators in Prijedor, Sanki 
Most and surrounding villages how to provide an open, non-discriminatory environment 
where students from different ethnic backgrounds can feel at ease and are free to interact 
with others (Green 2000: 448).
Green and Hoewing have encountered a number of challenges. Green argues that 
after several seminars, participants still hold to their ‘ethnic alliance and identity’. The 
translators have informed the conveners of ‘the accusations, blame and regressive 
arguments that have emerged during the breaks and also about moments of compassion 
and connection’ (Green 2000: 448). At some moments, the conveners feel that while 
some progress has been made, they have not been able to see a transformation in some 
participants. While they are more open to considering new ideas and to accept the 
validity of others’ stories, they still feel that they did not commit acts of violence. This
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kind of behaviour has been apparent in members of both communities, though Green 
does show that it is stronger in the Bosnian Serb side, especially in Prijedor, where 
58,000 Bosniaks were expelled from their homes and some where sent to concentration 
camps (Green 2003).
Nevertheless, some of Projekt Dijakom’s Bosniak and Bosnian Serb graduates 
have decided to meet one month in either Sanki Most or Prijedor ‘with students of the 
host community’ to train them in cross cultural communication and conflict resolution 
skills. Other participants have started to offer workshops on tolerance and community 
building to adolescents (Green 2000: 449). Participants’ willingness to start their own 
mechanisms to try to deal with the high level of social separation is in line with Green’s 
belief that people have to play a leading role in peacebuilding. But, she is not blind to the 
many challenges Projekt Dijakom and other interethnic reconciliation mechanisms face, 
or the limitations of theories and skills developed outside Bosnia.
In fact, Green and Hoewing changed tactics. Rather than teaching participants 
skills, they decided to provide an informal setting were participants could hear stories and 
experiences of ‘second generation survivors of the Holocaust or people whose parents 
were engaged in the Third Reich’ (Green 2003). This seminar proved to be extremely 
productive as it was the first seminar where Bosniak and Bosnian Serb participants 
acknowledge wrongdoing and recognised the suffering each other has faced since the war 
started. It seems that for the first time, participants were not listening to outsiders, but to 
themselves. Can this transformation of attitudes lead to social transformation? It is too 
early to tell, but it must be recognised that Projekt Dijakom has slowly transformed the 
relations of Bosniak and Bosnian Serb educators in northwestern Bosnia and that these 
people will play an important role in interethnic reconciliation and trust-building for the 
next years. So, this is just one step in the larger process of transforming Bosnian society 
according to the ideals of society-centred peacebuilding.
B. Tapping on the Resources of Middle-Level Leaders
In his peacebuilding model, Lederach argues that these leaders make up society’s most 
critical. In 1997, he argued that ‘a literature on middle-range peacebuilding as such has 
not yet been developed’ (1997: 46). He does argue that a series of practices define this
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level of peacebuilding. These include: problem-solving workshops, peace commissions, 
and conflict resolution training. As seen before, some of these practices are also part of 
grassroots efforts. As a result, the difference between the grassroots and the middle-level 
are the people that are invited to join these processes. Academics, leaders in the education 
field, humanitarian organizations, business leaders, members of respected professions, 
and religious leaders, to name a few, have a ‘determinant location in the conflict, who if 
integrated properly, might provide the key to creating an infrastructure for achieving and 
sustaining peace’ (Lederach 1997: 46).
Although Lederach argues that the above-mentioned activities are the ones that 
define this level o f peacebuilding, this doctoral thesis argues that civil society 
programmes are important elements of this approach. In many ways, Lederach’s work 
attempts to find ways of transforming relations between groups as a step in the 
transformation of society and the establishment of self-sustaining peace. The difficulty is 
to translate breakthroughs at the group level at the societal level. Of course, this is also 
the problem at the grassroots level, but this type of efforts often attempt to incite change 
at the local level, not necessarily at the national level. Middle-level programmes attempt 
to promote change either at the national or grassroots level. Due to this definition, civil 
society groups must be included in these middle-level efforts for they attempt to translate 
strategies devised at the micro-sociological level at a national or grassroots level.
This section reviews four initiatives: the Institute for Resource and Security 
Studies’ (IRSS) Health Bridges for Peace; the Project in Times of Transition’s problem­
solving workshops and reconciliation initiatives; the Center for Civic Initiative’s work on 
civil society promotion; and the OHR’s Civic Forum. The first three are in line with 
Lederach’s understanding of middle-level peacebuilding efforts, while the last two 
approximate this thesis’s expanded understanding of this type of peacebuilding.
1. Health Bridges fo r  Peace
In 1997, Paula Gutlove of the IRSS in Cambridge, Massachusetts, facilitated the first of a 
series of problem-solving workshops in Gracanica, a small town on the inter-entity 
boundary line in northeast Bosnia. The town is surrounded by a number of Bosniak, 
Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb towns and villages. Having been one of the country’s
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most mixed regions, the fighting during the war was very intense, thus the levels of social 
separation, psychosocial trauma, and physical destruction are very high.
To tackle these three problems, Gutlove conceived the Health Bridges for Peace 
(HBP) program. She describes her approach as ‘integrated action’; meaning that she 
deliberately combines ‘conflict management with other social functions, such as the 
delivery of health care, education, humanitarian assistance, and policing’ as a means to 
encourage social interaction, reconciliation, and peacebuilding (Gutlove 2002a). While 
HBP started to work with middle-level health professionals, mostly physicians, social 
worker, psychologists, nurses and so on, it has had an impact at the grassroots and the 
top-level. In this way, the first phase of the programme was the facilitation of a number 
of training seminars in trauma recovery for 15 health professionals from different ethnic 
backgrounds from Gracanica and surrounding towns and villages. Although they were 
being offered training in a functional area, the seminars provided an opportunity for the 
participants to interact with each other and build trust to create an integrated health 
system for the town and the region.
It is important to note that Gutlove choose to work with health professionals 
because their original training taught them that they must offer assistance to anyone, 
regardless of their background (1997). Of course, the war did have a direct impact on the 
participants, but Gutlove felt that they could put some of those feeling asides to create an 
integrated health system. After these training seminars, the participants decided to 
establish support groups for ‘mothers of war-injured children, for bereaved parents, for 
teenagers’ (Gutlove 2002a). With time people in the community joined these participants 
to repair the building, where these support groups were meeting, and the community, 
with Gutlove’s assistance, decided to turn the initiative into a local NGO called Osmijeh 
(Gutlove 2002b).
Shortly after, women from the area decided to start a day-care centre for children 
with disabilities. Mothers were now free to do other things. Some of them actually ‘went 
out and found the abandoned elderly, and set up a meals-on-wheels program for the 
grandmothers and grandfathers who had been left behind when people evacuated during 
the war’ (2002a). Men from different backgrounds eventually became involved in 
Osmijeh. Most of them were unemployed. They paired with teenagers and repaired
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Osmijeh’s daycare centre and then they decided to also go to surrounding villages and 
rebuild school buildings, which doubled as community centres in the afternoon. In short, 
HBP’s desire to build an integrated health system for Gracanica and its surrounding 
villages had an impact at the grassroots, encouraging people to interact with people of 
different backgrounds and work to build a better community for all individuals.
As stated before, HBP also had an impact at the top-level. The Bosnian 
government has recognized the value of Gutlove’s work and has been searching for ways 
of reproducing the experiment in other parts of the country. Intergovernmental 
organizations have also expressed interest in Gutlove’s work. The World Health 
Organisation has asked Gutlove and IRSS to develop a programme that can be integrated 
into its activities. IRSS has also established the Medical Network, a region-wide 
peacebuilding NGO, with a diverse governing council, which facilitates training 
seminars, similar to those held in Gracanica in 1997, for health professionals in the 
former Yugoslavia. The Network was established in 1999, shortly after NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo. Since then, the Network’s volunteers throughout the region have 
increased from 800 to 8,000 in 2002.
2. The Project on Justice in Times o f Transition’s Problem-Solving Workshops 
Based at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Project on 
Justice in Times of Transition (PJTT) has been active in post-Dayton Bosnia. It has 
organized five problem-solving workshops. The first two workshops, one held in London 
in November 1996 and the other in Bosnia in August 1997, addressed the topic of 
multiethnic reconciliation. The third conference, which was held in Budapest in 
December 1997, was commissioned by the International Commission on Missing Persons 
to start a process to account for those people missing during the war. The fourth 
workshop, held in June 1998 in Budapest was a continuation of the first two workshops 
mentioned above. A year later and building on the last workshop’s recommendations, 
PJTT organized a seminar that explored ways to strengthen the role of women in Bosnian 
politics.
This subsection reviews PJTT’s work in promoting interethnic reconciliation. 
Noting that most reconciliation programmes practiced in Bosnia since the GFA’s signing
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have employed ‘methodology advanced by Westerners with little or no first-hand 
experience in post-conflict situations,’ PJTT, with the assistance of the British 
Association for Central and Eastern Europe (BACEE), decided to convene in November 
1996 leaders of Bosnia’s three national communities with leaders ‘from other countries 
that have recently faced similar obstacles in the aftermath of a violent civil conflict.’ By 
learning of others’ experience in post-war peacebuilding efforts, the facilitators hoped 
that leaders from Bosnia would start to talk of ways to support peacebuilding efforts and 
make reconciliation a reality. Even though the participants talked about issues of 
contention, they agreed that another workshop was needed to help them understand how 
to build trust between Bosnia’s communities (PJTT 2003).
From 31 July to 7 August 1997, PJTT and BACEE organized five workshops on 
multiethnic trust-building and reconciliation in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Mostar. 
A total of 61 participants from Bosnia’s three communities participated in at least one of 
these workshops. These participants ‘represented many sectors of society’ and included 
middle-level political leaders, respected journalists, retired politicians and judges, 
university professors, leaders of influential Bosnian NGOs, members of nationalist and 
non-nationalist political parties and religious figures (PJTT 1997). At the request of 
participants in the 1996 workshop on reconciliation, the PJTT and BACEE invited 
speakers from other post-war situations that could talk about ‘practical matters’ and that 
could suggest programs that could promote trust-building and reconciliation in Bosnia’s 
communities (PJTT 2003). The workshops’ conveners invited Naomi Chazan, a member 
of the Israel Knesset, Palestinian official Zahira Kamal, and Salvadorian former guerrilla 
Salvador Sanabria to talk about their experiences on the following issues: the prosecution 
of war criminals, and the roles of politicians, the media and religious institutions in post­
war peacebuilding. Although the participants found the presentations ‘thought-provoking 
and helpful’ (PJTT 2003), the workshop did not produce a plan of action. But, they did 
ask the conveners to conduct a third program on this issue.
The last of these workshops was held at the British Embassy in Budapest, 
Hungary on 4-6 June 1998. U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia, Ralph Johnson, moderated it. 
This workshop included 17 middle-level leaders of the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb 
communities. While Bosnian Croat leaders were also extended an invitation and some of
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them accepted it, ‘for various reasons at the last minute they did not travel to Budapest’ 
(PJTT 1998). Although the participants were surprised by their absence, they agreed that 
the workshop could still be ‘productive’ (PJTT 1998).
As seen in previous workshops, the conveners invited five speakers from other 
post-war societies to share their experiences with participants. They were: Naomi 
Chazan, who participated in the workshops held in 1997; David Ervine, spokesperson for 
the Northern Irish Progressive Unionist Party; Joseph Reilly, an active trade unionist and 
member of Sinn Fein’s National Executive committee; Piotr Staskinski, who was active 
in the Solidarity movement in Poland and edited Wo la. an underground newspaper, 
during the 1980s; and Joaquin Villalobos, former leader of El Salvador’s Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (PJTT 1998). They talked about the following topics: 
‘changing mindsets to transform conflict’; ‘reconciling political and community 
leadership’; ‘creating mechanisms for rebuilding trust’; and ‘developing a free and 
independent media’ (PJTT 1998).
Each presentation was followed by participants’ questions and debate about how 
speakers’ experiences could be applied to the situation in Bosnia. This workshop also 
included a number of informal events, where speakers and participants were encouraged 
to interact and explore ways of building new relationships (PJTT 1998). After three days, 
the participants were ready to offer three concrete proposals to move Bosnia closer to a 
self-sustaining peace (PJTT 1998):
1. Develop political leadership skills for women;
2. Encourage municipal cooperation on the return of refugees; and
3. Create a journalistic code of conduct.
The PJTT decided to organize a conference in 1999 on the first issue. The BACEE took 
the lead on the second issue (PJTT 1998). While the conveners have not directly 
addressed the third proposal, it is important to note that the Charles Stewart Foundation 
and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, which provided funding for the 
Budapest initiative, have been actively supporting programmes that foster media 
independence and training for journalists. One such example is the Centre for Civic
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Cooperation’s programme in this area, which has been funded since 1999 by both donors 
(CCC 2001).
While the level of trust in Bosnia is not very high, as noted in the World Bank’s 
reports at the beginning of this chapter, these workshops have been able to establish links 
between Bosnia’s communities and leaders. In fact, the PJTT’s methodology has helped 
participants understand that their problems are ones that have been faced and met by 
people in other war-torn societies. The workshops allowed middle-level leaders to meet 
with one another and to consider ways to promote reconciliation and peace in their 
communities. Work on the three proposals listed above has started, and while it is 
difficult to judge the overall success of these initiatives, it is important to stress that this 
type of work would not have been possible in the first years after the GFA’s signing. But, 
dialogue and reconciliation at the micro-level is slowly having an impact at the macro- 
societal level.
3. The Centers for Civic Initiatives
The Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI) is one of the few national NGOs in Bosnia, with 
offices in: Tuzla, Mostar, Sarajevo, Zenica, Doboj, BrCko, Livno, Visgrade, and Bihac. A 
group people that worked for the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs established it in 1998. CCI has three core objectives: public 
awareness campaigns; development of local advocacy groups; and development of 
advocacy networks (CCI 2003a). While several projects have been conceived to meet 
these goals, this subsection reviews CCI’s civil society development programme.
The CCI’s civil society programme starts with the conviction that civil society 
development and strengthening of existing groups could not take place in the first years 
after the GFA’s signing. Most of Bosnia’s citizens were ‘dealing with their daily 
existential problems failing to be more actively involved in the decision-making 
processes at different levels of authority’ (CCI 2003b). As an indigenous NGO, CCI’s 
civil society programme attempts to educate citizens about their rights and it encourages 
them to think of themselves as active members of society by either joining advocacy 
groups, establishing new groups, or just holding accountable elected representatives.
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CCI is also working with established advocacy groups and it has been offering 
training so these groups can put pressure on Bosnia’s authorities and influence the 
legislative process. While CCI’s work does not address issues pertaining interethnic 
reconciliation, it does give assistance to civic organizations that are trying to strengthen 
the process of democratization and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. Because 
CCI has offices throughout Bosnia and employs people from different backgrounds, it 
represents a microcosm of a future multiethnic society.
In many ways, CCI’s work is mentioned in this chapter because it represents a 
local organization that is giving civic organizations, than tend to support moderate, non­
nationalist interests, the necessary training to organize public opinion campaigns in a 
emerging democratic environment. As seen before, grassroots initiatives have been doing 
this with adolescents and at the local level, but CCI has the resources, the experience, and 
the infrastructure to carry out its work at the national level. The importance, in the 
context of this thesis, is that this type of work can support the work of NGOs and other 
interest groups that emanate from middle-level or grassroots conflict resolution 
initiatives. CCI’s work shows ways of connecting social transformation at the group level 
into the macro-sociological level.
4. The Office o f High Representative’s Civic Forum
High Representative’s Wolfgang Petritcsh’s desire to enhance the international 
community’s peacebuilding approach, by including new mechanisms to increase Bosnia’s 
ownership of these efforts, led him to conceive the Civic Forum. Petritsch announced the 
creation of this body in a speech before the UN Security Council. Its objective is to 
‘promote active citizenship’ and increase the ability of civil society groups to play ‘a 
more active role in the public policy discourse’ (Petritsch 2001b) of the country, as he felt 
that this has been ‘dominated by the agendas of political parties, elected officials, and 
representatives of the international communities’ (OHR-PS 200le). Indeed, an OHR 
press release stated the Petritsch would not only hear the concerns and proposals of those 
civic leaders invited to the meetings, but also ‘follow up on some of them with policy 
initiatives’ (OHR-PS 200le).
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Five meetings were held under Petritcsh. The first meeting was on 12 October 
2001, held at Petritsch’s residence in Sarajevo. Most of the participants worked in the 
Federation. A second session, also made up of people that worked in the Federation and 
held at Petritsch’s residence, was held on 22 November 2001. The topic on the agenda 
was the importance of economic reforms (OHR-PS 2001b). Also invited were 
representatives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The third meeting, held in Banja Luka on 21 December 2001, was one of the most 
important. Petritsch met with members of the RS’s civic sphere. They talked about many 
issues, ranging from the importance of economic reform to the ‘humiliating 
circumstances experienced by returnees and displaced persons’ (OHR-PS 2001a). The 
importance of this meeting can be further understood by analysing Petritsch’s reactions to 
the proceedings: ‘The issues you have raised are the same as those I have heard in 
Sarajevo [....] There is less division between the people of the two Entities than a first 
glance -  or politicians -  would suggest. This encourages me to be tougher on people who 
preach division’ (cited in OHR-PS 2001a). In addition, this last meeting also confirmed 
that Bosnia’s politicians and citizens shared a ‘lack of enthusiasm for Bosnia’s 
integration in Europe’ (OHR-PS 2001a). This is problematic because the path towards 
union with Europe is one of the incentives the international community is using to 
implement the peace agreement and strengthen the Bosnian state.
The fourth meeting, held in Mostar on 2 February 2002, provided a more 
optimistic view of Bosnia, though invited civic leaders complained that more had to be 
done to desegregate Bosnia’s education system and to strengthen Bosnia’s nascent civil 
society institutions. At the end of the meeting, the High Representative vowed to help 
them, but he also asked them to continue putting pressure to local authorities obstructing 
the peace implementation process: ‘When you see that something doesn’t work, then try 
to change it. Take fate of this city in your hands. It is possible. Just don’t give up’ 
(Petritsch in OHR-PS 2002b).
The last of these meetings was held in the OHR’s main office in Sarajevo on 19 
May 2002. Like the other meetings, Petritsch invited a number of civic leaders to talk 
about constitutional amendments needed to support the peace implementation process 
and to make Bosnia into a strong state. In their conservations, Petritsch reaffirmed his
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support for the political structures established by the GFA, but he also talked of the 
importance of changing the political culture of bitter interethnic quarrel to reform Bosnia 
according to European standards. Concrete proposals were not presented, but the 
participants agreed that pressuring Bosnian authorities to adapt their constitutions was 
necessary as at first step to entry into the European Union and the strengthening of civil 
society. In regards to the bitter ethnic divisions that still affect Bosnia, the participants 
and Petritsch considered ways of desegregating the country’s education systems (OHR- 
PS 2002a).
As noted in the previous chapter, the Civic Forum provided a mechanism were 
middle-level, civic leaders could meet with the High Representative and other 
international officials to talk about different issues affecting Bosnia and the establishment 
of a self-sustaining peace. The meetings were organized a key theme, but other issues 
were also discussed. Debate took place and Petritsch often remarked that he had a better 
understanding of concerns people had with the GFA’s implementation. Fora provided an 
environment conducive to dialogue and trust building. Many have seen this as a step in 
the right direction. Bosnian citizens should directly influence the international 
community’s work, and these middle-level leaders provided the High Representative 
their opinions on important topics. Also, the meetings have given legitimacy to certain 
individuals and the organisations they represent. Because most of these individuals 
oppose nationalist leaders’ projects, they started to give voice to new visions of Bosnian 
society, motivating debate on important topic among civic leaders, government officials, 
and diplomats.
C. Top-Level Programmes
For Lederach, top-level programmes are those that target ‘principal high-level leaders in 
the conflict’ (1997: 43). The Dayton peace initiative is mostly a product of these efforts. 
Lederach’s description of these efforts is similar to this doctoral thesis’s understanding of 
strategic peacemaking and state-centred peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are 
exceptions. Some top-level efforts can be in line with the ideals of the communicative 
approach.
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A case in point is the OHR’s Consultative Partnership Forum, which was 
developed by Petritcsh in 2001. This informal body was not supposed to ‘replace existing 
mechanisms of government’ (Petritsch 2001b). Its objective was to bring together 
members of Bosnia’s Council of Minister and the High Representative^ aids ‘to discuss 
and resolve urgent issues, mainly related to the agenda’ set by the PIC (OHR-R 2001a). 
While the Forum intended to create dialogue between the OHR and the Council of 
Ministers, the OHR expressed its commitment to invite leaders from other governmental 
bodies or from the international community, if it deemed necessary. The creation of this 
Forum sent an important signal to Bosnia’s citizens. Rather than just imposing an agenda 
on Bosnia, the Forum suggested that the international community would like to 
coordinate its policies with local institutions in order to make peace self-sustaining.
As noted in the previous chapter, even though several meetings were held, 
disagreement between international officials and Bosnian officials forced the High 
Representative to use his Bonn powers to get important legislation through. Nevertheless, 
the creation of the Forum and the holding of these meetings were positively received in 
Bosnian society. Alexander Stiglmayer (2001) noted that this informal mechanism 
demonstrated that Petritsch really cared for Bosnian concerns and that he welcomed their 
input in key legislation and in aspects of the PIC’s peace implementation strategy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As documented in the previous two chapters, state-centred forms of peacebuilding have 
dominated post-Dayton Bosnia. However, the international community through trial and 
error has realized that these efforts may not be able to establish a self-sustaining peace in 
the next couple of years. Not all ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding mechanisms have been 
effective in Bosnia, as Chandler’s and Belloni’s research demonstrate. As a consequence, 
this chapter reviewed a number of initiatives that are closely aligned to the 
communicative approach’s ideals.
As demonstrated in this chapter, the communicative approach questions whether 
state-building can promote reconciliation, processes of political will-formation, and the 
institution of reflexive structures of governance. While society-centred peacebuilding 
strategies place Bosnia’s citizens at the centre of peacebuilding efforts, the Bosnian state
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and the international community still have an important role to play. Building on 
Habermas’s research, administrative power must be complemented by communicative 
power. To put in another way, the people, acting via civil society organisations at 
national or local levels, must delimit and legitimise the activities of the state, and in the 
case of Bosnia, the international community.
This chapter shows a number of grassroots, middle-level, and top-level 
mechanisms that attempted to transfer more power to the people in peacebuilding. These 
efforts show that reconciliation is not something that can be achieved overnight. In fact, 
some conflict resolution experts working in Bosnia have had to reconsider their own 
strategies and adapt them to convince people to join different mechanisms that can bring 
people from contending factions closer together. Grassroots efforts demonstrate how 
outsiders had to experiment with different mechanisms to achieve and sustain dialogue 
between participants. However, once people from different communities have the 
confidence to work together, they can transform the social, economic, and political 
environment that supports and breeds inter-ethnic conflict. But, changing these social 
structures is not simple. People must create social organisations and networks to 
campaign and press for these changes.
How can this be achieved? Conflict resolution trainers and NGO workers could 
train individuals in capacity-building techniques, but it seems that inviting leaders from 
other war-torn societies is more beneficial. Participants can learn from people that have 
experienced similar challenges and they can see how different strategies of social change 
may apply to their own situation. This is not to say that conflict resolution training or 
civil society training may not be beneficial. Instead, individuals must understand how 
these tools fit within their own social context and seminars that include leaders from 
other war-torn societies seems to be a good mechanism to incite local actors to think of 
how to transform their own social conditions.
Accountability is another important issue. Even though the international 
community has funded different civil society training projects, many of them have not 
convinced people to create social organisations or to join established social networks. As 
noted above, many individuals in Bosnia feel that they cannot affect the way society is 
organised. Things have been changing, as more people are realising that they can put
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pressure on Bosnia’s authorities at different levels via elections and other procedures of 
deliberation. Another important element has been the willingness of the international 
community to draft their strategies with the input of Bosnia’s civic sector and politicians. 
Petritsch’s ownership approach has led to new developments that have strengthened 
Bosnia’s civic sector, giving an incentive for people of different backgrounds to work 
together to transform Bosnia according to their varied needs and interests.
It is important to stress that society-centred peacebuilding is used here to describe 
a set of practices that if integrated may promote social change at different societal levels. 
Having differentiated between these society-centred peacebuilding and state-centred 
peacebuilding practices and having reviewed some examples of the former, an important 
question remains unanswered: why are these not at the centre of the international 
community’s peacebuilding strategy? This important question will be answered in the 
next chapter, which concludes this thesis’s assessment of the making and the 
implementation of the Dayton peace initiative.
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CONCLUSION
Critical Reflections for Self-Sustaining Peace in Bosnia
INTRODUCTION
In the discipline of international relations, the critical approach has been sternly criticized 
for lacking a ‘research program’ that can guide foreign policy-making or, in the case of 
this thesis, peacemaking. A ‘research program’ must not be dogmatic, attempting to 
establish an ideology of how the world works. Rather it must assist investigators 
‘[discover] new facts and [develop] insightful interpretations’ to allow them to test 
existing theories or strategies and develop new ones by means of empirical studies. Do 
critical theories meet these general criteria?
Critics of critical approaches find that they are better are pinpointing what is 
missing in mainstream theories, rather than providing a credible theory that can inform 
practice (Keohane 1988: 393). Randall Schweller (1999: 14) captures this position in his 
scathing critique of Andrew Linklater’s Transformation of Political Community (1999):
Practitioners of international politics, however, understand foreign policy 
is too serious a business to entertain utopian ideas about dramatically 
reconstructed social relations; confronted by weighty foreign policy 
decisions, they do not enjoy the luxury of retreating into a fantasy world of 
their own creation, but instead must act under real-world constraints, 
knowing that bad judgment can lead to the subjugation or extinction of the 
state and its citizens.
While these views do stress critical theories’ main limitation, it is important to emphasise 
that critical theory does have the ability to show weaknesses in established theories or 
practices, forcing researchers to consider their efficacy and viability. In this way, critical 
theorising is a practical endeavour that can potentially affect how people understand, 
explain, and address social events. But, its vantage point is ipso facto, reducing critical 
theories’ influence in the policy world.
This debate has influenced this thesis’s investigation of the Dayton peace 
initiative. It accepts critical theories weaknesses, but it also emphasises that it can serve 
as a tool to demonstrate why policies, and the theories that influence them, have not
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achieved its intended objectives. In doing so, it explains why the international community 
must develop new strategies to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia, while also 
revealing some observations that must guide new research in international relations and 
conflict analysis. This thesis started by raising the following question: ‘has the Dayton 
peace initiative been success?’ Having examined the international, regional, and domestic 
dynamics that led to the negotiation of The General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA) and the many challenges and strategies employed to 
translate its provision into a self-sustaining peace, it is important to also answer the 
following questions. Why was the Contact Group successful at settling the conflict? Why 
has establishing a self-sustaining peace being harder than originally expected? Have the 
changes introduced by the Peace Implementation Council and the High Representative’s 
many state-centred strategies move Bosnia closer to a self-sustaining peace? If not, why? 
Can society-centred efforts and other strategies influenced by the communicative 
approach’s tenets translate the negotiated settlement into a self-sustaining peace? At the 
more theoretical level, are strategic and communicative approaches contradictory or can 
they be complementary in the establishment of a self-sustaining peace? This last question 
is answered in part two of this concluding chapter, while the rest of the questions, listed 
in above, will be considered in part one.
I. THE DAYTON PEACE INITIATIVE: A SUCCESSFUL FAILURE?
The Dayton peace initiative can be best described as a successful failure. While 
peacemaking efforts were successful at settling the war, they have equally failed to 
resolve the conflict that impelled the parties to go to war and establish a self-sustaining 
peace. As presented in chapter one and three, the making of a successful peacemaking 
initiative must address various challenges at three different levels of analysis: (1) the 
international, (2) the regional, and (3) the domestic.
The main problem confronted by peacemakers at the international level is that the 
international community is often divided about the best strategy to end a war. 
International actors intervene in intrastate conflicts, when these affect their self-interests. 
Even though these actors might conduct peacemaking activities via the organs of
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international or regional organisations, a peacemaking initiative tends to reflect the 
interests of the United States or other great powers. Without their consent, peacemaking 
initiatives will fail to settle the war, as powerful actors will discredit these initiatives and 
present new ones that reflect their more immediate concerns. It is important to remember 
that the international community’s peacemaking efforts to end the Bosnian war from the 
summer of 1992 to the spring of 1995 were marred by international disagreement on how 
to best settle the conflict. Although the United States initially believed that peacemaking 
efforts should be directed by the United Nations and the European Community/European 
Union, via the organs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), 
its peace initiatives, especially the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the Vance-Stoltenberg 
Peace Plan, were opposed by the Clinton administration, even though many of their 
provisions were included in the GFA. The Clinton administration’s opposition to these 
peace plans questioned the authority of the ICFY, compelling the warring parties to 
continue their war efforts (Gow 1997: 223-53).
While intrastate wars are mostly internal in nature, they are also affected by 
regional dynamics. This is especially true in the case of Bosnia, as the war was a product 
of Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and the Croat-Serb rivalry. Thus, the problem that 
peacemakers face at the regional level is that they failed to recognise the important role 
regional actors can play in a conflict’s settlement. The ICFY’s peace plans included the 
participation of Croatia and Yugoslavia, but the plans did not give them enough 
incentives to force their allies in Bosnia to end the war and accept these peace plans. 
Instead, both Croatia and Yugoslavia kept supporting their respective allies in Bosnia 
until a better peace plan was reached or their side won the war.
At the domestic level, peacemaking initiatives must offer incentives to contending 
parties to put down their weapons and start reconstructing the social, political, and 
economic fabrics of society. Although peacemakers must assist the parties during this 
phase of peacebuilding, it is important to emphasise that peacebuilding activities must 
promote the participation of local actors in these processes. It can not be said enough, 
peace initiatives can only be considered a success if they establish a self-sustaining peace, 
where former enemies work together to construct a new social order, keep implementing 
the negotiated peace agreement, and device non-violent mechanisms to address existing
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conflicts and if necessary to re-negotiate accepted peace agreements. This suggests that 
the international community’s peacebuilding strategy must think of new ways of 
transforming enemy relationships, foster interethnic reconciliation, and create a 
constituency that supports the implementation of peace processes as a means to re­
integrate society.
Seen from this perspective, the Dayton initiative was successful at ending the war 
because the Contact Group recognised the significance of regional dynamics. By offering 
Croatia and Yugoslavia incentives to end the fighting in Bosnia, Milosevic and Tudjman 
decided to coerce the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the GFA, even 
though the agreement’s provisions clearly contradicted these two groups. While the 
inclusion of regional powers was an important factor, the Clinton administration’s effort 
to convince other international actors to accept its peacemaking strategy as their own is 
an outstanding feature of the Dayton peace initiative. America’s partners in the Contact 
Group often questioned this approach’s use of military force to coerce the parties to join 
peacemaking efforts. However, the Clinton administration was able to keep the Contact 
Group unified, at least in the public’s eye.
The failure of the Dayton initiative, as seen in chapters six and seven, is the 
inability of the international community to establish a self-sustaining peace. Rather than 
detaching from Bosnia after the first post-Dayton elections, as originally planned, the 
international community had to intensify its peacebuilding activities. The OHR’s 
mandate was strengthened, while NATO forces were ordered to assist the work of the 
High Representative. Whereas the international community has acknowledged that it 
must reduce the scope of its activities and allow local institutions to take control of peace 
implementation efforts, it has been unable to do so because many international experts 
feel that Bosnia’s state institutions cannot carry out the GFA’s provisions. Accordingly, 
the PIC has created a number of programmes to give more authority for international 
agencies to fully implement the peace agreement by creating and strengthening Bosnia’s 
state institutions and undermine nationalist politicians’ ability to obstruct the peace 
process. Will an internationally backed state-building programme move Bosnia down the 
path of a self-sustaining peace?
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High Representative’s Wolfgang Petritsch’s “ownership” strategy accepted the 
limitations of the state-building programme, but international pressures prevented him 
from creating the proper mechanisms to establish a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. As 
noted in chapter seven, the PIC forced Petritsch to explain his actions, and at times he to 
defend his decisions before the U.N. Security Council. His ownership strategy started to 
become a reality once he assembled the new non-nationalist government, convincing the 
international community that Bosnians were ready to assume more control over their 
affairs. Although new government passed a number of key reforms, nationalists at 
different levels of government were stalling decision-making procedures. More 
importantly, differences between the many non-nationalist parties that formed the new 
government disagreed on many issues. For this reason, Petritsch created the Consultative 
Partnership Forum to minimise these disputes and to keep the legislative process afloat. 
His strategies, however, favoured state-building objectives, because the PIC was not 
willing to consider ways of moving too far from a its state-building programme, though it 
did welcome some of Petritsch’s modifications.
Can this modified state-building programme integrate Bosnia and translate the 
GFA’s provisions into a self-sustaining peace? A recent World Bank report finds that 
Bosnia’s social fabric is very weak and that interethnic distrust is a constant obstruction 
in trying to reconstruct multicultural networks that can make a multiethnic democracy a 
reality (Poggi 2002). Critics of mainstream theories of peacebuilding note that rebuilding 
institutions will not necessarily create reconciliatory processes that will unify divided 
societies and empower people to get together and actively participate in civic 
organisations. It is for this reason that the international community has funded so many 
‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding activities. While chapter eight reviews some of these 
activities, it is important to remember that they are not at the centre of the PIC’s 
peacebuilding strategies. Why is this the case?
The preponderance of the strategic approach in the making of the Dayton 
initiative can explain this failure. As explained in chapter one, the strategic peacemaking 
efforts are aimed at the imposition o f social order as means to keep intact the structures of 
the international system. As a result, strategic forms of peacemaking are led by state 
actors that perceive that a given conflict situation threatens their ability of conducting
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their foreign policies. Because outside actors tend to be stronger than the parties to the 
conflict, they utilise all available resources to impose a peace agreement that reflect their 
needs and interests, while marginalising the needs and interests of those people directly 
affected by the conflict. Consequently, the U.S.-led Contact Group decided not to invite 
‘moderate forces standing for multiethnicity and democracy’ (Udovicki and Stikovac 
1997: 199) because these leaders would not have been able to stop the fighting. Instead, it 
allowed Bosnia’s nationalists parties to represent their communities’ interests and in 
exchange for their co-operation, the Contact Group legitimated their position in post- 
Dayton Bosnia, though the parties did not achieve all of their objectives at Dayton.
Even though the Contact Group’s decision was motivated by its desire to end the 
war as quickly as possible, American and European negotiators thought that the elections 
would produce new leaders that supported the full implementation of the peace 
agreement. Of course, this did not take place. By early 1997, the PIC decided that it was 
necessary to weaken nationalist parties’ base of support by supporting non-nationalist 
parties and trying to strengthen central state institutions to block any attempts that the 
Republika Sprska or parts of Herzegovina would decide to unite with Yugoslavia and 
Croatia. Based on instrumental understandings of ethnic conflict and on state-building’s 
reliance on the integrative forces of ‘functional reason’, the PIC argued that a stronger 
central state could manage the conflict, while economic reforms would provide an 
incentive for leaders to co-operate, weakening ethno-national identities and nationalist 
political parties.
The international community has been partly successful. Today, Bosnia’s central 
state has gained more political and financial authority over the country’s affairs, while the 
OHR has been able to bring the entities’ constitutions in line with Bosnia’s constitution, 
written at Dayton. But, the nationalist parties still play a dominant role. Even though the 
non-nationalist coalition government won the election, the Socialist Democratic Party 
and other smaller parties have not made significant inroads in non-Bosniak communities. 
The Croatian Democratic Union’s struggle to establish a new third entity, Bosnian Croats 
unwillingness to dismantle parallel institutions, and the riots that ensued during the 
ceremonies to rebuild the Fehadija and the Osman Pasha Mosques are clear examples of 
Bosnia’s divisions.
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In hindsight, could the Contact Group been successful in the pre-settlement and 
post-settlement phases have it built its Dayton peace initiative on the tenets of the 
communicative approach? It is doubtful, as the present international context is based on 
Westphalian ideals, which still emphasise the importance of international order, the 
sanctity of the nation-state, and negative peace. Even though neo-liberal ideals and new 
interpretations of security have been playing a more influential role in international 
policy circles, these, as explained in chapter one, are in line with the tenets of the 
strategic approach to peacemaking. Oliver Richmond (2002: 187) shows that 
peacemakers ‘are reluctant to admit their roles and the impact of their actions are not just 
about making peace, but are also about exporting order, possibly unwittingly, via the 
value systems, economic, political, social, cultural models that have shape their own 
development.’ Again, the belief is that social integration can take still place via what 
Habermas’s calls the mechanisms o f ‘functional reason’.
While the communicative approach to peacemaking presents a critique of the 
Dayton peace initiative and strategic forms of peacemaking that confirms Richmond’s 
observations. But, is this the only contribution of the communicative approach? Chapter 
eight reviews of various ‘bottom-up’ or society-centred peacebuilding projects suggest 
that this approach has the potential of transforming enemy relations and building peace 
constituencies that can positively alter how society is organized, supporting mechanisms 
of deliberation. While most of the reviewed projects had positive impacts at the micro­
level, their effect at the macro-sociological level is in question. It is important to 
recognise this limitation, because peacemakers and international bodies working in war- 
torn societies are more concerned with the accomplishment of their interests and meeting 
the requirements of an exit strategy, than the long-term needs of the people that have 
been affected by the conflict (Richmond 2002: 190). For this reason, they modify existing 
post-settlement peacebuilding strategies in ways that can meet these two goals.
Noting both the potential and limitations of society-centred peacebuilding 
activities and the failure of state-centred peacebuilding in post-Dayton Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, are there ways the international community can establish a self-sustaining 
peace or will the Dayton peace initiative be part of the ever-growing list of failed peace 
agreements? Are communicative and strategic forms of peacemaking polar opposites or
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complimentary in the institution of a self-sustaining peace? Answers to these questions 
are provided in the next section.
n . TOWARDS NEW SYNTHESIS
Jurgen Habermas’s research divided society into the lifeworld and the system to show 
how functional reason, the mechanisms of administrative power and economic 
integration, were colonising the lifeworld and organising society according to system 
imperatives. In this way, Habermas showed how Max Weber’s ‘iron cage’ was 
materialising in modern life. Rather than succumbing to these system imperatives, 
Habermas developed a theory of communicative rationality that could empower to break 
with these processes and affect how society is organised. Through trial and error, and 
many years of research, he became convinced that individuals’ active participation in 
civil society could break with these system imperatives by directly influencing the works 
of government and the legislative system. For Habermas the law serves as a fabric that 
connects lifeworld and system, granting the system administrative power and the 
lifeworld communicative power. The former authorizes state institutions to enforce and 
use coercion to implement laws in order to safeguard the basis of social order and protect 
established procedures, while the latter form of power grants individuals the freedom to 
come together with other like-minded individuals to address matters of mutual concern 
and to delimit the power of state institutions.
In short, Habermas’s theory favors civil society networks over the state and 
strongly argues that social integration should be led by communicative power. This is not 
to say that he campaigns for a society free of functional reason, administrative power, 
legitimate use of violence, or state institutions. Habermas’s work is strongly influenced 
by a sense of pragmatism that attempts to preserve social order, but enabling civil society 
networks alter social structures according to the citizenry’s changing norms and values. 
Consequently, Habermas does not advocate for the lifeworld’s colonization of the market 
or the state, but for their co-existence, though the boundaries and the powers of these 
system elements is regulated by mechanisms ingrained in the lifeworld.
Habermas’s application of his theories in the real world is difficult. His research is 
aimed at explaining developments in advanced democratic countries, especially Germany
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and the United States. Many critics have expressed doubts whether his findings can be 
applied to other Western countries and to the non-Western world. While this doctoral 
thesis shares these same concerns, it is important to keep in mind Andrew Parkin’s (1996: 
440) characterisation of Habermas’s as a research programme that ‘aims to contribute to 
the struggles of the disempowered by offering understanding of the processes and 
tendencies that reproduce social relations power.’ In this sense, Habermas’s theories have 
influenced this doctoral thesis at both the theoretical and practical levels.
Like Habermas’s reconstruction of reason, this thesis recosntructs mainstream 
theories of peacemaking to support the existence and the significance of a communicative 
approach that can guide decision-makers’ attempts to establish a self-sustaining peace. In 
line with Habermas’s work, this thesis does not necessarily argue that strategic forms of 
peacemaking are irrelevant and that they should be dismissed at all costs. In an ideal 
world, social relations should only be structured via communicative power, but this is not 
possible in the real world. Administrative power is necessary because it can safeguard the 
basis of order. In this way, a new synthesis is needed, where communicative and strategic 
forms of peacemaking are combined to end conflicts and establish the foundations of a 
self-sustaining peace.
While the communicative approach was presented as a distinct way of explaining 
and addressing conflicts, it needs to be connected to the mainstream strategic 
peacemaking efforts, because many cases show that coercive diplomacy is a fast way of 
stopping the fighting and forcing the parties to negotiate an end to their conflict. Even 
though humanitarian interests may not always influence foreign intervention, a cessation 
of hostilities, for whatever reason, is better than genocide or acts of ethnic cleansing. The 
question is: how to best integrate former combatants and create a society that best 
represents their interests?
A conscious synthesis of both approaches to peacemaking may help the 
international community design and execute new strategies that can stop the fighting, but 
lead to the long-term resolution of the conflict. In the case o f Bosnia, it is too late to think 
of what the international community may have done to include moderate, non-nationalist 
leaders in the negotiations, held at Dayton. Today, a new strategy must replace the PIC’s 
state-building program with a society-building program. Such a strategy does not have to
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ignore elements of the PIC’s state-building programme. But, a society-building program 
should emphasise the importance of promoting reconciliatory mechanisms, building civic 
networks, and allowing civic leaders to have more influence over the central state’s and 
the international community’s decisions. In many ways, it would look like Petritsch’s 
‘ownership’ strategy, but it would dedicate more time and resources to reconciliatory 
mechanisms in order to increase interethnic trust and the creation of new civic bodies that 
represent Bosnia’s diverse interests.
A synthesis of both approaches would also challenge the international 
community’s belief that the GFA is the only vehicle towards self-sustaining peace. The 
PIC and the High Representative have corrected many of the faults ingrained in Bosnia’s 
constitution, which is part of the peace agreement. The international community has 
strengthened the central state at the expense of the entities’ authorities; it has pushed for 
constitutional amendments that protect the rights of Bosnia’s citizens regardless of where 
they live or their background. Why then is it that Bosnia’s citizens cannot re-negotiate the 
peace agreement’s provisions? The PIC fears that Bosnia’s leaders and authorities would 
partition Bosnia. This is a possibility, but the inclusion of non-nationalist leaders may 
provide new ideas that can modify current peacebuilding strategies according to the same 
Western ideals the international community is trying to push on Bosnia.
Combining these two approaches would also require building new bodies that can 
allow civic organizations directly affect the process of peace implementation and even 
scrutinize international agencies’ work. The Civic Forum was a good idea, but it was not 
used to its full potential. Petritsch repeatedly stated that the meetings helped appreciate 
people’s problems and opinions concerning the peace process. But, he rarely acted on 
participants’ recommendations. Petritsch should have followed up on their 
recommendations because it would have sent a clear message to Bosnia’s citizens: their 
participation in civic networks could affect how society operated. The Civic Forum 
should have also brought together these civic leaders and government officials.
Civic leaders and government officials should also be invited to the PIC’s 
meetings. Its decisions directly affect Bosnia, and the PIC should be informed of Bosnian 
views and interests before instructing the High Representative to carry out its strategies. 
In fact, this is a real problem that has been hardly studied in the peacebuilding literature.
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The clash between international and local interests has engendered an environment 
defined by a struggle to enforce or obstruct the process of peace implementation. It is 
important to finds ways of including local actors in decision-making procedures at the 
level of the international community. New mechanisms that increase local actors’ 
influence will encourage a sense of partnership that will enhance peacebuilding efforts. 
This does not mean that local actors should have posses a veto power over international 
treaties, but dialogue can lead to more effective peacebuilding strategies, aligning 
Bosnia’s many interests with those of the international community.
A synthesis of communicative and strategic approaches can lead to an infinite 
number of peacemaking strategies. Nevertheless, what is important to note is that 
strategic approaches tend to demonstrate how conflicts can be successfully settled, while 
communicative approaches show how to integrate a fractured society and how to 
establish a self-sustaining peace. What the synthesis does not explain is how long it takes 
to transform negotiate agreements into a self-sustaining peace. Even though it is difficult 
to estimate how long it would take or how much resources it would take, these 
shortcomings could force the international community to exit war-torn societies 
prematurely, allowing former combatants to continue the fighting. Will this be the fate of 
Bosnia?
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter one posed the following question: has the Dayton peace initiative been a 
success? The review of the making, the implementation, and the subsequent revisions of 
this initiative, in the context of the theoretical debate between strategic and 
communicative approaches to peacemaking, proposes that it has been a successful failure. 
As said earlier in this concluding chapter, even though the initiative settled the war, it has 
not been able to make peace self-sustaining in Bosnia. From a critical-theoretical 
perspective, the problem is not only the policies designed and implemented by the 
international community, but also the theoretical positions that have consciously or 
unconsciously guided decision-makers in the international community to support such 
peacemaking practices.
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The evidence presented in chapter two demonstrates how strategic conceptions of 
peacemaking drove the Bosnian peace process. Even though a self-sustaining peace is 
something the international community desires, so it can decrease the amount of 
assistance it offers Bosnia, decision-makers have failed to understand the reasons why the 
strategic approach will not create the necessary mechanism to achieve this objective. As 
explained in chapter one and illustrated in part two, strategic conceptions of peacemaking 
are adequate if the aims are the settlement of conflicts, the imposition of political order, 
and the stabilisation of social relations. The resolution or transformation of conflicts is 
not part of this agenda. Although the international community has forced Bosnia’s 
citizens to accept the political structures set by the GFA, this will not integrate society, 
because many individuals in Bosnia believe that these are not legitimate. Although the 
international community believed, during the Dayton peace talks that elections would 
provide these structures the necessary legitimacy to fix Bosnia’s many problems and 
integrate its divided society, evidence suggests that this is not the case.
Today, Bosnia is still dependent on foreign aid and on the work of international or 
regional political bodies, which intervene in its political process when Bosnia’s 
politicians fail to create the necessary policies to reform the country’s economy and to 
rehabilitate its social fabric. While Bosnia non-nationalist’s parties have been gaining 
more influence, they do not have the influence their nationalist counterparts have had at 
the local level, where most of the problems between each ethno-national community still 
occur. Of course, the fact that non-nationalist politicians are playing a larger role in the 
country’s decision-making process should be seen as a positive element. However, these 
politicians tend to represent the interests of moderate Bosniaks and lack strong support in 
the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat communities. From these communities’ 
perspectives, the government is being administered by the Bosniaks. This could fuel the 
conflict in the near future.
As the international community considers its next steps in Bosnia, it must take 
into consideration that instituting a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia cannot be 
accomplished solely via the tenets of the strategic approach to peacemaking. A self- 
sustaining peace entails that Bosnia’s citizens engage each other in reconciliatory 
processes. A new culture of peace must flow from these processes, so the foundations of
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civil society can be put into place. Such a culture would support the projects espoused by 
moderate political forces and pressure nationalist political parties to re-consider their 
ideas and policies in favour of new ones, if they are going to keep hold of their seats in 
government. For this reason, the international community should support a new version 
of Petritsch’s ownership approach; one in which society-centred peacebuilding strategies 
are used to integrate Bosnia’s fractured social fabric and to motivate people to join social 
movements that can alter the way society is organized.
But, a reconsideration of current strategies cannot take place until decision­
makers recognise that strategic approaches are not the best means to establish a self- 
sustaining peace in Bosnia. This is why this doctoral thesis ‘problematizes’ peacemaking 
processes by showing the existence of two theoretical approaches, which seem to be 
competing, but are actually complimentary. Normative concerns do raise questions 
regarding the morality of strategic peacemaking efforts; these practices cannot be 
abandoned all together. What is needed is a conversation between these two approaches 
to construct more effective peacemaking strategies and in the case of Bosnia a movement 
from strategic to communicative forms of peacemaking.
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